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The DTI’s Corporate Law and Governance strategy aims to promote and deliver an effective 
framework for corporate governance in the UK, giving confidence to investors, business, and 
other stakeholders to underpin the relationship between an organisation and those who hold 
future financial claims against that organisation.  However, corporate governance involves 
various problems of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts that generate a need for 
public policy responses to mitigate market failures and ensuring that companies moves towards 
‘good’ corporate governance.  Since the early 1990s, the UK has been very active in 
undertaking policy reforms that includes a number of corporate governance codes, expert 
reports, a high level review of company law, and new regulations and legislation.  These policy 
initiatives need to be monitored and evaluated in terms of their success in influencing the key 
drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance.
This Report undertaken for the DTI has several aims: to identify key drivers of good corporate 
governance based on a review of social science literature; to describe the content of UK 
regulatory initiatives with regard to those drivers; and to evaluate gaps in the content and 
implementation of UK policy regarding corporate governance, using those drivers as 
benchmarks.  In addition, some further implications of this study are discussed for future policy 
and research on UK corporate governance.  
The Report identifies key drivers of good corporate governance based on extensive review of 
the broad social science literature.  Good corporate governance is defined here with regard to 
the rights and responsibilities of company stakeholders, and the wealth-creating and wealth-
protecting functions of corporate governance within this context.  Based on this definition, a 
detailed review of the theoretical and empirical social science literature on corporate 
governance was undertaken across seven broad areas:  boards of directors, shareholder 
activism, information disclosure, auditing and internal controls, executive pay, the market for 
corporate control, and stakeholders.  The result was the identification of 18 key ‘drivers’ or 
governance mechanisms, which promote ‘good’ corporate governance.  An internet-based 
survey of international corporate governance experts was conducted in order to confirm and 
further specify these drivers in relation to the UK context.
Next, key gaps in the UK regulatory framework are explored with reference to the drivers of 
good corporate governance.  A comprehensive review was undertaken to evaluate corporate 
governance-related developments in UK regulation since 1990.   Policy initiatives were 
analysed with regard to both their content and effectiveness in promoting each of the identified 
drivers.  Several potential gaps in coverage were identified in the areas of executive pay and 
employees stakeholders.  A number of potential gaps in effectiveness were also identified with 
regard to other key drivers such as boards, shareholder involvement, information disclosure, 
auditing, and the market for corporate control.   The analysis was supported by feedback from a 
Focus Group of expert practitioners that took place at the DTI in January 2006.  
The Report also emphasises that the effectiveness of corporate governance regulation depends 
very much on balancing different governance demands and regulatory trade-offs.  Corporate 
governance is shaped by a number of contingencies, complementarities, and costs.  Various 
organisational contingencies may place different demands on corporate governance drivers, and 
their implementation is also associated with different sorts of costs.  Looking more generally, 
different drivers may act as complements or substitutes for one another.  Better appreciation of 
2such interdependencies is crucial to formulating a coherent regulatory strategy and balancing 
important regulatory trade-offs between the following - mandatory regulation (uniform 
requirements) and more flexible forms of soft-law such as codes based on comply-or-explain 
principles and self-regulatory norms of professional groups.
This analysis suggests a number of areas for future research. Bearing in mind the depth and 
breadth of the UK regulatory initiatives, it is important to verify whether they were followed by 
behavioural changes of the participants in corporate governance mechanisms, including 
unintended consequences such as the development of ‘gaming’ practices.  Further research is 
needed on a potential ‘gatekeeper failure’ in situations where reliance on ‘reputational 
intermediaries’, such as auditors, securities analysts, attorneys, and other professionals, is not 
fully justified.   Other research recommendations are related to wealth creation and performance 
trade-offs.  It is important to go beyond the question of maximizing shareholder returns and 
consider to what extent different corporate governance configurations promote long-term, 
value-creating economic production in a fashion that benefits not only shareholders but also
other groups that make specific investments in corporations.   Finally, a more holistic approach 
to the effectiveness of corporate governance drivers requires further research on such aspects as 
stakeholder involvement, contingencies, complementarities, and cost aspects that may affect the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms.
The authors would like to point out that, since the report was written, there have been various 
developments, not least changes in UK law, which have overtaken some of the details in our 
analysis.  However, the basic review of the evidence basis and the perspectives offered remain 
very much current.
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The scandals at Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat have placed the corporate governance 
systems of modern corporations under close scrutiny. Lapses in the personal and professional 
integrity of accounting firms and their corporate clients have led to some undermining of 
confidence in capital markets and to substantial erosion of trust in institutions of modern 
capitalism. As a result, investors and regulators are forcing companies to improve disclosure 
policies, to rethink their relationships with auditors, and to strengthen corporate boards as part 
of a wide ranging reform of corporate governance. The aim of the corporate governance 
regulatory initiatives in the UK and elsewhere is to promote and deliver an effective 
framework for corporate activity, giving confidence to investors, business and other 
stakeholders. Such a framework encompasses the internal structures of the company that 
result in more effective management, as well as external relationships between a company and 
its stakeholders. 
Corporate governance regulation is designed to ensure an effective framework exists to 
underpin the relationship between an organisation and those who hold future financial claims 
against that organisation. Holders of such claims may include shareholders, commercial 
lenders and other stakeholders all of whom are important from a public policy perspective. 
All of these groups (sometime referred to as principals) rely on the good stewardship of 
executives and managers (often referred to as agents) in the organisation to meet these claims 
when they arise. Therefore, it is important that there is a close alignment between managerial 
objectives and those of principals, and that stakeholders can obtain timely and verifiable 
information (both financial and non financial) regarding the organisation’s past performance 
and future prospects.  Moreover, investors and key stakeholders should be made aware of the 
potential risks facing the organisation and the policies in place to mitigate them. When these 
conditions are met capital markets may operate more effectively, scarce human and financial 
capital may be allocated more efficiently, and company stakeholders are likely to be treated 
more fairly and equitably, as well as more effectively exercise their responsibilities.
Social scientists have produced a wide body of research that addresses various aspects of 
corporate governance and their effects on organisational outcomes in individual countries and 
within an international perspective. This research shows that corporate governance often 
involves a number of market failures, which can result in a less than optimal outcome for both 
principals and agents.  Information is often asymmetric or imperfect. It is impossible to write 
contracts accounting for all potential uncertainties and differing incentives can result in the 
objectives of principles and agents being misaligned. Public policy responses are therefore 
geared towards mitigating these ‘market failures’ and ensuring that moves towards ‘good’ 
governance are made. These responses, however, need to be informed by well grounded 
research. This report addresses these issues by considering general social sciences research on 
the “good” governance principles and how recent policy initiatives correspond to these 
principles. 
71.2 The Role of Public Policy 
In order to improve corporate governance practices and the efficiency of corporate 
governance mechanisms, a number of initiatives have been developed in recent years to 
enhance the transparency and quality of corporate financial and non-financial disclosure, to 
increase levels of shareholder engagement, to improve the effectiveness and accountability of 
boardrooms, and to foster a long-term investment culture. 
In the UK, the major policy developments began in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result 
of a number of corporate scandals such as Polly Peck and Maxwell. The presence of financial 
reporting irregularities led to the establishment of the ‘Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance Committee’ led by Sir Adrian Cadbury. The resulting Cadbury Report, 
published in 1992, developed a set of principles of good corporate governance, which were 
enshrined in a code of best practice which, in turn, was incorporated into the Listing Rules of 
the London Stock Exchange.
Since then a number of reports have built on the work of Cadbury and have updated and 
enhanced the original recommendations. In 1994 the Rutteman Report on Internal Control 
and Financial Reporting was published. The Greenbury Report followed in 1995, 
responding to concerns over directors’ pay.  In January 1996 the Hampel Committee was 
established to review the extent to which the objectives of the Cadbury and Greenbury 
Reports were being achieved. The resulting Hampel Report led to the publication, in 1998, 
of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance, which applied to all listed companies. It 
introduced the principle of ‘comply or explain’. Companies had to produce a narrative 
statement, detailing the extent of their application of the Code, together with an explanation if 
they had not applied its principles.  
Since the publication of the Combined Code, the content and implementation around these 
codes have been reflected upon, supplemented and revised in a nearly continuous process of 
review.  Regarding internal controls, the Turnbull Committee was established in 1998 to 
develop guidance for companies regarding these provisions and published the Turnbull
Guidance, ‘Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code’ in 1999.  The 
Financial Reporting Council undertook a subsequent review of the Turnbull guidance on 
internal control and published revised guidance in October 2005.  Regarding shareholder 
engagement, in 2001 the Myners Review considered the relationship between institutional 
shareholders and companies and a made a number of recommendations concerning 
communication between the two parties and the role of investors as responsible owners.  
Regarding boards and directors, in 2002 the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations
were introduced following further concerns over the increasing levels of directors’ pay.  In 
addition, in 2003, the Tyson Report on the recruitment and development of non-executive 
directors was published.  Finally, in December 2004, the DTI launched Building Better 
Boards. This is a set of guiding principles, building on the Higgs and Tyson reports, designed 
to assist companies in developing more diverse and effective boardrooms.
In 2002, the DTI and HM Treasury launched a review of the Combined Code. The result was 
the Higgs Report on ‘The Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors’, which was 
published in January 2003. Around the same time, the Financial Reporting Council published 
the Smith Report entitled ‘Guidance on Audit Committees’. The recommendations from both 
of these reports led to amendments to the Combined Code of Corporate Governance, which 
was published in July 2003.  Following a review of the implementation of the Combined 
8Code in 2005, the FRC consulted on a small number of changes to the Code that were 
incorporated in an updated version of the Code published in June 2006.
Parallel to this rapid development of codes, in March 1998, the DTI launched a long-term 
fundamental review of core company law. This review, the Company Law Review, was led 
by an independent Steering Group whose aim was to develop a simple, modern, efficient and 
cost effective framework for carrying out business activity in Britain for the twenty-first 
century. The CLR presented its Final Report in July 2001, and a full statement of its proposals 
in the White Paper of 17 March 2005.  The proposed reforms rest on four key objectives:
 Enhancing shareholder engagement and a long-term investment culture;
 Ensuring better regulation and a Think Small First approach;
 Making it easier to set up and run a company; and
 Providing flexibility for the future.
The Bill was introduced in 2005 and at the time of writing is nearing its final stages and about 
to be passed into law.  
There is a clear need to evaluate the effectiveness of these policy initiatives in terms of their 
success in influencing the key drivers of good corporate governance. The results of the 
monitoring and evaluation will also inform the development of future policy. 
1.3 Report Objectives
This Report reflects an effort to summarise various research advances with regard to corporate 
governance within a broader social sciences perspective, and create additional understanding 
around current and future policy options.  The report draws upon a broad and integrated 
perspective of corporate governance issues in order to increase the social science evidence 
base upon which public policy is made.  This evidence base will serve as a benchmark to 
examine whether and how key drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance are addressed within 
recent public policy initiatives, as well as evaluate the extent to which those policies 
successfully support the drivers of good corporate governance.  On this basis, the report 
outlines potential areas where the government may consider whether measures are necessary 
to close gaps in existing regulation, and better understand the strengths and deficiencies in the 
implementation and enforcement of existing regulatory frameworks.  The focus of these 
discussions is largely centred on listed UK companies and does not attempt to address other 
important corporate governance issues specific to non-listed or other types of firms.  
Specifically, the objectives of the Report are to undertake a detailed review of the social 
science literature on corporate governance, to identify key ‘drivers’ or mechanisms that are 
seen as promoting ‘good’ corporate governance, and to map and evaluate UK policy 
initiatives with reference to these drivers.  The main research questions are as follows:
 To what extent can we usefully talk about good corporate governance?
 Does the existing corporate governance literature enable us to determine the key 
determinants or ‘drivers’ of good corporate governance?
 How closely have the public policy initiatives in the UK, introduced since the early 
1990s, corresponded to these determinants of good corporate governance?
9 Are there clear areas where either public policy initiatives, or the manner of their 
implementation, do not adequately support the drivers of good corporate governance?
 Following on this, is it possible to identify broad areas in which new policy initiatives 
should be developed or in which alternative methods of implementing existing 
policies should be considered?
1.4 Research Design and Methodology
1.4.1 Theoretical underpinnings of ‘good’ corporate governance
Understanding the determinants of ‘good’ governance and their implications for regulation in 
the UK requires an analysis which integrates different aspects of corporate governance into a 
broader perspective, in turn firmly rooted in the theory and evidence coming from various 
streams of the social sciences, including economics, finance, law, political science, sociology, 
and management studies.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, no universally accepted consensus exists as to what ‘good’ corporate 
governance means. The economics and finance literature is focused on the problems of 
agency relations between shareholders and managers which result from the separation of 
ownership and control, particularly in large corporations.  Grounded in agency theory, the 
overwhelming emphasis of this research has been on the efficacy of the various mechanisms 
available to protect shareholders from the self-serving behaviour of executives (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). The stakeholder literature is often set up in terms of differing perspectives.  A 
broad contrast is made between shareholder and stakeholder orientations: the former is said to 
see the firm in terms of relations between shareholder principals and managerial agents and 
the maximisation of shareholder value; the latter sees the enterprise in terms of broader 
relations between all stakeholders with an interest in the firm and a broader set of goals to be 
maximised or satisfied (Freeman 1984; Donaldson 1989; Donaldson and Preston 1995).  
Attempting to reconcile the two, Some writers talk about ‘enlightened shareholder value’ or 
‘instrumental stakeholder theory’ or ‘strategic corporate social responsibility’ or ‘the good 
firm’ (Parkinson 1995; Jones 1995; Kay and Silberston 1995).  
While this debate between shareholder and stakeholder perspectives cannot be resolved here, 
both perspectives share some common prescription in promoting basic accountability of 
executive directors for how they use company assets – in short, the corporate governance 
problem relates to how to assure that managers remain both honest and dynamic over time 
(Dore 2005).  Consequently, a broad and less normative definition of corporate governance 
would include “structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties with a stake in the 
firm” (Aoki 2001a).  Any notion of ‘good’ corporate governance certainly implies 
mechanisms to ensure executives respect the rights and interests of company stakeholders, as 
well as ensuring that stakeholders act responsibly with regard to the wealth invested in and 
generated by the enterprise.  This definition may also imply significant public interest 
elements regarding corporate governance that legitimate, but also regulate, the purposes for 
which managerial power over the corporation may be legitimately exercised (Parkinson 
1993).  
In this Report, the analysis of ‘good’ corporate governance is undertaken within a broad 
social sciences perspective. Within this perspective, the notion of ‘good’ corporate 
governance is seen as involving both the minimisation of downside risks to shareholders or 
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other stakeholders, as well as enabling management to engage in entrepreneurial activities 
which may benefit those shareholders or stakeholders through the upside potential of firms’ 
wealth creation (Keasey et al. 1997). This distinction has been referred to as the wealth-
creating and wealth-protecting sides of corporate governance (Page 2005; Filatotchev and 
Wright 2005). Therefore, our research attempts to extend our understanding of ‘good’ 
corporate governance issues beyond the narrow confines of an economics and finance 
perspective, and embraces issues of corporate strategy, knowledge, and innovation.  
1.4.2 Identifying issues from a social science perspective
This Report approaches corporate governance in terms of understanding its multiple 
dimensions, including the economic, strategic, social, and legal factors associated with 
different mechanisms of corporate governance.  While corporate governance operates at the 
firm-level, its effectiveness also has social prerequisites.  The Report therefore draws upon a 
broad interdisciplinary social science literature in order to identify potential determinants or 
drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance that are relevant in the UK setting.  This perspective 
also suggests examining the effectiveness of corporate governance drivers in a holistic fashion 
that takes account of the costs of corporate governance, the various organizational 
contingencies in applying corporate governance in different environments, and the 
complementarities or substitution among different corporate governance drivers.  Finally, 
gaps in public policy may be identified by comparing regulatory initiatives with these key 
drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance.  Where these drivers are addressed by regulation, the 
Report evaluates to what extent those initiatives are effective in the light of regulatory trade-
offs and the need to balance different corporate governance demands. In sum, the Report 
focuses on a number of key issues informed by a broad social science perspective.
Concerning potential determinants of ‘good’ corporate governance:
 Understanding of the economic and strategic effects of corporate boards. This includes 
analysis of monitoring, resource, and strategy roles of independent directors and board 
committees. From the knowledge-based view of the firm, the cognitive capabilities of 
boards for the accumulation and processing of relevant information are critically 
important, especially for the growing number of firms from knowledge-intensive 
sectors. 
 Understanding key factors underpinning shareholder activism. With the increasing 
concentration of ownership among institutional investors, shareholders are becoming 
more pro-active in terms of their influence upon the strategic decisions that drive the 
firm’s dynamics. However, the current system of voting shares and policies of fund 
managers suggest continued deficits in terms of fulfilling fiduciary responsibilities and 
effectively communicating their views to management by recording their policy 
position. Research also suggests important differences in the role and interests of large 
block holders and smaller, portfolio-oriented investors.  Ownership concentration may 
be a potential substitute for other governance mechanisms, but, in turn, it raises separate 
issues of minority shareholder rights, as well as transitions from and to concentrated 
ownership structures.
 Analysis of the optimal extent of information disclosure. Substantial information 
asymmetries exist between managers and shareholders, executive and non-executive 
board members, and managers and employees.  Bearing this in mind, an efficient 
system of reporting and disclosure forms a cornerstone of ‘good’ governance. However, 
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disclosing too much of proprietary information may harm the firm’s competitive 
advantage and reporting also involves substantial fixed costs. Comprehensive research 
on effective and efficient disclosure practices is a central task from the policy-making 
perspective.
 Discussion of the relationships between the firm and external governance 
constituencies, such as the firm’s auditors and advisors. An independent auditor that 
scrutinises financial and strategic information and documents developed by the 
executive team represents a powerful driver of good corporate governance. A longer-
term involvement in non-audit transactions may provide the auditor with in-depth 
knowledge and information about the firm that may enhance their monitoring 
capacities. An in-depth analysis of monitoring and strategic roles of the auditor may 
provide a valuable input into the policy process. 
 Understanding of links between general corporate governance factors and the 
organisation’s control systems, such as financial controls, risk management, etc. 
Research shows that ‘good’ governance is not solely based on board routines and 
auditor’s vigilance. These governance factors need to be integrated with internal 
organisational rules and procedures, and this “seamless” integration requires an 
appropriate model of functional links and information flows.
 Analysis of executive compensation as an incentive mechanism that aligns interests of 
managers and shareholders. Performance-related pay should complement monitoring 
functions of corporate governance, in particular in complex, diversified organisations 
where information asymmetries and potential for shareholder abuse are at their highest 
levels. However, executive equity-based compensation schemes can also lead to short-
termism and an increase in managerial opportunism. When internal control systems fail 
to prevent cases of “reward-for-failure”, a regulatory approach may need to be 
informed by evidence from ‘good’ governance research.
 Understanding of the market for corporate control.  Takeovers constitute an important 
mechanism for replacing inefficient management or executing important business 
restructuring.  However, markets for corporate control may also lead to opportunistic 
behaviour and “breach of trust” through asset stripping and the elimination of healthy 
competitors.  The resource-based view of firm capabilities suggests the importance to 
balance regulatory “level playing fields” with protection of firm-specific assets. 
 Analysis of how ‘good’ corporate governance drivers operate within a broader 
stakeholder framework.  Participation of stakeholders such as employees should 
complement internal monitoring and control functions in promoting greater managerial 
accountability, as well as enhance the effective implementation of decisions.  Both 
international and UK evidence suggests that stakeholder participation is particularly 
salient in promoting organisational effectiveness in the context of firm-specific 
knowledge and information sharing.
Concerning the effectiveness of ‘good’ corporate governance drivers:
 Understand potential costs of corporate governance and their organisational effects. 
Corporate governance regulation may lead to an increase in direct and indirect costs 
of compliance with ‘good’ governance principles, including the out-of-pocket 
compliance costs that are reflected in the firm’s balance sheet and other accounting 
documentation (e.g., the audit costs, directors’ insurance, etc.) and less explicit 
opportunity and strategic costs (e.g., directors’ time spent on governance issues, costs 
of strategic disclosure, etc.). 
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 Understanding contingency factors that affect benefits and costs of ‘good’ corporate 
governance drivers. Agency problems and associated corporate governance remedies 
may have different characteristics in young and mature companies, in fast growing as 
opposed to declining organisations, in regulated and competitive industries, etc. 
‘good’ corporate governance is an essentially dynamic phenomenon, and it is 
essential to understand the life cycle of corporate governance when making decisions 
on the implementation aspects of governance regulation.
 Identifying possible complementarities/substitution between different corporate 
governance ‘drivers’. Since ‘good’ corporate governance comes at a cost, 
organisations should be able to create an optimal “bundle” of governance drivers that 
should match organisational resources and its strategic objectives.
Concerning the role of public policy in promoting ‘good’ corporate governance drivers:
 Understanding regulatory trade-offs.  Public policy faces choices between mandatory 
regulation (e.g. uniform requirements), enabling regulation (e.g. removing past 
restrictions, allowing choice of structures), or more flexible forms of soft-law such as 
codes based on comply-or-explain principles, self-regulatory norms of professional 
groups and voluntarism. Mandatory regulation can help to overcome market failures 
and weak diffusion of governance practices, but may be inflexible in addressing the 
governance needs of different types of firms. Meanwhile, soft-law approaches may be 
less effective in terms of enforcement. 
 Balancing different governance demands.  Given the affinities between corporate 
governance, firm’s lifecycles (e.g. start-up promotion, mature firms, and restructuring 
or wind-up) and important stakeholders, analysis is needed of how these different 
governance needs can be implemented within the UK regulatory framework. 
 Tensions between national and international regulation.  UK companies and 
government policy are increasingly affected by regulatory developments outside the 
UK, such as Sarbanes-Oxley, international accounting standards, or EU directives.  
While the formulation of common international standards may be important in some 
regulatory areas, such initiatives need to be integrated into existing national 
regulatory frameworks in ways that complement existing approaches and incentives.  
Public policy analysis must therefore not only identify gaps in the UK law, but also 
understand the extent of overlap with or differences in the approaches taken by 
various international initiatives.  
1.4.3 Research Methodology
The research involved three stages: 1) literature review and the determinants of good 
corporate governance concepts; 2) analysis of UK public policy measures related to corporate 
governance; and 3) identification of potential gaps in the content or effective implementation 
of these policy measures.  
The main objectives of the literature review stage were as follows: 1) to review corporate 
governance literature drawing on a broad range of social sciences; 2) to understand to what 
extent a ‘good’ corporate governance framework suggested by the literature can be usefully 
deployed in the UK context; and 3) to identify the main drivers of ‘good’ corporate 
governance in the UK context and to consider how these can be translated into policy 
evaluation benchmarks. The review was based on an extensive research of relevant social 
science literature, including academic journals, books, and web-based sources. On the basis of 
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this review, it was possible to identify drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance and to develop 
a number of policy evaluation benchmarks. To verify the appropriateness of these 
benchmarks, the researchers conducted a web-based survey of leading experts in the corporate 
governance field. This methodology provided a cost-effective and timely access to a pool of 
expertise both in the UK and abroad. A special website was created and a web link to a 
structured questionnaire was sent by e-mail to a network of experts. This allowed the 
researchers to bring an element of objectivity into the process of identifying corporate 
governance drivers and associated policy evaluation benchmarks. 
The objectives of the public policy analysis was to identify the main components of corporate 
governance regulation in the UK, with a particular emphasis on the regulatory initiatives that 
underpinned the amended Combined Code and changes in Company Law with regard to 
information disclosure and boardroom reforms.  The researchers undertook a review of the 
regulatory initiatives starting from the publication of Cadbury Report in 1992, using diverse 
sources such as government publications, the DTI website, etc. In addition, a number of EU 
regulations and the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards may also have 
a profound impact on the governance regulation in the UK, and the researchers included 
relevant EU initiatives into their survey of corporate governance regulation.   This stage of the 
analysis focused on how those policy initiatives relate to the determinants of ‘good’ corporate 
governance as identified in the earlier stages of the research.
The overarching objective of the final policy evaluation stage was to assess whether corporate 
governance regulation in the UK fully reflects the determinants of ‘good’ corporate 
governance suggested by the social science literature.  The researchers identified current gaps 
in the regulation with regard to corporate governance benchmarks, as well as problems with 
implementation. This stage suggested strategic guidelines for future policy developments as 
well as outlining possible adjustments to the implementation methods.
The evaluation methodology included a Focus Group that involved representatives of 
business, the accounting profession, investor communities, and stakeholder groups. The 
objectives of the discussions were to help the researchers in the following respects: (1) to 
develop an in-depth understanding of organisational issues related to corporate governance 
regulatory processes; (2) to obtain feedback on the research framework and benchmarking 
methods that would allow them to refine research outcomes; and (3) to define more precisely 
the structure of gap analysis and metrics that were used in the evaluation.
The next step of the evaluation was the development of a gap analysis of regulatory initiatives 
versus ‘good’ corporate governance benchmarks. This analysis provided a mapping of policy 
initiatives against the identified drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance and an evaluation of 
these initiatives along two dimensions:
 Content Gaps: Are there ‘good’ governance drivers that are not adequately covered by 
the governance regulation?
 Efficiency Gaps: To what extent do outcomes of the regulatory initiatives meet their 
objectives?
This analysis of regulatory gaps was closely related to the issues around choices of regulation 
implementation methods. Even when regulatory initiatives reflect ‘good’ governance drivers, 
specific implementation problems may reduce anticipated outcomes. In this regard, the 
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researchers focused on efficiency and context aspects of the implementation, with a particular 
emphasis on the following questions:
 Does a specific policy initiative take into account direct and indirect costs of 
compliance with ‘good’ governance principles, including the out-of-pocket 
compliance costs that are reflected in the firm’s balance sheet and other accounting 
documentation (e.g., audit costs, directors’ insurance, etc.) and less explicit 
opportunity and strategic costs?
 Does the scope of regulation accommodate various firm- and industry-level 
contingency factors, such as differences in organisational size and age, resource base, 
stages in the firm’s life cycle (e.g., fast growth versus maturity and decline), etc?
 To what extent the regulation encourages stakeholders’ involvement that should 
complement internal monitoring and control functions in promoting greater 
managerial accountability, as well as enhance the effective implementation of 
decisions?  
The gap and implementation analyses helped to identify areas where additional policy 
developments may be needed or the methods of implementation may need to be changed.
This Report forms a fact base, which can be use to direct future corporate governance reform.  
It helps to identify and measure regulatory gaps, in terms of the aims, coverage, and 
implementation of corporate governance regulation.  In particular, the report helps to 
understand the interrelationships between different elements of corporate governance and 
their regulation and hopefully offer a useful evaluation of UK corporate governance.  The 
project also helps to identify a series of priority actions required to execute effective and 
efficient corporate governance regulation strategies. 
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2 Review of the Social Science Literature on Corporate 
Governance
2.1 Introduction
This section presents a detailed review of the social science literature on corporate governance.  
By way of introduction, a preliminary indication of the scope of our review is needed.  
Seven key areas or ‘families’ of issues were identified for this review:  board of directors, 
shareholder activism, information and disclosure, auditing and internal controls, executive pay, 
the market for corporate control, and stakeholder involvement.  The review covers a broad base 
of social science literature drawing heavily on the fields of financial economics, strategy, 
management, and sociology, as well as law and political science.  Our emphasis here is on the 
review of empirical research results, rather than conceptual and theoretical debates (although 
these are discussed briefly where appropriate).  Furthermore, the review focuses on corporate 
governance at the level of the company and its direct relationship with key stakeholders.  As 
such, it does not attempt to review the impact of different regulatory regimes and policies in the 
UK or otherwise.  
The review of empirical literature draws heavily on UK studies, where possible.  The review 
also inevitably draws on the large body of empirical research on U.S. corporate governance, but 
also provides brief comparisons with other European or other countries where these provide 
useful alternative benchmarks for ‘best practices’.  Where possible, we also present the result of 
‘meta-analysis’ that undertakes a secondary analysis of statistical data from a large number of 
studies in order to examine the robustness of research findings across different samples and 
contexts.  
2.2 The Board of Directors
2.2.1 Introduction
Corporate governance research that examines the impact of board composition on critical 
decisions has predominantly adopted an agency theory rationale. Three fundamental 
behavioural assumptions about agents and principals underlie agency theory: Both agents and 
principals are assumed to be (a) rational and (b) self-interested, whereas the agent is assumed to 
be (c) more risk-averse than the principal (Jensen and Meckling 1976). It is therefore argued 
that in situations in which there is a conflict of interest between the agents and principals, the 
former are likely to select self-serving actions at the expense of the latter’s welfare (Fama 1980; 
Fama and Jensen 1983). This stream of research identifies situations in which shareholders’ and 
managers’ goals are likely to diverge and examines mechanisms that can mitigate managers’ 
self-serving behaviour (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Board monitoring has been centrally important in corporate governance research, with boards of 
directors described as “the apex of the internal control system” (Jensen 1993: 862). Boards 
represent an organisation’s owners and are responsible for ensuring that the organisation is 
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managed effectively. Thus, the board is responsible for adopting control mechanisms to ensure 
that management’s behaviour and actions are consistent with the interests of the owners. 
Important control mechanisms are the selection, evaluation and if necessary removal of a poorly 
performing CEO and top management, the determination of managerial incentives and the 
monitoring and assessment of organisational performance (Johnson et al. 1993; Mizruchi 1983; 
Zahra and Pearce 1989). The main driver of these control mechanisms is the board’s obligation 
to ensure that management operates in the interests of the company’s shareholders – an 
obligation that is met by scrutiny, evaluation, and regulations of top management’s actions by 
the board (Hillman and Dalziel 2003).  
A review of corporate governance literature reveals that a conflict of goals between a firm’s 
CEO and its shareholders typically revolves around three main underlying issues: CEO com-
pensation, risk to the firm, and corporate control. CEOs have been criticized for benefiting 
themselves by receiving excessive compensation, which is often unrelated to the performance of 
the firm (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Furthermore, because risk averse CEOs, unlike 
shareholders, are unable to diversify their firms’ non-systematic risk, they have been criticized 
for adopting risk-reduction strategies that are not optimal to shareholders (Amihud and Lev 
1981). Finally, managers who isolate themselves from the disciplinary force of the market for 
corporate control and resist being replaced have embodied perhaps the costliest manifestation of 
self-serving behaviour (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Given that a 
board’s governing role is oversight, it follows that board effectiveness will be manifested in the 
mitigation of self-serving behaviour by managers and improvement in performance.
Management research has suggested that boards can extend their involvement beyond 
monitoring and controlling top management to the provision of ongoing advice and counsel to 
executive directors on strategic issues (Johnson et al. 1996; Westphal 1999; Zahra and Pearce 
1989). Advice and counsel from non-executive directors can broaden the range of strategic 
options considered by management and help management to identify new strategic 
opportunities (Judge and Zeithaml 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Strategy researchers 
indicate that a board of directors may also play an important role in establishing relationships 
between the organisation and its external environment. Resource dependence theory proposes 
that organisations are dependent upon resources in the environment for their survival and 
views directors as instruments, which organisations can use to deal with external 
dependencies (Dalton et al. 1999; Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Directors, in this view, help to secure valuable information and resources and provide access 
to key constituents (Hillman et al. 2000). Again, these roles of boards in regarding to service, 
strategy and resources should lead to an improvement in the firm’s competitiveness and 
performance.  Moreover, despite the focus on shareholder interests and the board, outside of the 
U.S. or UK, it should be noted that board composition often involves a wider spectrum of 
stakeholders and, more specifically, includes employee representatives in Scandinavian 
countries, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands (Jackson 2005a).  Here board behaviour may 
substantially depart from the agency theory perspective to consider the governance of a wider 
range of managerial objectives.
The review of existing research on the governance roles of the board in the broader social 
sciences field has focused on three main themes: the effects of board composition and structural 
parameters on business strategy and performance; relationships between board characteristics, 
such as diversity, external ties, etc. on the firm’s competitiveness and performance; and links 
between board processes and organisational outcomes.
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2.2.2 Board composition and performance
2.2.2.1 Board independence
An important stream of research in the financial economics and management fields is focused 
on organisational outcomes of board composition and structural characteristics. The extent of 
board independence is often considered as an important driver of ‘good’ corporate governance. 
This focus on board independence is grounded in agency theory, which addresses inefficiencies 
that arise from the separation of ownership and control (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976). From the agency theory perspective, boards of directors (and 
particularly independent or outside members) are put in place to monitor managers on behalf of 
shareholders (Lynall et al. 2003). The board of directors has the formal authority to ratify 
management initiatives, to evaluate managerial performance and to allocate rewards and 
penalties to management on the basis of criteria that reflect shareholders’ interests. Consistent 
with agency theory, a board comprised of independent directors (e.g., board members who are 
not dependent on the current CEO or organisation) is more likely to provide an effective 
oversight of the firm’s CEO and other executive directors. Independent directors are generally 
believed to be more effective in protecting shareholders’ interests, resulting in higher firm 
performance (Baysinger and Butler 1985; Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990). In some countries, 
the distinction between supervisory and managerial roles within the board is formally codified 
into a two-tier board structure (Donnelly et al. 2000).  Similarly, legal scholars emphasize the 
fiduciary responsibilities of directors to ensure that managers are acting in the interests of 
shareholders (Bhagat and Black 1999; Mace 1971).  
An extensive literature has examined the relationship between the composition of the board of 
directors and different proxies for corporate performance. Four main approaches to measuring 
board composition have been identified: inside, outside, affiliated, interdependent/independent 
directors (Anderseen and Reeb 2004; Daily et al. 1997; Daily et al. 2003; Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1991; 2003; Lynall et al. 2003).  Most of the studies on board composition effects 
classify directors either as insiders (current and retired firm employees and their family 
members) and outsiders (non-employees). Outside directors are often further divided into those 
with existing or potential business ties to the firm (affiliated directors) and those members for 
whom directorships are their only tie to the firm (independent directors). Daily et al. (2003) 
makes further differentiation within the independent director group by considering the timing of 
outside director’s appointment to the board. Directors appointed during the tenure of current 
CEOs (“interdependent directors”) may feel beholden to them and may be less likely to 
challenge them. The remaining group (“independent directors”) may be best able to fulfil the 
control role since they are not encumbered by personal and/or professional relationships with 
firm management.  A number of authors point out that independent directors on a firm’s board 
are very often executive directors in other companies. There is evidence that better managers 
are preferred as independent directors because they will be better monitors of managerial 
discretion (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Mace 1971; Kaplan and Reishus 1990; 
O’Sullivan 2000). 
A substantial number of empirical studies try to verify whether independent directors perform 
their governance functions effectively by linking board structure with performance. Baysinger 
and Butler (1985) found that firms with more outside board members realised higher return on 
equity. Rosenstain and Wyatt (1990) examine a stock price reaction on the day of the 
announcement that outside director will be added to the board. They find that there is a 
statistically significant 0.2 percent increase in stock prices in response to the announcement of 
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these appointments. In their analysis of family controlled firms in the USA, Anderson and Reeb 
(2004) provide evidence that when the divergence of interests between family- and outside-
shareholder interests becomes large and costly, independent directors can intervene to protect 
the interests of all shareholders. Using a sample of the Standard & Poor’s 500 firms they show 
that the proportion of independent directors on a family-controlled firm’s board is positively 
associated with performance measured by Tobin’s Q, whereas the affiliated directors provide a 
negative impact on performance. Several other researchers have also noted a positive 
relationship between outside directors’ representation and firm performance (Barnhart and 
Rosenstein 1998; Chaganti et al. 1985; Pearce and Zahra 1991).
However, a number of studies find negative relationship between board independence and firm 
performance (Baysinger et al. 1991; Davis et al. 1997; Kesner 1987). Some researchers have 
suggested that the amount and quality of inside directors’ information may create benefits 
associated with the inside directors’ majority and may lead to more effective evaluation of top 
managers (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990, Hill and Snell 1988, Hoskisson et al. 1994). Finally, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998; 2003) suggest that board composition is an endogenous 
outcome of the firm’s operating and strategic decisions and past performance. Hence, there 
should not be any causal effect of board composition on performance.
Some authors tried to verify the relationship between board independence and performance 
using meta-analytical methodology (Dalton et al. 1998; Dalton et al. 1999; Rhoades et al. 2000). 
Meta-analysis is a statistical research synthesis technique that allows for the aggregation of 
results across separate studies to obtain an estimate of the relationship between two variables in 
the population (Hunter and Schmidt 1990).  Therefore, these methods can contribute to a 
broader and more robust understanding of governance effects that is less dependent on the 
specific data and methods used in individual studies. Dalton et al. (1998), for example, used 54 
empirical studies of board composition and financial performance, and did not identify any 
significant effects of board composition on performance. This conclusion holds across the many 
ways in which financial performance has been measured in the literature. The results of other 
meta-analyses (e.g., Dalton et al. 1999; Rhoades et al. 2000) are inconclusive.
2.2.2.2 Separate CEO and Chairman
A number of papers analyse another important proxy for the board power: CEO duality 
(whether the CEO concurrently serves as board chairperson). Many researchers believe that the 
dual board leadership structure seriously compromises the independence of the board. The 
tenets of agency theory would suggest that such centralised leadership authority will lead to 
management domination of the board and result in poor performance (Fama 1980; Fama and 
Jensen 1983; Lorsh and MacIver1989; Molz 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). While there is a 
relatively small body of empirical research examining board leadership structure, neither the 
joint nor separate board leadership structures has been strongly supported as enhancing firm 
financial performance (Daily and Dalton 1992; 1994; Beatty and Zajac 1994 Boyd 1994; 
Ocasio 1994). In their meta-analysis of 31 studies of links between board leadership and 
financial performance, Dalton et al. (1998) do not establish any significant causal relationships. 
Again, their data provide no evidence that the board leadership structure – firm performance 
relationship is moderated by the nature of the performance indices.
2.2.2.3 Board committees
A relatively small number of academic papers analyse how independent directors can impose 
structural constraints on managers by limiting their participation in important board 
subcommittees, such as the audit committee, nominating committee and compensation 
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committee (Anderson and Reeb 2004; Golden and Zajac 2001; Lorsh and MacIver 1989; 
Wesphal and Zajac 1995).  Daily (1995), Kesner (1987) and Dalton et al. (1998) explain that 
many of the critical processes and decisions of boards of directors do not derive from the board-
at-large, but rather in its subcommittees. Daily (1995) finds that greater proportions of affiliated 
directors on the audit committee have impact on the structure and length of bankruptcy 
procedures. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1997) report that CEO compensation was related to the 
composition of the compensation committee. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) examine the 
extent to which the CEO is involved in the board selection process. They find that the CEO’s 
involvement in nomination committee decreases the firm’s subsequent number of independent 
directors. Aguilera (2005) suggests that staggered (or classified) boards that make only a 
fraction of board members eligible for re-election each year reduce accountability of board 
members to shareholders. However, no empirical research that addresses the relationship 
between subcommittee composition and its impact on firm financial performance has been 
identified as conclusive (Dalton et al. 1998).
2.2.3 Board composition and strategic decisions
Another stream of research suggests that, rather than examining a board’s monitoring 
effectiveness by using the firm’s financial performance as a proxy, a more accurate evaluation 
can be gained by examining discrete decisions that involve a potential conflict of interest 
between management and shareholders (e.g., Deutsch 2005; Mallette and Fowler 1992; 
Sundaramurthy 1996). Such decisions will be referred to as “critical decisions.” The rationale 
behind this line of inquiry is that whereas board monitoring has a direct effect on firms’ critical 
decisions, it has only an indirect effect on firm performance. Moreover, a company’s financial 
performance is influenced by a multitude of endogenous and exogenous factors beyond the 
composition of its board (Kosnik 1987; Bhagat and Black 1999). 
2.2.3.1  CEO turnover
A central task of effectively functioning boards is the removal of poorly performing executives. 
Boards with greater structural independence may be more able to remove ineffective executives 
prior to a crisis reaching the point of corporate bankruptcy. This action may prove critical in 
reversing a financial decline, since deficiencies within the top management team may be related 
to firm failure. A substantial number of studies are focused on board structure effects on the 
probability of the CEO turnover (Alexander et al. 1993; Boeker 1992; Daily 1995; Diacon and 
O’Sullivan 1995); Fizel and Louie 1990; Judge and Dobbins 1995 Mangel and Singh 1993; 
Sanders and Carpenter; 1998; Weisbach 1988; Young et al. 2000).  In his meta-analysis of 
board independence effects on strategic decisions, Deutsh (2005) uses 16 different studies to 
support the assumption that more independent boards are associated with a higher probability of 
the CEO turnover.
2.2.3.2 Executive compensation
Another stream of research links board structure with executive compensation. Although it is 
often argued that a high level of total compensation enables firms to attract and retain high-
quality CEOs, the elevated levels of remuneration awarded to CEOs of publicly traded 
corporations is often criticized (Deutsh 2005) suggesting that a number of firms systematically 
overpay their executives and that these firms could have secured the service of the same CEO at 
substantially lower costs to shareholders. Because CEOs prefer the highest compensation level 
possible, vigilant board monitoring is expected to result in lower levels of CEO compensation. 
A number of authors analyse the effects of board independence on the level of CEOs 
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compensation (Boyd 1994; Conyon and Peck; 1998; Fizel and Louie 1990; Mangel and Singh 
1993; Sanders and Carpenter; 1998). However, no systematic relationship was found between 
the two variables.
2.2.3.3 Independent directors and strategic restructuring
Prior strategy research has indicated that independent directors are involved in strategic change, 
restructuring, and corporate entrepreneurship (Johnson et al. 1993; Pearce and Zahra 1992; 
Hoskisson et al. 2002; Tihanyi et al. 2003). Gibbs (1993) in a study of strategic restructuring in 
large U.S. firms provides evidence that board independence is positively associated with re-
focusing strategies and an increase in financial leverage that reduces the firm’s free cash flow. 
Goodstain and Boeker (1991) in their study of 327 hospitals in the USA provide evidence that 
independent boards are positively associated with strategic restructuring measured in terms of 
changes in the breadth of products and services an organisation offers. 
However, more recent studies suggest that board structure may have a selective effect on 
different types of strategies. For example, a number of studies associate board independence 
with diversification and M&A strategies (Baysinger et al. 1991; Beekun et al. 1998; Hill and 
Snell 1988; Hoskisson at al. 1994; Johnson at al. 1993; Judge and Zeithaml 1992; Pearce and 
Zahra; 1992; Sanders and Carpenter 1998; Hoskisson et al. 2002; Tihanyi et al. 2003; Zajac and 
Westphal 1994). Studies of R&D expenditure suggest that innovation intensity, on the other 
hand, is positively associated with insider-dominated boards (Barnhart and Rosenstein 1998;  
Baysinger et al. 1991).  Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) suggest that the superiority and quality 
of inside directors’ information combined with their specific risk preferences may explain these 
differential effects of board structure on various types of business strategies.  
2.2.3.4 Anti-takeover defences
Both financial economists and strategy researchers investigate the effects of board 
independence on the adoption of the anti-takeover defences. Takeover defences are adopted to 
deter hostile takeovers. Indeed, Pound (1987) found that takeover defences decrease the 
likelihood of takeover attempts by 26 percent. Whereas CEOs favour takeover defences because 
they protect their positions and provide greater freedom from the disciplining influence of the 
market for corporate control, it has been argued that takeover defences have negative effects on 
shareholders’ wealth (Mallette and Fowler 1992). For example, research indicates that poison 
pills, a common takeover defence, have a significant negative effect on a firm’s stock price. 
Furthermore, stock prices typically decline following court decisions that validate poison pills 
and rise after court decisions that invalidate them. This negative wealth effect may stem from 
the fact that firms that adopt a poison pill are less likely to be targets of acquisition. Shivdasani 
(1993) suggest that board independence affects takeover probabilities by influencing both the 
quality of the company’s management and the process of takeover. However, other empirical 
studies by Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994), Coles and Hesterly (2000) and Mallette and Fowler 
(1992) provide ambiguous results.
2.2.4 Board characteristics, business strategy and performance
Although agency theorists emphasize the core board’s function as a monitoring and control 
mechanism, there is growing recognition in management research and an upper echelon 
perspective (e.g., Carpenter and Westphal 2001; Daily and Dalton 1992; Geletkanycz and 
Hambrick 1997) that board directors also constitute a critical organisational resource.  Rooted in 
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behavioural and socio-economic research, stewardship theory holds a less self-centred view of 
managerial behaviour than do agency theorists. The stewardship framework suggests that 
whereas managers are expected to adopt self-serving behaviour as a response to highly 
threatening situations, they tend to serve the good of the organisation in situations where only 
relatively minor conflicts of interests exist (Anderson and Reeb 2002; Davis et al. 1997; 
Deutsch 2005). Acting as stewards, executive directors may collaborate with independent board 
members who provide industry specific expertise, objective advice and act as advocates for 
corporate health and viability.
More recent resource-dependence, behavioural and socio-cognitive views on corporate boards
have extended agency research by suggesting that pro-active behaviour by non-executive 
directors depends not only on the extent of board independence, but also on the strategic 
perspective and base of experience they bring to the organisation (Carpenter 2002; Carpenter 
and Westphal 2001; Carpenter et al. 2003; Beatty and Zajac 1994; Westphal and Zajac 1995; 
Westphal 1999; Golden and Zajac 2001).  The resource-dependency view emphasizes that, in 
addition to control functions, the board may also play service and strategic roles in the decision-
making process (Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Provan 1980), especially at those 
points in the life cycle of the firm that involve strategic transition (McNulty and Pettigrew 
1999).  Pye (2001) suggests that in order to ‘add value’ to the board, non-executive directors are 
expected to bring a background of executive experience of running other firms. Previous studies 
identify four types of resources that are provided by boards: (1) advice and counsel; (2) 
legitimacy; (3) channels for communicating information between the firm and external 
organisations, and (4) assistance in obtaining resources or commitments from important 
stakeholders outside the firm (Hillman et al. 2000; Lynall et al. 2003). 
Therefore, according to socio-cognitive and resource perspectives, outside board members’ 
experience may not only improve their monitoring efficiency, but also substitute for a relative 
lack of executives’ business experience/contacts (Carpenter et al. 2003; Beatty and Zajac 1994; 
Shivdasani and Yemack 1999). Within this research, structural board characteristics are not so 
important compared to factors associated with board’s ‘human’ and ‘social’ capital, such as 
board size, demography characteristics and business links outside the focal firm (Carpenter and 
Westphal 2001). These characteristics underpin service, strategy and resource roles of boards 
and should lead to an improvement in the firm’s competitiveness and performance. 
2.2.4.1 Board size
Resource dependence theory has been the primary foundation for the perspective that larger 
boards will be associated with higher levels of firm performance (Dalton et al. 1999; Pfeffer 
1972; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Provan 1980). In this view, board size may be a measure of an 
organisation’s ability to form environmental links to secure critical resources. From the 
monitoring perspective, a number of authors suggest that larger boards are not as susceptible to 
managerial domination as their smaller counterparts (Zahra and Pearce 1989). Daily et al. 
(2002), and Daily and Dalton (1992; 1994) find positive effect of board size on financial 
performance in large samples of firms in the USA. Golden and Zajac (2001) find a non-linear 
(inverted U-shape) relationship between board size and strategic change. Using 27 board size-
related studies in their meta-analysis, Dalton et al. (1999) find significant positive effect of 
board size on performance. 
However, agency researchers are more sceptical about the effects of board size on the 
monitoring capacity of independent directors (Jensen 1993). When boards become too big, 
agency problems (such as director free-riding) increase within the board, and it becomes more 
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symbolic and less part of the management process (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003).  Yermack 
(1996) reports that there is a significant negative relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q. 
Judge and Zeithaml (1992) report that large boards are less likely to be involved in strategic 
decision, a finding also supported by Goodstain and Boeker (1991). Therefore, the 
organisational outcomes of board size remain an empirical issue.
2.2.4.2  Board diversity
Research on the service/expertise/counsel roles of the board emphasises that directors may 
provide a quality of support and advice to the CEO otherwise unavailable from other corporate 
staff (Dalton et al. 1998; 1999; Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Lorsh and MacIver 1989; Zahra and 
Pearce. 1989).  The effectiveness of these support and service roles of the board, in turn, 
depends on the boards’ cumulative human capital that is often linked to various board 
demography characteristics, such as tenure, professional diversity, etc. Boards that are 
composed of lawyers, financial representatives, top management of other firms, public affaires 
specialists, etc. may be more effective in terms of bringing important expertise, experience and 
skills to facilitate advice and counsel. This research emphasises that board structural 
characteristics (e.g., the proportion of independent directors, separate CEO and Chairperson) are 
less relevant compared to the quality of the board’s cumulative human capital. A number of 
studies argue that board diversity in terms of directors’ professional experiences should lead to 
more efficient service/expertise/counsel roles of the board and, as a result, to better performance 
(Carpenter 2002; Baysinger and Butler 1985; Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Kaplan and 
Reishus 1990; Wagner et al. 1998; Westphal 1999).
Another stream of research links board’s human capital with a number of ‘demographic’ 
factors, such as directors’ age and tenure, although empirical evidence linking these factors with 
performance outcomes is rather limited. Boeker (1992), Pfeffer (1983) and Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1996) argue that greater tenure of board members is associated with greater rigidity, 
increased commitment to established practices and procedures, and increased insulation towards 
new ideas.  However, Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) suggest 
that longer tenure provides directors with much more comprehensive access to a richer stock of 
remembered information, relative to what novice can access. Golden and Zajac (2001) in their 
study of strategic change in U.S. hospital find a curvilinear relationship between the average 
tenure and strategic restructuring: as average board member tenure increases, its effect on 
strategic change is positive for boards with lower levels of tenure, and negative for boards with 
higher levels of tenure. Similarly, these authors present evidence of non-linear effect of 
directors’ age on strategic change: as the average age of board members increases, its effect on 
strategic change is positive for younger boards, and negative for older boards. Generally, 
existing research considers board diversity and limits on board members’ tenure and age as 
‘good’ corporate governance drivers. 
2.2.4.3 Interlocking directorships
A board’s social/relational capital is another important factor essential for the provision of 
resources, advice and counsel. This factor is usually associated with external directorships and 
other extra-organisational “ties” held by the firm’s directors. First, resource based research 
provides evidence that board interlocks are associated with effective capital acquisition 
(Filatotchev and Toms 2003; Mizruchi 1996; Mizruchi and Stearns 1994). Second, building 
cognitive capacity by “importing” knowledge from the outside becomes vital for a long-term 
survival of the firm (Carpenter 2002). This “import” may be facilitated by appointing non-
executive directors who have served on the boards of other, well established firms, or who have 
important professional and social links that may be used strategically by the firm. The links that 
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non-executive directors have with the firm’s environment can be used to obtain important 
information and strategic expertise (Golden and Zajac 2001; Pettigrew 1992; Westphal and 
Fredrickson 2001). Carpenter and Westphal (2001) and Westphal (1999) find that boards 
consisting of directors having ties to strategically related organisations were able to provide 
better advice and counsel, which is positively related to firm performance. Third, board social 
capital has been linked to the provision of firm legitimacy and reputation. Social network theory 
emphasizes the importance of network formation in terms of reputation, trust and mutual inter-
dependence (Geletkanycz and Hambrick 1997; Lynall et al. 2003). Therefore, having directors 
with extensive extra-organisational ties may be an important factor associated with resource and 
service roles of boards.
Some authors, however, are cautions with regard to possible governance implications of board 
interlocks. A “class hegemony” perspective suggests that by inviting their friends from other 
companies to sit on the focal firm’s board, executives re-enforce their power within the 
organisation (Mace 1971; Pettigrew and McNulty 1998; Useem 1984; 1993).  Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003), for example, provide evidence that CEO pay at a given company increases 
when the given company’s board contains directors who are CEOs of firms on whose boards 
the CEO of the given company sits. In this context, previous research emphasises the 
importance of both the intensity of non-executive directors’ external ties (for example, an 
average number of board “interlocks” held by a non-executive director) and their diversity, such 
as directors’ membership in social and political elites, professional services organisations, etc., 
in addition to their board “interlocks” (Carpenter 2002; Daily et al. 1999; Filatotchev and 
Bishop 2002; Pettigrew 1992; Zahra and Pearce 1989). Certo (2003) and Certo et al. (2001) find 
that firms with prestigious and diverse boars experience better performance at their initial public 
offering (IPO). Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) draw similar conclusions in their study of IPOs in 
the UK. Higgins and Gulati (1999) suggest that board interlocks are particularly important for 
young, entrepreneurial firms that are in search of resources and legitimacy.
2.2.5 Board processes
Although there seems to be general agreement in the governance literature that boards deal with 
strategic issues, the extent of the board’s involvement in strategic decision-making is disputed. 
Lorsch and McIver (1989) argued that the board’s primary role is in advising and evaluating 
strategy, rather than in initiating strategy. Demb and Neubauer’s (1992) research on boards of 
directors from a number of European countries found that ‘setting strategic direction’ was 
considered an important role of the board. However, overall they found a wide variety of views 
on how boards should be involved in strategy. At one end of the spectrum, the board was 
perceived as rather passive and uninvolved while at the other end the board was regarded as 
initiating, decisive and fully responsible for strategic decision-making. 
A growing number of papers move away from research on the organisational outcomes of board 
structure and demographic characteristics to greater focus on board processes and functions. 
This research aims to shed light on a number of relatively under-researched issues that 
Pettigrew (1992, p. 176) raised in his study on managerial elites, such as: Why do boards look 
the way they do? How do particular constellations of human resource assets on the board occur 
and build up? How does executives’ power affect the control relationships between team 
members and the board? These questions extend discussion beyond the relatively narrow 
boundaries of agency theory. Indeed, a growing number of studies suggest that the agency 
framework should be used in conjunction with complementary theories (Daily et al. 2003; 
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Pettigrew 1992), including behavioural (e.g., Hambrick and Mason 1984; Sanders and 
Carpenter 2003) and socio-cognitive research (Carpenter et al. 2003; Carpenter 2002) in 
examining governance-related issues.
2.2.5.1 Conduct and processes of the board
Board process research is focused on the general conduct of board affairs and how and why 
board processes impact on empirical patterns of strategy and performance (Pettigrew 1992). 
These studies move away from the empirical analysis of publicly available data on board 
structure and characteristics and rely on an in-depth research methodology, such as interviews 
and case studies (e.g., McNulty and Pettigrew 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995), customized 
surveys (e.g., Pye 2001; Roberts and Styles 1999), and ethnographic research (e.g., Samra-
Fredricks 2000). 
Board process researchers emphasize that independent directors have by virtue of their different 
positional power, knowledge of the business, and information a lesser set of structural sources 
of power than the CEO and other executive directors. Their prospect of influence depends on 
their will and skills in mobilizing resources available to them (Pettigrew and McNulty 1998; 
Lorsh and MacIver 1989; Zajac and Westphal 1996). Whilst board structure conditions board 
effectiveness, it is the behavioural dynamics of a board and the web of interpersonal and group 
relationships between executive and independent directors that determine board effectiveness 
(Roberts et al. 2005). Therefore, ‘good’ corporate governance drivers may also be associated 
with factors that affect board dynamics and interrelationships, such as the role of a Chairperson, 
information flows inside and outside the firm, coalition formation, etc.
Bearing in mind power discrepancy between full-time executive directors and non-executive 
directors, ‘good’ corporate governance drivers may be associated with company actions aimed 
at reducing this power gap. An unrestricted access to information is generally regarded as a 
source of directors’ power, as well as directors’ in-depth knowledge of the business (Golden 
and Zajac 2002; Roberts et al. 2005; Useem 1993; Wesphal 1999). The conduct and process of 
the board may be another potential source of directors’ power and their involvement in strategy. 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999), Pye (2001; 2002) draw attention to factors such as the board 
meeting agenda, the process and conduct of board meetings, strategy “away days”, etc. If 
accompanied by process of information sharing, challenge and open debate, these activities may 
increase board effectiveness. 
Board process research develops a new perspective on the roles of the Chairperson. Roberts and 
Styles (1999), Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) and Roberts et al. (2005) argue that a 
complementary relationship between the CEO and Chairperson is at the heart of effective board 
relationship. They suggest that the Chairperson’s work in building non-executives’ knowledge 
through induction and strategy away days, in structuring board agenda and ensuring the quality 
and timeliness of board information are pivotal in creating the conditions for non-executives to 
be effective. 
Moving away from formal board structures and procedures, other authors emphasize the 
importance of informal dialogue between board members, between board meetings. Mace 
(1971), Lorsh and MacIver (1989) and Westphal (1999) suggest that social ties and interactions 
between the CEO and independent directors may enhance mutual trust, intensify advice-seeking 
activities of executives, and reduce defensive and political behaviour on board. It is important 
for directors to build and maintain trust in their relationships with executives, but also to 
maintain some distance so that effective monitoring can be achieved (Dalton et al. 2003). 
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Roberts et al. (2005) identify a set of three characteristics critical to independent directors 
effectively creating accountability in the boardroom: they should be (1) engaged but non-
executive; (2) challenging but supportive; (3) independent but involved. This research suggests 
that “independence of mind” rather than independence of board is the key to effective board 
behaviour, and, hence, ‘good’ corporate governance.
2.2.5.2 Board evaluation and controls
One of the critical functions of boards it to evaluate performance of executive directors. 
However, managerial strategies are often evaluated more on financial criteria because rich 
information is difficult to obtain for non-executive board members.  The opportunity costs and 
time required to evaluate strategic decisions are high for outside directors, and they are likely to 
use financial controls such as returns on sales and assets, total shareholder return, etc. This may 
create managerial risk-aversion and focus on strategic decisions that generate immediate 
financial outcomes rather than long-term returns, such as R&D and innovation (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson 1990; Hoskisson et al. 2002).  Board members may be tempted to step back from the 
involvement in strategy development process and rely on evaluation of strategic outcomes 
instead (McNulty and Pettigrew 1999).  A number of authors strongly suggest that board 
members should rely on strategic controls when evaluating performance of the executives, such 
as the quality of strategic decisions, their justification, short- and long-term objectives, etc. For 
example, by approving or disapproving capital investment projects, board takes strategic 
decisions. Independent directors should ensure that executive directors are actively involved in 
formulating strategy, rather than leaving strategy to emerge in a haphazard fashion. Where a 
strategy is in place, McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) suggest that independent directors should 
evaluate its content and impact by asking executives to justify their strategic intentions and 
questioning their course of actions. Introducing the notion of “honest incompetence” as a more 
realistic driver of the need for board oversight, Hendry (2002) suggest that the involvement of 
independent directors does not need to be threatening to executive directors, and board reforms 
should focus on increasing board competence. In a rare empirical study, Golden and Zajac 
(2002) provide support of these arguments by studying strategic change in the U.S. hospitals. 
They find that strategic change is positively associated with (a) board attention to strategic 
issues, and (b) the comprehensiveness of a board’s evaluation of the CEO. 
Board process researchers emphasize that, in terms of ‘good’ corporate governance practice, 
boards should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its performance, as well as 
performance of individual directors. Board assessment would lead to changes in the 
composition of boards to make them more effective (Shen 2005). Evaluating the balance of 
skills, knowledge and experience on the board, in advance of making new appointments, is an 
important aspect of maintaining board effectiveness. An induction and professional 
development system should also ensure that directors are, and remain, sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the company (Roberts et al. 2005).
2.2.5.3 Board incentive systems
Literature review above suggested that outside directors are expected to play the monitoring, 
resource and service roles inside boards. Yet their incentives are not clear. Fama (1980), Fama 
and Jensen (1983), and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) emphasize the fact that they have 
incentives to build reputations as expert monitors. From the cognitive perspective, it may be 
vital that non-executive directors are not only vigilant, but that they also have strong incentives 
to share their valuable knowledge and experience with members of the board. 
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Extending agency arguments related to the incentive alignment effects of directors’ equity, 
some researchers suggest that non-executive directors will perform their advisory and resource 
roles better when they have a significant financial stake in the company. The primary 
hypothesis here is that board equity compensation will be positively associated with firm 
performance because of improved board functions (Dalton et al. 2003; Hillman and Dalziel 
2003; Hoskisson et al. 2002; Kosnik 1990; Shen 2005). Hambrick and Jackson (2000) indicate 
that non-executive share ownership not only creates financial incentives for non-executives but 
also increases their identification with the company, making them more willing to use their 
knowledge and more generous in their time and attention. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) cite 
evidence suggesting that the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance is 
stronger when boards have incentives. Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) provide evidence that 
directors’ ownership improves performance of IPO firms in the UK. However, while 
theoretically appealing, this “incentives – performance” hypothesis has not been unambiguously 
supported in a recent meta-analysis (Dalton et al. 2003).
2.2.6 Board governance effects: contingency factors 
A number of authors suggest that the effects of board structure and characteristics on 
performance may be contingent on various contingent factors such as the firm’s size, age, 
industry, growth/decline phase, etc. In particular, the scale and diversity of large firms may 
cloud any relationship between board composition and performance. However, in smaller, 
entrepreneurial firms, boards could more easily meet their resource, counselling and control 
roles. Boards of smaller, less complex firms would enjoy more discretion with fewer vested 
interests within the firm (Dalton et al. 1998). Consistent with this perspective, recent meta-
analysis has found that the board size/firm performance relationship is stronger for smaller, as 
compared to larger, firms (Dalton et al. 1999). Daily and Dalton (1992) provide evidence of a 
positive relationship between both the number and proportion of independent directors and 
price-earnings ratio in a sample of small firms. IPO research in the USA and UK (Certo 2003; 
Certo et al. 2001; Filatotchev and Bishop 2002) discover that newly listed companies with more 
diverse and independent boards have better performance. 
Some researchers emphasise that board governance may be particularly important in the 
environment of organisational decline or bankruptcy (Daily and Dalton 1994; Filatotchev and 
Toms 2003; Hambrick and D’Aveni 1992). In their study of UK textile companies in the 
environment of industrial decline, Filatotchev and Toms (2003) show that the “survivors” had 
relatively larger boards and significantly larger board diversity measured in terms of outside 
directorships held by individual directors compared to the “early exits”.  These authors argue 
that board “interlocks” helped companies to restructure and survive. Daily and Dalton (1994) 
and Dalton et al. (1999) suggest that board size may play an important role in crisis situations, 
since, from a resource-dependency view, larger boards may provide more diverse networking 
links to resource providers. Gilson (1990) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) find that 
following a bankruptcy or private restructuring, debtholders take an active role in the firm’s 
governance, including appointing a number of directors.
Finally, an emerging research on the life cycle of corporate governance (Filatotchev and Wright 
2005; Lynall et al. 2003) suggest the notion of a number of firm life cycle stages where different 
forms of corporate governance may be required. Corporate governance may thus need to be 
viewed as a dynamic system that may change as firms evolve over these stages. The firm’s 
evolution is accompanied by changes in ownership structure, board composition, the degree of 
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founder involvement, etc. The balance of the accountability and enterprise roles of the various 
governance elements may change over this life cycle from establishment, growth, maturity and 
decline.  For example, the knowledge contribution of boards may be more important in growing 
entrepreneurial firms than in firms facing more mature markets. However, monitoring roles of 
the board may be particularly important at maturity stage. Therefore, there may be a number of 
optimal board configurations, depending on a particular stage of the firm’s life cycle.
2.2.7 Complementarity and substitution between governance channels
In a vast majority of governance-related papers a particular aspect of corporate control, such as 
board structure or composition, is related to performance measurements. Some authors have 
recognized that governance mechanisms operate interdependently, with the overall 
effectiveness depending on a simultaneous operation of several mechanisms in limiting 
managerial opportunism (Rediker and Seth 1995; Walsh and Seward 1990). Since alternative 
control mechanisms exist, greater use of one mechanism need not be positively related to firm 
performance. Where one specific mechanism is used less, others may be used more, resulting in 
equally good performance (Agrawal and Knoweber 1996). Different governance mechanisms 
can substitute or complement each other (Dalton et al. 2003; Hoskisson et al. 2002), and the 
cost-benefit trade-offs among a variety of governance mechanisms would determine their use. 
A limited number of papers explore these substitution/complementarity effects empirically.  
Deutsch (2005) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find complementarity between board 
composition and executive pay. Rediker and Seth (1995) in their study of 81 bank holding in the 
USA find a substitution effect between governance effects of independent boards and large-
block investors.  They suggest that a combination (or bundles) of governance mechanisms may 
reduce principal-agent costs and align interests of principals and agents.
2.3 Share Ownership and Shareholder Activism
2.3.1 Introduction
There is a growing body of research in the economics and management literature that links the 
pattern and amount of stock ownership with managerial behaviour, and, eventually, corporate 
performance (see Dalton et al. 2003, and Short 1994, for a comprehensive survey). The 
concentration of ownership may be an effective approach to controlling the agency problems 
caused by the separation of risk-bearing and decision functions in firms (Alchian and Demsetz 
1972; Demsetz 1983; Tihaniy et al. 2003). However, because most of the previous research in 
the corporate governance area is focused on corporations with diffused ownership within the 
framework of the conventional U.S./UK model of corporate control, little is known about the 
behaviour of joint stock firms with concentrated ownership (Holderness and Sheehan 1988). In 
terms of issues related to ownership structure and identities of the major groups of shareholders, 
previous research has recognized several possible governance roles for large-block 
shareholders, some of which are likely to be value-enhancing while others are likely to have 
negative effects (see Hansmann 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1997, for an extensive discussion). 
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2.3.2 Large-block shareholders, business strategy and firm performance
2.3.2.1 Shareholder activism and firm’s performance
Within economics and corporate finance research, the majority of studies were focused on 
ownership concentration effects in large, publicly traded firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976), for 
example, explain how the increase in concentration in managers’ cash flow rights constrains the 
consumption of perquisites by managers and thus produces a positive effect on corporate 
valuation. Further research suggests that large-block outside ownership may also be an effective 
counter-balance to managerial opportunism. Companies may have large, undiversified 
shareholders that play a critical leadership and monitoring role. They have both the incentives 
and the means to restrain self-serving behaviour of managers (Maug 1998; Zeckhauser and 
Pound 1990). Monks and Minow (2002), Hoskisson et al. (2002) and Tihaniy et al. (2003) 
provide an extensive survey of literature, which suggests that shareholders with significant 
ownership positions have both the incentives and to monitor executives and the influence to 
bring about change they feel will be beneficial. Concentration of voting power in large investors 
is, therefore, only a partial indicator of ownership influence; some of them use their power 
through the increased shareholder activism. Increased activism is a preferable modus operandi
for large shareholders because of their major stakes in corporations. The barriers to these 
investors’ divestments of their holdings are high, and they have few options for alternative 
(large) investments (Admati et al. 1994; Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). 
Therefore, a large number of studies grounded in agency theory suggest that large-block 
shareholders have both the incentive and influence to assure that managers and directors operate 
in the interests of shareholders (Daily et al. 2003). Therefore, their presence among the firm’s 
investors provides an important driver of ‘good’ corporate governance that should lead to 
efficiency gains and improvement in performance (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). This assumption has been subjected to extensive empirical tests. For example, 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) analyse performance of large firms with majority shareholders 
(e.g., owners with equity stakes between 50 and 100 percent). In their study, firms with 
concentrated shareholders outperformed a control group of diffusely held firms. Wruck (1989) 
provides empirical evidence that suggests that when managers have an opportunity to conduct a 
self-serving deal that damages shareholders, the decision to sell a block of securities to non-
management investors increase shareholder wealth. Mikkelson and Rubak (1985) also find that 
firm market value increases when a block purchase is announced. The study by McConnel and 
Servaes (1990) suggests a positive relationship between institutional share ownership and 
Tobin’s Q. Hill and Snell (1980) find a positive relationship between ownership concentration 
and productivity for their sample of 122 Fortune 500 firms. Glassman and Rhoades (1980) 
report a positive relationship between ownership concentration and profit rate of lead banks in 
the USA. Finally, Filatotchev and Toms (2003) in their study of UK textile firms suggest that 
the firm’s performance and survival in this declining industry was partially explained by 
presence of dominant institutional equity-holders.
A number of studies provide empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate 
ownership patterns and firm’s performance around the world (see La Porta et al. 2000b, for a 
comprehensive survey). In particular, La Porta et al. (2000a), in their study of the largest quoted 
firms from 27 countries, find that higher cash flow ownership is associated with higher 
corporate valuation, and that this effect is greater in countries with inferior shareholder 
protection. Using a data-set of 2,658 listed East Asian corporations, Claessens et al. (1999) 
document that high cash-flow rights in the hands of large-block holders are positively related 
29
with corporate valuation. However, the concentration of control rights in their study is 
negatively associated with valuation of corporate assets, pointing to a possibility of an 
entrenchment effect of concentrated voting control. This evidence is consistent with the 
assumption that in established publicly traded firm’s ownership concentration is a substitute for 
legal protections in providing the functions of corporate governance (La Porta et al. 1998). 
2.3.2.2 Shareholder activism and strategic decision
Strategic management provides another important stream of research that links ownership 
patterns with the firm’s strategic decisions. For example, using structural equation modelling, 
Hoskisson et al. (1994) show that large block shareholders help mitigate against poor strategy, 
such as diversification, to evolve into poor performance, therefore decreasing the magnitude of 
restructuring. Hill and Snell (1988) find that ownership concentration is positively correlated 
with R&D expenditures, specialization and relatedness in a sample of 94 firms in research-
intensive industries. According to Black (1992) institutional investors have demonstrated a 
decided propensity to restrain managerial appetite for value destroying mergers and 
acquisitions.
2.3.2.3 Conflicting evidence
Some researchers have indicated, however, that concentrated shareholding may create a trade-
off between incentives and entrenchment (La Porta et al. 2000a; Short 1994). For example, 
using a variety of linear regressions, Morck et al. (1988) suggest that there is an incentive effect 
of managerial ownership on performance (measured in terms of Tobin’s Q) in the 0 percent to 5 
percent ownership range, negative relation in the 5 percent to 25 percent range, and a further 
positive relation beyond 25 percent. Building on this theoretical framework, the empirical study 
by McConnell and Servaes (1990) finds a significant curvilinear relation between Tobin’s Q 
and the share of common stock owned by the managers. In addition, there is evidence that 
concentrated non-managerial ownership can also harm market valuation (Roe 1990). 
In particular, lack of diversification and limited liquidity mean that large shareholders are 
affected adversely by the company’s idiosyncratic risk (Maug 1998).  To compensate for this 
risk they may use an opportunity to collude with managers or shift wealth from minority 
shareholders to themselves. For example, Pound (1988) argues that large institutional investors 
and unaffiliated blockholders are likely to side with management (the strategic-alignment 
hypothesis).  Likewise, blockholders may be influenced by other existing business relationships 
with management (the conflict-of-interest hypothesis). Building on this research, some authors 
point out that ownership concentration per se may negatively affect the value of the firm when 
majority shareholders have a possibility to abuse their position of dominant control at expense 
of minority shareholders (Bebchuk 1994; Stiglitz 1985). As a result, at some level of ownership 
concentration the distinction between insiders and outsiders becomes blurred, and blockholders, 
no matter what their identity is, may have strong incentives to build coalitions with managers 
and divert resources in ways that make them better off at the expense of other shareholders 
(Wruck 1989). La Porta et al. (1998) and Modigliani and Perotti (1997) suggest that in this 
environment firms with concentrated owners would face difficulty raising equity finance, since 
minority investors fear expropriation by managers and concentrated owners, and, as a result, 
profitable new ventures will be forsaken. 
A number of empirical studies failed to confirm positive links between ownership concentration 
and performance. For example, Demsetz and Len (1985) find no association between ownership 
concentration and accounting profit rate in their sample of 511 large U.S. firms. Using a large 
sample of Forbes 800 firms and controlling for endogenous nature of large-block shareholding, 
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Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) do not find any significant effects of ownership concentration and 
a variety of performance measurements. Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) examine strategic 
restructuring in a panel of the large U.S. firm and suggest that institutional investors did not 
serve to discipline managers.  They also provide evidence that concentrated shareholders 
normally support managers in their quest for growth. In addition, Dalton et al. (2003) applied 
meta-analytical procedure to 229 studies related to equity holdings and firm financial 
performance. Their tests do not provide support to the hypothesized relationship between share 
ownership by large blockholders and a number of performance proxies that include Tobin’s Q, 
returns on assets, equity, sales, investment, etc. The authors conclude that, “the results of our 
meta-analyses do not support agency’s theory proposed relationship between ownership and 
firm performance.”
A number of more recent studies tried to find explanations for this inconsistency in theoretical 
predictions and empirical evidence with regard to the governance roles of concentrated owners. 
Jensen (1993) has questioned the promise of shareholder activism in general, and institutional 
investor activism in particular. Their increasing reliance on indexing investment strategies 
suggests that they believe that, on average, their portfolio of firms will yield returns comparable 
to those for the market as a whole, regardless of the governance structure of their portfolio 
firms.  Black (1992) documents an increasing importance of “exit” strategies for the fund 
managers as opposed to shareholder activism. Daily et al. (2003) also suggest hat shareholder 
activism can be much more costly than pure reliance on indexing strategies. Some authors 
challenge the very foundations of the “blockholders – firm performance” hypothesis. More 
specifically, previous research treats ownership concentration as exogenous and does not 
address the issue of what affects ownership concentration for a given firm. A number of authors 
have suggested that firm characteristics, such as size, investment needs, industry, location, etc., 
may determine its ownership structure (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Jensen and Warner 1988).  In 
other words, a firm’s ownership structure is an equilibrium response to an individual firm’s 
operating characteristics and its competitive environment (Short 1994), and the direction of 
causality between ownership concentration and firm characteristics is not entirely resolved by 
papers using cross-sectional variations in ownership. 
Despite these empirical and theoretical arguments against shareholder activism hypotheses, a 
growing number of studies point out that the answer may be in the types of blockholders and 
what they actually do in terms of governing the firms in which they invest.
2.3.3 Governance roles of different types of blockholders
Most research on performance effects of large-block share ownership has not differentiated 
among types of investors.  Only recently have studies acknowledged that the identity of such 
owners has important organisational implications because different owners may have different 
objectives and decision-making horizons (Hoskisson et al. 2002; Tihanyi et al. 2003; Aguilera 
and Jackson 2003). For example, banks and investment trusts may behave differently in terms 
of their strategic preferences (see Chang 2003; and McConnell and Servaes 1990, for a 
discussion). 
2.3.3.1  “Pressure-sensitive” vs. “pressure-resistant” investors
Some authors (e.g., Brickeley et al. 1988; David, Kochhar and Levitas 1998; Kochar and David 
1996) differentiate between “pressure-resistant”, “pressure-sensitive” and “pressure-
indeterminate” institutional investors. Pressure-resistant institutions, such as public pension 
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funds, mutual funds, foundations and endowments, are unlikely to have strong business links 
with their investors, and they may have stronger influence on strategy choices and their 
performance outcomes (Dalton et al. 2003; Hoskisson et al. 2002).  Johnson and Greening 
(1999) also indicate that pension and investment fund managers’ objective is a high relative 
performance of their portfolio firms because of their own reward system. They are the most 
likely among institutional investors to monitor organisational decision makers and to be labelled 
“activist institutional investors” (Brickley et al. 1988). On the other hand, “pressure-sensitive” 
investors such as insurance companies and banks are likely to have business relationships with 
the firms in which they invest (Kroszner and Strahan 2001). Because they often have an 
obligation to support the management’s agenda, their governance role tends to be more passive 
compared to “activist” investors (Tihaniy et al. 2003). Corporate pension funds typify the 
pressure indeterminate institutional investor category. Relationship between the funds and the 
firms in which they invest may exist, and they are unlikely to actively challenge firm decision 
makers (Dalton et al. 2003). 
Daily et al. (2003) and other authors suggest that only pressure-resistant investors behave in line 
with the assumptions of agency arguments related to the governance roles of block-holders. 
Hoskisson et al. (2002), for example, provide empirical evidence, which suggests that managers 
of public pension funds prefer internal innovation and investment in R&D, whereas professional 
investment funds’ managers prefer external innovations such as M&A.   Wahal (1996) finds 
that pension funds moved away from takeover related proxy proposals in the late 1980s and 
toward governance related proxy proposals in the 1990s, suggesting that their managers are 
interested in active voice and less interested in short-term arbitrage. Research by Woidtke 
(2002) supports this view. Tihaniy et al. (2003) provide evidence of long-term strategic 
orientation of pension funds compared to other institutional investors.
2.3.3.2 Private equity firms
Another stream of research in economics and finance suggests that private equity firms and 
venture capitalists may have a particularly strong impact on the process of corporate governance 
development because of their early involvement in the strategic development of the portfolio 
firm. They also gain a detailed knowledge and substantial decision-making rights in firms that 
they finance (Lerner 1995). In particular, private equity firms impose contractual restraints on 
managerial discretion, including the use of staged investment, an enforceable nexus of security 
covenants, and the option to replace the entrepreneur as manager unless key investment 
objectives are met (see Megginson and Weiss 1991, for a discussion).  Since these special rights 
end at the time of an exit, when the need for oversight is particularly great, outside investors 
may compensate for a relative loss of control by strengthening other governance mechanisms, 
such as increasing the IPO firm’s board independence (Black and Gilson 1998). In addition, 
they often influence the distribution of the firm’s shares in the process of IPO (Brav and 
Gompers 1997). Therefore, private equity firms represent an ultimate version of “pressure-
resistant” investors, although in the UK their investments are mainly confined to entrepreneurial 
ventures, buy-outs and public-to-private transactions (Manigart et al. 2002).
2.3.3.3 Individual blockholders
A number of studies identify individual or group blockholders as another important type of 
“pressure-resistant” investors. These investors hold 5 percent or more of a give firm’s equity. 
Demsetz (1983) suggests that the substantial wealth they have at risk implies that benefits of 
monitoring will outweigh associated costs. Therefore, they have a stronger incentive than even 
activist institutional investors to engage in control activities (Dalton et al. 2003). Pound (1992) 
suggests that blockholders demonstrated their ability to effect changes in the composition of 
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boards and corporate constitutions. Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) provide empirical evidence 
that blockholders’ equity was associated with proactive restructuring strategies in their panel of 
388 Fortune 500 firms. Their evidence is consistent with the argument that large blockholders 
play a critical role in monitoring and re-directing corporate strategy.
Family owners represent an important subset of individual and group blockholders. A number 
of researchers express concerns about the problems associated with family control, and the 
increased likelihood of the abuse of managerial power.  Research from North America in 
particular, (e.g. Morck et al. 1988, Smith and Amoako-Adu 1999) provides evidence of the 
negative effect of a controlling family on corporate performance. In addition, strategy research 
identifies family firms to be altruistic in the relationship between parents and their children 
((Schulze et al. 2003), which may have an impact on the effective succession process when the 
founder retires.  Moreover, family interest may dominate over the interest of non-family 
shareholders, since the concentration of personal and family wealth in owner-managed firms 
normally creates a preference for income and for wealth preservation over other dimensions of 
firm performance such as maximisation of dividend payments to outside shareholders (Carney 
and Gedajlovic 2003). Finally, family control tends to shield a firm from the disciplinary 
pressure of the market for corporate control since concentrated share ownership reduces the 
probability of a hostile take-over (Gomez-Mejia, et al. 2001; 2003).
However, whether families or professional managers run companies better for society in general 
is still open to debate.  During the current prolonged recession, corporate scandals and the 
collapse of stock markets have resulted in a return to the kind of values prevalent in family-
owned companies. Family businesses that survived their own internal succession dramas have 
tended to take a longer-term view rather than live and die by stock market evaluation of their 
performance (Bruton et al. 2003). Because of the extension of altruism from the family system 
to the firm, owners in the current generation have the tendency and obligation to reserve wealth 
for the next generation. As a result, family firms often possess longer horizons compared to 
non-family firms (James 1999). Family firms, therefore, represent a special class of large 
shareholders that may have a unique incentive structure, a strong voice in the firm, and 
powerful motivation of managers. Anderson et al. (2003) suggest that these characteristics can 
alleviate agency conflicts between the firms’ debt and equity claimants and reduce the agency 
costs of debt. In addition, strategy analysis of corporate governance (Filatotchev and Bishop 
2002) view family control as less of a problem as it could be a potential provider of more useful 
resources and a possible enhancement of firm value.  Furthermore, through family networks, 
uncertainties and complexity are reduced because information is shared and circulated among 
the participants in the network, resulting in better monitoring of activities both within and 
between firms. A number of more recent empirical studies provide evidence that controlling 
family ownership is associated with better performance (Chang 2003; Joh 2003; Carney and 
Gedajlovic 2002).
2.3.3.4 Blockholder coalitions
Finally, some recent studies emphasise that firms may have multiple large shareholders. Some 
researchers suggest that it may be optimal to have more than one large owner in terms of the 
effectiveness of corporate governance (Dyck 2000).  When control is dissipated among several 
large investors, a decision to behave opportunistically requires the consent of a coalition of 
investors, and this coalition might hold enough cash flow rights to choose to limit expropriation 
of the remaining shareholders and pay the profits as efficient dividends (La Porta et al. 2000b). 
In this particular case, a relatively low entrenchment effect associated with small shareholdings 
of the coalition’s members may be dominated by the Jensen-Meckling incentives generated by 
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the combined coalition’s share ownership. For example, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) 
suggest a theoretical model explaining an alignment effect of a coalition of large shareholders, 
that is a positive relation between the cash flow stake of the controlling coalition and total firm 
value. 
2.3.4 Process aspects of shareholder activism
A number of recent studies have moved from traditional empirical analysis of links between 
ownership structure and types of owners outlined in sections above to more qualitative, multi-
disciplinary research on actual actions of large-block owners in terms of their involvement in 
corporate governance. For example, Daily et al. (2003) discusses corporate governance 
practices of large public pension funds such as CalPERS and TIAA-CREF in the USA.  
CalPERS, for example, has been active in seeking greater board independence by requesting 
that firms in which the fund invests (1) compose their boards predominantly of independent 
directors, (2) identify a lead director to assist the board chair, and (3) impose age limits on 
directors (Daily et al. 2003: 373). Similarly, TIAA-CREF was very critical of firms that 
maintain what the fund views as inappropriate corporate governance structures. More 
specifically, the fund pressured Walt Disney to reconfigure its board and make it more 
independent from management. Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) provide evidence, which 
suggests that by publicly criticizing board oversight and confronting complacent management, 
institutional investors destabilize managerial power and pressure strategic changes in line with
shareholder demands. Black (1992) notes that institutional investors have the motivation to 
discourage conglomerate acquisitions that may dilute managerial attention and depress firm 
value. Aguilera (2005) indicates that companies in the UK and USA are under pressure from 
institutional investors to appoint a lead (senior) independent director whose responsibility is to 
serve as a communication channel between shareholders and the board.
Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) suggest that external blockholders also act as an agent or 
catalyst for certain types of change.  For example, blockholders may alter the balance of power 
by influencing board and management turnover (Denis and Sarin 1999) enabling an efficient 
succession (Boeker and Goodstain 1993). Wahal (1996) suggests that target firms are 
increasingly adopting proxy proposals regarding changes in corporate governance. 
Blockholders may initiate revisions in executive compensation (David et al. 1998) and in 
directors’ term of office (Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003).
Since institutional investors are usually companies with their own ownership and management 
systems, it is important to monitor their activism. Institutional fund managers are themselves 
agents, and may not fulfil their duty to influence managers in their portfolio companies (Black 
1992). It is important to have transparency of voting by institutional investors and disclosure to 
clients on how their shares were voted (Woidtke 2002). However, this may increase the costs of 
compliance burdens with limited benefits in terms of improved corporate governance.
The legal perspective on corporate governance suggests further that to be effective, institutional 
investors should have a right to sue company directors and auditors for negligence and breach 
of duty.  In the past, the company itself primarily initiated legal actions against directors.  Legal 
scholars suggest that shareholders should have a statutory right to bring an action enforcing the 
company’s rights against directors through so-called derivative claims (Bebchuk 2005). Some 
researchers document that the increase in shareholder activism has been accompanied by an 
increase in shareholder lawsuits in recent years (Kesner and Johnson 1990). Langevoort (2001) 
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suggests that the very threat of lawsuits may provide a powerful governance effect associated 
with large-block shareholders.
Bebchuk (2005) indicates, however, that only a small fraction of public companies in the USA 
faced contested board elections that were designed to oust existing directors. One of the barriers 
to contested board elections is associated with financial and organisational difficulties 
shareholders face when trying to place their own directors on a company’s proxy statement. 
Bearing this in mind, Bebchuk supports suggestions that companies should be able to choose to 
provide shareholders with proxy statements via the Internet.
2.4 Information and Disclosure
2.4.1 Introduction
The academic literature suggests that information flows are a fundamental prerequisite, 
cornerstone, or driver of corporate governance and that in turn the informational environment of 
the firm affects strategy and performance.  The starting point for most analysis is that 
‘information asymmetry’ (Akerlof 1980) or ‘information impactedness’ (Williamson 1985) is 
pervasive in firms and has negative effects in terms of uncertainty, adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and opportunism.  In turn, this leads to higher transaction costs, the false pricing of 
assets, the misallocation of resources, and lower liquidity.  Because of market failures and fears 
of competitive disadvantage, the state has intervened with laws to make firms disclose.  
However, in addition, firms have an interest in disclosing, above what it legally mandated, in 
anticipation of benefits, such as the reduction of uncertainty and of the price of capital.  Much of 
the literature then suggests that an optimal disclosure strategy is one where firms supply 
maximum information, subject to legal, cost, and proprietary constraints (for a broad review of 
the concepts and the theoretical literature, see Stigler 1961; Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Hirschleifer 1973; Grossman and Hart 1980; Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981; Healy and Palepu 
2001; Verecchia 2001).
The literature makes a number of distinctions, which are useful for analysis.  As already 
suggested, information disclosure may be divided into mandatory and voluntary, the latter also 
encompasses requirements of a ‘comply or explain’ type.  This distinction may also be put in 
terms of public and private information.  There are various kinds of information, for example, 
financial information (profits, losses etc.), operating information (strategy, performance against 
objectives etc.), and governance information (board composition, executive remuneration etc.).  
Information may be backward- or forward-looking, with the latter usually adjudged to have a 
premium.  
There are also various producers, holders, donors or withholders, recipients, and users of 
information.  In other words, there is a stock and a flow.  The main producers and holders of 
information are the top management team.  However, within the management hierarchy, there 
are information flows, vertical and horizontal, which may have implications for corporate 
governance and business strategy and performance.  Hence, managers below the top team may 
have information which is useful to superiors and which they may or may not convey.  In turn, 
senior managers and executives will have information, which has relevance to the board, 
including non-executives directors.  Finally, senior managers may provide information to fixed 
claim holders, employees, and other stakeholders.  The main body of literature surveyed below 
35
concerns the flow of financial and operating information, both mandatory and voluntary, from 
the top management team to investors and their advisers.  
2.4.2 Information disclosure: the firm, its investors, and performance
Within economics and accounting research, the vast majority of studies have focussed on the 
provision of strategic financial and operating information by the top management team (senior 
managers and executive directors) to outside investors, especially shareholders, and those 
associated with them, such as fund managers and analysts.  The literature is mainly concerned 
with voluntary disclosure and refers to how informative disclosure is in terms of both quantity 
and quality of information (Healy and Palepu 2001; Core 2001).  The underlying notion in the 
literature is that greater disclosure will allow investors to monitor management better and 
effectively to exercise their rights. The focus is on both the determinants and effects of 
discretionary information disclosure.  
In terms of determinants, for the U.S., Lang and Lundholm (1993) show that disclosure is 
greater where firms are larger, perform better, and need to raise capital.  Ruland et al. (1990) 
demonstrate that, as insider ownership increases, firms are less likely to provide certain types of 
information such as earnings forecasts.  By contrast, El-Gazzar (1998) shows that the presence 
of large institutional owners leads to a higher level of voluntary disclosure.  Consistent with 
other research, Skinner (1994) finds that firms with bad earnings news are more likely to 
disclose information than firms with good news.  Using information on contested takeover bids, 
Brennan (1999) suggests that targets disclose more information on earnings than a sample of 
other firms.  One interesting study of Singapore listed firms suggests that companies with a 
higher proportion of independent directors have higher levels of voluntary disclosure (Cheng 
and Courtenay 2004).
For the UK, Meeks et al. (1995) find disclosure related to firm size, debt-equity ratios, country 
of incorporation, and international listing.  It should be noted that in this and other cross-country 
studies UK firms rank highly in such exercises in terms of informativeness of disclosure.  Again 
using a sample of UK firms, Mangena and Pike (2004) confirm work which suggested that 
better information is provided where audit committees are independent and have financial 
expertise (Beasley 1996; McMullen 1996; Klein 2002; Carcello and Neal 2000 2003).  In their 
own study, the authors find that the quality of disclosure and financial reporting is negatively 
associated with shareholdings of audit committee members, but positively associated with the 
presence of financial expertise on the audit committee and external auditor involvement.  In 
their work, no statistically significant relationship was found between the quality of financial 
reporting and other corporate governance variables (such as audit committee size, directors’ 
shareholdings, and the proportion of non-executive directors).  Other UK research suggests that 
disclosures are not just positively related to firm size, but vary significantly across sectors, and 
that companies whose future earnings are poor are more likely to make disclosures (Abraham 
and Tonks 2004).  Preliminary research by Hussainey, Schleicher, and Walker (2004) suggests 
that for the most part loss-making firms tend to decrease disclosure in the year that the loss is 
reported.  However, a significant proportion of loss-making firms respond by temporarily 
increasing their disclosure.  Perhaps not surprisingly, loss-making firms increase the narrative 
content of the annual report giving more information about projected future earnings. Using 
case studies, Holland (1997) showed private disclosure was driven by the financial reporting 
cycle, by the need to build on this with core fund managers, and by ad hoc events.  In more 
recent work, Holland (2005) has suggested that disclosure, both public and private, increases 
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when firms seek additional market-based finance (equity or debt), when performance declines, 
and during take-over battles.  
A recent UK study (Emmanuel and Garrod 2004) of the content of segment reports within 
annual reports and of operating and financial reviews (OFR) finds that companies, which 
provide the fullest and most relevant segment reports, provide less voluntary additional 
disclosure in the OFR than companies providing less extensive disclosure in their segment 
reports.  This consideration of mandatory and at the time voluntary reporting leads the authors 
to conclude that it is unclear that the introduction of more mandatory disclosure will 
automatically lead to an increase in useful disclosure.
In terms of outcomes of disclosure, the theoretical literature suggests a negative relationship 
between disclosure and the cost of capital.  Information asymmetries are said to produce a 
‘lemons’ problem, which causes good and bad projects to be valued at the same level and 
thereby to reduce liquidity in firms’ shares (Akerlof 1970; Copeland and Galai 1983; Kyle 
1985; Glosten and Milgrom 1985).  By contrast, the disclosure of good information reduces 
asymmetry, lowers the returns which investors demand, and thus lowers the cost of capital to 
the firm (Diamond and Verrechia 1991).  
Empirical research usually valorises disclosure outcomes by looking at the cost of capital.  The 
research has produced mixed findings.  For the U.S., Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggested that 
there is a significant positive relationship between disclosure and analyst following, in the sense 
that companies’ financial affairs are watched closely.  The benefits of this are higher liquidity 
(Roulstone 2002).  Such firms also have less dispersion in analysts’ reports and less volatility in 
forecasts.  However, Botosan (1997) and Richardson and Welker (2001), using voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports, found a significant negative relationship between disclosure and 
the cost of capital, both equity and debt, though this is only for firms with low analyst 
following.  For foreign firms trading in the U.S., Botosan and Frost (1998) found a significant 
negative relationship between the timeliness, but not the level of disclosure, and liquidity.  In a 
later study, Botosan and Plumlee (2002a) found that more extensive and timely disclosure 
resulted in lower equity and debt costs.   In the case of debt finance, Sengupta (1998) produced 
similar results, finding that higher levels of disclosure are associated with lower interest rates. 
He argues that greater disclosure lowers perceived default risk and results in a lower cost of 
borrowing.  Another recent study (Bushee and Leuz 2004) of smaller U.S. firms coming under 
SEC regulations for the first time suggests that mandatory requirements do lead to more 
disclosure and for some firms a significant increase in liquidity.  Disclosure also had positive 
externalities for other firms who can be better valued and more easily raise funds. However, for 
some newly regulated firms, the costs of disclosure, both real and perceived, forced them to go 
private or into less regulated markets.  In an interesting study, Leuz and Verrechia (2000), using 
a group of German firms, some using less-informative German (IAS) standards and others 
more-expansive U.S. (GAAP) standards, found that the latter had lower bid-ask spreads and 
higher share turnover and therefore presumably lower capital costs.  
For the UK, Walker and Tsalta (2001), in a study for the Association of Certified Chartered 
Accountants, found that there is a strong positive relation between the quality of both review 
material and forward looking information in annual reports and analyst following.  In addition, 
they suggest that improvements in disclosure tend to be driven by higher levels of analyst 
following.  Gietzmann and Ireland (2004), using measures of disclosure, which attempt to 
capture quantity rather than quality of disclosure, find the expected negative relationship 
between timely disclosure and the cost of capital.  Schleicher and Walker (2002) and Hussainey 
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et al. (2003) find that improved levels of annual report disclosure lead to higher levels of share 
price anticipation of earnings and less volatility in shares, especially for loss making firms.
Chahine and Filatotchev (2005) review the literature on information disclosure and IPOs. Using 
signalling theory, they examine the links between disclosure, corporate governance, and 
‘underpricing’ of IPOs in France.  They argue that there is a negative effect of board 
independence and venture capital ownership on disclosure.  However, disclosure mitigates 
information asymmetry between the IPO firm and investors and has a significant negative effect 
on underpricing.  The results also suggest that other governance characteristics, such as board 
independence and venture capital ownership, may act as substitutes for disclosure.  This 
supports earlier work by Schrand and Verecchia (2002) for the U.S., which also found that 
greater disclosure is associated with lower underpricing.
Other research considers different outcomes.  Thus, Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) suggest 
that improved corporate disclosure results in higher levels of institutional ownership and less 
share volatility.  However, related research suggests higher institutional ownership is positively 
associated with stock market volatility (Sias 1996).  Bushee and Noe (2000) qualify this 
literature and suggest that this higher volatility is the result of ‘transient’ institutions, which are 
attracted by ‘good news’ and increase their holdings subject to disclosure changes.
It has long been argued that in the UK there has always been extensive ‘behind closed doors’ 
disclosure by top management to investors and fund managers and that this is both an advantage 
and disadvantage of the British system (Charkham 1994; Black and Coffee 1994).  Private 
briefings and ‘one-to-one’ meetings are an important aspect of information disclosure by firms 
to large investors.  In its guidance on the improper use of private information, insider dealing, 
and market abuse, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) draws attention to the grey area of 
illegality which exists around such briefings and selective disclosure (FSA 2005).  In terms of 
academic research, much of the UK work in this area is theoretical or legal.  It suggest that, on 
the one hand, activities of this kind can lead to the disclosure of price-sensitive information and 
give one set of investors, invariably large institutional investors and fund managers, an edge 
over others.  In turn, this can have adverse effects on credibility and market efficiency.  On the 
other hand, if within the law, the disclosure of private information can help in marketing a 
firm’s shares and in setting the right price for them.  It can also help smooth the market 
(Marston 1999).  A review of the legal literature suggests that on the whole the advantages of 
such briefings outweigh the costs and disadvantages and that such behaviour is likely to 
increase in the future (Hendry et al. 1999; Al-Hawamdeh and Smith 2005; Helbok and Walker 
2003).  One U.S. study suggests that the provision of good and timely information by firms 
limits insider’s ability to trade profitably on private information.  Using the intensity and 
profitability of insider trades to proxy for information asymmetry, Frankel and Li (2004) find 
that greater disclosure and increased analyst following is associated with reduced insider 
purchases and reduced profitability of insider trades.  Financial statement informativeness is 
negatively associated with the frequency of insider purchases.
Finally, we turn to a recent stream of cross-country research, which touches on information 
disclosure, its determinants and outcomes.   Much of this work uses the index developed by the 
Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR).  This represents the average 
number of 90 items included in the annual reports of a sample of domestic companies from a 
spread of countries.  The index has limitations, in particular it does not include private 
information and some of the scoring might be questioned.  However, the index suggests 
significant cross-country differences in corporate disclosure regimes and it has been widely 
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used to measure the quality of accounting information and investor protection in a country.  It 
should be noted that the UK scores high in the index on measures relating to information 
disclosure and informativeness.
In a much-quoted study, LaPorta et al. (1998) suggest that the CIFAR index is positively 
correlated with the willingness of investors to finance firms and the resulting costs of capital.  
The index is also significantly negatively related to concentration of stock ownership, 
suggesting that where there is less information disclosure and investor protection, there is a 
substitution towards monitoring by large shareholders, which the authors suggest may be more 
expensive.  However, the possibility that the causality goes in the opposite direction cannot be 
rejected.  Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) also find that the CIFAR index explains differences 
in the level of financial intermediary development – the lower the index in terms of 
transparency, the higher the level of financial intermediation.  In another study, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) show a positive correlation between the CIFAR index and external financing 
and between the index and the growth in the number of new enterprises.  Later, Lombardo and 
Pagano (2000) found a negative correlation between the CIFAR index and IPO underpricing.  
Also using the same index, Carlin and Mayer (2000) show that the growth in industry GDP and 
in R&D spending as a share of value added are higher in industries with a high demand for 
external financing in countries with a high CIFAR index.  
The index and the LaPorta type work has been strongly criticised by some commentators (for a 
useful overview, see Vitols 2005).  Others have tried to improve the index.  Thus, Bushman, 
Piotroski, and Smith (2001) provided a framework for measuring corporate transparency across 
countries, which includes the quality of corporate reporting and public information, measures of 
private information provision, and measures of the dissemination of information.  In part taking 
up on this, in more recent work, La Porta et al. (2004) use a more specific index of information 
disclosure (covering prospectus, transactions, shareholders, inside ownership, compensation, 
and irregular contracts).  Again it should be noted that the UK scores high in this.  The work 
shows that higher disclosure is positively correlated with larger stock markets, a larger number 
of listed firms, and IPO values and that it is negatively correlated with ownership concentration.
2.4.3 Other types of information disclosure
To this point we have discussed mainly (1) the public and private disclosure of financial and 
operating information by (2) senior managers and executives within the firm to (3) 
shareholders, fund managers, and analysts.  There are, however, other aspects of information 
disclosure, which have important implications for corporate governance and for firm 
performance. These are areas, which also start to take us away from a more structural approach 
based on economics and accounting and into areas of process analysis and areas where 
multidisciplinary perspectives are more useful. First, there is what might be called governance 
information viz. information on aspects of corporate governance per se, such as board 
composition, the make-up of committees, executive pay etc.  Here there has been little academic 
research to date on mandatory and voluntary disclosure of such information.  The main 
exception is on executive pay, which has received considerable public and academic attention.  
This is dealt with in more detail in section 2.6.  One useful review of the Australian literature by 
Collett and Hrasky (2005) suggests that voluntary governance disclosure is positively associated 
with the intention to raise equity capital, but not with the intention to raise debt capital. 
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Second, another area very important to corporate governance centres on the flows of 
information within management itself.  Here Williamson’s (1985) notion of information 
‘impactedness’ is useful – information may exist within an organisation, but it may be held by 
certain groups, and there are limits to the extent to which actors are able to understand and 
process the information (bounded rationality).  An important aspect of this is the flow of 
information to directors, especially non-executive directors.  Much thinking on governance is 
posited on the notion that the board of directors will monitor and check top management.  
Furthermore it is based on the notion that non-executive or independent directors will play a 
significantly large part in this.  It is then assumed that they will have free access to information 
required to fulfil their obligations of monitoring and control and that they will have the time and 
capability to process this (Tricker 1997).  One interesting Australian study (Nowak and McCabe 
2003), drawing on case studies of a number of companies, suggests that in practice many non-
executives believe that it is top management and full-time executives who have power over 
information and may release it differentially and at times which suit them.  There is thus a 
contradiction between theory and practice.  Access to information for monitoring and control 
therefore depends on the incentives of directors to seek information and on the incentives or 
‘integrity’ (Nowak and McCabe 2005) of top managers to provide it.  Some evidence to support 
the contention of information impactedness is to be found in Gaved (1997).  He notes that fund 
managers consistently express the wish to work only with executive directors.  In reality they 
are doubtful as to the quantity and quality of information, which non-executive directors 
possess.
Third, there is the provision of information by shareholders, especially large block and 
institutional shareholders, about their own activities.  Clearly in the case of large block holders, 
institutional investors, and venture capital funds, their actions have a significant effect on 
corporate governance.  Of course, there is law in this area.  At certain levels of ownership, large 
shareholders have to declare their holdings and also to declare their intentions in terms of 
takeover where this is appropriate under the City Takeover and Merger Code.  Also, in so far as 
institutional investors are themselves firms, they have to make disclosures to their own 
shareholders.  Where they are funds, such as pension funds, they have to make disclosures to 
their members.  There are a number of specialist areas of law here and a number of other 
academic literatures. One topic area concerns whether shareholders should provide information 
on how they cast their votes.  Thus, in the U.S., from 2003, the SEC has required that mutual 
funds disclose publicly their proxy voting policies and their voting records.  In the UK, the 
Hampel Committee has made recommendations in this area, and the government has announced 
that it will reserve rights to make this obligatory. Gaved (1998) has reviewed the limited and 
mainly normative literature and suggests a code of disclosure for institutional investors.  The 
suggestion is that it is important to have agents watching the agents and to have the latter 
making disclosures about their activities (Black 1992; Woidtke 2002).     
2.4.4 Conclusions
Four conclusions may be drawn on consequences, determinants, and interactions of information 
disclosure as a mechanism of corporate governance.
First, information disclosure, both public and private, has effects on corporate governance and 
in turn on business strategy and firm performance.  Many of these are beneficial e.g. reduced 
uncertainty and lower cost of capital.   
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Second, there are costs for the firm to be offset against any advantages and we have touched on 
some e.g. the possible attraction of short-term investors and greater share price volatility.  There 
are three other costs: (a) the fixed costs of producing and processing information; (b) the 
proprietary or indirect costs when competitors, customers, and others use the information to the 
firm’s disadvantage; and (c) the legal and reputational costs which may be incurred when firms 
get their information practices wrong.  
Third, we have mainly been concerned with how information disclosure may drive corporate 
governance.  However, it is also the case that other corporate governance arrangements can 
shape disclosure practice.  The studies cited above are not always able clearly to specify the 
direction of causal links.  The system of corporate governance plays a key role in the 
improvement of the quality of the financial reporting and information system for several 
reasons.  First, an effective governance system is able to identify the key recipients of 
information.  Second, no one dominant group dictates the disclosure content or timing of 
disclosure. Third, an effective corporate governance system is able to verify the information and 
decide on appropriate communication channels and timing (Forker 1992: Melis 2004).  One 
useful Australian study (Beekes and Brown 2005) suggests that better governed firms make 
more informative disclosures, in particular they make more price-sensitive disclosures, they 
have a larger analyst following, and price discovery is faster.  
Fourth, information acts as a substitute or complement for other forms of corporate governance.  
Other corporate governance mechanisms may substitute for information disclosure e.g. 
monitoring by large shareholders.  It is more likely that other corporate governance mechanisms 
complement information disclosure e.g. non-executive directors and independent auditors.  
There are thus interactions across corporate governance mechanisms, and information 
provision, though important, is not sufficient to solve all corporate governance problems.
2.5 Audit and Internal Controls
2.5.1 Introduction
Auditing and internal controlling are self-regulatory elements of corporate governance.  A well-
functioning system of auditing and controls is often seen as central to creating appropriate 
linkages of information, incentives, and governance between managers and investors. This 
process involves a wide set of intermediaries, including: various groups of investors; 
reputational intermediaries that certify the objectivity of information provided to investors, such 
as financial analysts, ratings agencies, internal and external auditors; and internal governance 
agents such as corporate boards (Palepu and Healy 2003).  Reputational intermediaries play a 
particularly central role as ‘gatekeepers’ in giving assurance about the quality of informational 
flows and compliance with governmental regulation (Grabosky 1995).  However, these 
intermediaries are themselves subject to their own sets of incentive and governance problems, 
and are therefore regulated by a variety of state agencies and professional bodies charged with 
certifying and maintaining standards.  
The external audit function has long been viewed as a certification mechanism to aid in 
controlling incentive or contracting problems (Lambert 2001).  Financial audit procedures, in 
particular, are intended to demonstrate the completeness, accuracy and validity of transactions, 
which make up the financial statements. Auditing and controlling issues were often considered 
technical and straightforward, and the issue received relatively little attention in the mainstream 
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of the corporate governance debate compared to topics such as board structure or shareholder 
activism.  This changed dramatically after the collapse of Enron in 2001.  The case suggested 
that the incentive structure that motivates actors in the system generates much less powerful 
checks against abuse than many observers have believed (Bratton 2002).  
While the case of Enron is not, in itself, evidence of a wide failure of corporate governance, 
many observers note that Enron and UK cases like Maxwell, are symptomatic of a wider set of 
governance issues related to the extent and quality of auditing.  The deeper problems with 
auditing are indicated by the fact that, between January 1997 and June 2002, approximately 10 
percent of all listed companies in the United States announced at least one financial statement 
restatement and resulted in an average decline of 10 percent of the firms’ stock prices (Coffee 
Jr. 2003).  This massive loss in shareholder wealth due to faulty financial statements suggests a 
more systematic problem.  
At the same time as concern grows regarding the quality of financial accounting and auditing, a 
growing interest in auditing is now arising from the stakeholder perspective (Baker and Owsen 
2002).  In order to support stakeholder involvement or monitoring in corporate decision-
making, a demand has grown for increased disclosure of information on corporate social 
responsibility or environmental performance.  All these aspects of information disclosure have 
widened the scope of issues in need of auditing or where firms are under pressure to develop 
systems of internal control.  The large economic literature on ‘reputational risk’ confirms the 
importance of auditing and control of a wide array of non-financial risks that may threaten the 
reputation of the firm, and damage intangible assets and consumer goodwill.  
A further and somewhat neglected aspect of this literature concerns how information disclosure 
and auditing relate to the broader firm-internal information flows and participation of 
stakeholders within the organisation.  For example, much of the broader social science literature 
on auditing has stressed the fact that auditing increasingly means the auditing of internal 
systems of control (Power 1997).  This broader social science perspective focuses not just on 
the incentives and legal constraints on behaviour, but the question of how corporate governance 
institutions influence people’s tendencies toward cooperative versus uncooperative behaviour 
(Blair 2002).  In particular, where corporate cultures instil large incentives for or acceptance of 
unethical behaviour, legal controls alone prove insufficient (Dallas 2003).  The process of 
‘distrust’ and verification can never give complete assurance, and therefore all governance 
processes need to carefully balance elements of ‘trust’ and ‘distrust’ (Lane and Bachmann 1998; 
Blair and Stout 2001).  
Consequently, growing attention has been placed on the links between external governance 
through auditors and internal controlling.  Controlling is also about assuring information flow to 
the board and procedures for monitoring compliance throughout the organisation. One 
emerging issue here is ‘whistle blowing’ and more generally governance mechanisms to assure 
that employees are protected when reporting fraud.
2.5.2 The governance role of auditors
2.5.2.1 Introduction
Audits involve verification based on the concept of sufficiency – namely, that the scope and 
depth of information is sufficient to enable an opinion to be formed.  Over time, the depth of 
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mechanical checking of financial calculations evolved into a ‘systems audit’ approach, where 
essentially auditors form an opinion as to whether adequate internal controls are in place so that 
the accuracy of financial information is assured (Power 1997).  The Cadbury Code requires that 
directors must now maintain effective systems of internal control, and has led to growing 
reflection of the process of auditing and controlling.  Some critics stress that while the public 
interest objective of audits is to detect fraud, in reality, audits deliver an opinion on the financial 
statements with reference to notion of fairness or ‘true and fair’ view (Humphrey and Moizer 
1990; Humphrey et al. 1992).  Attempts to develop audit guidance along these lines have results 
in the concept of having systems that yield ‘reasonable expectation’ of detecting fraud.  Within 
this context, the lack of clear criteria for establishing what audits can and cannot do leads to 
heated debates over the role of audit failure in corporate fraud.  Keasey and Wright note, “audit 
failures are almost impossible to judge because the activities of accounting and auditing are so 
vaguely defined” (Keasey and Wright 1993, p.299).  
The obscurity about the nature of assurance provided by accounting means that any evaluation 
ultimately appeals to practitioners’ judgement in determining what is reasonable.  Given this 
high level of uncertainty, the audit process is heavily involved in formal procedural knowledge 
and in the development of professional codes of ethics, rules on independence and the like 
(Preston et al. 1995).  This type of uncertainly about the quality of audits also entails that 
reputation and image management are essential in the operation of the auditing market (Podolny 
2001).  
2.5.2.2 Auditor independence 
Auditor effectiveness, like board effectiveness, hinges on the ability to act independently as a 
gatekeeper. However, the auditing industry has evolved to take a rather narrow and mechanical 
approach to auditing, eschewing issues of business judgement.  In the U.S., this approach 
evolved in response to the growing deregulation of the industry and threat of litigation against 
auditors in the 1970s.  These regulatory changes prompted auditing firms to move toward less 
variable, more mechanical and standardized auditing procedures (Palepu et al. 2003).  The 
sinking profit margins associated with this approach also prompted greater emphasis on 
economies of scale and gaining more clients.  Some observers note, in particular, that auditing 
firms became increasingly dependent on recommendations from large clients to generate higher 
volume business.  This dependency of client firms is noted as a factor that helped undermine the 
independence of U.S. auditing firms (Palepu et al. 2003).
Many U.S. observers note a decline in the quality of auditing and auditor independence during 
the 1990s, which contributed to scandals such as Enron. Coffee notes two trends (Coffee Jr. 
2003) in particular.  First, auditors faced reduced legal exposure as the result of legislation and 
judicial decisions in the 1990's sheltering them from liability.  Second, auditors also benefited 
from the increased potential for consulting income or other benefits from their clients that 
resulted in their acquiescence as gatekeepers or financial irregularities.
The provision of non-audit services by auditing firms is also considered to have a strong 
potential to undermine the objectivity and scepticism of the auditors, and consequently the 
independence of the audit process (Francis 2004).  The issue of Arthur Andersen’s 
independence is a case in point, since Andersen served as both Enron’s internal and external 
auditor for two years and ended up auditing the transactions on very same special purposes 
entities that it had advised to set up (Gillan and Martin 2002).
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Econometric evidence on these points is unfortunately scarce, and the results largely unclear.  
Based on a large sample of NYSE-traded S&P 1500 stocks, Acioglu et al. (2005) find some 
weak evidence to support the argument that auditor compensation lowers firm disclosure quality 
and market liquidity (Ascioglu et al. 2005).  Large consulting fees (relative to audit fees) 
received by auditors from the same client have been shown to influence auditor’s independence 
(Frankel et al. 2002).  Another study by Callaway et al. also finds that auditors are less diligent 
in curbing income-increasing earnings management for client firms from which they receive 
high proportions of non-audit fees (Callaway Dee et al. 2002).  However, other studies find that 
auditors are more likely to issue going concern opinions to clients paying higher audit fees, 
suggesting that auditors behave with relatively greater independence towards these clients 
(DeFond et al. 2002). Similarly, another study by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2003) concluded that 
auditor fees had no effect on discretionary accruals after controlling for firm performance.  
These results may suggest that market-based incentives, such as loss of reputation and litigation 
costs, override the benefits auditors are likely to receive from compromising their independence 
to retain clients that pay larger fees (Reynolds and Francis 2001).  Auditors may therefore be 
unlikely to risk their reputation on a single client’s indiscretions (Coffee Jr. 2003).  
One interesting interpretation of this literature suggests the link between auditor fees and 
independence may depend upon the corporate governance context of the client firms 
themselves.  A large study of over 2,000 U.S. firms showed that while no general relationship 
existed between auditor fees and accrual behaviour, the provision of non-audit services is 
potentially problematic for a small subset of firms that appear to be de facto controlled by 
management (Larcker and Richardson 2003).  Firms with lower institutional holdings, higher 
insider holdings, smaller board of directors (and audit committee), and lower percentage of 
independent board (and audit committee) members had more discretionary accruals.  
Despite the lack of clear empirical evidence, the climate of the late 1990s U.S. led to more 
fundamental arguments about the very system of auditing.  The audit system sets up a 
fundamental tension for the auditor because the parties to whom he technically owes allegiance 
are not the party who hires him and pays for his services (O’Connor 2004). If accountants rely 
on repeat business from management, auditors face a fundamental compromise of their 
objectivity and independence (O’Connor 2002). The provision of non-audit services by auditors
to their audit clients has exacerbated this fundamental tension.  The experience of the 1990’s 
U.S. suggests that auditors may act irrationally in acquiescing to managerial fraud, despite the 
large losses to reputation (Prentice 2000). 
This discussion suggests a question of how big the impact of auditor reputations might be, and 
whether this is effective as a governance mechanism.  Econometric analysis of the Arthur 
Andersen case in the wake of Enron suggest that the clients of Andersen lost only about 4 
percent more than the non-Andersen clients in risk-adjusted stock market returns over the 
events in the four month period (Callen 2002).  Likewise, audit fees have increased and 
concentrate even more on ‘Big Four’ audit firms following Enron (Asthana et al. 2004).  A 
further study did find a fall in information quality post-Enron across all auditors, and adverse 
effect on market risk premiums (Dunne et al. 2005).  However, the size of these effects seems 
rather modest and one cannot infer that reputation effects will be self-enforcing as a corporate 
governance mechanism.
These results are suggestive for the UK, where the situation regarding auditor independence is 
largely similar.  Auditors in the UK are appointed by and report to shareholders.  In theory, 
therefore, the UK system avoids the conflict of interest in the auditor being accountable to two 
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different constituencies. However, in practice the directors and auditors also have a conflict of 
interest because directors are required to manage the auditor on behalf of the shareholders 
(Turnbull 2005). Professional bodies in the UK have recently shifted from a rule-based notion 
of independence toward a more framework-based approach to independence (Citron 2003).  
This notion of independence is seen largely as accommodating the interests of the profession 
(ibid).  Other studies document the large concentration and importance of non-audit fees in the 
UK market (Beattie et al. 2003).  The largest four firms received 90 percent of audit fees in 
2002, and 96 percent following the demise of Andersen.  The average ratio of non-audit fees 
(paid to auditor) to audit fees was 208 percent.
These arguments have led to proposals about possible ‘best practices’ for auditors, including:
 The mandatory rotation or state-appointment of the external auditor; 
 Placing restrictions on the quantity of ‘non-audit’ tasks involving external auditors;        
 Placing unconstrained legal liability on auditors.
2.5.2.3 The role of the Audit Committee
Most public policy around the world has sought to address the issue of auditor independence 
largely by extending and improving the oversight of external auditors through an active audit 
committee within the board of directors.  The audit committee should assure that the auditors 
are independent from the CEO, but supervised closely by independent outside directors.  
Various governmental bodies and researchers have expressed doubts about the effectiveness of 
audit committees.  Again, cases involving fraud, such as Enron, have further vindicated those 
doubts.  
Despite the presence of the audit committee at Enron, serious issues appeared regarding the 
independence of committee members.  The U.S. Senate investigation into the role of the Enron 
board of directors in the company’s collapse highlighted numerous financial ties between Enron 
and certain directors in three general areas: directors being paid consulting fees in addition to 
board fees, transactions with entities in which directors played a major role, and donations to 
groups with which directors were affiliated (Gillan et al. 2002).  Such events have accentuated a 
variety of previous criticisms found in the literature. For example, audit committee members 
may lack genuine independence, expertise and experience in oversight (Cohen et al. 2002).  
Moreover, the level of interaction between the audit committee and auditors is highly variable 
(DeZoort 1998).  This raises a large set of research questions about how audit committees 
actually operate and to what extent they fulfil their responsibilities (Kalbers and Fogarty 1998)
The post-Enron literature explored further the potential weakness of the board's capacity to 
protect the integrity of financial disclosure, and highlighted problems related to the increasing 
reliance on stock price performance in measuring and rewarding managerial performance 
(Gordon 2002). Here the nominal independence of outside directors in the audit committee may 
be insufficient to assure better selection and monitoring in the audit process, since the those 
directors have few incentives to more actively intervene in the audit process (Blair 2002).  In 
particular, the dramatic changes in executive compensation toward equity-based compensation 
such as stock options has arguably given management strong incentives to inflate reported 
earnings and create short-term price spikes, even if they were unsustainable.  Here the use of 
independent directors does not address the fundamental conflict of interest.  In this regard, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been argued to further support the problem it was supposed to 
eliminate. The Act relies on what it defines as independent directors to manage their legally 
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mandated conflict of interest between shareholders or investors. However, this in turn 
introduces a conflict of interest between executives and non-non executive directors when a 
check on management is most required (Turnbull 2005).
Despite the huge debate over audit committees, empirical evidence on the role of audit 
committees is still mixed and inconclusive (Turley and Zaman 2004).  A few studies try to draw 
links between audit committees with outside membership and overall corporate performance 
(Laing and Weir 1999).  Here three more specific aspects of the literature on audit committees 
are identified and reviewed.
A first set of literature addresses the adoption of the audit committee as a response to agency 
costs.  One systematic review of the empirical literature concludes that, “Overall, the empirical 
evidence on the formation of, and/or reliance on, audit committees provides very limited 
support for viewing their effects solely in terms of managing the costs associated with agency 
related factors” (Turley et al. 2004). While the voluntary adoption of audit committees is 
positively related to board characteristics such as independence, the actual activity of the 
committee is mostly affected by firm size (Collier and Gregory 1999).  For example, the 
frequency of meetings has been found to increase with firm size and with increases in the 
proportion of outsiders on the board (Menon and Williams 1994).  Likewise, the number and 
duration of AC meetings are negatively related to the presence of a dominant chief executive 
officer (CEO) and positively related to top tier audit firms (Collier et al. 1999).
A second set of literature looks at the impact of audit committees on financial reporting itself, 
particularly the issue of so-called ‘earnings management.’  A study of 684 NYSE listed firms 
shows that having a majority of independent members of the audit committee reduced levels of 
earnings management (Klein 2000).  Similarly, Larcker et al. noted a negative link between 
board independence and earnings management (Larcker et al. 2003).  A positive link has also 
been demonstrated between audit committee existence and earnings overstatements, as 
indicated by prior period adjustments to correct errors in previous reports, are less likely among 
companies that have audit committees (Dechow et al. 2000; DeFond et al. 2002).  
Other recent studies stress the importance of director qualifications in promoting audit 
effectiveness (Xie et al. 2003), finding that board and audit committee members with corporate 
or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current 
accruals. Felo et al. also find that the percentage of audit committee members having expertise 
in accounting or financial management is positively related to financial reporting quality (Felo 
et al. 2003). The same authors report, however, that audit committee independence is not related 
to financial reporting quality, even when using several different measures of financial reporting 
quality. Thus, the empirical literature does provide some support for the view that mandating 
greater expertise on audit committees may be beneficial to investors.
A final set of literature looks at the impact of audit committees on broader aspects of the audit 
function.  There are several issues here, such as the selection, retention and removal of the 
auditor or influence the level of audit fees.  Given the difficulties of measuring independence, 
little evidence exists as to whether audit committees actually influence auditor independence 
(Turley et al. 2004).  One study finds no impact of audit committees per se on changes in 
auditors, but a negative relationship between auditor committee independence and irregular 
changes of auditors (Archambeault and DeZoort 2001).  Other literature looks more deeply at 
the broader social networks of audit committee members.  For example, one study of 247 
NYSE listed firms concluded that independent directors still displayed important biases in their 
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selection and retention of audit companies, in that their decisions were often influenced by 
relationships between the audit firms and the companies of the committee members (Reinstein 
and Weirich 1996).  Turning to audit fees, some evidence supports the idea that the audit 
committee seeks to enhance audit quality, and may lead to an increase in audit fees (Collier et 
al. 1999).  Meanwhile, little evidence suggests that if the audit committee initiates greater 
control over the audit process, fees may decrease.  
Turning to the UK specifically, empirical studies also suggest rather mixed evidence about the 
effectiveness of the audit committee.  On earning management, one study suggests that the 
existence of an audit committee is not associated with the extent of changes to financial 
statements (Beattie et al. 2003). Audit committees did reduce the confrontational intensity of 
interactions between auditors and management by increasing the level of discussion and 
reducing the level of negotiation.  Another study of audit committee independence and audit 
reporting has found that the greater the percentage of independent directors on the audit 
committee, lower the probability that the auditor will issue a going-concern audit qualification 
(Carcello and Neal 2003).  For a sample of 47 UK firms subject to regulatory action by the 
FRRP, no significant relationship existed between FRRP action and presence of audit 
committees (Peasnell et al. 2000).  However, Windram and Song (2000) found a significant 
negative relationship between FRRP action and the AC’s financial literacy, the frequency of AC 
meetings and the number of outside directorships held by AC members (Windram and Song 
2000).
On the audit process, one study of UK firms found no evidence that the presence of audit 
committees impact the level of audit fees (Goddard and Masters 2000).  However, another study 
of 402 listed UK firms found that the proportion on non-executive directors did have a positive 
impact on audit fees, while the proportion of equity owned by executive directors had a 
negative impact (O'Sullivan 2000).  This suggests that non-executive directors may play a 
beneficial role in raising the intensity of auditing.  Consistent with theories stressing auditor 
reputation, ‘Big Six’ auditing firms had a positive effect on audit committee activity (Collier et 
al. 1999).  
On the whole, recent literature expresses strong scepticism as to whether the integrity of audits 
is improved by the appointment of independent directors and auditing committees (Romano 
2004).  The most robust evidence seems to be that the qualifications of audit committee 
members have a positive impact on various aspects of the auditing process.  Yet, in one recent 
evaluation of the empirical literature, the authors suggest the following conclusion:
“The fact that corporate failures and irregularities occur in companies with ACs 
complying with, or even exceeding, recommended best practice illustrates the 
importance of understanding the process associated with audit committee operations. 
For example, Enron provides an example which counters the proposition that financial 
literacy among AC members will lead to effectiveness…While audit committees may be 
enhanced by certain characteristics (such as independence and expertise), these 
attributes alone are unlikely to deliver an improvement in financial reporting quality… 
Policy on audit committees has tended to emphasise characteristics of the committee 
and its members, but the processes through which the AC’s activities are conducted and 
the impact on other organisational processes and the behaviour of other participants are 
of at least equal importance. Extant research provides very little understanding of these 
processes.” (Turley et al. 2004)
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Likewise, one of the most in-depth qualitative studies on auditing, based on interviews with 
members of UK audit committees, suggests their largely ceremonial function in giving mutual 
assurance and comfort to outsiders, rather than their substantive role in intervention and 
verification of company information (Spira 1999b; Spira 1999a).  
2.5.2.4 The role of shareholders 
Scandals such as Enron, Tyco, or Parmalat also demonstrated the interdependence between 
auditing and disclosure practices and the ‘demand’ for information by investors.  These cases 
provide serious reasons to question the strength of the efficient market hypothesis given that, for 
example, Enron’s stock price was based on a highly irrational reliance on its auditors' 
compromised certification (Gordon 2002).
 A central issue is how information links with the incentives of investment fund managers 
(Coffee Jr. 2003).  The ‘herding argument’ suggests that institutional investors may be 
“uniquely focused on their quarterly performance vis-à-vis their rivals, and have strong 
incentives to ‘ride the bubble,’ even when they sense danger, because they fear more the 
mistake of being prematurely prophetic” (Coffee Jr. 2003). 
A range of academic research findings have found evidence that sell-side analysts are 
influenced by their proximity to investment banking. Several U.S. studies show that earnings 
forecasts and investment recommendations are more optimistic for analysts that work for lead 
underwriter banks (Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999; Dechow et al. 
2000).  Selective disclosure by companies, together with a desire by analysts to maintain access 
to management and to attract investment banking business to their employers, is shown to lead 
to biased earnings forecasts (Hutton 2002). In general, the conflict between research and 
underwriting may explain a decline in sell recommendations by analysts over time and the poor 
record of analysts that covered dot-com stocks.
However, some research indicates that blockholders who play a more active monitoring role can 
make positive contributions to audit quality and lead to lower levels of earnings management.  
For example, one U.S. study showed that the presence of a blockholder within the audit 
committee had a large and significant impact in reducing earnings management of listed firms 
(Klein 2000).  One UK study on auditing, however, found no evidence that large blockholders 
had any significant impact on audit fees (O'Sullivan 2000).  
2.5.2.5 Regulation and professional norms
A last important area of research concerns the impact of regulatory intervention itself on the 
auditing process.  Just considering the UK, inquiries by the UK Financial Reporting Review 
Panel (FRRP) have been shown to have a positive impact on subsequent auditor independence 
and compliance practices, since personal embarrassment and loss of personal reputation appear 
highly motivating to board members (Fearnley et al. 2002).  In particular, the FRRP helps give 
auditing firms additional leverage in negotiating with directors and thereby prevent non-
compliance.  Moreover, the presence of executive directors on the audit committee was found to 
have a negative impact on audit committee activity (Collier et al. 1999).  
Finally, an under explored area of research has been the role of professional bodies themselves.  
Various scandals such as Enron, Tyco, or Parmalat, have led to international debates about the 
need to re-examine the incentives inside the audit firms that would be needed to encourage audit 
professionals to exercise judgment, and walk away from clients that don’t deserve their 
certification, even when they are large and important clients (Bratton 2002).
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2.5.3 The governance role of internal controls
2.5.3.1 Introduction
The Turnbull Guidance (1999 2005) is about the adoption of a risk-based approach to 
establishing a system of internal control and reviewing its effectiveness and aims to provide a 
conceptual framework for companies to disclose risk.   It makes good business sense to manage 
risk effectively and to embed internal control in the business processes by which a company 
pursues its objectives.  An internal control system encompasses the policies, processes, tasks, 
behaviour and other aspects of a company taken together. With Enron and WorldCom, few 
boards will need to have constant remainders that managing risk is important to the overall well 
being of the business. The proliferation of risk management systems has become a prevalent 
feature of contemporary organisations (Power 1997).  As noted in the previous sections, a 
growing aspect of auditing and disclosure relates to using self-regulation within the corporation 
itself in the form of procedures and standard practices of risk management and control.  
2.5.3.2 Risk management systems
The board of directors is directly responsible for a company’s risk management and control 
(Turnbull 1999; Financial Reporting Council 2005).  The Combined Code states that it is the 
responsibility of the audit committee to not only consider the internal financial control but also 
look at the broader aspect of the internal control and risk management systems.  Despite 
practitioners increasing interest in internal control and corporate risk management there has 
been little published to conceptualise an adequate system of internal control that promotes good 
corporate governance (Solomon et al. 2000).  Companies are still able to be flexible to 
individual company needs, which is particularly relevant for grouped companies (Meyrick-
Jones 1999).  However, systems should still be referenced towards safeguarding shareholder 
value (Groves 1999; Blackburn 1999).  It is important to stress that risk should be managed, no 
eliminated.  Elimination of risk would be contrary to economic principles in that risk is 
effectively part of the entrepreneurial process and profits are seen to be the reward for risk 
taking.  If then risk is to be managed rather than eliminated, the board of directors must ensure 
that all types of risk are considered (Informa Group 2003).  
If a broader approach to risk is to be taken, the board of directors cannot directly manage risks 
in such diverse areas. However, they must be satisfied that responsibility for managing 
appropriate levels of risk has been delegated to individuals at the appropriate levels within the 
company.  This should ensure that risk is fully embedded in the firm’s culture. This would 
include not only legal/regulatory compliance and financial risks, but broader assessment of 
items that could be strategic, people, market, ethical or operational risk (RSM International 
2003).    Legal and compliance risk is one of the biggest risks that a company could ignore.  
There is a vast regulatory environment that the company must comply with, ranging from 
accounting and finance laws to health and safety.  Strategic risk can affect a company in a 
number of ways, such as failure to have a proactive focused corporate strategy or manage 
change within the internal environment.   Ethical risk to the company would involve items such 
as the failure to have high ethical standards across the business, and obtain contracts via 
unethical means (Cooke 1991).  This could also then cross over into financial risks and 
susceptibility to fraud or accounting irregularities.  
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Competitive risks involve items such as not responding to the developments within the 
marketplace.  This might involve a firm lagging behind its competitors with regards to area such 
as technological advances within its product range or Internet developments, both internally and 
externally.  After sales services being weak could also provide higher levels or risk in a 
competitive marketplace, especially if the company is already floundering by not responding to 
market trends.  Internal communication with the company can highlight risks at all levels.  
Within the board of directors, there is particular reputation risk to the human capital of directors 
if performance is poor (Cannella Jr et al. 1995).  There is also the risk of loosing key members 
form the board of directors. A practitioner survey shows many company boards do have clarity 
when it comes to identifying the key risks faced by their companies.  Robson Rhodes show that 
72 percent of respondents in their 2003 survey claimed that key risks have been identified at 
board level (RSM Robson Rhodes 2003).  
All of the various types of risk, and particularly the invention of the catch-all notion of 
‘operational risk’, are recognized as contributing to a broad notion of reputational risk (Power 
1997).  Although reputation is an intangible asset, a growing literature in economics recognizes 
the value of reputation.  Reputation management is particularly important when firms face crisis 
situations, and where external stakeholders focus attention on various sorts of mismanagement.  
The proliferation of risk management also reflects the defensive stance of groups, such as 
companies or professionals, who used to absorb risk on behalf of the public.  The growing 
salience of reputational risk may help explain the increasing interest in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), as well as the diffuse nature of this debate.
A study by the Institute of Chartered Accountants for England and Wales (1997) not only 
reveals a lack of risk information in the UK but advocates that risk should be incorporated in 
firms financial statements.  There is now even greater concern for advocating financial control 
following the powers introduced under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The IFRS will increase the risk of compliance for 
companies and their auditors (The Institute of Charted Accounts in England & Wales 2004).  
2.5.4 Support and protection of ‘whistleblowers’
2.5.4.1 Introduction
Jubb (1999) suggests that the term whistleblowing should not be directly interchangeable with 
‘informing’ and insists that “whistleblowing is characterized as a dissenting act of public 
accusation against an organization which necessitates being disloyal to that organization” (Jubb 
1999 p77).  Furthermore, whistleblowing is seen as the process whereby employees are able to 
report any practice or incident where members of the company have been behaving unethically 
(Lewis 2001).    
There are organisational needs for both loyalty and institutionalised whistleblowing (Wim and 
Commers 2004).  Whistleblowers often act because, as professionals, they feel compelled to 
adhere to certain recognised ethical standards (Brinker et al. 1985).  The moral motive for 
whistleblowing is further discussed by Bowie and Duska (1990) and implied by Chambers 
(1995).  However, the truth is that support for whistleblowers’ might not be there.  Employees 
may experience retaliation for doing so (Martin 2000).  There might be the threat of job loss, an 
unexpected department demotion or physical threats. It is no surprise that there has been the 
public acknowledgement that whistleblowing is relevant to all organisations and systems to 
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protect whistleblowers should be an everyday function of corporate life (Borrie and Dehn 
2001).  
The Public Interest Disclosure Act (1998) provides protection for whistleblowers. This implied 
that employees should be encouraged to ‘raise concerns’ and hence installing internal company 
whistleblowing policies was a proactive way to ensure early-warning systems were established 
in organisations and help maximize long-term owner value from an ethic perspective (Sternberg 
1996).   This act provided full protection to the whistleblower, who if victimized, could then 
claim to an employment tribunal.  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (2003) highlighted that 
responsibility should be with the board of directors who should be more accessible, with an 
open door policy with regards to whistleblowing. Finally, the new revised Combined Code 
(2003) clearly shows the responsibility for systems to enable (and protect) whistleblowing lies 
now with the audit committee: “The audit committee should review arrangements by which 
staff of the company may, in confidence, raise concerns about possible improprieties in matters 
of financial reporting or other matters. The audit committee’s objective should be to ensure that 
arrangements are in place for the proportionate and independent investigation of such matters 
and for appropriate follow-up action” (Combined Code 2003 section C 3.4 p17).
The guidance challenges the board to ensure that there are adequate procedures to track any 
whistleblowing and further follow the actions that have been taken in relation to the concerns 
raised by the whistleblower.   This then ensures that companies complement the Act with their 
own internal procedures.  
Empirical research on the effectiveness of the whistleblowing procedures is difficult to find, 
presumably due the requests for anonymity.  However, Public Concern at Work reported in 
2003, that people were twice as likely to blow whistles at work than five years ago (Public 
Concern at Work 2003).  Increasingly there are debates as to good practice within this area 
which supplement board and company advice contained within the Combined Code (2003) and 
the Turnbull Guidance (2005).  Practitioners and government bodies ensure that this remains 
within the public eye.  The Committee on Standards in Public Life (2005) has only recently 
endorsed the following four key elements of good practice with regards to whistleblowing:  (1) 
ensuring that staff are aware of and trust the whistleblowing avenues, (2) the provision of 
realistic advice about what the whistleblowing process means for openness, confidentiality and 
anonymity, (3) a continual review of how the procedures work in practice, and (4) ensuring 
regular communication to staff about the avenues open to them.  
2.5.5 Costs of audits and controls
Auditing and internal controls impose considerable costs upon firms.  The costs of any 
significant new regulation may outweigh the compliance yield, particularly given the 
entrepreneurial and risk taking purposes of private corporations. Legal regulation and reputation 
effects will inevitable prove inadequate as constraints. 
Evidence from the U.S. suggests that outright audit failure rates are infrequent, far less than 1 
percent annually, and audit fees are quite small, less than 0.1 percent of aggregate client sales 
(Francis 2004). Francis argues that there may be an acceptable level of audit quality at a 
relatively low cost. However, the cost of failure in the area of auditing and controls, as well as 
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the impact of earnings restatements on shareholders may be quite high (Coffee Jr. 2003).  The 
appropriate trade-off between the quality and cost of auditing and control are likely to be 
affected by a number of important contingencies, such as the involvement of stakeholders, 
incentives and composition of boards, or different patterns of ownership.  Francis concludes, 
“We do not know from research the optimal level of audit quality and therefore whether we 
currently have ‘too little’ or ‘too much’ auditing?”
Literature on internal control and risk management has also suggested a number of critical 
points. In particular, the trend toward defensive reporting and proliferation of internal 
procedures as part of risk management are all extremely time consuming and may undermine 
the ethics of communication and cooperation with organisations (Power 1997).  These trends 
undermine the distinction between regulation, auditing and organisation-specific rules, since 
private actors are likely to consider procedures defensively and demonstrate compliance.  The 
management of risk may effectively undermine professional judgement, as professionals 
themselves attempt to ‘manage’ risks associated with their own judgements.  
2.5.6 Complementarity and substitution among governance mechanisms
The intense focus on auditing reflects the importance of disclosure and quality of public 
information within Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems.  Here the efficiency of market-
based governance mechanisms depends, in strong part, on the transparency of corporate 
information.  This emphasis is therefore rather different than in European or Japanese corporate 
governance, where private information flows between stakeholders play a greater role.  Where 
stakeholders have their own sources of private information, corporate governance systems may 
be less vulnerable to gatekeeper failure.  Here fewer conflicts of interest may exist between the 
way executives are paid and the process of the audit.  Furthermore, inside stakeholders, such as 
employees, may bring internal information to bear that is independent from the executive 
directors, thereby increasing transparency and quality of internal control systems.  
In the UK context, auditing independence is closely linked to broader issues of director 
independence and shareholder involvement.  Here it seems unlikely whether auditing and 
internal controls act as substitutes for these corporate governance devices, but they may prove 
complementary in the sense that genuine director independence may strengthen the audit 
process, and quality auditing will strengthen the effectiveness of monitoring by the board or 
shareholders.  However, perhaps more fundamental, are issues of incentives and conflicts of 
interest that may undermine the quality of firm-internal communication. 
2.6 Executive Pay
2.6.1 Introduction
This section is concerned with the impact that corporate governance initiatives have had on the 
remuneration of UK executives.  Over the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the levels of executive 
pay were felt by many to increase dramatically and unjustifiably (Smith and Szymanski 1995).  
Whilst the Cadbury Report (1992) made several recommendations on good practice, the general 
opinion was that it did not go far enough with regards to executive pay (Association of British 
Insurers 1994).  The Cadbury Report’s prime recommendation connected with pay was the 
establishment of a Remuneration Committee.  This committee was to be more independent, 
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consisting of wholly (or mainly) non-executive directors; furthermore, the pay setting 
procedures were to demonstrate greater transparency.  Aside from this, the general consensus 
was that Cadbury did little to address the issue of executive pay in detail.  Instead, the main 
focus was on disclosure and transparency.  Some investor groups (such as the National 
Association of Pension Funds and the Association of British Insurers) were highly disappointed, 
having hoped that Cadbury would bring about more specific suggestions, such as shorter service 
contracts for executive directors, improved disclosure of pay levels, and showing the different 
elements of pay for individual directors.  
Greenbury Report (1995) reinforced the Cadbury approach by extending the role and the 
independence of the remuneration committee, which should be composed entirely of non-
executive directors and report directly to shareholders via the annual report and accounts 
(including the chair of remuneration committees attending the company’s AGM).  The 
remuneration committee were to cover all aspects of remuneration including service contracts, 
severance pay, bonuses, incentive schemes and disclosure of these in the remuneration 
committee’s report.  
The early 1990s also saw an increasing academic debate within the UK and elsewhere (Conyon 
and Leech 1994; Keasey et al. 1993; Hallock and Murphy 1999; Tosi et al. 2000).  These 
studies showed that whilst there had been a rapid growth in the levels of remuneration, there 
was a suggestion that these increased levels of pay did not promote or reflect increased 
company performance.
2.6.2 The governance role of executive pay schemes
The implementation of incentive schemes to promote shareholder value is underpinned by 
agency theory.  Classic agency theory shows a relationship where the owners (principals) of 
companies, namely the shareholders, delegate the management of the company to hired persons 
(agents) (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980).  These agents take the form of management 
and in particular the higher echelons of company management, i.e. the board of directors. The 
separation of ownership from control leads to information asymmetries, and leaves room for 
self-serving opportunist behaviour by the agent (Berle and Means 1932).  Within the agency 
theory literature, executive pay is a key mechanism for helping to minimize agency costs in 
order to align the incentives of managers with the interests of shareholders.  (Eisenhardt 1989).  
The central prescription of the agency theory literature is to develop outcome based contracts 
for the executive (Fama and Jensen 1983), and designing these contracts to include an 
appropriate incentive in terms of a compensation plan (Williamson 1985).  Corporate 
governance issues such as monitoring of verifiable performance targets and incentive alignment 
should also be an integral part of such contracts.  Indeed, “corporations can and should increase 
their control over top managers by increasing the use of managerial incentives and monitoring 
by the board of directors” (Zejac and Westphal 1994 p121). 
In designing such contracts, Hart (1995) argues that any contract design will not be able to 
cover all eventualities.  In short, all contracts are inherently incomplete because attempting to 
write a contract that would cover all future eventualities would be insurmountable.  
Consequently, incentive contracts for executives need to be complemented by other corporate 
governance mechanisms that support monitoring of management, such as having independent 
directors in charge of remuneration and nomination of executive directors.  
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In the absence of a ‘perfect contract’, the interests of the shareholders can be promoted by the 
remunerations committee issuing a ‘second best’ contract that relates executive reward to the 
performance of the company (Fama 1980; Fama et al. 1983).   Such contracts should 
incorporate incentive schemes for executive directors as this is deemed to be a key help in 
overcoming agency problems (Murphy 1985; Beatty and Zajac 1994; Fama 1980; Fama et al. 
1983; Dittmann and Maug 2003).  Indeed this is supported by the recommendations of the 
Greenbury Report (1995) and the Combined Code (2003).
In response to this and in order to recruit and retain competent executives, companies within the 
UK design compensation strategies to incorporate long-term incentives (Conyon et al. 2000b; 
Conyon 2000).  These compensation strategies involve the use of two main types of incentives, 
namely the executive share option scheme (ESOS) and the long-term incentive plan (LTIP).   
To assist companies in devising suitable schemes which align the interests of executives and 
shareholders, the Greenbury Report (1995) and the Association of British Insurers (ABI) have 
continued to promote ‘best practice’ and over the years since 1995 the ABI have issued various 
proposed ‘best practice’ guidelines (Association of British Insurers 1996; 1999; 2002; 2004).  
These guidelines recommend that companies adopt conditional incentive schemes, which 
incorporate predetermined performance criteria, which must be met before option and LTIP 
grants can vest to the executive.  If performance criteria are not met by the executive then grants 
should lapse and so the executive gains nothing.
2.6.3 Executive pay tied to performance
The Combined Code (2003, p 12) states that: “A significant proportion of executive directors 
pay should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance”. With 
this in mind executive pay can be seen to have three distinct elements.  Firstly, a ‘base’ pay, 
which usually includes fees salary and bonus, secondly, additional benefits to the executive, for 
example perquisites, (annual cash values of company cars, club memberships etc.) and lastly, 
long term incentives (generally ESOs or LTIPs) (Conyon et al. 2000b). This modern day 
structure of compensation can be seen to be clearly underpinned by the principal agent problem 
and with agency theory in mind, does promote executives to act in the shareholders interests 
(Rosen 1990).  Such compensation structures are not however the direct result of the policy 
developments with the UK.  It was clear even prior to Cadbury, that such incentive style pay 
elements were awarded (Main and Johnston 1993).  However, performing detailed empirical 
research in the UK in the early 1990’s proved to be difficult due to the lack of information 
disclosure (Gregg et al. 1993).  
Caution is necessary in considering the early studies of executive pay and how it is linked with 
performance.  Firstly, the measure of compensation used in some early UK studies focussed on 
the cash elements of compensation i.e. salary and bonus and was generally only the amount 
attributed to the highest paid director rather than the whole board of directors.  There is also no 
indication as to whether any account was taken for exceptional payments (such as an incentive 
bonus to join the company), which would temporarily distort the levels of pay (Bruce and Buck 
1997).
Secondly, this method only measures actual compensation paid and takes no account of any 
long-term compensation, such as the estimated value of share options and any other forms of 
deferred remuneration.  Some scholars argue that by excluding an estimation of these additional 
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components the actual level of pay recorded is underestimated (Murphy 1985).  The 
consequence of this is that any estimated relationship between levels of remuneration and 
company performance may be biased (Bruce et al. 1997; Conyon et al. 1995).  Of particular 
relevance here is that Murphy (1999) concluded for the U.S. that there is the tendency for the 
non-cash incentive pay to be greater than the cash element and Conyon and Murphy (2000a) see 
the UK following in the same direction.  So the question about the pay-performance link still 
remains unanswered.  Evidence from the UK is not only conflicting but also limited in exactly 
what proportions of pay have achieved greater performance outcomes.  For example, Gregg et 
al. (1993) study 288 large UK companies (based on the top 500 Stock Exchange companies).  
Whist their study covers a period of 1983-1991 (pre Cadbury), they found that whilst pre 1988, 
there was a weak pay-performance link, after this the link broke down and was not significant.  
One of the first studies to be completed in the UK that incorporated the values of executive 
option grants was that of Main, Bruce and Buck (1996).  Although their sample was 
comparatively small (only 60 companies), they found evidence of a much stronger link 
between pay and performance.  With a broader approach having been taken towards 
measuring pay, the strengthening of the pay performance link might be due to the 
incorporation of performance-based contracts.  In support of this, Conyon et al.(2000c) also 
found a link between pay and performance.  This study, however, only covers a period up to 
1995, but uses two primary measures of performance: total shareholder return (defined as the 
return of an investors shareholding reflected in the company’s share price, assuming all 
dividends are reinvested) and earning per share (defined as the total profit after tax divided by 
the number of ordinary shares). Whilst links were positive with regards to total shareholder 
return, no link existed between pay and earnings per share.  However, it is hard to distinguish 
in such early studies any impact of the corporate governance reforms, as there is little 
information whether the companies studied had incorporated suggested reforms into their pay 
strategies at the time.  
Following on from these early studies, Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2005) sample companies in 
1997.  These companies had the opportunity to incorporate ‘best practice’ and yet still did not 
demonstrate the stronger links found by Main et al. (1996).  With little evidence in this study to 
link pay and performance, Conyon et al. propose that pay-performance links vary with the 
structure of the option contract given to executives.  In a further study of 510 CEOs in the fiscal 
year 1997/1998 Conyon (2001) found evidence of a positive relationship between firm 
performance and the effective ownership of stock-based compensation by management.
Whilst differences in compensation levels are observed and links to performance in these 
studies are significant, other scholars offer a word of caution that these may not be due to 
increased performance but could result from differences in firm size, growth opportunities, firm 
financial policy, ownership characteristics, and other governance arrangements (Konstantinos et 
al. 2004). 
The focus of these studies was to investigate the links between pay and performance, a parallel 
stream of research also developed examining the differing types of incentive pay being used.  
With the public emphasis, via the Combined Code, that incentive should now be linked to 
performance, it was not surprising to see a growing use of variable pay packages with specific 
performance targets attached (Câmara 2001; Pass et al. 2000).  However, early evidence shows 
that UK companies post 1995 who have imposed specific performance targets have not 
necessarily increased performance levels or out performed those with no performance criteria 
(Pass 2003). Pass (2003) shows that a substantial proportion of the schemes used are 
‘undemanding’, rewarding for average performance rather than exceptional performance. 
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Indeed, Edelsten (2005) recently encouraged employers to incorporate best practice in incentive 
design and stated that this would involve clarifying what the concept of ‘good performance’ 
means. Even with the growth of performance conditions and the use of LTIPs there has still 
been an increase in average total rewards to executives. Yet there has been an apparent 
reduction in the performance sensitivity with regard to pay (Buck et al. 2003).  This study 
suggests that the effectiveness of either the incentive mechanism or the performance targets are 
still not adequate.  It is unclear then as to whether the types of incentive grant has any differing 
effect on performance, however, there has been a growing switch from share options to LTIPs, 
with only two-thirds of FTSE 100 companies now continuing to grant share options and around 
80 percent granting LTIPs (IDS 2005).  
2.6.4 The Remuneration Committee
Following the recommendations of the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports, and in line 
with the Combined Code, the remuneration committee is primarily responsible for the setting of 
executive pay.  The theoretical importance of the remuneration committee is clear, as without it, 
executives have the opportunity to award themselves levels of pay that have no relationship to 
shareholders interests (Williamson 1985).  The remuneration committee of today should 
comprise “at least three, or in the case of smaller companies two members who should be 
independent non-executive directors” (Combined Code 2003, Section b.2.1 p 14). The 
committee must consider when setting compensation that it should attract, retain and motivate 
high quality directors.  In doing so they must compare levels of the pay with the performance of 
the company and examine pay levels within the given industry.  It must also be sensitive to the 
organisations pay strategy on a wider scale.  Further it should ensure that it follows Schedule A 
within the Combined Code when designing schemes of performance related pay, which should 
be a significant proportion of the total remuneration package.  
Main and Johnson (1993) studied 220 large UK companies in 1990 for evidence of a 
remunerations committee finding that some 30 percent indeed had them.  Where they existed, 
Main and Johnson found that they were often not composed solely of non-executives, which is 
now seen as good practice.  Furthermore, they found a positive relationship between the highest 
paid director’s compensation and whether the company revealed the existence of a 
remunerations committee.  This suggests that having a remuneration committee was not an 
indication of improved corporate governance.  Indeed their findings showed that remuneration 
committees seemed to be associated with higher levels of pay and made no positive impact on 
the incentive structure of pay.  Whilst this study was pre-Cadbury, further support comes from 
Conyon and Peck (1998), who also reported that higher levels of executive pay were associated 
with a greater proportion of independent directors on the remuneration committee. Therefore, 
independence of the remuneration committee may not provide adequate controls over the levels 
of pay.  Daily et al. (1998) found no evidence that remuneration committees with affiliate 
directors paid the executives higher than independent committees.
This could be indicative of Ezzamel and Watson’s (1998) suggestion that a ‘cosy collusion’ 
exists between executive directors and non-executive director who happen to sit on each others 
remuneration committees and thus are able to bid up each others earning. If this is the case then 
the concept of the remuneration committee is failing and not tough enough (Brett 2003).  In the 
UK, nearly half of company chairmen surveyed in the wake of the Hampel Report thought that 
bidding up of pay occurred, but as a consequence of increased disclosure rather than the 
presence of remunerations committees (Clarke et al. 1998).  
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2.6.5 Pay disclosure
Academics have cited lack of disclosure as a barrier to compensation research (Conyon, 2001; 
Egginton et al., 1993; Gregg et al., 1993; Main et al., 1996) and bodies such as the Association 
of British Insurers has called for greater levels of disclosure (Association of British Insurers, 
1996).  The disclosure of directors’ pay has increased over the last 15 years.  Pre Cadbury few 
details where included and certainly not against named board members (unless the CEO or 
Chairman). The disclosure requirements now provide for greater transparency and are contained 
within the statutory based Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002). This requires 
companies to provide information as to names of remuneration committee members (and 
advisors where used), overall remunerations policy statements, performance conditions for 
share options and LTIPs, and details of service contracts to name but a few. The regulations 
provide a comprehensive framework for shareholders to assess how well remuneration is 
governed.  This increased level of disclosure has particularly been welcomed by bodies such as 
the ABI (Association of British Insurers, 2004) whilst others advocate caution (Conyon, 2001)
with the benefits unproven (Conyon et al., 2002).  Early research suggests that there is a high 
level of compliance with the regulations with most of the top 350 FTSE companies disclosing 
what the regulations require (Deloitte & Touche, 2004).  However, meeting the regulations 
requirements for disclosure still does not mean that the company’s remuneration policies and 
practices will be clearly explained.  Deloitte & Touche’s research suggests that only half of the 
FTSE 350 companies use the remuneration report to communicate their remuneration policies 
in an effective way.
As mentioned above, levels of disclosure might be perceived as a mechanism that increases 
overall pay levels for executives (Clarke et al., 1998).  It is however perhaps too early to say 
what effect (if any) this has had on levels of executive pay as the regulations only came into 
force in August 2002.  One thing is known, the UK is considered to be well in advance of most 
other European countries, with possibly the highest levels of disclosure in the world (Sunders, 
2005). 
2.6.6 Costs, complementary and substitution among governance mechanisms
Practitioners believe the issues of executive compensation is now more complex (Deloitte 
2005).   There are more ‘rules’ to follow.  Greater transparency means more inspection by 
shareholders and the general public.  Moreover, other company stakeholders are taking a greater 
interest in executive pay.  
The question still remains as to how effective incentive pay mechanisms are in promoting 
shareholder value.  Whilst Murphy (2003) in the USA has found a growing trend towards 
greater proportions of incentive pay in new economy firms the link to performance is still 
questionable.  This growing trend is replicated in the UK where on average, incentives currently 
comprise 51.7 percent of FTSE 100 lead executives total earning, whereas one year ago, the 
proportion was 41 percent (IDS 2005).  
Given the weakness of the link between executive pay and performance, improving the 
effectiveness of incentive contracts needs to be supported by a variety of other complementary 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Conventional wisdom does stress that executive pay must 
be implemented and monitored by genuinely independent directors within the board.  This 
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section also suggested the importance of shareholder activism in promoting more fair and 
equitable executive pay schemes, both directly in terms of pressuring companies and indirectly 
by improving the quality of independent directors. A further argument exists that other 
stakeholders should be involved in the design of executive pay schemes.  The recent experience 
of Germany suggests that employee representation in the board has important effects on the 
design of executive stock option plans, leading to adoption of more and qualitatively stricter 
performance conditions than similar U.S. companies (Buck and Sharhrim 2005).  Finally, given 
the paucity of evidence on the effectiveness of current executive pay schemes, a large debate 
has emerged over the costs of executive pay and expensing of stock options within company 
balance sheets.  
2.7 The Market for Corporate Control
2.7.1 Introduction
The market for corporate control is one of the most controversial aspects of corporate 
governance.  Many takeovers are motivated by industry-specific factors such as synergy effects 
(Chatterjee 1986), gaining market access or power (Stigler 1982), diversification (Marris 1964)
or restructuring in response to changes in the technological, economic or institutional 
environment (Pfeffer 1972).  Firms may use acquisitions to access new products, research and 
knowledge (Hitt, et al. 1996).  Acquisitions may also provide important exit strategies for 
investors and entrepreneurs (Thornton 1999).  Moreover, waves of acquisitions often occur in 
response to changes in regulatory environments, such as deregulation of an industry or financial 
innovations related to financial markets or systems of taxation (Stearns/Allan 1996; Fligstein 
1990).  A large social science literature has emerged in this regard as to the role of M&A in 
corporate strategy.
A second broad set of motivations for takeovers relate to corporate governance and the agency 
costs associated with the separation of ownership and control (Fama 1980; Fama 1983).  Here 
control is seen as a valuable asset where value may be realized by gaining control of poorly 
performing firms and replacing inefficient management (Shleifer and Summers 1988).  Markets 
for corporate control become salient given a high “separation from ownership and control” 
(Berle and Means 1932) within large corporations. Where ownership is fragmented, few 
incentives exist for investors to monitor management because other “free-riding” shareholders 
may appropriate resources devoted to monitoring. Individuals therefore diversify their portfolios 
and prefer exit to voice in response to poor performance. Moreover, small shareholders often 
lack information to monitor management effectively. The literature identifies several 
mechanisms through which these market failures may be remedied: legal protection of 
shareholders, incentive contracts for management, the presence of large blockholders, or 
markets for corporate control (Shleifer and Vishny 1996).  In particular, the market for 
corporate control can be seen as a substitute for corporate governance based on direct 
monitoring by large blockholders who possess substantial control rights.  Consequently, 
takeovers constitute a key governance mechanism within market-based systems of corporate 
governance such as the UK or USA.  By contrast, in bank-based systems of governance such as 
Germany and Japan monitoring is undertaken by banks, who are engaged in relationship 
lending and holding equity within listed firms (Aoki 1988; Aoki and Patrick 1994; Berglöf 
1991).  This difference in the role of the market for corporate control is a central factor 
distinguishing diverse national systems of corporate governance (Kester 1990; Baums 1993; 
Höpner and Jackson 2001). 
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Henry Manne (1965) first described the governance function of takeover markets: “The lower 
the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive 
the take-over becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company more 
efficiently.”  Manne posited a strong relation between share prices and managerial performance. 
As shareholders exit poorly performing firms, lower share prices create incentives for outsiders 
to accumulate control rights, replace the management, and restructure the firm. These outsiders 
can recoup their investment through a share price premium, selling their equity stakes later at a 
higher price. Moreover, the institutionalisation of an active market for corporate control exerts 
market discipline on the managers of (potential) target firms.  When exposed to the threat of 
hostile takeover, management must seek to improve returns to capital and not investment in 
“underperforming” assets, or else managers risk their jobs if shares under-perform. In sum, the 
market for corporate control is an important driver of market-based corporate governance, 
which allows investors to retain capital liquidity and diversified portfolios. 
The market for corporate control has faced strong critics.  Two criticisms, in particular, question 
whether tender offers, mergers and leveraged buyouts produce net gains to society (Jarrell et al. 
1988): first, gains to a given party may be simple re-distributions resulting from losses to 
someone else; second, M&A may divert energy from more productive endeavours.  Many 
authors note that the transfer of wealth from stakeholders to shareholders accounts for a large 
proportion of takeover premiums and may lead to net losses of efficiency due to breaches of 
trust (Shleifer and Summers 1988).  Manne (1965) himself anticipated the enormous impact of 
takeovers on the distribution of wealth: “...we can see how this mechanism for taking control of 
badly run corporations is one of the most important ‘get-rich-quick’ opportunities in our 
economy today.”  
Several arguments cast empirical doubt on the efficiency of the market for corporate control.  
First, the stock market may often fail to effectively value corporations (Kraakman 1988). 
Capital markets often take myopic, short-term views of investments, follow speculative trends 
that make valuations very volatile, or fail to respond to bad management because shareholders 
are uninformed (Miles undated). Second, management may react negatively to takeovers 
through costly defensive strategies such as golden parachutes, poison pills and legal protections 
(Bittlingmayer 1998). Third, management may adopt short-term strategies to bolster share 
prices, thereby sacrificing beneficial long-term projects and investments.  A large debate has 
emerged around this issue of managerial short-termism in the UK (Demirag 1998; Cosh 1990). 
Fourth, bidding firms may themselves pursue selfish managerial interests, as suggested by the 
so-called hubris theory of M&A (Roll 1986).
Existing research on the governance roles of the market for corporate control has focused on 
three main themes: the effects of takeovers on the financial performance of target and bidder 
firms; the relationships between takeovers and other aspects of firm strategy and structure; and 
the issue of takeover defences and their implications.  
2.7.2 The market for corporate control and financial performance
The empirical evidence on performance impact of takeovers is heavily dependent on the 
country, time period, method, and criteria of performance.  Given that the empirical evidence 
on takeovers is mixed at best, it is useful to review the various meta-analytic analysis of 
merger and acquisition performance. The first published meta-analysis of takeovers covered 
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41 published studies and examined the impact of M&A on stock market performance (Datta 
et al. 1992).   Their report suggests that the overall empirical results indicate that while target 
firms’ shareholders gain significantly from mergers and acquisitions, those of the bidding 
firm do not.  They also find lower gains in stock financed acquisitions, as well as in 
acquisitions involving conglomerate firms.  A variety of studies have concluded that the 
impact on acquiring firm performance remains ‘inconclusive’ (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; 
Jarrell et al. 1988).  Bruner (2002) comes to similar conclusion in his less formal review of 
100 scientific studies from 1971 to 2001.    
More recently, a meta-analytic study by King et al (2004) analysed the results of 93 empirical 
studies, largely of US companies.  An important feature of their study was to include both 
stock market and accounting measures of post-merger performance.  Their analysis utilizes a 
combined total of 852 bivariate effects and a total n size of 206,910.  Their analysis shows 
that target firms did gain abnormal share price returns as a result of mergers.  In this regard, 
their results are consistent with past reviews of the empirical literature of M&A (Jensen and 
Ruback 1983).  However, the meta-analysis showed that acquiring firms had no abnormal 
returns within the first 20 days and even showed significantly negative abnormal returns in 
periods longer than 20 days.  Likewise, acquiring firms had significantly negative ROA in the 
first year following a merger, but no significant positive or negative effect thereafter.  The 
authors conclude that: “Collectively, these results imply that anticipated acquisition synergies 
are not realized by acquiring firms.  That is, M&A activity does not create superior post-
acquisition performance for acquiring firms and is consistent with the non-value-maximizing 
arguments often advanced to explain M&A activity” (p.192-193).
Given the largely negative results, an important question arises as to whether some sets of 
mergers characteristics influence the likelihood of positive performance effects.  Several 
potential moderating variables include conglomerate mergers, related acquisitions, method of 
payment (cash vs. equity) and prior acquisition experience. Among these four variables, 
conglomerate mergers involving unrelated product-market diversification had significant 
negative abnormal returns (King, et al. 2004).  The remainder of the section presents a more 
detailed review of the literature focused on the UK or international evidence related to four 
aspects linking the market for corporate control and company financial performance – target 
firm characteristics, share price performance, the issue of stock market misvaluation and the 
method of payment in M&A.  
2.7.2.1 Target firm characteristics
A large literature on takeover explores the link between target firm performance and the 
likelihood of takeover.  The agency theory perspective suggests that takeovers play a 
disciplinary role based on the underperformance hypothesis – namely, poorly performing firms 
are more likely to be the target of a takeover and particularly a hostile takeover bid.  Overall the 
empirical literature does not provide strong evidence that target firms have underperformed 
prior to takeover (Agrawal and Jaffe 2003).  
Studies in the U.S. find that friendly targets are not poor performers and are motivated by 
specific synergies desired by the acquirer (North 2001; Powell 1997). Hostile takeovers should 
be more likely to occur for disciplinary reasons than friendly takeovers (Morck et al. 1988).  
However, several studies conclude that no evidence of share price underperformance exists 
among targets of tender offs, which are associated with unsolicited or hostile bids (Martin and 
McConnell 1991; Dodd and Ruback 1977; Kini et al. 1995).  The evidence using Tobin’s Q and 
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operational performance is mixed.  Thus, the U.S. literature seems to have largely rejected the 
underperformance hypothesis (Agrawal 2002).  
In the UK, empirical work is more limited.  Early UK studies find that target firms displayed 
lower profitability than non-acquired firms (Singh 1975; Levine and Aaronovitch 1981; Cosh et 
al. 1984).  More recently, Dickerson et al. (2002) (2002) find that a one standard deviation 
increase in profitability is associated with a fall in the conditional probability of takeover of 25 
percent among UK manufacturing firms from 1975-1990.  However, the authors note that this 
effect was weaker during the takeover boom in the later half of the 1980s, as compared to the 
earlier half.  Nuttall (1999b) finds that friendly targets have significantly lower Q values than 
non-acquired firms.  Looking specifically at hostile takeovers in the UK, the evidence for the 
underperformance hypothesis is again mixed.  Franks and Mayer (1996) concluded no evidence 
existed of negative abnormal returns in firms’ targeted in hostile takeovers in 1985 and 1986.   
However, hostile targets did have significantly lower Q values than non-hostile targets. Several 
further studies also find that share price underperformance has no significant impact on the 
likelihood of becoming a hostile takeover target vs. a non-target or friendly target (Sinha 2004; 
Kennedy/. 1996). Meanwhile, Dahya and Powell (1998) find that hostile targets in the UK have 
significantly lower profitability, higher debt, lower managerial ownership, and high ownership 
stake held by external block holders relative to friendly targets.  In sum, the UK literature finds 
some evidence for the underperformance hypothesis but this evidence is positive for operational 
measures and largely insignificant for stock market measures.
Less literature addresses the question of whether corporate governance characteristics also 
impact on probability of being acquired.  Several US studies report that non-hostile target firms 
had higher levels of managerial shareholding than non-acquired firms, suggesting that executive 
pay may influence managerial attitudes toward mergers (North 2001; Morck et al. 1988).    
However, these results are contradicted by other studies which show no relationship (Song and 
Walkling 1993).  In the UK, Dayha and Powell (1999) find that friendly targets had lower 
shareholdings by outside directors and higher shareholdings by executive directors than hostile 
targets.  In terms of board structure, Dayha and Powell (1999) find no difference between 
hostile and non-hostile targets in the separation of the CEO and Chairman role (board duality), 
nor the percentage of non-executive directors. Both results are contradicted by Weir, who finds 
that friendly targets had a greater incidence of duality than non-targets and no difference in 
CEO shareholdings or executive director shareholdings (Weir 1997).  Several more recent 
studies post-Cadbury again produce contradictory results.  Comparing hostile vs. non-target 
firms, Sinha (2004) finds that corporate governance characteristics had no significant impact on 
becoming a hostile takeover target.  Meanwhile, Weir and Laing (2003) show that “firms that 
were more likely to attract a friendly bid if they had higher institutional shareholdings, higher 
executive director shareholdings, as well as higher CEO shareholdings and greater non-
executive director independence.”  These findings suggest that director shareholders and 
independence may align managerial interests with target firm shareholders in accepting friendly 
bids.  
In sum, the literature does suggest some link between poor performance and the likelihood of 
takeover.  However, the strength of this association seems to vary substantially according to the 
country, industry and time period examined.  Perhaps more significantly, the evidence using 
stock market based performance measures appears largely inconclusive.  The important 
implication here is that the share price mechanism, posited by Manne (1965) as the central 
driver of the market for corporate control, does not appear to operate efficiently.  This finding is 
quite significant for debates on the appropriate role of the board, shareholders and takeover 
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defences for increasing the efficiency of the market for corporate control.  Nonetheless, the 
empirical evidence suggests that accounting based measures of operational performance are 
broadly consistent with the underperformance hypothesis and disciplinary role of takeovers.  
Sociological literature has stressed that the characteristics of target firms will differ greatly 
depending on the historical and institutional context (Thornton 2001).  For example, US target 
firms were very different in the 1960s, during the heyday of the conglomerate firm, than during 
the 1980s, when the changes toward great institutional investor power led to firms being 
sanctioned through ‘conglomerate discounts’ and subsequent takeover (Davis and Stout 1992).  
Patterns of M&A activity have also been shown to differ according to the educational 
backgrounds and ideologies of top managers in a given place and time.  The rise of executives 
with backgrounds in finance and decline of executives trained in production and engineering in 
the United States were significantly associated with shifts in the patterns of M&A activity 
(Fligstein 1990).  Finally, conformity with prevailing strategies and structures, such as relational 
network forms of organisation, help explain changes in the risk of acquisition (Thornton 2001). 
This literature suggests, more broadly, that the effectiveness of the market for corporate control 
depends strongly on complementarities with a variety of supporting institutions. Institutional 
differences or shifts in the aggregate composition of ownership, the identities of top managers, 
or the conformity with prevailing patterns of strategy and structure within an industry all impact 
upon the likelihood of acquisition and hence the potential efficiency or role of the market for 
corporate control.  In particular, the research on the relationship between governance 
characteristics and the likelihood of acquisition suggests the potential importance of ownership 
patterns and boards in shaping takeover activity.    
2.7.2.2 Shareholder returns
A broad consensus exists that share price premiums for target firms are large (Bittlingmayer 
1998).  The order of magnitude often cited within econometric studies of U.S. firms is often for 
average abnormal returns as high as 20-30 percent (Bruner 2002).  Studies of UK firms 
(Danbolt 2000) and European firms (Goergen and Renneboog 2004) have confirmed similar 
gains for target firm shareholders.  
Meanwhile, the literature largely agrees that for shareholders of acquiring firms returns are 
either zero or negative.  While most of the literature relates to U.S. companies, very similar 
results are found elsewhere, such as Germany (Gerke et al. 1995) or Europe more generally 
(Goergen and Renneboog 2004).  Several studies that analyse long-term returns to shareholders 
of UK acquiring firms tend to find significant negative cumulative abnormal returns to acquirers 
(Gregory and McCorriston 2002; Forsyth and Raj 2002 2003; Sudarsanam et al. 1996).  Other 
studies of UK firms have argued that shareholder returns for acquiring firms are neither 
negative, nor positive on the whole.  For example, Higson and Elliot examine takeovers 
between 1975 and 1990, and found no evidence of negative abnormal returns over the three 
years following takeover completion (Higson and Elliot 1998).  These authors found that 
weighted abnormal returns, measured against a benchmark that controls for firm size, are not 
significantly different from zero. Meanwhile, they find that whereas positive abnormal returns 
were witnessed during the period 1981-1984, negative returns were found for the periods 1975-
1980 and 1985-1990.  
Advocates of the market for corporate control stress a bright side interpretation of the M&A 
literature.  Specifically, they interpret the empirical evidence as suggesting that target firm 
shareholders do benefit, and that bidding firm shareholders do not lose (Jensen et al. 1983).  
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Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue that, “Since targets gain and bidders do not appear to lose, the 
evidence suggests that takeovers create value” (p.21).  
In particular, the large gains for target firm shareholders are argued to offset the negative or 
neutral returns for acquiring firm shareholders.  Clear knowledge of the source of take-over 
gains is still lacking.  The evidence on the net gains of takeover activity is mixed, and most 
studies report zero or quite small net gains (Mulherin and Boone 2000).  Andrade et al. examine 
mergers between 1973 and 1998 and also find that target firms gains are offset by acquiring 
firm losses to net a statistically insignificant change in performance (Andrade et al. 2001).  
Similarly, one UK study reported net abnormal returns of around 2 percent after target firms 
gains offset bidder firm losses (Sudarsanam et al. 1996), and this is consistent with other studies 
of UK firms (Draper and Paudyal 1999; Franks and Harris 1989).    
2.7.2.3 Misvaluation
Most research on M&A assumes that capital markets efficiently value firms.  This view, which 
has been called the Q hypothesis of takeovers, focuses on how takeover can cause target assets 
to be employed either more or less efficiently (Lang et al. 1989; Servaes 1991; Jovanovic and 
Rousseau 2002). Efficiency improves after takeovers following elimination of wasteful target 
behaviour, better bidder investment opportunities, etc.  High market value is an indicator that a 
firm is well governed or has good business opportunities, and that these are reflected in the 
creation of shareholder value. Takeovers of less efficient target firms by better-managed firms 
will improve efficiency.
The misvaluation hypothesis holds that bidders try to profit either by buying undervalued 
targets for cash at a price below fundamental value; or by paying equity for targets that have 
lower relative valuations than the bidder. Overvaluation of target firms encourages target 
management to voluntarily accept offers in order to ‘cash out’ before share prices are corrected 
to lower levels (Shleifer and Vishny 2003). In essence, therefore, misvaluation affects the 
expropriation opportunities and managerial incentives for conducting M&A.  Relative levels of 
(mis)valuation between targets and acquirers should impact transaction characteristics, 
including the means of payment (stock versus cash), the form of the offer (merger versus tender 
offer), the bid premium, hostility of the target to the offer, and event period returns. 
Recent empirical work on U.S. takeovers in the period 1978-2000 gives substantial support for 
the misevaluation hypothesis (Dong et al. 2003).  Dong et al. show, in particular, that bidders 
are overvalued relative to their targets in both cash and equity offers, and in both mergers and 
tender offers. Overvalued bidders are more likely to use stock and less likely to use cash as 
consideration, are willing to pay more relative to target market price, are less inclined to use 
tender offer rather than merger bid.  An important consequence is that these deals earn lower 
announcement period returns. Undervalued targets receive higher premium relative to market 
price, are more likely to be hostile to the offer, more likely to receive tender offers rather than 
merger bids, and earn higher announcement period returns.  
2.7.2.4 Method of payment
Two fundamental methods for acquiring firm to pay for acquisitions are cash and stock shares 
(equity).  Financial economists argue that firms will use cash to finance an acquisition if their 
firms’ shares are undervalued, but use equity (e.g. share swaps) if their firm’s stock is 
overvalued (Travlos 1987).  Cash offers are further argued to act as an important signal of a 
high-valuing bidder that is determined to acquire the target firm, thereby discouraging other 
bids.  Some studies find that cash offers are associated with higher long-term post-merger 
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performance of the acquiring firms, whereas acquisitions for stock had negative performance 
(Rau and Vermaelen 1998).
More generally, however, the link between type of payment and performance remains unclear 
empirically (Hayward and Hambrick 1997).  In particular, meta-analysis of post-merger 
performance in 24 different studies shows no demonstrable relationship between payment 
method and post-acquisition performance (King et al. 2004).  Looking at the UK evidence, only 
a handful of studies look at the method of payment. One study from the UK found that cash 
financed mergers outperform stock financed mergers (Abhyankar 2005).   One study of UK 
firms in 1995-96 shows that cash bids did deter competing bids, and were associated with 
higher post-merger performance (Cornu 2000).  Finally, Draper and Paudyal suggest that 
shareholders of UK target firms benefit the most if given to option to receive payment in either 
cash or shares (Draper and Paudyal 1999).
Despite the ambiguities of the evidence, one possible interpretation is that share based 
acquisitions are more vulnerable to misevaluation and bidders may suffer from overvaluation 
relative to targets (Shleifer et al. 2003).  The misvaluation hypothesis implies that bidders will 
tend to be overvalued relative to targets, especially among stock offers, in which it is the 
bidder’s relative overvaluation that enables its expropriation of target assets.  In such 
circumstances, takeovers are not driven by generating value through the elimination of agency 
costs, but by overvaluation itself.  These arguments are consistent with empirical research 
showing that the payment of high premiums to shareholders of the target firm was associated 
with lower post-acquisition performance (Travlos 1987).  
2.7.2.5 Leveraged buy-outs and public-to-private transactions
A particular category of transactions attracting recent attention in the literature is public-to-
private buy-outs.  In the UK, during the 1990s, the decline in number of hostile acquisitions 
coincided with a general increase in share prices and improvements to corporate governance.  
Meanwhile, the number of public-to-private transactions (PTPs) in the UK grew nearly five-
fold.  These transactions are characterized not only by de-listing firms after acquisition, but also 
finance through private equity and a higher proportion of debt than other transactions (Weir et 
al. 2003).  The motivations and governance aspects of PTPs are argued to be distinct.  They are 
neither hostile because the objective is not to replace poorly performing management nor are 
they synergistic because the outcome does not involve the association of two complementary 
companies.
Most literature on PTPs stresses not poor performance, but high agency costs due to incentive 
misalignment as a motivation of PTP.  Jensen (1986) argues that firms going private will have 
substantial free cash flow and that the PTP transaction will return some cash to the shareholders 
(Jensen 1986). PTPs are usually highly leveraged and thereby commit management to paying 
out free cash flow to cover the debt repayments rather than spend them on unprofitable 
investments.  Alternatively, various authors stress that undervaluation by the stock market may 
give equity-holding executives or institutional investors incentives to cash out their shares 
(North 2001).  However, a variety of additional hypotheses exist regarding PTPs, suggesting 
that managers may use buy-outs as a last resort takeover defence (Lowenstein 1985) or to avoid 
transaction costs associated with stock exchange listings. 
In the UK, Weir et al. have explored the characteristics of PTPs showing that target firms have 
higher board shareholdings and higher institutional shareholdings, consistent with the financial 
incentive hypothesis (Weir et al. 2003). However, the authors find no evidence that PTP target 
64
firms have different internal governance structures, have higher free cash flow or spend 
different amounts on capital projects. It was also found that the premiums received by 
shareholders in firms going private were lower than those received by shareholders of other 
acquired firms. Another study of UK PTPs from 1997 to 2003 stresses that target firms were 
significantly undervalued and undervaluation led subsequent PTPs to have large premiums for 
shareholders, particularly in the case of management buy-outs (Renneboog et al. 2005).  Here 
inside management could use information asymmetries to exploit undervaluation.  By contrast, 
the authors find no evidence in support of the free cash flow hypothesis.
2.7.3 Takeovers in the context of corporate strategy, structure and stakeholders
While the above literature in finance is focused on the issue of shareholder gains or losses as a 
result of M&A, another large literature in business strategy and industrial relations explores the 
effects of the market for corporate control on other aspects of firms’ performance, corporate and 
business strategy, organisational structure, and the wealth of different stakeholders.  This 
literature attempts to address arguments about business synergy and whether M&A lead to 
improved productivity and operational performance.  Another stream of literature addresses 
issues of distributive outcomes among stakeholders, and whether the shareholder gains noted by 
financial economists result from transfers of wealth from other stakeholders that potentially 
destroy value.
2.7.3.1 Operating performance and productivity
Literature in strategy is concerned with the effects of takeovers on operational performance (e.g. 
accounting based measure of profitability) and, in particular, productivity.  In the UK context, 
particular concern relates to the ‘short-termism’ argument: the way that the incentives faced by 
institutional fund managers transmit a short-term focus to management, which means that they 
discount returns in the distant future too heavily.  In particular, the threat of takeover (or 
consequences of hostile bids) may lead firms to forego long-term investments.  This argument is 
often thought to explain why investment and indeed R&D levels are relatively low in the UK 
compared to other countries (ESRC 2003).  Likewise, the emergence of hostile takeovers in 
Continental Europe may have a significant impact on the firm-specific investments and 
competitive advantage of firms in more coordinated market economies such as Germany (Hall 
and Soskice 2001).  
Compared to the large literature in finance on shareholder returns, fewer studies have directly 
explored the link between takeovers and productivity (Bond et al. 1998).  Powell and Stark 
report that takeovers completed in the UK over the period 1985 to 1993 result in modest 
improvements in operating performance (Powell and Stark 2004). They report that the median 
increase in post-takeover performance for acquiring firms ranges from 0.13 percent per annum 
to a statistically significant 1.78 percent per annum, depending on the definition of operating 
performance used. Industrial relatedness and the removal of the target CEO have a positive 
impact on post-takeover performance, but method of payment is found to have an insignificant 
impact.  Another UK study, based on a panel of firms in 1989-1996, finds that the risk of 
takeover has a positive and significant effect on productivity (Nuttall 1999a).  
2.7.3.2 Dividends and investment
Generally, takeovers lead to significantly lower investment and had a positive but insignificant 
impact on dividends (Nuttall 1999a).  Looking at hostile takeovers, in particular, the risk of 
takeover had a strong and significant negative effect on investment and strongly positive effect 
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on dividend payout (Nuttall 1999b).  These results are partially consistent with both a 
disciplinary view of takeovers, as well as the short-termism view.  
The ‘free cash flow’ theory suggests that firms without profitable investment opportunities are 
more likely to be taken over (Jensen et al. 1983).  However, these effects can be mitigating by a 
firms’ dividend strategy.  Paying higher dividends may act as a signal to shareholders that 
managers are not wasting valuable resources.  Rather, profits that cannot be reinvested within 
the firm and paid out in the form of dividends and reinvested in other more profitable 
opportunities.  As such, dividend policy is a useful device for encouraging or maintaining 
shareholder loyalty.  Conversely, the presence of an active market for corporate control may 
encourage firms to raise dividends (Dickerson 1998) and pay-out a higher share of corporate 
value-added to shareholders (De Jong 1992 1996).  Some UK studies have found the raising 
dividends has a significant, although modest, negative impact on the likelihood of being taken 
over (Dickerson 1998; 2002).    However, the impact of dividends was not greater among firms 
with poor investment opportunities (defined by low Tobin’s-q), as would be expected by the 
free cash flow hypotheses (ibid).
Takeover may also have an impact on investment patterns.  Interestingly, both over and 
underinvestment might prevail, depending on the relative bargaining powers between the 
acquiring firm, target firm management and shareholders (Canoy et al. 2001).  The reduction of 
investments and short time horizons of investment in UK firms is strongly associated with 
debates over managerial short-termism (Barton 1992).  Some studies show that high R&D 
investment does not appear to increase vulnerability to takeover and firms that are acquired do 
not have higher R&D than those that are not (Jenkinson and Mayer 1994).  However, the same 
studies note strong reductions in levels of investment, which may be consistent with either the 
disciplinary role of takeovers or short-termism.
2.7.3.3 Business portfolio
A large literature, particularly in institutional theory, has noted the different characteristics of 
various merger waves in the last century in terms of their business characteristics.  During the 
1960s, conglomerate mergers involved firms building up diversified groups by moving into 
unrelated industries (Steiner 1975).  These mergers occurred during a period of high stock 
market valuation and generally were financed through exchange of shares (Shleifer et al. 2003).  
During the 1980s, diversified firms in the U.S. were undervalued by the stock market – the so-
called “conglomerate discount.” Changes in anti-trust law and financial innovations around so-
called junk bonds contributed to an unprecedented takeover wave (Blair 1993; Bhagat et al. 
1990). Diversified firms were taken over at high rates, split into component business, and sold 
to firms within the same industry (Davis et al. 1994). Takeovers promoted corporate 
consolidation, since acquiring companies could keep related parts of the target company but 
recoup the purchase price through selling unrelated business to other buyers in those industries 
(Bhagat et al. 1990). Others firms proactively divested assets in order to focus on a core 
competence.  In the 1990s, mergers became much less hostile and took place largely in related 
industries, using stock swaps to consolidate industry structures (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001).  
One study of 178 successful UK bids in 1979-1989 suggested that conglomerate mergers in 
unrelated areas were actually more successful than mergers between related firms (Holl 1997).  
The authors also note that managers in related firms were less likely to resist bids.  But they 
noted that financial and managerial synergies were more important in M&A success than 
operational synergies.  
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2.7.3.4 Managerial turnover
The impact of an acquisition on executive turnover is well documented. In the U.S., Martin and 
McConnell (1991) found that 41.9 percent of CEOs left within one year of an acquisition 
(Martin et al. 1991).  UK evidence suggests that hostile takeovers are associated with a greater 
degree of top executive turnover compared to that of friendly takeovers.  Dahya and Powell 
show that 35.24 percent of top management teams leave in the first year post take-over and 
25.80 percent in year 2 (Dahya et al. 1998 1999).  Kennedy and Limmack (1996) report that in 
the first year after acquisition, 40.14 percent of companies changed their CEO in the first year 
after acquisition and 25.7 percent changed them in the second. Franks and Mayer found that 50 
percent of directors of target firms resigned after the bid had been accepted (Franks et al. 1996). 
The results give further support to the disciplining role of the hostile takeover.
2.7.3.5 Employment
The impact of takeovers on employees is central to the controversy over the market for 
corporate control.  From the agency theory perspective, the disciplinary role of takeovers should 
reduce excess employment and enhance labour productivity.  Takeovers are argued to shift 
assets to more efficient uses while also enhancing the accountability of managers to 
shareholders. Alternatively, from the resource-based view of the firm or stakeholder theory, 
takeovers may diminish firm-specific human capital and knowledge, particularly in the case of 
hostile takeovers.  Here the source of gains in takeovers derives from the ability of managers to 
breach with impunity the ‘implicit contracts’ of a variety of key stakeholders (Shleifer and 
Summers 1988).  In particular, if employees and other constituencies with asset-specific 
investments are not adequately protected by law, takeovers will serve to transfer wealth to 
shareholders at the expense of long-term performance of the enterprise (Deakin et al. 2002).  
More generally, the threat of hostile takeover may decrease the level of investment in firm-
specific assets by managers, employees and other stakeholders, thereby offsetting any gains in 
the reduction of agency costs (Schnitzer 1995)
The ‘breach of trust’ hypothesis assumes that employees are willing to make firm-specific 
investments in human capital in return for an implicit promise of job security.  Since employees 
hold assets whose value is ‘locked in’ to the particular firm, they become vulnerable to ex post 
renegotiation of implicit contract terms by management. In the context of a hostile takeover, 
downsizing enables management to capture the future ‘rents’ or income streams which would 
otherwise have accrued to employees, and to convert them into takeover premiums for the 
shareholders’ benefit. Shleifer and Summers (1988) suggest that, following a successful hostile 
bid, a new management team comes in and finds itself able to realize short-term gains to meet 
the costs of the takeover through asset disposals. They argue that, “Hostile takeovers are 
external means of removing managers who uphold stakeholder claims. Takeovers then allow 
shareholders to appropriate stakeholders’ ex post rents in the implicit contracts. The gains are 
split between the shareholders of the acquired and the acquiring firms. At least in part, 
therefore, the gains are wealth redistributing and not wealth creating”.
A wide range of social science literature supports the ‘breach of trust’ argument in UK firms, 
and generally suggests casts doubt on the efficiency of the market for corporate control.  
Conyon et al. (2001; 2002) examined hostile takeovers in the UK between 1987 and 1996, 
reporting significant falls in both employment and output.  While the authors interpret these 
changes as increased organisational efficiency, they also suggest that the evidence cannot 
directly measure or test for potential losses in firm-specific assets.  Deakin et al. (2002) 
conducted case studies of 15 UK takeovers in 1993-1996, reporting substantial job losses and 
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short-term sale of assets (Deakin et al. 2002).  Their study gives additional qualitative insights 
into the marginal role of employment considerations within the decision-making process, and 
subsequent losses of employee morale.  These results are consistent with other UK research in 
organisational behaviour suggests that, even where merging firms have similar corporate 
cultures, mergers lead to a substantial decline in the mental health of employees (Cartwright 
1993).  
Comparative research likewise suggests that the absence of takeovers has important distributive 
consequences.  In countries with active markets for corporate control, such as Britain, a lower 
proportion of corporate wealth goes to employees and reinvestment in corporate growth (De 
Jong 1992; 1996).  Research on the 100 largest German firms show that the threat of takeover is 
associated with higher dividend pay-outs and a declining labour share of value-added (Beyer 
and Hassel 2002).  
2.7.4 Takeover market:  contingency factors
A number of authors suggest that the role played by market for corporate control is contingent 
upon a variety of firm-internal factors such as the firm’s size, age, industry, growth/decline 
phase, etc. Moreover, environmental factors such as stock market activity, ownership patterns, 
regulatory institutions, inter-firm networks and managerial conceptions of control impact M&A.  
An emerging research on the life cycle of corporate governance (Filatotchev and Wright 2005)
suggest that as firms evolve over different stages of development, they face different corporate 
governance demands.  This line of theory suggests that the market for corporate control can be 
most important in managing difficult ‘transitions’ between stages, such as when maturing 
entrepreneurial firms are purchased and integrated with more established firms or when firms in 
declining industries consolidate.  
Industry factors are also important, such as whether competitive advantage is based around 
incremental innovation or radical innovation (Hall et al. 2001).  Industries characterized by 
incremental innovation tend to require input of firm- or relationship-specific assets, unlike 
industries undergoing radical innovation where new knowledge and assets need to be combined 
quickly using the external market.  
In this context, the threat of hostile takeover may undermine particular institutional advantages 
associated with firm-specific investments (Höpner et al. 2001).  In order to generate sufficient 
shareholder returns, firms are constrained from growing beyond a level at which the marginal 
returns to equity diminish. Without such constraints, firms retain a wider range of strategic 
options, such as: pursuing higher market share, spending more on capital and R&D investment; 
specializing on market segments offering lower returns but large size and relatively low risk; 
and absorbing higher labour costs to avoid layoffs during downturns and protect employee 
morale and firm-specific human capital.  More generally, one might say that the importance of 
firm-specific or relationship-specific investments by different stakeholder groups for 
competitive advantage is an important contingency that impacts the wealth creating or 
destroying effects of the market for corporate control (Deakin et al. 2002).  
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2.7.5 Costs, complementarity and substitution among governance channels
The literature on the market for corporate control suggests a number of important linkages 
between governance channels.  The literature on misvaluation suggests that effective markets 
for corporate control presuppose high levels of information disclosure, long-term value-oriented 
investors and legal regulation of takeover defences.  In this sense, the market for corporate 
control is complementary to a liberal, market-oriented financial regime.  The complementarities 
of takeover markets with employee voice may, however, be negative according to the ‘breach of 
trust’ hypothesis.  These negative influences may, nonetheless, be mediated by greater 
protection of firm stakeholders during the process of M&A, as suggested by the regulatory 
experiences in Germany or Japan.
The market for corporate control acts as a substitute for other channels of governance, 
particularly the mechanisms of monitoring by relationship-oriented banks or direct monitoring 
by large blockholders.  The mixed or weak evidence on the performance aspects of M&A 
suggest that the market for corporate control is not superior to these other forms of monitoring, 
but given the particular ownership and financing patterns of firms, the market may be a 
substitute governance mechanism ‘of last resort’.  
2.8 Stakeholders 
2.8.1 Introduction
It has been argued that participation by various stakeholders may complement other internal and 
external monitoring mechanisms and thereby promote greater managerial accountability.  In 
turn, some have argued that this will make for better decisions, the more effective 
implementation of decisions, and better performance outcomes.  
An extensive literature exists on stakeholding in the modern business enterprise.   An increasing 
amount of this literature is set within the framework of corporate governance and draws 
parallels or contrasts between shareholding and stakeholding.  Some of the literature draws on 
economics and accounting, but much uses political science, legal analysis, and sociological and 
management literatures.  In part because of paucity of empirical data, fewer studies exist of the 
kind found in the financial literatures on boards or blockholders, which use statistical techniques 
to test the basic hypotheses found within the stakeholder literature.  A large amount of the 
literature is also of a more normative kind, putting the case for stakeholder voice in the firm and 
in its governance.  The stakeholder literature overlaps with the corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and corporate social performance (CSP) literature.  These literatures are included in this 
review where appropriate.
2.8.2 Stakeholders: identification, contrasting perspectives, and empirical evidence
This section discusses the issue of identifying who are stakeholders and discusses the widely 
contrasting perspectives on stakeholders.  Empirical work on the impact of firms adopting a 
general stakeholder orientation, represented largely through CSR, is reviewed.  We then focus 
on two particular stakeholders – debtholders and employees
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2.8.2.1 Identification 
No firm agreement exists in the literature as to which groups constitute stakeholders.  Some of 
the literature includes creditors and debtholders in the definition – they have real claims on the 
firm, which are not necessarily the same as those of shareholders.  Employees are normally 
included – they have an economic stake in the firm, have a voice of varying degrees, and their 
involvement can arguably affect performance.  As part of an outer circle of stakeholders, local 
communities are often included in the definition – they also have a stake in the firm’s existence 
and disregarding the voice of local communities can have negative effects on the firm.  The 
environment is increasingly included in discussions of stakeholding – the firm’s activities can 
affect environmental conditions and the sustainability of company activities.  These issues can, 
in turn, affect the reputation of the firm in the eyes of consumers and investors.
Some would include customers as stakeholders – they clearly have an interest in the firm’s 
activities, though here it might be objected that the relationship between the firm and its 
customers is primarily a form of market transaction often of a short-term nature, thereby falling 
outside the internal governance of company decision-making.  Some would also include 
suppliers and subcontractors – they also have an interest in the well being of the firm and 
relations between them can be long term.  On the other hand, again it might be objected that the 
relationship between the firm and its suppliers is largely of a transactional kind. 
Below we focus on two groups: creditors and employees.  This is for several reasons.  First, 
they are included in most definitions of stakeholding.  Second, they are both relatively distinct 
groups.  Third, there exists an extensive body of empirical literature, both national and 
international.
2.8.2.2 Contrasting perspectives  
The stakeholder literature is often framed in terms of differing perspectives.  A broad contrast is 
made between shareholder and stakeholder orientations: the former is said to see the firm in 
terms of relations between shareholder principals and managerial agents and the maximisation 
of shareholder value; the latter sees the enterprise in terms of broader relations between all 
stakeholders with an interest in the firm and a broader set of goals to be maximised or satisfied.  
Various arguments are made in support of the stakeholder perspective.  One argument is moral 
or political – there is an intrinsic case for the involvement of stakeholders in the firm in terms of 
democratic rights and voice (Freeman 1984; Donaldson 1989; Donaldson and Preston 1995; 
Blair 1995; Davis et al.1997).  Another argument is more instrumental or economic – there is an 
extrinsic case for shareholder participation in terms of team production, commitment, firm-
specific investments, and risk sharing (Blair and Stout 1999; Parkinson 2003).  This latter 
perspective might also be termed the enlightened self-interest model. 
Arguments against all forms of stakeholding go back at least to Friedman (1962) and Hayek 
(1969).  Apart from basic moral objections linked to the notion of private property, various 
more practical problems with stakeholding are identified – too many stakeholders, the lack of 
pledgeable income in the case of some, no clear task or accountability for management, 
deadlocks in decision making, problems of mechanisms (Sternberg 1997; Tirole 2001).
Some writers see middle courses and talk about ‘enlightened shareholder value’ or 
‘instrumental stakeholder theory’ or ‘strategic corporate social responsibility’ or ‘the good firm’ 
(Parkinson 1995; Jones 1995; Kay and Silberston 1995; Campbell 1997; Kay 1997; Keasey, 
Thompson, and Wright 1997; Kelly and Parkinson 1998; Slinger 1999).  With some variants, 
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this basically states that satisfying stakeholders is both morally desirable and makes good 
business sense; firms which build good relations with stakeholders gain competitive advantage; 
however, according to this perspective, the primary responsibility for the running of the firm 
should be vested in managers and their task is to balance or integrate the interests of the 
different stakeholders (see debates in Vinten 2001; Gamble and Kelly 2001; Letza et al. 2004; 
O’Sullivan 2000).
2.8.2.3 Empirical literature on stakeholding and corporate social responsibility
Here we review the general empirical literature on stakeholding.  Some of the literature focuses 
on determinants, other literature on outcomes of stakeholder participation.  
In terms of determinants, McGuire et al. (1988), using Fortune ratings of CSR reputations, 
show that rankings of firms’ prior performance, assessed by both stock market returns and 
accounting measures, are closely related to CSR, more so than subsequent performance.  They 
suggest that firm performance affects CSR rather than the reverse.  Various articles by Graves 
and Waddock (1994) and Waddock and Graves (1997) also report that prior financial 
performance is positively associated with CSP, suggesting that ‘slack resource availability’ and 
CSP are closely aligned.  Also, the salience of CSP issues varies by industry in line with the 
concern of firms in different contexts.  However, the same authors also show that CSP is 
positively related to future financial performance.  Luoma and Goodstein (1998) focus on the 
representation of non-shareholder stakeholders, such as employees, public officials, suppliers 
and customers, on company boards.  Their research finds that stakeholding representation is 
modest in the U.S. (as it is in the UK) and is more likely to occur where companies are larger or 
are in industries with a higher degree of regulation.  These factors do not influence stakeholder 
representation on board committees.  However, firm size and the legal environment are 
associated with the adoption of stakeholder-oriented board committees.
In an interesting U.S. study, Johnson and Greening (1999) used the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini 
(KLD) index of five broad variables to measure a firm’s stakeholder position (employees, 
product safety / quality, diversity, community, and natural environment).  They found that 
different aspects of governance shaped different social activities.  Thus, pension fund equity 
ownership was associated with certain type of CSP, such as employee relations, women and 
minorities, and communities, which they described as ‘people’ issues.  It was also associated 
with quality and environmental aspects of CSP, which they described as ‘product’ issues.  
Outside director representation was also positively related to both CSP dimensions.  By 
contrast, mutual fund and investment bank equity exhibited no direct relationship with CSP.  
Top management equity holdings were positively related to product but unrelated to people 
dimensions.  Finally, organisations, which perform well on the people dimensions of CSP, tend 
to have higher financial performance as well
For the UK, Cox et al. (2004) use data from a Management Today survey compiled over a ten-
year period.  Matching this with ownership, they find that long-term institutional investment is
positively related to CSP.  On the lines of Johnson and Greening (1999) above, disaggregation 
of CSP into its constituent components suggests that pension funds and insurance companies 
exhibit a positive orientation to employee- rather than community-based CSP.  They suggest 
that this may reflect the positive relationship between employee-based CSP and efficiency and 
risk reduction. Considering the impact of investment screens on the selection of stocks, they 
suggest that long-term institutional investors select stock primarily through exclusion, rejecting 
firms, which have poor CSP.  
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In terms of outcomes of stakeholder participation, there is considerable case study based 
research, which suggests a positive relationship between stakeholding and performance (see, for 
example, the Royal Society of Arts 1995).  However, there are obvious problems with the 
selection of companies and the ability to generalise from such studies.  Fortunately, there are 
also a number of statistical studies and meta-analyses of these. 
An early meta-analysis by Ullmann (1985) found no clear relationship between CSP, social 
reporting, and economic performance of U.S. companies.  The author concluded that this was 
because of different definitions of terms and deficiencies in the various studies.  However, he 
suggested that the more elaborate studies seemed to reject a relationship between social 
performance and economic success.  He concluded that the area was one where poor data was 
in search of a good theory.  In a later meta-analysis of event studies, Frooman (1997) found that 
irresponsible and illicit behaviour had a negative impact on share price performance.  Similarly 
measures of CSP, including responsibility for the environment and fair treatment of employees, 
were positively correlated with return measures of financial performance, such as return on 
assets and stock appreciation (see also Wood and Jones 1995).
In another meta-analysis of 51 studies, Griffin and Mahon (1997) suggest that the majority of 
these report a positive relationship between CSR and profitability.  Similarly, Orlitzky (2000) 
uses meta-analysis techniques and draws from relevant articles in major world management 
journals over 20 years.  He suggests that CSP and financial performance display a significant
positive correlation, but more so with accounting measures than other economic measures.  
However, environmental aspects of CSP are not as highly correlated with financial outcomes.  
The main transmission mechanism is argued to relate to reputation, both reducing downside 
reputational risks and promoting positive corporate image.  In a joint article, Orlitzky and 
Benjamin (2001) use measures of CSP such as disclosure to stakeholders, reputation ratings, 
social audits, and managerial orientation.  They find that the higher a firm’s CSP, the lower its 
financial risk, but more so with market risk than accounting risk.  They suggest that there is 
reciprocal causality: prior CSP is negatively related to subsequent financial risk and prior 
financial risk is negatively related to subsequent CSP.  Of all the CSP measures, reputation for 
social responsibility is more important in terms of risk implications.
Finally, we cite two useful individual studies.  Berman et al. (1999), taking 81 large U.S. firms 
and using the KLD index, find that only employee and product quality / safety measures 
directly affected financial performance.  They suggest the results confirm the ‘strategic 
stakeholder management model’, which says that firms address stakeholder concerns, which 
they believe will enhance financial performance.  Their study suggests that firms are unlikely to 
voluntarily address stakeholder concerns because of moral commitment to stakeholder groups.  
For the UK, Greenley and Foxall (1997) take a multiple stakeholder orientation and find in their 
sample of UK companies that consumers are prioritised as the main stakeholder.  The 
orientation towards multiple stakeholders is positively associated with performance, though the 
association is contingent on a good external environment and the absence of strong competitive 
pressures.  The limited nature of voluntary efforts may provide rationale for further regulatory 
intervention.  
These studies provide some suggestive findings about the reciprocal links between corporate 
governance, stakeholder activity, and company strategy.  However, they have shortcomings.  
Some of these problems relate to the small-scale nature of the statistical research in terms of the 
number of observations, cross sectional data, missing variables, and issues involving the 
direction of causation (Harrison and Freeman 1999; De Bakker, Groenewegen, and Den Hond 
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2005).  However, research on CSR also suffers from some particular problems.  The data is 
drawn variously from business magazines, consultancy work, content analysis, and event 
studies; some of the constructs are rather vague; and there is a lack of a common theory to 
underpin the studies.  As one recent overview has suggested ‘empirical tools are only beginning 
to be developed’ and ‘the stakeholder model remains relatively unsophisticated’ (Harrison and 
Freeman 1999: 481, 484).
We now turn to two specific groups - debtholders and employees.
2.8.3 Debtholders
Debt and debtholders can play a significant role in corporate governance and in shaping 
business strategy and performance (Hart 1995, chapter 6; Jensen 1986; Myers 2001).  Debt may 
take the form of long- or short-term loans from a variety of financial intermediaries who are 
more or less likely to intervene directly in the firm.  It may take the form of loan contracts 
arranged ‘privately’ with banks or ‘publicly’ via bond issues in financial markets.  Here we 
focus mainly on banks because of the availability of literature.  In practice, debt is a contractual 
guarantee to future cash flows, and the expectation is to achieve a level of return specified at the 
commencement of the debt contract, including repayment of the debt.  The contractual claim on 
future cash flow constrains managerial discretion.  Debt-holders may force liquidation and 
restructuring when firms are in distress.  For these reasons, debt has been seen as a critical 
control on managerial behaviour in the financial economics literature (Modigliani and Miller 
1958; Hart 1995).  Credit ratings are also important mechanisms of control because they signal 
the financial health of firms to all investors and affect the cost of capital.  The negotiation of the 
initial debt provides the first potential for influence.  Thereafter, monitoring through the stages 
provides the basis for further interactions between creditors and managers.  Where there are 
repeated interactions and a ‘relationship’ develops, financiers may become directly involved in 
the governance and management of the firm (Stiglitz 1985).  This can lead to interlocking 
directorships when a senior officer of the bank sits on a customer’s board.  Arrangements of this 
kind have been particularly common in Germany and Japan, where debt is intertwined with 
equity ownership and where loan providers often have board representation (Jackson 2003).  
The literature is concerned with both the positive and negative effects of debt on the governance 
and performance of the firm
2.8.3.1 Advantages of debtholders for the firm
First, banks and other forms of intermediated finance obviously provide firms with access to 
funds.  Banks may also provide economies of scope in terms of a breadth of other services 
(deposit, investment, currency, and advisory activities).  These roles will be particularly 
important at certain points in the company’s life cycle, especially during early stages when 
equity finance is unobtainable or too expensive, during flotation or rapid expansion, and during 
distress via the revision of contracts or by providing new lending.  Banks have access to a wide 
spread of private information, especially where they also provide other services.  They are also 
likely to have the professional capability and expertise to engage in effective scrutiny.  In this 
way, they can obtain a good picture of the firm’s financial and operational position which helps 
with monitoring and can provide reliable signals to those outside the firm (Fama 1985; Boot and 
Thakor 1997a and 1997b; Holland 1994; Myers and Majluf 1984; Mickiewicz and Filatotchev 
2005).  
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Second, bank lending can send positive messages to the market and reduce the cost of capital.  
Thus, there is evidence that it reduces the underpricing of IPOs and has a positive effect on the 
share price of the firm.  Equally, corporate divesture can be influenced beneficially: firms with 
bank debt receive better returns on such divestitures (James 1987; Slovin et al., 1988; Lummer 
and McConnell 1989; James and Weir 1990; Slovin and Young 1990; Hirshey et al. 1990).
Third, through inside information and monitoring, lenders can prevent borrowers from 
overextending themselves and making unwise investments (Boot and Thakor 1997a and 
1997b).  Similarly, bank relationships can enable a firm to obtain finance without disclosing 
proprietary information and this may encourage investment in R&D or in non-tangible, but high 
value, assets (Bhattacharya and Chiesa 1995; Yosha 1995).  Bank involvement may also offer 
protection against hostile takeover (van Damme 1994).
Finally, and more generally, banks and other major lenders can provide a set of 
counterbalances: against self-seeking behaviour by managers; against shareholders who may be 
more prepared to take on unwise risks; and against both managers and large shareholders who 
may exploit the firm to the disadvantage of smaller shareholders and other stakeholders (Hart 
1995; Jensen 1986).  Also where there is equity ownership by banks, the possibility of strategies 
towards risk, which are too heavily skewed in favour of one type of financier, are reduced.  The 
incentive to take large risks with borrowed money for the benefit of shareholders is reduced if 
shareholders also are lenders (Stiglitz 1985; Van Damme 1994).
These functions of intermediated finance are classically seen as operating in the Japanese and 
continental European, especially German, systems (Charkham 1994; Corbett 1994; Berglöf and 
Perotti 1994; Gilson and Roe 1993; Hoskisson et al. 2004).  Franks and Mayer (1997) provide 
empirical evidence of how these relationships can work.  They suggest that banks not only 
provide funds for company expansion, but can also develop well-informed and positive 
relations with executives.  This may be particularly appropriate where the firm’s activities are 
opaque to outsiders (as proxied by long-term R&D expenditure), or where complex supplier / 
customer relationships exist, or where other intangibles are concerned (Zeckhauser and Pound 
1990; Roe 1997).  Edwards and Fischer (1996) and Ongena and Smith (2000) provide an 
overview of the evidence on the relationship between German and Japanese banks and firms.  
They suggest that benefits historically outweighed costs, but may have reduced over the long 
term.
2.8.3.2 Disadvantages of debtholders for the firm
On the negative side, it has been contended that lenders such as banks can have too much 
influence within the firm and that this can lead to a hold-up problem.  Equally, some have 
argued that there has been a tendency, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, to ‘romanticise’ the 
corporate governance role of German ‘house’ banks and Japanese ‘main’ banks (Coffee 1991; 
Edwards and Fischer 1996; Macey and Miller 1997).  
First, relationships with banks may paradoxically mean that firms finish up paying above-
market interest rates for their borrowing.  Macey and Miller (1997) interpret such rates as 
‘rents’ which banks earn on their loans in exchange for insulating incumbent managers from the 
market for corporate control and accepting less than optimal returns on any equity holdings they 
may have.  In turn, this situation lowers market liquidity and prevents outside shareholders 
making a credible takeover threat where this might be desirable.  In U.S. empirical work, 
Petersen and Rajan (1994 and 1995) found that the length of relationship between a bank and a 
firm positively affects the availability of bank credit but had no significant influence on interest 
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rates.  Some European research confirms these U.S. studies with regard to availability and loan 
rates (Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Harhoff and Körting 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele 1998; 
and Angelini et al.1998).  Of course, if banks do gain a monopoly position and firms become 
locked in, it is to the advantage of the latter to maintain multiple-credit relationships, and indeed 
these are quite common (Houston and James 1996; Ongena and Smith 1998a; Ongena and 
Smith 1999).
Second, there is evidence that intermediated forms of finance may distort investment decisions.  
Thomas and Waring (1999), for example, find that in making investment decisions large bank-
controlled firms in Germany and Japan are influenced more by liquidity considerations than by 
the prospect of long-term returns.  In the case of both Japan and South Korea, it has been argued 
that banks have allowed firms to engage in unwise diversification projects and have been slow 
to force restructuring and the sale of under-utilised assets (Taniura 1993).  
Third, intermediated finance in general and banks in particular may be less efficient in dealing 
with managerial opportunism and controlling owners.  In part, this is because the credibility of 
bank threats is reduced where the bank is a big lender and where action would hurt the bank and 
jeopardise the loan.  Similarly, where the bank is also a large shareholder this may constrain its 
disciplinary role (Holland 1994; Andersen et al. 2003).
Fourth, banks may collude with managers to retain profits rather than distribute dividends 
(Baums 1993).  For example, Harris and Raviv (1990) provide evidence that German banks are 
reluctant to discipline managers in client companies, especially where they are linked to these 
companies through a system of cross-shareholdings. Thus, banks with board seats and/or shares 
in a firm have been seen to protect their investments by keeping cash within the firm.  ‘This 
amounts to banks forming a coalition with managers to keep down dividends payable to outside 
shareholders’ (Baums 1993).  In his study of German banks, Nunnenkamp (1996) has shown 
that high retention reduces the risk that the company will default on its outstanding debts.  Thus, 
banks may be less than ideal monitors for outside shareholders (Macey and Miller 1997)
Fifth, because of the small numbers involved, it is also possible that large creditors may collude 
with large shareholders to the disadvantage of small shareholders.  Wright et al. (2003) and 
Mickiewicz and Filatotchev (2005) have suggested that the problems of collusion between 
banks and incumbent managers at the expense of shareholders and between banks and major 
shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders may be particularly acute in transition and 
developing economies.
Finally, lenders may form an implicit coalition with our next stakeholder viz. employees.  If 
both are risk-averse and their claims are a concave function of firm profitability, they have some 
congruence of interests.  This may lead to low risk, but low reward projects (Perotti and van
Thadden 2004).
2.8.4 Employees
Employees can be stakeholders in the firm individually or collectively.  Individually employees 
may have a stake through voice mechanisms such as line management meetings, briefing 
groups, report-back circles etc.  They may also be communicated with via various company 
reports.  These mechanisms are often referred to as direct communication and voice.  
Individuals may also have a stake through financial plans such as individual share ownership.  
75
Collectively employees may express their voice through joint consultation or collective 
bargaining via trade unions or board level representation.  These are usually referred to as 
indirect or representative employee voice.  In addition, there is the important role of employee 
trustees in pension schemes.
2.8.4.1 Employees as individuals
The relevant literature on individual voice is least extensive.  Using the Workforce Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS), Forth and Millward (2002) suggest that formal mechanisms such as 
line management meetings, briefing groups, and quality circles have become more common in 
recent years and that around three quarters of large private sector workplaces have such 
arrangements.  Employees and employers value these arrangements.  These voice mechanisms 
do not seem to have been used to supplant collective representation, for example, via trade 
unions, but they may be used to exclude such.  Little relevant work has been done on the effects 
of such forms of voice on outcome variables, which relate to governance.  However, the 
literature suggests that they have little effect on matters, which might be deemed to come within 
the area of corporate governance (Gospel and Willman 2003).   One recent study (Peccei et al. 
2005a) suggests that such forms of voice are strongly correlated with the provision of 
information to employees and in turn that this can have a positive effect on employee 
commitment and ultimately on productivity.
The literature on employee shareholding has been well surveyed (Pendleton 2001).  It makes the 
following points.  There are about 2,000 all-employee share plans in operation in the UK and 
about 3 million private sector employees are members of such schemes (HM Revenue and 
Customs 2005).  Individual employees hold a relatively small proportion of shares, which 
constitute less than 5 per cent or less of total equity in enterprises with shareholding schemes in 
total (Pendleton 1997).  In terms of determinants, empirical studies suggest that share ownership 
plans are most likely to occur in large, listed firms, and there is growing evidence of a 
correlation with high levels of human capital (Robinson and Zhao 2005).  In terms of outcomes, 
the literature finds a positive effect of share ownership plans on productivity, but no link with 
profitability has been clearly demonstrated.  However, this causal link with productivity is 
debated, as it is unclear whether high productivity may drive employee share ownership or vice-
versa (Pendleton 2001; Sesil et al. 2002).  Overall, the impact of employee share plans on 
corporate governance practices appears to be limited.  It should be noted that share plans are 
themselves influenced by corporate governance practices (see the Association of British 
Insurers’ corporate governance guidelines which recommends a limit of 10 per cent of equity 
being made available to employees).  
2.8.4.2 Employees as collectives
The literature on collective voice is more extensive.  The stylised facts for the UK are as 
follows.  First, there is no legal right to board representation for employees as in some other 
European countries.  Second, there are, however, now legal rights to voice via various joint 
consultation arrangements, which have some parallels with works councils in continental 
European countries.  In companies above a certain size and with operations in more than one 
EU country, there are also rights to establish European works councils.  Third, in the private 
sector, voice via joint consultation is stable, while voice via trade unions and collective 
bargaining is shrinking (Gospel et al. 2003; Gospel and Willman 2003).
In terms of empirical studies 20 per cent of private sector workplaces in large companies have 
joint consultation committees and most of these have committees at both workplace and 
company level.  Company size is negatively associated with workplace committees, but 
76
positively associated with higher-level committees or a combination of the two (Cully et al.
1999: 99).  Less work has been done on outcomes.  However, Peccei et al. (2005a and b) show 
that employees receive less information and voice through these mechanisms than they do 
through either direct participation or through trade unions.  In recent years, European works 
councils have been established in a number of British multinationals and other EU 
multinationals operating in the UK.  The initial verdict on these is that to date their coverage has 
varied between sectors, being strongest in areas of manufacturing, such as motor vehicles, and 
that some have been able to provide real voice in company activities, especially where they are 
backed by trade union representation (European Foundation 2004).  It is too early yet to 
comment on legally mandated national works councils in Britain since these only started to 
come into effect in 2005.  Overall, the literature on consultation suggests that it has little effect 
on matters, which might be deemed to come within the area of corporate governance, but the 
European, and national works councils have the potential to bring about changes in this area 
(Gospel and Willman 2003).
The literature on employee voice through trade unions is the most extensive, paradoxically 
given the decline in union recognition, membership, and coverage in recent years.  
Theoretically, it is argued that trade unions can monitor management and act as a check on its 
activities (Freeman and Medoff 1984).  Presently in the UK 20 per cent of private sector 
workers are in trade unions.  Unions bargain at various levels, but in particular at the level of the 
workplace and company level bargaining is relatively limited in the UK.  The determinants of 
trade unions recognition and collective bargaining in the private sector include industry, firm or 
workplace size, and age of plant.  In terms of outcomes, nowadays unions have only a modest 
effect on pay, productivity, financial performance, investment, and employment growth, 
compared to the past.  However, unions are a force for fairness in the workplace: they narrow 
pay differentials, improve health and safety, and boost family friendly policies (Cully et al.
1999; Metcalf 2005).  The effect that unions in the UK have on corporate governance is limited, 
in part because they have rarely had much voice at the level of the company.
Finally, in this review of the UK, we refer to employee stakeholding via pensions.  Employees, 
both present and past, have a substantial stake in the firm where there is a company pension 
scheme.  At the present time in the UK, there are around 18,000 private sector defined benefit 
schemes and 70,000 defined contribution schemes and there are around 9.8 million active 
members of such schemes (National Statistics 2005).  The existence of such plans was 
historically deemed to have had broadly beneficial effects for firms in terms of recruitment and 
retention (Hannah 1986).  However, in more recent years, the liabilities attaching to pensions 
funds have come to be seen increasingly as a major cost for the firm and for shareholders and 
hence the decline in the number of such schemes and in particular of defined benefit schemes.  
More is said in section 2.3 above on large blockholders.  Here, from a stakeholder viewpoint, 
we would make the following points.  Since 1995 employees and retirees get to name at least 
one third of the trustees on boards running pension schemes.  One stated intention of this has 
been to increase member involvement in pension fund boards, making them more attentive to 
social responsibilities and more activist in nature.  On the other hand, trustees are required to act 
in the best interests of the schemes’ members in a manner consistent with overall liabilities and 
returns.  Furthermore, trustees may lack sufficient knowledge for active involvement.  These 
factors place significant restrictions on the management and investment activities of trustees.  
However, where there is union involvement and where trustees have the information and 
motivation, they can have more effect on corporate governance and in companies in which they 
invest.  To date, in the UK, this has not developed to the extent of CALPERS and TIAA-CREF 
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in the U.S.  Thus, large cross-national differences exist in the extent of employee voice in the 
governance of pension funds (Jackson and Vitols 2001; Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2004).
2.8.4.3 The German case
The case of Germany is often referred to in discussions of employee stakeholding and is briefly 
summarised here.  In Germany, there are two well-developed institutions, which either do not 
exist or do not exist to the same extent or with the same rights as in the UK.  The first is 
employee representation on the supervisory board; the second is works councils.  
In terms of board level representation, arrangements vary with the size of firm, but basically 
either one third or one half of seats on supervisory boards of large firms go to employee 
representatives, and these may include trade union officials.  Most big firms have such 
representation, which is highly correlated with size.  In terms of effects, there has been 
considerable debate in recent years.  Recent studies by Schmid and Seger (1998) and Gorton 
and Schmid (2000) present findings that parity codetermination caused a 21-25 per cent 
decrease in share price relative to companies with one third codetermination.  However, the 
study has been strongly criticised on methodological grounds (Frick et al. 1999).  Baums and 
Frick (1998) find no negative effect on share price following on the introduction of parity 
codetermination and significant court decisions.   Kraft and Stank (2004) and Fitzroy and Kraft 
(2005) show a small positive effect of codetermination on the innovation and on productivity.
In terms of works council representation in Germany, these operate in most large firms and 
have extensive information, consultation, and codetermination rights.  They can exist at 
workplace, subsidiary, and company level.  The existence of such councils is highly correlated 
with size.  Here, the effects of such representation seem to be clearer.  Several recent articles
have summarised the literature (Addison et al. 2004; Frege 2002; Frick and Lehmann 2004).  
These studies suggest that significant productivity advantages accrue to plants with works 
councils over those without.  For a recent overview of the German literature in a comparative 
perspective, see Vitols (2005).
Many critics of the German system argue that employee codetermination is not compatible with 
strong capital market pressures, as found in the UK (Pistor 1999; Roe 1999).  However, a 
number of studies now show how employee representatives in Germany are adapting to a 
growing shareholder-value orientation of German management.  These studies suggest the 
emergence of augmented stakeholder coalitions which now include institutional investors, 
resulting in a kind of “negotiated shareholder value” in Germany (Vitols 2004; Höpner 2001; 
Jackson 2005b).  For example, performance incentives for employees remain less strong than in 
the UK, thus perhaps representing a more egalitarian version of Anglo-American practices. 
Likewise, company case studies in Germany show that employees still maintain an active voice 
in the decision making process (Jackson 2003).  
2.8.5 Costs, complementarities and substitution among governance mechanisms
Stakeholder participation in corporate governance certainly has important costs associated with 
it.  Disclosure of CSR or environmental impacts greatly increases the scope of information to be 
included in company reporting and raises issues of establishing objective and comparable 
standards across firms.  Likewise, stakeholder voice may also have considerable impact on 
decision-making processes within the firm.  In particular, employee involvement may slow 
down decision times.  However, stakeholder involvement may have offsetting benefits of 
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speeding up implementation once decisions have been made, since stakeholders will have 
higher levels of information and greater consensus around those decisions.  As such, the net cost 
impact of stakeholding remains unclear, but is unlikely to be prohibitive for large organisations.
Stakeholding has important complementarities with other elements of corporate governance.  
For example, the linkages between various dimensions of corporate governance and employee 
voice have been conceived in different ways in economic theory.  First, transaction cost models 
suggests that commitment by investors to specific firms supports stable long-term employment, 
investment in worker training and co-operative industrial relations (Hall et al. 2001). These 
institutional complementarities support dynamic (X-) efficiency in lower-volume, higher-
quality product markets requiring high skills (Streeck 1992). Second, agency theory argues that 
employee rights increase the agency costs to diffuse shareholders (Jensen et al. 1976) and 
reinforce the advantages of direct control coming from relational finance, which are needed to 
counter-balance the strength of labour. For example, Roe (1999) argues that, in countries like 
Germany, ‘diffuse owners may be unable to create a blockholding balance of power that 
stockholders would prefer as a counterweight to the employee block.’  Third, the economics of 
information and co-operation stress potential positive-sum aspects. For example, information 
and disclosure may enhance the prospect of voice for both investors and employees, thereby 
increasing the accountability of management (Aoki 1988; Hirschman 1972). The presence of 
stakeholders on boards may provide greater independence from the CEO, and help establish a 
more effective system of checks and balances within the board (Aguilera et al. 2003).  
Different models of complementarities may represent only some aspects of economic exchange
that have potential trade-offs.  Strong labour participation may increase agency costs but lower 
transaction costs. Take-overs may lower agency costs, but increase transaction costs.  Inferences 
about the overall complementarity between particular institutions remain challenging.
Likewise, we cannot tell a priori which dimension will drive overall performance (Jackson 
2005c).  Efficiency does not result from a universal “one best way,” but suggests that different 
patterns of comparative institutional advantages exist for different sorts of strategies (Hall et al. 
2001; Aoki 2001b).  Importantly, these may imply different salience of firm-specific employee 
investment and, consequently, different sorts of corporate governance arrangements for 
protecting stakeholder wealth (Parkinson and Kelly 2001). 
Finally, stakeholder involvement may be an important substitute for other corporate governance 
mechanisms.  A large literature suggests that bank-based monitoring is a substitute for an active 
market for corporate control (Aoki et al. 1994; Baums 1993).  Where banks play an active role 
intervening in the governance of firms during financial distress, in the last resort mechanism of 
takeover may be unnecessary.        
  
2.8.6 Conclusions
A number of conclusions may be drawn on the nature, determinants, consequences, and 
interactions of stakeholder involvement in corporate governance.
First, stakeholders are a heterogeneous group and concepts and theories attaching to them are 
also diverse. Second, the studies suggest that in various ways and to varying degrees 
stakeholders can be involved in the governance of firms.  However, in the UK, the group, which 
probably has the most influence, are banks and other debt holders, followed by employees. 
Third, many of the general studies suggest a small positive effect of stakeholding on certain 
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aspects of company performance.  However, this is not confirmed by all studies.  In the case, of 
specific groups such as debtholders and employees, their stakeholding can pose costs on the 
firm.  There are also benefits in terms of information flows and commitment. Fourth, there are 
some, albeit limited, complementarities within stakeholder groups and between stakeholders 
and other forms of corporate governance.  Hence, employee representation may complement 
community representation. Similarly, bank voice and shareholder voice may overlap – though 
equally we have suggested that they may conflict.
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3 Survey of Corporate Governance Experts
3.1 Methodology
On the basis of our literature review, the Team members have identified broad “families” of 
drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance such as: “board independence”, “board diversity”, 
“disclosure practices”, etc. Each “family” of drivers includes more specific, measurable and 
observable operationalizations that allow us to develop a number of policy evaluation 
benchmarks. For example, the “board independence” family includes five specific 
operationalizations, such as “a high proportion of independent board members”, “separation of 
the roles of CEO and board Chairman”, etc.
However, the literature does not provide a comprehensive assessment of the validity of 
individual drivers in a systematic way. Nor does it provide ranking of individual drivers in 
terms of their relevant importance vis-à-vis other drivers in the same “family” of the ‘good’ 
governance benchmarks. 
To verify the appropriateness of the identified ‘good’ governance drivers, the Team conducted a 
Web-based survey of leading experts in the corporate governance field. This methodology 
provided a cost-effective and timely access to a pool of expertise both in the UK and abroad. A 
special Website was created at the Management Department, and a Web link to a structured 
questionnaire was e-mailed to a network of experts. 
The literature review outcomes were used to develop a Survey Questionnaire that included 18 
“families” of good corporate governance drivers. Each “family” comprised a number of 
specific, observable and measurable operationalizations of a particular driver, and the 
respondents were invited to score each item on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 = not important 
and 7 = highly important. Full details of the questionnaire items are provided in Appendix I. 
This framework allowed the Team to introduce some greater objectivity into the process of 
identifying drivers of ‘good’ governance and associated policy evaluation benchmarks. 
This methodology was aimed at achieving three objectives. First, a relatively high score across 
the population of respondents would indicate high importance of a particular family of “good” 
governance drivers.  Second, using individual average scores, various drivers within the same 
family could be ranked in terms of their relative importance vis-à-vis other drivers in the same 
family. Third, the standard deviations of individual scores could be used as an indication of the 
extent of experts’ agreement or disagreement with regard to importance of a particular driver. 
This allows to make various caveats with regard to the expected validity of a particular 
evaluation benchmark when applied to the UK regulation. 
3.2 Survey Results
The Team identified 133 corporate governance experts using various sources of information, 
such as the literature review, corporate governance-related Websites (e.g., the European 
Corporate Governance Institute, University of Birmingham Centre for Corporate Governance 
Research, etc) and personal contacts. Bearing in mind the Project’s objectives, the main focus 
was on corporate governance experts in the UK. However, the Team also tried to approach a 
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number of international experts, since their opinion and expertise would contribute to the 
overall objectivity and reliability of the Survey. In terms of the country-of-residence, the 
population of experts had the following breakdown:









In terms of their professional background most of the respondents work in academic and 
research organisations. However, the Team decided to include a control group of 17 corporate 
governance practitioners from a variety of business and professional organisations such as the 
ICAEW, Standard Life Investments Ltd, etc. The experts’ professional backgrounds had the 
following breakdown:
Background/research field Number of experts
Economics 35
Business, management 28
Finance and accounting 18
Law 17
Sociology 12
Others (political sciences, HRM, etc)  6
Practitioners 17
The Team notified all experts about the Survey on 31 October 2005. The Survey Website was 
open on 14 November 2005, and all experts were invited to fill in the questionnaire. 
Subsequently, two further letters were sent to the experts on 21 and 28 November 2005. The 
Website was closed on 6 December 2005.
The Survey generated 53 useable responses with an above average response rate of 40 percent 
which indicated that the respondents had found the Survey interesting and important. Relatively 
low standard deviations and the average scores above 5 for the majority of the drivers indicate 
high levels of validity and reliability of the Survey results. This also indicates that the experts 
attached a high level of importance to a substantial number of ‘good’ governance drivers 
identified during the literature review. These were important findings since they helped to 
define to what extent we can usefully talk about good corporate governance. The survey also 
explicitly confirmed that the existing corporate governance literature enables us to determine 
the key determinants of good corporate governance.
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Drivers of ‘Good’ Corporate Governance in the UK Context
4.1 Introduction
The results of the literature review and the experts’ survey form a factual base for identifying 
‘good’ corporate governance drivers. The literature review provides empirical and theoretical 
underpinning for selecting an individual driver using a broad range of social sciences-based 
research. More specifically, it helps to identify (1) a ‘good’ corporate driver as a broad 
conceptual construct (e.g., “board independence”; “stakeholder involvement” etc;) and (2) to 
develop a more detailed set of specific and measurable operationalizations of each driver (e.g., 
“the proportion of independent directors on board”, “separate Chairperson and CEO”, etc.). 
However, the literature review does not necessarily provide a clear validation of the individual 
drivers and their operationalizations in an integrated, systematic way. Most of the academic 
publications reviewed above are usually focused on one-two aspects of “good” governance, 
without providing an overall picture of relative importance of a wider range of drivers. 
Therefore, to identify the validity and  importance of the individual driver operationalizations in 
a systematic manner we use the results of our expert survey. Corporate governance experts were 
asked to rate each individual operationalization on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not important, 7 = 
high importance). Individual scores allow us to verify the importance of a particular driver 
operationalization relative to other operationalizations in the same “family”. 
Before we report Survey results, a number of important caveats should be introduced. First, the 
vast majority of our respondents were from the UK/USA. Therefore, their views may  be biased 
towards the Anglo-American model of corporate governance that puts less emphasis on the role 
of employees and other stakeholders. Second, the average scores should be considered in 
conjunction with the standard deviations of individual responses in order to explore the extent 
of disagreement among experts with regard to a particular driver operationalization. For 
example, although the “Caps on the size of executive pay” driver has received a relatively low 
score of 3.54, the standard deviation of 1.95 indicates that there is a serious disagreement 
among experts with regard to the importance of this driver. Finally, although our methodology 
allows to introduce some elements of hierarchical order into broad families of drivers, it does 
not provide sufficient scope for a robust econometric analysis of the effectiveness of individual 
drivers. Indeed, such analysis should be based on large samples of company-level data that links 
corporate governance factors with business strategy and performance (Filatotchev and Wright, 
2005).
4.2 Summary of Good Corporate Governance Drivers
Our analysis suggests the following as ‘drivers’ of good corporate governance in the UK 
context:
1. Board independence
2. The diversity, human and social capital within the board
3. High engagement in board processes 
4. Presence of large-block shareholders
5. Shareholder activism
6. Breadth and depth of public information disclosure
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7. Breadth and depth of private information sharing
8. Independence of the external auditors 
9. Competence of the audit committee
10. Presence of internal control systems and support of whistleblowing
11. Long-term performance-related incentives 
12. Transparent and independent control of the remunerations committee
13. An active market for corporate control
14. Transparency and protection for shareholders and stakeholders during mergers and 
acquisitions
15. Board power in takeover bids, subject to shareholder veto
16. Stakeholder involvement within corporate governance 
17. Voice mechanisms for debt holders
18. Employee participation in financial outcomes and collective voice in decision-making 
The next sections review and briefly explain each of these drivers alongside the results from 
our expert survey.
4.3 Corporate Boards
The literature review has identified three major ‘good’ corporate governance drivers associated 
with corporate boards:
 Board independence;
 Diversity, human and social capital within the Board;
 High engagement in Board processes.
4.3.1 Driver 1:  Board independence
The review of the economics and corporate finance literatures does not provide unambiguous 
evidence that the extent of board independence has a positive effect on the firm’s efficiency and 
performance. However, management and business strategy research suggests that this corporate 
governance parameter has significant effects on “critical” organisational decisions, such as 
executive turnover, value-enhancing business strategy, and limitations on anti-take-over 
defences.  These “critical” decisions are, in turn, related to efficiency improvement and superior 
performance.  In terms of specific operationalizations of board independence, the survey 
generated the following results:




Independent nomination, remuneration and audit committees 6.08 1.38
Separation of the roles of CEO and board Chairman 5.74 1.43
A high proportion of independent board members 5.24 1.41
Presence of a senior (lead) independent director 5.12 1.62
Board size 3.98 1.43
Control question: a high proportion of executive directors 3.26 1.49
As this table clearly shows, the following two driver operationalizations have obtained the 
highest score (in descending order): (1) independent board committees and (2) absence of the 
84
CEO duality. The presence of a senior (lead) independent director and the proportion of 
independent directors have median importance, whereas the large board size is considered as a 
relatively less important factor. A control question confirmed that the high proportion of 
executive directors on board might be detrimental for ‘good’ governance. There is a good deal 
of agreement among the experts on the individual scores that is confirmed by the standard 
deviations.
4.3.2 Driver 2: The diversity, human and social capital within the board
Our analysis of the governance roles of boards in the broad social sciences field, including 
management, sociology and behavioural research has suggested that boards can extend their 
involvement beyond monitoring and controlling top management to the provision of 
ongoing advice and counsel to executive directors on strategic issues.  Resource 
dependence theory indicates that a board of directors may also play an important role in 
establishing relationships between the organisation and its external environment. From the 
service, strategy and resource roles of boards ‘good’ corporate governance drivers are 
associated with high levels of board diversity and its human and social capital.   In terms of 
specific operationalizations of board diversity and its human and social capital independence, 
the survey generated the following results:




Human capital of independent board members  (experience, 
expertise, reputation)
5.92 1.20
Board directors’ heterogeneity in terms of human capital 
(education, expertise, etc.)
4.85 1.52
Number of network ties to other firms and external constituencies 4.21 1.56
Board directors’ heterogeneity in terms of gender and age 3.87 1.68
The following two driver operationalizations have obtained the highest score (in descending 
order): (1) human capital of independent board members (experience, expertise, reputation) 
(2) board directors’ heterogeneity in terms of human capital (education, expertise, etc.). One 
of the respondents emphasized the importance of international experience among independent 
directors. The number of network ties to other firms and external constituencies has median 
importance, whereas board directors’ heterogeneity in terms of gender and age are considered 
as relatively less important factors. 
4.3.3 Driver 3: High engagement in board processes 
Our review of the board process research indicated the importance of factors associated with the 
general conduct of board affairs and how and why board processes impact on empirical patterns 
of strategy and performance. This research identifies the effective and efficient board processes 
as ‘good’ governance drivers, including issues around information provisions and 
communication, incentives, etc. In terms of specific operationalizations of ‘good’ board 
processes, the survey generated the following results:





Extensive and timely provision of  information to independent 
directors 
6.17 0.97
Board focus on strategic controls (growth of market share, 
competitiveness)
5.46 1.24
Regular evaluation of board members 5.35 1.38
Regular meetings of independent directors (separately from board 
meetings)
5.35 1.44
Bottom-up information flow from functional departments to 
independent directors
5.35 1.52
Regular communications with major shareholders/investors 5.22 1.34
Frequency and lengths of board meetings 4.91 1.32
Board focus on financial controls (accounting performance, TSR, 
EPS etc.)
4.87 1.40
Directors' financial incentives, including equity-based incentives 4.52 1.44
Imposing age and term limits for independent directors 4.04 1.67
Using specialist recruitment companies when recruiting new board 
members 
3.92 1.58
Imposing age and term limits for executive directors 3.70 1.72
Independent directors' social ties with CEO/executive directors 3.02 1.74
This table shows that the extensive and timely provision of information to independent directors 
is widely considered as a ‘good’ governance driver by (the average score is above 6 and 
standard deviation is below 1). This driver is followed by the “board’s focus on strategic 
controls (growth of market share, competitiveness)”. Interestingly, board focus on financial 
controls (accounting performance, TSR, EPS etc) received a relatively low score of 4.8 on 
average indicating that these financial parameters of the firm’s performance are less important 
from the ‘good’ governance perspective than longer-term, strategic outcomes.
Information-related drivers of ‘good’ governance, such as regular communications among 
board members, vertical and horizontal information flows, etc., generally received above the 
average scores. On the other hand, directors’ financial incentives were not considered as part of 
the efficient board process, followed by age and term limits on executive and independent 
directors. Independent directors’ social ties with the CEO are considered as a sign of bad 
governance.
4.4 Share Ownership and Shareholder Activism
The literature review in Chapter 2 focuses on two major ‘good’ corporate governance drivers 
associated with shareholder activism:
 The presence of large-block shareholders;
 Shareholder activism
4.4.1 Driver 4: Presence of large-block shareholders
 The review of economics, corporate finance and “law and economics” research streams did not 
provide unambiguous evidence that presence of large-block and institutional investors among 
the firm’s shareholders may perform monitoring and resource functions of ‘good’ corporate 
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governance. However, management and business strategy research suggests that this corporate 
governance parameter has significant effects on “critical” organisational decisions, such as 
executive turnover, value-enhancing business strategy, and limitations on anti-take-over 
defences.  
The experts’ evaluation of the governance roles of various types of shareholders provided the 
following pattern: 




Pension funds, mutual funds, foundations 4.58 1.50
Private equity investors 4.52 1.76
Individual (non-family) blockholders 4.36 1.70
Family blockholders 4.20 1.63
Corporate pension funds 3.85 1.55
Insurance companies 3.69 1.69
Banks 3.31 1.49
Dispersed individual shareholders 2.18 1.41
In line with research on “pressure-resistant” and “pressure-sensitive” institutional investors, the 
experts assigned the highest scores to the governance roles of pension funds, mutual funds, 
foundations, and private equity investors. Some respondents also suggested that various 
associations of institutional investors such as NAPF, ABI, etc., play strong governance roles, as 
do individual blockholders and family owners. At the other end of the spectrum are dispersed 
individual shareholders whose governance roles received the lowest score. However, it must be 
kept in mind that none of the individual scores is above 5 indicating that, on average, our 
experts were rather sceptical about the effectiveness of large blockholders form the ‘good’ 
governance perspective.
4.4.2 Driver 5:  Shareholder activism
Our review of research on actions of large-block owners suggests that their presence per se may 
be a necessary but not sufficient condition to promote efficient governance in their portfolio 
companies. Shareholder activism, or direct involvement of shareholders in “critical” decisions, 
may be another important driver of ‘good’ governance. In terms of the specific 
operationalizations of this “family” of drivers, the survey generated the following results:




Influencing revisions of executive compensation 5.02 1.35
Influencing board and management turnover 4.98 1.28
Regular discussions with board members of strategy issues (M&A, 
etc.)
4.87 1.73
Disclosure of voting at shareholder meetings 4.87 1.84
Voting at the AGM 4.63 1.88
Use of lawsuits against managers and auditors for negligence or 
breaches of duty
4.15 1.88
Use of electronic voting systems 4.12 1.93
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Publicly criticizing board members 4.04 1.66
Maintaining stable shareholding 3.53 1.32
Investors’ active involvement in revisions of executive compensation and board/management 
turnover received relatively high ranking by the experts. It is closely followed by the regular 
discussions with board members of strategy issues and ‘good’ voting practices. Apart from 
maintaining stable shareholdings, all aspects of shareholder activism received above average 
scores.
4.5 Information and Disclosure
The literature review in Chapter 2 focuses on two major ‘good’ corporate governance drivers 
associated with information and disclosure:
 Broad and deep public information disclosure
 Private information sharing 
4.5.1 Drive 6:  Breadth and depth of public information disclosure
The review of the economics, corporate finance, and accounting literature suggested that 
information disclosure is a significant driver of corporate governance.  The literature is mainly 
focused on flows to shareholders and it suggests a positive effect of such flows.  More broadly, 
information on employment and environmental policies are important prerequisites for 
promoting corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investment as governance 
mechanisms.  In terms of the operationalization of information disclosure, the survey produced 
the following results:




Annual report and related documents 5.79 1.49
Information specifically on corporate governance (e.g. director’s 
pay)
5.74 1.15
Operating and financial reviews 5.65 1.20
Audit committee’s oversight of publicly disclosed information 5.63 1.51
Information on related party transactions 5.62 1.11
Information on employment policies 4.94 1.45
Information on environmental policies 4.72 1.60
Quarterly or monthly reports 4.70 1.79
Information on corporate social responsibility 4.69 1.70
The survey results show that annual reports with general information, as well as particular 
sorts of information on corporate governance, operating and financial reviews, and related 
party transactions were important aspects of disclosure.  Other sorts of information related to 
stakeholders were also considered moderately important.   It will be noted that public 
information is generally rated more important as a driver than private information (see 
below).  Overall, there was little variation in the views of our respondents.  
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4.5.2 Driver 7:  Breadth and depth of private information sharing
The literature places considerable emphasis on the flow of private information to large 
investors, fund managers, and analysts.  It is less about flows within the firm vertically or 
horizontally and here it would seem that more research could be done since there are important 
processes.  In terms of the operationalization of private information sharing, the survey 
produced the following results:




Vertical information flows between the board and function 
departments 
5.12 1.38
Provision of information to employees 4.80 1.55
Horizontal information flows between functional departments 4.62 1.59
Provision of information to other stakeholders 4.62 1.56
Private information to key investors 3.84 1.83
Private information to analysts 3.50 1.78
In terms of private information, it is not the provision of information to fund managers and 
analysts, which is rated highly, but the provision of internal information to boards themselves.  
There is substantial agreement between the experts on the individual scores, which is confirmed 
by the standard deviations.
The results suggest that both public and private information flows are key drivers of good 
corporate governance and that it complements various other mechanisms.
4.6 Audit and Internal Controls
The literature review in Chapter 2 focuses on three major ‘good’ corporate governance drivers 
associated with executive pay:
 Independent external auditors
 Highly qualified audit committees within the board
 Support of audit through internal control, risk management and protection of whistle-
blowing
4.6.1 Driver 8:  Independence of the external auditors 
The empirical literature stresses the importance of auditor independence in promoting the 
quality and integrity of information provision and disclosure.  In terms of the specific 
operationalizations of auditor independence, the survey generated the following results:




Restriction on the quantity of ‘non-audit’ tasks involving external 
auditors 5.28 1.65
Regular rotation of appointed external auditor 4.87 1.72
Shareholders’ vote on appointment of the external auditor 4.40 1.91
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Unconstrained legal liability of auditors 4.26 1.90
The survey results stress the prevention of conflicts of interest by restricting non-audit tasks.  
Other devices such as rotation of auditors, shareholder involvement or unconstrained legal 
liability were seen as only moderately important.  
4.6.2 Driver 9:  Competence of the audit committee
In tandem with auditor independence, the empirical literature suggests that oversight by a 
professionally qualified audit committee has positive effects on the intensity and quality of the 
audit process.  The literature suggests that nominal independence of audit committee members 
is insufficient to improve audit quality without sufficient qualification.  In terms of the specific 
operationalizations of auditor committee structure, the survey generated the following results:




Professionally qualified members on the audit committee 5.73 1.37
Reporting from the audit committee to shareholders 5.47 1.60
Board approval of external auditor appointment 5.23 1.71
The results show that professional qualification, reporting of the committee to shareholders and 
board involvement in the appointment of auditors are all considered highly important.
4.6.3 Driver 10:  Presence of internal control systems and support of whistleblowing
Existing literature suggests that having adequate systems of financial controls and risk 
management are a driver of good corporate governance.  It might also be noted that the 
literature often lacks detailed codification of what constitutes good systems of internal control, 
as these are often very specific to the firm.  However, the literature also stresses that the 
integrity of such systems may be enhanced by support and protection of ‘whistleblowers’ with 
inside information to form internal checks and balances, particularly where ethical misconduct 
or fraud is an issue.  In terms of specific aspects of controlling, the survey produced the 
following results:




Financial control and budgeting systems 5.81 1.14
Support and protection of ‘whistleblowers’ 5.73 1.27
Risk management systems 5.48 1.36
These results suggest the high importance of internal systems of control as a driver of ‘good’ 
corporate governance.
4.7 Executive Pay
The literature review in Chapter 2 focuses on three major ‘good’ corporate governance drivers 
associated with executive pay:
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 Provision of long term incentives tied to company performance
 Pay set by an independent remunerations committee
 Disclosure of pay.
4.7.1 Driver 11: Long-term performance-related incentives
Whist there is still apparent dispute between academic literature as to whether pay and 
incentives provide stronger links with performance, and thus promote the board of directors 
acting in line with the wishes of owners, incentive schemes still remain highly acclaimed within 
the UK in terms of ‘best practice’.  In terms of long-term performance pay and its link to 
performance, the survey generated the following results:




Long term incentive plan 5.00 1.61
Performance-related bonus 4.48 1.67
Share option incentive scheme 4.23 1.69
Non-remuneration based incentives (e.g. firm’s pension 
contribution)
3.58 1.53
As noted in Chapter 2, UK firms have moved somewhat away from share option schemes in 
favour of the long-term incentive plan.  The survey results show this as the highest scoring 
corporate governance driver.  The expert survey also revealed the performance related bonus 
scored higher in terms of promoting good corporate governance than the share option scheme.  
The performance related bonus is generally, in pay structure terms, considered only to be a 
‘short-term’ incentive.  Executives typically receive an annual cash bonus that is paid on the 
achievement of company and/or individual performance.  It is deemed that this motivates year 
on year growth, rather than linking to long-term objectives.
4.7.2 Driver 12: Transparent and independent control of the remunerations committee 
High levels of disclosure came top in the good corporate governance drivers.  This is promoted 
effectively within the Directors Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) (see Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Chapter 4 The Regulatory Framework).  Shareholders are now able to 
see within the remuneration report details of pay for individuals and details of incentives 
schemes along with performance conditions.  This is not just confined to the performance 
conditions but also the company must provide an analysis of the methods used to assess 
whether the performance conditions have been met with an explanation of why those methods 
were chosen.  




High levels of pay disclosure 5.69 1.35
The costs of issuing share options clearly shown in the annual 
report and accounts
5.23 1.79
Incentives tied to performance targets 5.00 1.63
Remuneration committee’s access to external profession advice 4.91 1.75
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Shareholders to vote on remuneration 4.48 1.84
Issuing ‘out of the money’ options 3.76 1.77
Caps on the size of executive pay 3.54 1.95
When combined with independence within the board committees, pay disclosure acts as a 
complementary governance aspect to promote objectivity and openness of information. Taking 
into account the knowledge, in real terms, as to how much such incentives cost the company, 
the shareholder now has differing methods to overcome previous asymmetries of information.  
The launch of IFRS2 requires companies to charge share options, which have only previously 
been disclosed in footnotes, through the income statement so investors can see exactly how 
much company board members stand to gain from options.  Shareholders’ voting on the 
remuneration of the executives has not been chosen as a prime governance driver.  It could be 
that our experts understand that even if the company’s shareholders do not approve the 
remuneration report, it does not necessarily mean that past (or future) payments are rendered 
unlawful.  However, few listed companies would want to flout shareholder opinion, and such 
action would undermine the remuneration committee.
4.8 Market for Corporate Control
The literature review has identified three major ‘good’ governance drivers associated with the 
market for corporate control:
 An active market for corporate control;
 Transparency and protection of shareholders and stakeholders during the takeover 
process;
 An active role of the board regarding takeover bids
4.8.1 Driver 13:  An active market for corporate control
The role of the market for corporate control has been highly controversial within the corporate 
governance literature.  Empirical research does not provide strong evidence for a positive effect 
on the long-term shareholder returns.  As such, the disciplinary role of takeovers must be 
considered a governance mechanism ‘of last resort.’  However, management and business 
strategy research suggests that M&A may play an important role in managing certain 
organisational transitions as the firm grows, matures and declines.  These “critical” decisions 
are, in turn, related to efficiency improvement and superior performance.
In terms of various sorts of transactions that constitute the market for corporate, the survey 
generated the following results:




An active M&A market 4.73 1.48
Management buy-outs (MBO) 4.54 1.54
Public-to-private transactions 4.44 1.72
Leveraged buy-outs (LBO) 4.43 1.73
Hostile takeovers 4.40 1.72
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This table shows that an active M&A market was considered important by our survey 
respondents, but achieved a result near to the overall survey average.  The survey gave near 
equal rating to all the various types of M&A transactions, although greater consensus existed 
over the importance of management buy-outs (MBO).  
4.8.2 Driver 14:  Transparency and protection for shareholders and stakeholders 
during mergers and acquisitions
The literature also suggests a number of procedural aspects of takeovers that are important in 
the context of good corporate governance.  In particular, to function effectively, the market for 
corporate control must be characterized by high transparency and fair treatment of various 
shareholders, including protection of minority shareholders.  The literature also stresses the 
protection of employee rights and firm-specific human capital as important in minimizing 
‘breaches of trust’ and undermining cooperation and commitments within companies.  Finally, 
empirical research also associated cash payment with higher performance of M&A.  In terms of 
various sorts of procedural aspects of takeovers, the survey generated the following results:




Transparency of ownership and control (inc. defensive measures) 5.74 1.36
Principle of equal treatment of shareholders 5.50 1.46
One-share / one-vote principle 5.22 1.86
Mandatory bid rule 4.62 1.70
Squeeze out and sell-out rules 4.61 1.55
Protection of employee interests during M&A 4.46 1.64
Establishment of an international ‘level playing field’ that reduces 
takeover barriers 
4.39 1.81
Protection of firm-specific assets during M&A 4.11 1.63
Payment through cash 4.02 1.61
Payment through debt (e.g. LBO) 3.86 1.28
Break-through rules 3.74 1.52
Payment through share swaps 3.71 1.29
Ability to ‘ring fence’ target firms from acquirers in countries with 
higher takeover barriers 
2.85 1.42
The survey results stress the important of transparency and equal treatment of shareholders as 
being highly important.  One-share / one-vote principles also received a high score, but a high 
standard deviation.  The type of payment used during acquisitions was considered as relatively 
unimportant.  Wealth protection functions of guarding employee interests or other firm-specific 
assets were considered moderately important.
4.8.3 Driver 15:  Board power regarding takeover bids, subject to shareholder veto
The literature on takeovers suggests that the board should play a substantial role in the takeover 
process.  Empirical research showed that while some sorts of takeover defences may destroy 
firm value, the complete neutrality of the board is likely to be unrealistic and undesirable.  
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Managers should be able to say “no,” but not say “never” regarding takeover bids.  In terms of 
the appropriateness of various sorts of board actions, the survey generated the following results:




The board should have substantial decision power regarding 
takeover bids, subject to shareholder veto
4.74 1.50
White knights or defence through building a constituency of stable 
long-term shareholders
3.93 1.34
Pre-bid defensive actions 3.70 1.57
The board should be strictly neutral during takeover bids 3.55 1.77
Post-bid defensive actions 3.44 1.30
Anti-takeover devices (e.g. poison pill, golden parachutes, etc.) 3.05 1.38
The survey results suggest that the board should play an active role in takeovers rather than 
being neutral, but board actions should also be subject to some oversight or final power by the 
shareholders.  Various anti-takeover devices and defensive actions were generally considered as 
inappropriate.
4.9   Stakeholders
The literature review has identified three major ‘good’ governance drivers associated with the 
stakeholders:
 Stakeholder involvement within corporate governance
 Voice of debt-holders
 Employee participation in financial outcomes and collective voice in decision-
making.
4.9.1 Driver 16:  Stakeholder involvement within corporate governance
The review of the economics and corporate finance literature does not assign much role to 
stakeholders as drivers of corporate governance, with the exception of debtholders.  Much of 
the literature on banks is ambiguous in terms of benefits and costs.  The accounting and 
behavioural literatures does suggest that the involvement of stakeholder in general can have a 
significant effect on corporate governance and performance outcomes.  The literature on 
employee involvement suggests that in the UK context, employees and their representatives do 
not play a significant role.








Local communities 3.47 1.62
NGOs 3.19 1.63
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Our survey rated employees and debtholders as the two most important drivers of corporate 
governance among the various stakeholder parties.  However, they only just obtained critical 
importance, e.g., an average score above 4.  In addition a relativel high standard deviation of 
responses poits to a certain disagreement among experts.
4.9.2 Driver 17:  Voice mechanisms for debt holders
Debtholder voice was considered an important driver of ‘good’ corporate governance.  The 
finance literature stresses the potential monitoring role of banks, particularly as a substitute 
for the market for corporate control.   In terms of specific operationalizations, the survey 
produced the following results:




Individual voice through meetings and contacts with managers 4.75 1.49
Use of contractual mechanisms of monitoring (bank covenants, 
etc.) 
4.67 1.65
Inclusion of governance factors in risk evaluation mechanisms 4.45 1.56
Use of delegated monitoring systems 4.18 1.61
Access to private information 3.86 1.53
Board presence 3.45 1.59
Among the mechanisms of debtholder involvement, direct voice based and formal contractual 
mechanisms were rated high.  Private information or board presence was considered as 
relatively less important.  
4.9.3 Driver 18:  Employee participation in financial outcomes and collective voice in 
decision-making 
Employee participation is widely considered to be an important driver of ‘good’ corporate 
governance by supporting firm-specific investment of employees and alignment of incentives 
with those of shareholders or managers.  In terms of specific operationalizations of employee 
participation, our survey produced the following results:




Employee share ownership 4.73 1.64
Employee voice via pension fund 4.49 1.73
Consultative committees such as works councils 4.48 1.82
Individual voice through meetings, employee reports 4.44 1.80
Board-level representation of employees 4.08 1.87
Trade unions 3.69 1.72
Among the mechanisms of employee involvement, share ownership was rated highest.  This 
was followed by voice via pension funds and via consultative committees such as works 
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councils.  Both forms of individual voice, such as employee reports, and trade unions were 
not seen as important.
4.10 Corporate Governance Drivers: Complementarities, Contingencies 
and Costs.
Most of the empirical evidence base in corporate governance research reviewed in Chapter 2 
has remained focused on isolated sets of corporate governance practices, such as 
independence of outside directors or shareholder activism.  The empirical results of such 
studies are often ambiguous, since the effects of corporate governance structures or processes 
remain contingent on the presence or absence of other corporate governance elements.  In 
looking at these corporate governance ‘drivers’ as a benchmark for good corporate 
governance, some caution must be advised.  Rather seeing good corporate governance 
‘drivers’ that are universally applicable, best practices or ‘drivers’ may better be understood 
to be good in particular combinations.  Corporate governance systems are often viewed as 
clustering along two internally consistent types, either a pure market or shareholder type vs. a 
pure relational or stakeholder type (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Hall et al. 2001).  Here we 
consider the potential complementarity or substitution among drivers from the perspective of 
the UK context, taking existing institutional frameworks as given.  
In addition, ‘drivers’ of good corporate governance must be seen in light of different 
organisational contingencies.  That is, ‘drivers’ may be effective only in particular contexts 
that are specific to an industry or the life cycle of the firm.  While this makes generalization 
about best practices more difficult, one potential implication is that public policy should allow 
firms to adopt a diversity of corporate governance devices in order to best deal with important 
contingencies.  In short, a ‘one size fits all’ approach may be undesirable.  
Finally, we consider corporate governance drivers in the context of potential cost 
implications.
4.10.1 Complementarity and substitution among corporate governance drivers
More recent studies suggest viewing corporate governance as a system of interrelated elements 
having strategic or institutional complementarities (Aoki 1994; Milgrom and Roberts 1994,  
1995). Some authors have recognized that governance mechanisms operate interdependently, 
with the overall effectiveness depending on a simultaneous operation of several mechanisms in 
limiting managerial opportunism (Rediker and Seth 1995; Walsh and Seward 1990). For 
individual firms, corporate governance involves different sets of practices that need to operate 
as a whole in order to be effective.  Since alternative control mechanisms exist, greater use of 
one mechanism needs not be positively related to firm performance. Where one specific 
mechanism is used less, others may be used more, resulting in equally good performance 
(Agrawal and Knoweber 1996). Different governance mechanisms can substitute or 
complement each other, (Dalton et al. 2003; Hoskisson et al. 2002), and the cost-benefit trade-
offs among a variety of governance mechanisms would determine their use. Likewise, national 
models or regulatory frameworks for corporate governance have interrelated elements that need 
to perform complementary functions (Aoki 2001b; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Fiss 2005).
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The results of the Experts Survey are consistent with these arguments. We have selected 10 
‘good’ governance drivers that obtained the highest score, and list these drivers and their 
average scores in descending ordered:
Survey Item Average Score 
(scale of 1-7)
Extensive and timely provision of information to independent directors 6.17
Independent nomination, remuneration and audit committees 6.08
Human capital of independent board members 5.92
Financial control and budgeting systems 5.81
Annual report and related documents 5.79
Transparency of ownership and control (inc. defensive measures) 5.74
Separation of the roles of CEO and board Chairman 5.74
Information specifically on corporate governance 5.74
Support and protection of ‘whistleblowers’ 5.73
Professionally qualified members on the audit committee 5.73
These survey results clearly show that drivers belong to different “families” that were identified 
in the literature review.  In other words, there is no one single “family” that was identified as the 
most efficient driver of ‘good’ corporate governance, and the efficiency of corporate 
governance in a particular firm depends on a combination of drivers coming from various 
“families”. These drivers may substitute or complement each other in terms of their effects on 
organisational outcomes, including business strategy and performance.
Research that explores these substitution or complementarity effects empirically is limited, but 
existing studies provide important empirical evidence.  For example, a number of studies 
suggest that disclosure may be an important complement to other governance ‘drivers’, such as 
institutional ownership, board independence, etc. El-Gazzar (1998) showed that large 
institutional blockholders were associated with higher levels of voluntary information 
disclosure.  Using information on contested takeover bids, Brennan (1999) suggests that targets 
disclose more information on earnings than a sample of other firms.  A recent study of 
Singapore listed firms indicates that companies with a higher proportion of independent 
directors have higher levels of voluntary disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay 2004). Similarly, 
using a sample of UK firms, Mangena and Pike (2004) confirm that better information is 
provided where audit committees are independent and have financial expertise.  
Some authors emphasise that inefficiency of certain types of corporate governance drivers may 
be compensated by active functioning of alternative governance mechanisms. Jensen (1986; 
1993) suggests that when the market for corporate control is less efficient, the governance 
effects of debt holders may play particularly important role in restraining managerial discretion, 
especially in companies with a substantial “free” cash flow. In their study of U.S. firms with 
continued founding-family ownership in the U.S. Andersen and Reeb (2004) provide evidence 
that independent, non-family directors may substitute for the governance deficiencies associated 
with family owners.
These findings led Rediker and Seth (1995) to suggest that a combination (or bundle) of 
governance mechanisms is required to reduce principal-agent costs and align interests of 
principals and agents. Complementarities/substitution imply that reforms made in one element 
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of corporate governance are mediated by the wider configuration of governance channels and 
national institutions.  Thus, best practice should be understood in terms different combinations 
of practices, rather than as individual good corporate governance ‘drivers’ that are universally 
applicable.  
4.10.2  Contingencies related to ‘good’ corporate governance drivers
A number of recent review articles on various drivers of good corporate governance suggest 
that their effectiveness and efficiency depends on a number of important firm- and industry-
level contingency factors such as the firm’s size, age, industry regulation, growth/decline phase, 
etc. (Dalton et al. 1999; 2003; Deutsch 2005; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). For example, 
some governance drivers may be more efficient in smaller firms since the scale and diversity of 
large firms may cloud any relationship between corporate governance and performance. 
However, a small scale of operations and lack of resources may constrain the firm’s ability to 
introduce effective governance systems, such as an extensive reporting and diverse and 
independent board.
A growing amount of research now explores the effects of various governance drivers in 
different contingencies empirically. For example, Meeks et al. (1995) find disclosure being 
related to firm size, debt-equity ratios, country of incorporation, and international listing. Other 
UK research suggests that disclosure is not only positively related to firm size, but varies 
significantly across sectors, and that companies whose future earnings are poor are more likely 
to make disclosures (Abraham and Tonks 2004).
Consistent with this perspective, recent meta-analysis has found that the relationship between 
board size and firm performance relationship is stronger for smaller, as compared to larger firms 
(Dalton et al. 1999). Daily and Dalton (1992) provide evidence of a positive relationship 
between both the number and proportion of independent directors and price-earnings ratio 
in a sample of small firms. IPO research (Certo et al. 2001; Filatotchev and Bishop 2002; 
Sanders and Boivie 2004) shows that newly listed companies with more diverse and 
independent boards have better performance. On the other hand, Luoma and Goodstein 
(1998) focus on the representation of non-shareholder stakeholders, such as employees, public 
officials, suppliers and customers, on company boards.  They find that such stakeholder 
representation is more likely to occur where companies are larger or are in industries with a 
higher degree of regulation.
Some researchers emphasise that various corporate governance drivers may be particularly 
important in the environment of organisational decline or bankruptcy. Holland (2005), for 
example, has suggested that disclosure, both public and private, increases when performance 
declines and during take-over battles.  Daily and Dalton (1994), Filatotchev and Toms (2003) 
and Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) argue that board diversity and external “interlocks” may 
play an important role in crisis situations, since, from a resource-dependency view, these board 
configurations may provide more diverse networking links to resource providers. 
An emerging body of research on the life cycle of corporate governance (Filatotchev and 
Wright 2005; Johnson 1997; Lynall et al. 2003; Aoki 2001) suggests the notion of a number of 
firm life cycle stages where there may need to be different “bundles” of corporate governance 
characteristics.  Corporate governance should thus be viewed as a dynamic system that may 
change as firms evolve over these stages. The firm’s evolution is accompanied by changes in 
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ownership structure, board composition, the degree of founder involvement, etc. The balance of 
the accountability and enterprise roles of the various governance elements may change over this 
life cycle from establishment, growth, maturity and decline.  
In the early stages of the life cycle, the entrepreneurial firm has a narrow resource base. It is, as 
a rule, owned and controlled by a tightly knit group of founder-managers and/or family 
investors, and the level of managerial accountability to external shareholders is necessary low. 
In this context, the knowledge contribution of boards may be more important than in firms 
facing more mature markets. As the firm grows, it requires access to external resources and 
expertise that may fuel and support this growth, and it opens up its governance system to 
external investors, such as “business angels” and venture capital firms. At this stage, the balance 
between resources and accountability starts to shift towards greater transparency and increasing 
monitoring and control by external providers of resources.  
When the firm has exhausted its growth opportunities in the focal industry and perhaps over-
diversified into related and unrelated industries (Hitt et al. 2003), the governance system 
becomes less transparent. Misalignment of incentives leads to a managerial drive for ever-
increasing expansion and diversification producing performance deterioration and loss in
shareholder value. Even where there is a substantial inherited resource base, at this stage the 
existing governance system may be insufficient to prevent managerial opportunism or arrest 
organisational decline (Filatotchev and Toms 2003). In a turnaround situation, governance itself 
may turn into a driver of further decline by imposing serious financial constraints that erode the 
organisation’s resource base.
Bearing in mind these changing strategic and operating conditions of the firm, its dynamics may 
impose different demands on its governance system. Therefore, there may be a number of 
optimal configurations and combinations of ‘good’ corporate governance drivers that should 
perform different monitoring, resource and strategy roles, depending on a particular stage of the 
firm’s life cycle.
4.10.3  Costs related to ‘good’ corporate governance drivers
Most of the corporate governance-related research is focused on potential benefits of various 
corporate governance practices. However, drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance may also 
have associated costs, including the out-of-pocket compliance costs that are reflected in the 
firm’s balance sheet and other accounting documentation (e.g., the audit costs, directors’ 
insurance, etc.), less explicit opportunity costs (e.g., directors’ time spent on governance issues 
instead of business strategy, costs of strategic disclosure, etc.), and the legal and reputational 
costs which may be incurred when firms get their governance practices wrong. 
Direct costs of corporate governance are related to the out-of-pocket expenses that are 
associated with compliance with the governance rules and regulations. More specifically, these 
costs include expenditures on recruitment and remuneration of executive and independent 
directors and costs of setting up and running control and risk-management systems, including 
board committees, etc. For example, recent changes in corporate governance standards require 
the auditor to perform a walk-through of major classes of transactions while evaluating 
management’s assessment of controls, in addition to traditional audit functions. Aguilera (2005) 
suggests that accounting firms are concerned with being sued, and they have developed a 
voluntary “enhanced audit” that costs companies more than traditional audit services. In 
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addition, new corporate governance rules increase litigation risks and associated increase in the 
firm’s expenditures on directors’ insurance and indemnity policies. A survey of 224 large public 
firms in the USA by Financial Executives International with regard to the direct costs of 
complying with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act finds that the average first-year estimate 
is almost $3 million for 26,000 hours of internal work and 5,000 hours of external work, plus 
additional audit fees of $823,200, or an increase of 53% (Zhang 2005). Aguilera (2005) reports 
that AIG is concerned over the new regulatory environment and its $300m per year expense to 
fulfil the new requirements.  
Similar to the costs of compliance, the board monitoring and control effort is costly, both for the 
directors and for the firm. Being very busy people, independent board directors necessarily 
consider their board duties as a part-time job. While they are compensated handsomely for their 
time, neither their incentive structure nor their time commitment allows them to devote all their 
energies to monitoring activities (Walsh and Seward 1990). Aguilera (2005) points out that 
boards can easily become overwhelmed with reporting requirements stemming from new 
regulation such as the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as well as voluntary codes and initiatives from 
the investor, accounting and legal professions.
Some researchers differentiate between direct compliance costs and less explicit, indirect 
opportunity costs and strategic costs of competition. Indirect corporate governance costs are 
associated with the fact that focusing on compliance may divert managers’ attention from 
strategic and operating decisions associated with running the firm. In addition, the litigation 
risks may change management’s risk-taking behaviour, and this, in turn, will likely slow down 
the growth of the firm. These costs are impossible to quantify on the basis of ad hoc
assumptions (Zhang 2005). 
A number of studies associate disclosure with high opportunity costs relating to the firm’s 
proprietary information (Healey and Palepu 2001; Lang and Lundholm 2000). In environments 
where information leaks routinely and competitive advantage may evaporate quickly, executive 
team members may not be willing to share their trade secrets or other proprietary information 
about the firm's R&D in progress, innovations or recent discoveries (Verrecchia 1983). In 
addition, an extensive disclosure policy may lead to high costs of possible ex post litigation 
(Beatty and Welch 1996).  Voluntary disclosure, therefore, represents an endogenous choice 
that is an outcome of a trade-off between the reduction of cost of capital resulting from a 
reduction of asymmetric information and the increase in proprietary and litigation costs (Leone 
et al. 2003). 
Aguilera (2005) suggests that there may be a cost/benefit trade-off associated with ‘good’ 
governance drivers. On the one hand, restoring investors’ confidence might translate into a 
higher market capitalization, and, hence, it might pay off in the long-term. On the other hand, 
potential consequence of over-regulating the corporate governance environment is that it might 
detract from flexibility and risk-taking, to the point that some of the firms might consider going 
private, and smaller companies might be deterred from listing because of higher governance 
demands. The costs of internal monitoring and control can become so high that no effective 
managerial control exists. In such cases, the value of the company would diminish accordingly 
(Walsh and Seward 1990).
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5 Focus Group Analysis
5.1 Introduction
The review of the literature identified a number of key drivers of corporate governance 
relevant to the UK context, as previously discussed in Chapter 2.  The overarching objective
of the next stage of research is to evaluate whether corporate governance regulation in the UK 
fully reflects the determinants of ‘good’ governance suggested by the social science literature.  
As part of this stage, the Project Team has organised a one-day Focus Group discussion with 
an objective to discuss potential gaps in the regulation with regard to the corporate 
governance benchmarks, as well as problems with the chosen methods of implementation. 
The concept of ‘families’ of good corporate governance drivers provided a firm foundation 
for Focus Group discussions, giving a vital qualitative input into the implementation and 
efficiency of corporate governance regulations and best practice guidelines within the UK.  
The utilisation of the Focus Group enabled various governance-related aspects to be discussed 
in a more unstructured way and then further incorporated within the overall view of corporate 
governance and in particular the gap analysis as presented in Chapter 6.
5.2 Aims and Objectives of the Focus Group
The aims and objectives of the focus group was to provide discussion as to whether the 
corporate governance regulation in the UK fully reflects the determinants of good corporate 
governance suggested by academic literature and good corporate governance benchmarks. 
The focus group is an integral part of this stage, and its objective is to help the DTI and the 
research team in the following ways: 
(1) To develop an in-depth understanding of what constitutes good corporate 
governance and what drives it
(2) To obtain feedback on the gaps which might exist in the content of the present UK 
regulatory framework
(3) To generate practical insight about the problems and costs of implementing the 
current regulation or relevant desirable alternatives.
5.3 Participants and Groupings
The presence of several participants was required in order to provide a representative sample 
incorporating many sectors with differing requirements and views of corporate governance.  
Invitations to participants placed an emphasis on their participation in the debate about what 
constitutes good corporate governance and the practicalities of implementing regulation and 
best practice guidelines within the UK.   
In line with current methodology for focus groups, all participants received a briefing note 
prior to the session and this was further enhanced by an introductory presentation on the day.  
Team members acted as facilitators and mangers of the discussions in order to encourage 
involvement by all members of the group and to maintain its intended focus.  Appendix II 
provides a list of participants in the focus group.
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Overall, the Focus Group discussions involved thirty participants who were divided into three 
groups organised around separate ‘families’ of good corporate governance drivers. The 
groups were carefully selected in order to provide a mix of perspectives, while at the same 
time bringing together experts with a particular set of interests.  The presence of several 
participants allowed for a variety of points of view to emerge and for the group to respond to 
and discuss these views.  In order to direct the discussions and provide participants with 
guidance for the day, each group was briefed separately to consider specific corporate 
governance drivers with regard to the following three aspects:  
(1) To what extent and in what way is each of the items genuinely a ‘driver’ of good 
corporate governance; 
(2) How adequate is current UK regulation in promoting each driver; and 
(3) What are the problems and costs of implementing the current regulation?  
The outcomes of the focus group discussions are reported below.
5.4 Focus Group Discussions
Whist the remit of each group was to consider the three aspects mentioned above, where 
additional topics arose during the discussions, these too have been incorporated in the 
outcomes from the focus groups. The following sections provide a summary of discussions 
that took place in the three groups.
5.4.1 Focus Group 1.  Boards, auditing and internal controls, executive pay
This group was focused on internal corporate governance systems. The discussion topics 
included the following good corporate governance ‘drivers’:
 The nature and importance of board independence
 The diversity of human and social capital within the board
 Ensuring directors’ engagement in board processes
 The transparency, independence and competence of the audit committee
 The independence of external auditors.  
 The presence of internal control systems
 The role of performance incentives for executives
5.4.1.1 Corporate boards
The group wished to emphasis that issues were considered vis-à-vis the ‘enlightened 
shareholder’ model.  With this in mind, the general consensus of the group was that boards 
should be viewed as a whole and there was a danger of giving too much emphasis to structure 
rather than the practices of the board.  It was not so much a drive towards independent boards 
that was required, rather a balance.  It was not necessarily independence that was an asset to 
the board, but rather experience.  Whilst there should be independence of appointment and 
behaviour, this should not be viewed as, or lead to, a lack of engagement with company 
issues.  The ‘comply or explain’ was complimented within the UK by a ‘peer regulation’ as 
board of directors are able to use other boards as comparators to their own environment 
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although some caution should be shown in that the board should not just look to others but to 
shareholders.  
Within the UK, disclosure and the lack of restrictions enabled an informed debate to take 
place where companies respect views of their shareholders.  This was an advantage of the UK 
system and should not be regulated away.  The UK showed a ‘layered’ approach and the 
Combined Code promoted good practice and a checklist rather than a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach.  This was particularly demonstrated in the success of AIM, where the lack of 
regulation enabled companies to follow what was appropriate for their needs.  This 
highlighted the need to take into account company contingency factors, such as company size, 
age etc.
This promoted discussions with regards to the roles of the board and how it functions against 
the background of shareholders.  It was acknowledged that the role of the board was very 
different to that of executive management.  It was felt that boards could not operate on a ‘tick 
box’ approach and that efficiency came from clarity of roles within the board.  In particular 
the presence of a senior (lead) independent director provided a safety gap and a starting point 
for challenging both board roles and decisions, although in practice independent directors 
were more likely to act collectively.  
The overall consensus was that no content gaps existed in the current regulatory environment 
in the UK with regard to the corporate board roles and functions. However, there is a shift in 
balance towards more formal approach that is focused on structural parameters. Efficiency 
gaps came from too much focus on structural issues rather than understand how boards work 
and the processes used.  Caveats should be made to enable contingencies with regards to 
company size, age and organisational development. For example smaller companies may not 
a) need more independent directors and b) may not be able to afford them.  There may be 
room here for guidelines and principles but certainly not regulation.  
5.4.1.2 Audit and internal controls
The UK does not seem to show the systematic problems seen within the US in terms of 
failures of the internal control systems and company auditors.  Whist there is still a ‘post 
Enron’ sentiment in the USA; the market place within the UK shows no apparent market 
failure.  Some participants expressed concern that there had been considerable reviews and 
changes, which were still being embedded into practice.  The general view was that these 
were now being consolidated and that more ‘process’ did not necessarily mean greater 
quality.  More regulation and too much emphasis on independence of auditors do not 
necessarily lead to a higher quality of auditing.  Some participants emphasize that it is 
important to organize effective and efficient communications around auditing process.  The 
concern was that if regulation transposed advisors into ‘gatekeepers’ then trust and judgement 
would be ‘regulated out’.  As a consequence, auditors would not be able to provide sound 
advice, and this would make it more difficult for directors to make sound and well-informed 
decisions. 
There had been a drive towards greater communication and transparency although there may 
still be an expectation gap that when the auditors sign an item off it is ‘perfect’.  The 
imposition of further rules would put the profession in danger of spending more time 
following rules than working actively for the client.  
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It was felt that audit firms were now driven by ‘reputational risk’, which provided a powerful 
market force and should not be under estimated.  This gave more focus on quality, which 
went far deeper than legislation.  Furthermore, the Combined Code asked for ‘recent and 
relevant’ experience for Audit Committee members.  It should be left for the board to decide 
how to interpret this; their interpretation could be tougher than a simple academic 
qualification.  More regulation would infer a failure of trust, judgement and purpose. It was 
felt that internal control systems are one of the hardest items to assess if you are an investor in 
the company.  
As such no content gap was exposed. There was a danger, however, that the rules had created 
an environment that had become fixated on structure.  
5.4.1.3 Executive pay
The focus on levels of pay and performance related incentive reduced this to a purely 
financial basis.  Executives are not just concerned with financial rewards but other aspects 
such as loss of jobs or negative reputation.  
The group felt strongly that pay must not become an issue for regulation.  Levels of pay 
should be left to market forces.  In leaving this to companies, specific consideration could be 
given to size of company, and a balance between short-term v long-term issues.  The greater 
transparency had provided a basis for dialogue, but this must be balanced and an over 
emphasis on transparency had the danger of driving good talent either into the private sector 
or abroad.  
Guidance for the remuneration committee was well defined within the Combined Code and 
this should left alone and trusted to function.    It was felt that remuneration committees are 
now more accountable and must balance this with the need to attract the right calibre of talent 
to the board.  This still means offering competitive levels of pay.  
There was no need for regulation in this area, this should be left to the market mechanism and 
entrusted to the board of directors and shareholders. However, executive remuneration 
initiatives should be considered in conjunction with other laws and regulations, such as 
employment law.  This law could often be enforced, although designed for another purpose 
and may result in unintended consequences where directors are protected and thus there is the 
potential for this to enable rewards, even for failure.  
5.4.2 Focus Group 2. Shareholder activism and the market for corporate control
This group was focused on the following aspects of corporate governance: 
 The role of large-block shareholders
 The prospects and barriers to shareholder activism
 The role of the market for corporate control in good corporate governance
 Transparency and protection for shareholders and stakeholders during mergers and 
acquisitions
 Board power in takeover bids
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5.4.2.1 Share ownership and shareholder activism
The group made an initial observation on terminology – namely, shareholder ‘activism’ may 
have negative connotations, and the report would be better served by a term such as 
shareholder ‘involvement.’  
Regarding large-block shareholders, the participants stressed that some concentration of share 
ownership facilitated greater involvement.  However, large shareholders may have both 
positive and negative impacts.  In some cases, dominant shareholders (such as the case of 
Abbott Group) have a positive effect and supports innovation.  Likewise, firms with more 
dispersed owners may be more likely to engage in ‘aggressive accounting.’  But in other 
cases, dominant shareholders may aim to entrench certain persons in the firm, as in the case of 
family ownership.  Or dominant shareholders may promote certain interests that differ from 
other shareholders   Here a stake of 5-10% may be enough for a conflict of interest to arise.  
Hence, the ability for minorities to have protection is important.  
In practical terms, it may be very hard to prove that the actions of a large shareholder led to 
abuses of other shareholders short of discovering criminal behaviour by the shareholder.  
Thus, although regulatory protection does exist, it may be worth further consideration of the 
implementation of minority shareholder protections.  However, some participants observed 
that cases such as the Fox TV case couldn’t happen in the UK, since the rights for 
shareholders to vote are better protected.
Other interesting cases included corporate pension funds, where large shareholders may have 
an issue of self-investment.  However, most participants thought regulation of this issue was 
adequate.  Private equity funds were also considered to have different interests from other 
shareholders, since they take an active stance toward management of the firm.  However, 
most participants did not consider this a problem for regulation.
For investment funds, an important prerequisite of effective involvement is the ability of 
different funds to coordinate their actions.  Most participants felt that this was possible in the 
London market, since the circles of investors were small enough for informal communication.  
In regulatory terms, this issue is addressed in the City Code.  However, a problem regarding 
coordination concerns the lack of transparency about shareholder involvement.  Lots of 
involvement is ‘behind the scenes’, as funds do not want to be perceived as being 
interventionist.  At the same time, lots of funds are not active.  
Participants debated further whether investors really have an interest in good corporate 
governance itself.  Some participants noted that investors are only interested in returns, and 
corporate governance was only a means to this end.  Other participants disagreed and noted 
that trustees of the pension funds were most likely to write in regarding corporate governance 
issues.  This suggests a large mandate for pension funds to get actively involved in corporate 
governance.  Moreover, many trustees are concerned about corporate social responsibility 
issues.  The example was noted that a racism case might damage the reputation of a firm and 
therefore shareholder value.  At the same time, conflicts may arise since trustees may be 
employees or stakeholders in the firm and thus face conflicts of interest in being too active.  
The group noted that a more serious issue about shareholder involvement regards the 
resources of shareholders themselves.  Pension funds have economies of scale compared to 
individual investors, but still lack capacity to get too involved.  Some participants noted that 
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fund managers might not understand corporate strategy issues, whereas others noted that 
short-termism is endemic within the City.  
Different strategies of involvement were noted among the group.  Some argued that it was 
driven by the size of the stake, whereas others saw it as a more complex function of a) the 
absolute exposure in money terms; b) the relevance of the stock within the portfolio; and c) a 
sense check as to whether one can realistically influence an outcome.   Other participants 
suggested that involvement could alternatively be issue-led – shareholders target particular 
issues across a wider range of firms.
In terms of regulation, disclosure is centrally important to shareholder involvement.  The 
participants largely agreed that the UK approach was quite good in being flexible about 
disclosure.  No amount of information is ever enough for outside investors to really control 
the company.  But requiring disclosure has a psychological effect on managers in making 
them consider issues, and consider shareholder interests.  Promoting disclosure is not too 
expensive, and Turnbull guidance is very flexible in this regard.
A long discussion rose around the issue of operating and financial reviews (OFRs).  Many 
participants were concerned that the lack of a clear framework for reporting is a problem and 
detracts from having a level playing field.  Some feared that the situation might revert back to 
being worse than before the whole issue emerged in the UK.  Other participants disagreed and 
thought that more flexibility is good, since other frameworks do exist and a single, uniform 
framework would be too heavy handed.  In practice, the group agreed that more disclosure of 
information about the context of the business and potential risks is good as a principle, but the 
details become very complicated.  High standards may evolve in a flexible way, but market 
participants must first identify the best standard.  For example, guidance on reporting about 
the firm as a “going concern” has evolved nicely, but the quality of evaluation of the board 
remains poor since no standards have been identified.  
The group noted an important contingency in that institutional investors could gain private 
information about large, FTSE-100 firms based on one-to-one meetings with the directors, but 
mandatory disclosure is very important for small firms where investor knowledge is much 
weaker.  
Participants lacked clear agreement about the importance of the AGM.  Some noted that this 
was the ‘up most important focus’ for funds, whereas others noted that funds rarely attend 
AGMs.  Funds are reluctant to raise problems at the AGM, since any information enters the 
public domain and negative information may damage share prices.  So at the AGM, the key 
role is that of individual shareholders, rather than institutions.  Institutional investors use their 
influence largely outside the forum of the AGM.  A final issue raised was how to facilitate the 
participation of foreign shareholders at UK AGMs through more modern technology.  
Some noted that the positive effect is largely psychological, since the directors must prepare 
for any type of question to be asked.  Also shareholders can observe the entire board interact, 
and gain useful clues about the roles of board members.  One participant noted, however, that 
directors are not required by regulation to answer all the questions asked at the AGM.  
In terms of shareholder rights, the group agreed that less regulation is good.  An important 
backdrop of shareholder rights exist in the Combined Code and this system was considered to 
work well ‘most of the time.’  Other recommendations, such as the right to question auditors, 
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were considered impractical since the process of actually doing so will be too cumbersome.  
Disclosure of executive remuneration was noted as one recent change in regulation that had a 
very good effect.
The group stressed the importance of self-regulation in the area of voting.  The ABI 
Guidelines are very important in setting an agenda, and these work well in the context of 
comply-or-explain principles.  Here the focus is on the level of corporate disclosure, rather 
than the exact content.  Some participants felt that voting itself is a rather blunt instrument for 
corporate governance.  Shareholders have diverse views, and managers must make their own 
judgment about strategy.  Important is that that managers clarify ‘why’ shareholders cast no 
votes.
Some participants thought disclosure of pension fund voting is important for trustees as part 
of market transparency.  However, most participants doubted any effect of having pension 
funds know how each other voted.  ISC Principles govern this issue, but have proven 
ineffective in getting voluntary compliance.  Most participants were opposed to legislation, 
but suggested trustees should move vocally demand disclosure.  Some participants noted that 
a shareholder lawsuit would prompt greater action by funds.  This relates to the broader issues 
of corporate governance of funds and other gatekeepers themselves.  
5.4.2.2 Market for corporate control
The group noted that the UK takeover rules are quite stringent.  Many participants cited the 
flexible nature of the UK code as being beneficial.
The main issue in terms of takeovers was the quality of the acquirer.  It was noted that while 
giving share price premiums to target shareholders, not all takeovers create value for the 
acquiring company.  However, some group members expressed strong scepticism as to 
whether regulation could possibly address this issue.
In terms of takeover defences, the group discussed the issue of U.S. style poison pills.  The 
group generally viewed these as undesirable, and some even described them as “damaging 
and undesirable.”  
One regulatory gap that emerged in the discussion related to the charging of ‘break fees’ paid 
to the bidder if negotiations were broken off.  Investors felt that these charges were too 
common and too high, representing a source of major abuse in the UK system. Some group 
members also noted that the role of advisors in deals were potentially under-regulated.
In sum, the focus group did not unambiguously identify any major content gaps in the 
regulation of shareholder involvement, nor in the area of takeovers.  However, many members 
of the group considered the abandonment of the OFR to be a gap in the regulation of 
information disclosure that would have otherwise facilitated greater shareholder involvement.  
This point was widely debated in the group.  
More broadly, other potential market failures were noted regarding shareholder involvement, 
particularly regarding smaller companies where information provision may be weaker and 
institutional investors may have fewer resources for active involvement.  However, these were 
not necessarily identified in the focus group as areas that should be subject to regulatory 
intervention.
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In terms of implementing regulation, the focus group often noted that the flexible regulatory 
approach in the UK as a strong point of the UK market.  In this regard, the focus group 
stressed the need for further development in mechanisms of soft-law and self-regulatory 
guidelines on voting and disclosure of voting by institutional investors.  
5.4.3 Focus Group 3. Information disclosure, stakeholders
This group was focused on the following issues:
 The role of public information disclosure 
 Private information sharing as an informal governance mechanism
 The role of stakeholders or more generally, corporate social responsibility, in 
corporate governance 
 The role of debtholder voice within corporate governance  
 The role of employee voice in corporate governance
 Appropriate mechanisms for stakeholder involvement 
5.4.3.1 Information and disclosure
The group agreed on two initial general statements on information.  First, they felt that 
information disclosure was a ‘lubricant’, which made the whole system of corporate 
governance work.  It is essential to all other structures and processes in governance.  Second, 
they thought that, by most international standards, disclosure in the UK is already high.
On the provision of public information, the group felt that disclosure in annual reports and 
public documents is a significant driver.  It has grown extensively in recent years and is well 
covered by the regulatory framework.  Firms have to and do provide information of this kind.  
Both, the content gap and implementation gap are therefore small.  However, there are costs 
involved and these have risen, especially for smaller firms.
One of the big developments in terms of public information has been information on 
corporate governance per se.  This often now takes up more space than the financial report.  It 
does act as a real driver, but gaps in the regulatory framework and its implementation are not 
evident.  Indeed, there is over-regulation in some areas, such as details of executive share 
options, providing information, which is often difficult to interpret.
There was a general feeling that it was desirable to have an OFR and the proposed version of 
this was acceptable and potentially useful to companies.  Many firms have already introduced 
it and find it beneficial.  However, in the absence of a mandatory requirement, not all firms 
will voluntarily produce an OFR.  This will be the case in particular with smaller firms and 
may well be to the disadvantage of their shareholders.  It was noted that there would be an 
Business Review under the EU Accounts Modernisation Directive.  However, this will not 
require certain types of information especially on corporate social responsibility; it will also 
not be audited – this will entail certain cost savings, but may also reduce the value of the 
document.
In other areas, such as the disclosure of related party transactions and the oversight of 
information provision by audit committees, it was felt that no gaps exist in the UK regulatory 
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framework as broadly defined in terms either of content or implementation, again with the 
exception of smaller firms.
On the provision of private information, one area in particular was stressed in terms of a 
driver of good corporate governance, namely the provision of information to independent 
directors.  The role and demands of these have increased significantly in recent years and, to 
do their job effectively, they require information.  It was felt that both Company Law and the 
codes are sufficient here and there is little gap in terms of their implementation except for a 
random mix of firms.  
Another area, which the group stressed, was the disclosure of information in private briefings 
for institutional investors and city analysts.  These have become more demanding in terms of 
information provision and briefings constitute a real monitoring of the firm’s top 
management.  However, though investors and analysts gain a feel for the firm and its 
management, nevertheless companies have to be very careful that they do not disclose 
privileged information, which is not available to other investors.  All information shared with 
these parties should go on company websites.
5.4.3.2 Stakeholders
There was some debate within the group as to which stakeholders should be included as 
drivers of good corporate governance.  There was some discussion of customers, local 
communities, NGOs, the state, the press, but these were not emphasised as drivers.  Two 
groupings were, however, discussed further.
In the case of debtholders, it was felt that they were not quite stakeholders in ways that have 
come to be defined.  They do play an important role via meetings and via delegated 
monitoring.  However, the regulatory framework as it stands at the moment in terms of 
contract law was seen as sufficient.
In the case of employees, there was more debate, but on the whole it was felt that they can be 
a driver in corporate governance via whistleblowing, via checks on management, and because 
they are a core resource which needs to be involved in the business so at to get the best out of 
them.   There was felt to be some gap in terms of the content of employee voice mechanisms.  
One area, which was singled out, was the role of employee trustees in pension funds.  The 
running of and accounting for pension funds is becoming more important and complex and 
this will increase in the future.    Here, there may be something of a gap in the regulation of 
disclosure.  Whilst some regulation had been beneficial, there was also a negative side in that 
the legislation on pension fund management had forced company directors and other senior 
managers to resign from managing certain funds, thus leaving the management of those funds 
in the hands of more junior employees. There is also a gap in implementation in that pension 
fund trustees do not always have the capability to perform their tasks.  More training might be 
required.  Another area, which was stressed, was the usefulness of reporting to employees and 
reports about employee value.  However, consensus was less strong when it came to 
mechanisms for implementation.  No support was expressed for board level representation; 
however, some support was expressed for employee consultative committees, including trade 
union back up where appropriate.
Overall, the group favoured an approach based on a set of set of good corporate governance 
principles, supported by an underlying framework of minimal regulation and a good whistle-
blowing process.  
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5.5 Summary of Focus Group Discussions
The Focus Group did not unambiguously identify any major content gaps in the corporate 
governance regulation.  However, many members of the group considered the abandonment 
of the OFR to be a gap in the regulation of information disclosure that would have otherwise 
facilitated greater shareholder involvement.  This point was widely debated in the Group.  
More broadly, other potential market failures were noted regarding shareholder involvement, 
particularly regarding smaller companies where information provision may be weaker and 
institutional investors may have fewer resources for active involvement.  However, these were 
not necessarily identified in the Focus Group as areas that should be subject to regulatory 
intervention.
In terms of implementing regulation, the Focus Group noted that the flexible regulatory
approach in the UK as a strong point of the UK market.  In this regard, the focus group 
stressed the need for further development in mechanisms of soft-law and self-regulatory 
guidelines on voting and disclosure of voting by institutional investors.  
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6 The UK Regulatory Framework: Gap Analyses
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we outline the main elements of the UK regulatory framework and map these 
against the drivers we have already identified.  The approach in UK policy and practice has 
been to see the company as primarily a private body, albeit subject to public interest concerns 
and a regulatory framework.  The company is a private body in that its members are 
shareholders and the governance of the firm concerns the relationship between shareholder 
principals and managerial agents who oversee and run the firm on their behalf.  This contrasts 
with the public view of the company, which has prevailed in much of continental Europe where 
the constitution and governance of the firm is seen in terms of the insider relationship between 
various parties, such as shareholders, debt holders, employees, and other stakeholders.  A major 
issue in the UK has been to what extent companies should be regulated by outside bodies, in 
particular, by the state (Parkinson 1993; Donnelly et al. 2000).
In the following sections, we provide some brief background on the UK regulatory framework, 
outlining the major bodies of laws, regulations, codes and other forms of professional self-
regulation, which bear upon corporate governance.   Next, we undertake a detailed analysis of 
‘gaps’ in the UK regulatory framework in addressing the various drivers of ‘good’ corporate 
governance identified in Chapter 4.  As will be explained below, the gap analysis examines gaps 
in the regulatory content (e.g. to what extent a particular driver is addressed) and in the 
effectiveness of implementation (e.g. whether or not regulation achieves the desired effect).  
Our view of effectiveness is a broad one that incorporates not just traditional issues of 
regulatory enforcement, but how regulation relates to various contingencies facing different 
types of companies, complementarities with other elements of corporate governance, and costs 
related to compliance.  The chapter concludes with some preliminary observations about gaps in 
the UK regulatory framework.  
6.2  Background
There are two main sources of corporate governance regulation in the UK – laws and regulation 
of various kinds and rules and self-regulatory codes with some legal underpinnings.  The latter 
have already been referred to in other chapters, but here we place them in a broader regulatory 
context.  We proceed here along a spectrum from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ law.  We also include in the 
analysis the roles played by the relevant bodies such as the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee.  These are clearly influential bodies as shown in our Survey above, but given the 
concern of this report with public policy, we concentrate on forms of regulation, which have 
some legal underpinnings.
In the UK, the common law has long played an important part in regulating companies, as in 
areas such as shareholder rights and directors’ fiduciary duties.  From the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards, there have been various statutory interventions, some of a piecemeal kind, 
others major initiatives, consolidations, and reforms.  In practice, the legislature has tended to 
intervene periodically when significant problems have been perceived or when there is a felt 
need for consolidation of existing legislation.  The main laws at the present time are the 
Companies Acts 1985 and 1989 and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  In the area 
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of insolvency and restructuring, there is also the Insolvency Act 1986 dealing with companies in 
distress and the Enterprise Act 2002 outlining administration procedures.  
Reacting to concerns about accounting and auditing, the government introduced the Companies 
(Audit, Investigations, and Community Enterprise) Act in 2004 to improve the oversight and 
regulation of the accounting and auditing profession.  This increased the powers of oversight 
and enforcement of the relevant regulator, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). 
Following an extensive review of company law and a white paper (DTI 1998; Company Law 
Steering Group 2001; DTI 2002), a major revision of corporate law is contained in the present 
Company Law Reform Bill 2005.  The key areas covered are as follows: formation, meetings, 
and resolutions; capital maintenance; reports and accounts; and directors’ duties and 
responsibilities, including to stakeholder groups.  The Bill also includes the following: 
investors’ powers to sue directors for negligence and breach of duty – so-called derivative 
actions; protection for auditors from catastrophic damage claims, though it will become a 
criminal offence for an auditor knowingly to produce a misleading audit report; and the 
government’s assumption of reserve powers to require institutional investors to disclose how 
they vote on company activities.  It should be noted that the Government consulted on future 
narrative reporting requirements between December 2005 and March 2006. In response to the 
consultation, on 10 May the Government brought forward amendments to the Company Law 
Reform Bill relating to future narrative reporting requirements. Under the new proposal, all 
companies, other than small companies, will continue to be required to produce a Business 
Review, in accordance with the EU Accounts Modernisation Directive. Quoted companies will 
need to provide certain information over and above that required of unquoted companies. At the 
time of this Report, the Bill is still going through Parliament. The Bill is taken into account in 
our analysis and ranking of legislation below with a caveat that its final content is obviously not 
certain
Other regulations of various kinds can be introduced in so-called secondary, delegated, or 
subordinate legislation.  These enable parliament or a designated body to introduce regulations, 
statutory instruments, and rules in line with primary legislation.  One relevant example of this in 
recent years is the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002), which require quoted 
companies to disclose executive remuneration policies and seek shareholder approval for these.
A further piece of the regulatory framework is the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (2003-
2004).  This sets out the principles and rules governing takeovers and mergers of UK 
companies.  It is issued and administered by an independent body, the Takeover Panel.  The 
Code is not legally binding.  However, in practice, it is mandatory, since parties failing to 
comply run the risk that the FSA may take action, which can include unlimited fines and 
criminal action.  With the implementation of the EU Takeover Directive in 2006, the Code will 
have statutory force.  The Code is further supplemented by legal rules on insider dealing 
through the Criminal Justice Act 1993, part V, which replaced the Company Securities (Insider 
Dealing) Act 1985.
An important piece of the regulatory jigsaw is the Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules 
(2005), issued and administered under the law by the Financial Services Authority (FSA).  
These revised earlier Stock Exchange Listing Rules in order to take account of the EU Market 
Abuse Directive, the EU Prospectus Directive, and the introduction of certain International 
Financial Reporting Standards.  The Rules set out a series of principles, which cover the 
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admission of securities to listing, directors’ responsibilities, information disclosure, the use and 
misuse of insider information, internal controls, and obligations to shareholders.  
In recent years, voluntary codes have been developed to regulate wider aspects of corporate 
governance.  A number of factors have driven this development– business scandals and 
corporate failures in the 1980s and early 1990s, perceived shortcomings in the regulatory 
framework, and possible legal interventions and EU Directives.  The development of such 
codes is in the British tradition of a preference for voluntarism by the state and self-regulation 
by companies and the City.  The Codes have been referred to in earlier chapters and will only be 
summarised in brief here.  The two initial documents were the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury 
(1995) reports.  The former of these focused on broad aspects of governance such as director’s 
responsibilities, audit committees, and the relationship between directors, auditors, and 
shareholders.  The latter focused more specifically on directors’ pay and remuneration 
committees.  Later, Hampel (1998a and b) reviewed the implementation of the Cadbury and 
Greenbury codes and the outcome of this report was the Combined Code 1998.  There were 
further reports by Turnbull (1999) on internal controls, Higgs (2003) on the role of non-
executive directors, and Smith (2003) on audit committees.  In 2003, a new Combined Code 
was issued.   This superseded the earlier Code and drew on the Turnbull, Higgs, and Smith 
guidelines.  A latest revision of the Combined Code took place in June 2006.
The Code is neither law nor regulation, but best practice recommendations for good corporate 
governance for listed companies (the requirements do not apply to AIM companies).  However, 
the Listing Rules interact with the Code, and listed companies must include a section in their 
annual report and accounts, which explain how they have complied with the Code or why they 
have not done so.  Since mid 2003, the Combined Code has come within the domain and 
oversight of the FRC, the statutory body, which regulates accounting and auditing.  Subsequent 
to this change, the Council initiated a review of the original Turnbull report and made a small 
number of amendments, including a recommendation that boards confirm that they have taken 
action remedying any significant failings in internal control systems (FRC 2005).
Finally, in this overview of the regulatory context, we briefly refer to Accounting Standards and 
International Accounting Standards.  The 1989 and 2004 Act referred to above give statutory 
underpinning to the various accounting standards and the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) is 
recognised as the authorised standard-setting body.  In addition, the Financial Reporting Review 
Panel (FRRP) is similarly recognised as the body authorised to investigate departures from 
accounting standards and other legal accounting requirements.  Both of these bodies are now 
part of the FRC (Nobes and Parker 2002; Dewing and Russell 2004)
6.3 An Analysis of Regulatory Gaps
Our gap analysis comparing various regulatory initiatives against the benchmarks of ‘good’ 
corporate governance drivers is based on information obtained from the review of the social 
science literature on corporate governance (Chapter 2), survey of corporate governance 
experts (Chapter 3), the development of ‘good’ governance drivers (Chapter 4), as well as 
feedback from the Focus Group (Chapter 5). The analysis maps policy initiatives against the 
identified drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance and provides an evaluation of these 
initiatives along a number of dimensions, which we conceptualise as content and 
effectiveness gaps.  By content gaps, we mean areas where drivers are not adequately covered 
by the regulatory framework.  By effectiveness gaps, we refer to gaps between the aim and 
actual outcome of regulatory initiatives.  
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In terms of effectiveness, we consider several aspects.  Implementation is explored by 
examining the type of regulatory instrument used (e.g. law, codes, professional norms) and 
the degree to which evidence exists regarding effective enforcement or whether potential gaps 
or market failures can be identified.  However, the consideration of effectiveness gaps has 
broader elements in terms of contingencies, complementarities, and costs.  By contingencies 
we mean that the situation of a particular company may have an impact on the salience of 
different drivers and the costs of regulation, e.g. differences in the size and age of companies, 
in their resource base, and in their life cycle.  By complementarities, we refer to situations 
where drivers and regulations in different areas may complement or substitute for one 
another, e.g. shareholder involvement depends on disclosure or the takeover market may 
substitute for blockholder involvement. The cost of regulation and drivers must also be taken 
into account in terms of compliance, opportunity, and strategic costs.    
The remainder of the section undertakes gap analyses for each ‘driver’ of corporate 
governance, which are presented in terms of seven broad ‘families’ of drivers:  corporate 
boards, shareholder involvement, information disclosure, auditing and internal controls, 
executive pay, the market for corporate control, and stakeholder issues.
6.3.1 Corporate boards
The literature review has identified three major ‘good’ corporate governance drivers associated 
with corporate boards:
 Board independence;
 Diversity, human and social capital within the board;
 High engagement in board processes.
The governance roles and functions of company boards have received a comprehensive coverage 
within the regulatory initiatives starting from Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) reports. In 
this section, the following regulatory and related documents have been reviewed with respect the 
above aspects of corporate boards identified as important drivers:
 Company Law (the Companies Acts of 1985 and 1989, the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, the Insolvency Act 1986, the Enterprise Act 2002, and the Companies 
(Audit, Investigations, and Community Enterprise) Act 2004).
 Company Law Reform Bill (January 2006)
 Financial Services Authority (2005) “The Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules”
 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003)
 Higgs Report (January 2003) “Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors”
 Dyson Report (June 2003) “Recruitment and development of non-executive directors”
 Financial Reporting Council (January 2006) “Review of the 2003 Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance”
6.3.1.1 Content gaps
This section aims at identifying various areas of board-related regulation where drivers are 
not adequately covered by the regulatory framework.   We consider the gaps in the regulatory 
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framework vis-à-vis the areas which academic research, including our own rankings above, 
suggest may be areas where government and business may wish to consider further action. 
We also consider gaps identified by public and private bodies, vis-à-vis statements and 
research by the major actors as to areas, which they perceive to be gaps.  
The broad social sciences research reviewed in section 2.2 of this Report identified a number 
of functions of ‘good’ governance that ranges from monitoring and control (“wealth-
protection”) to promoting managerial entrepreneurship (“wealth generation”) roles. Although 
the Company Law does not provide statutory statements of directors’ duties, subsequent 
regulatory documents develop specific definitions of an effective board. The Combined Code 
suggests that, “the board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within 
a framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risks to be assessed and 
managed” (p. 4). The FSA’s “Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules” states that directors 
must exercise due skill, care and diligence in managing the business of the firm. The 
Company Law Reform Bill is aimed at embedding in statute the concept of “Enlightened 
Shareholder Value” by insisting that directors’ duty is to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in fulfilling this duty the directors must have 
regard to the both short- and long-term factors and wider interests including employees, trade 
partners, etc. (Section 156). This approach is in line with academic research that suggests that 
a combination of entrepreneurial and monitoring functions of corporate boards is most likely 
to drive long-term company performance and maximise overall competitiveness, wealth and 
welfare of all stakeholders. 
6.3.1.1.1 Board independence
The review of the economics and corporate finance literatures generally considers the extent of 
board independence as an important benchmark of good corporate governance. On the other 
hand, directors dependent on the CEO and other executives, or directors with various conflicts of 
interest, are considered as unable to perform their monitoring and control functions objectively. 
Regulatory documents in the UK are specific about preventing possible conflicts of directors’ 
interests. Part 10 of the Companies Act 1985 contains a large number of provisions designed to 
deal with situations in which a director may potentially have a conflict of interests. Section 157 
of the Company Law Reform Bill states that, “a director of the company must exercise 
independent judgement.” The Bill is aimed at simplifying these provisions and making them 
more effective by introducing a number of requirements with regard to the disclosure of 
directors’ interests and service contracts. Section 9.8.6 of the FSA’s “Listing, Prospectus, and 
Disclosure Rules” state that, “annual reports and accounts should include a statement setting out 
all the beneficial and non-beneficial interests of each director of the listed company.” This 
information should help shareholders to verify if the company’s directors may have conflicting 
interests that may affect their independent judgement.
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance provides the most comprehensive guidelines on 
good corporate governance principles associated with structural parameters of board 
independence. The main principle in Section A.3 suggests that the board should include a 
balance of executive and non-executive directors (in particular independent non-executive 
directors). Section A.3.1 provides a detailed account of factors that may affect the extent of non-
executive director’s independence, and section A.3.2 suggests that, except for smaller 
companies, at least half of the board, excluding chairman, should comprise non-executive 
directors determined by the board to be independent. In addition, the Combined Code states the 
roles of chairman and chief executive officer should not be exercised by the same individual 
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(section A.2.1). The Code also suggests that the board should nominate a Senior Independent 
Director (SID) that should lead meetings of non-executive directors to appraise the chairman’s 
performance without the chairman present.  The Code also has provisions with regard to 
independence of the three main committees of the board. Section A.4.1 stipulates that a majority 
of members of the nomination committee should be independent non-executive directors. 
Sections B.2.1 and C.3.1 suggest that all members of a remuneration and audit committees 
should be independent non-executive directors. The Note to SYSC 2.1.4 R and section 3.2.15 G 
in the “Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules” also stipulate that the board of a listed 
company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors.
In sum, these regulatory documents combined mention and address the ‘good’ corporate 
governance drivers related to board independence identified in sections 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 4.3.1 of 
the Report.
6.3.1.1.2 The diversity, human and social capital within the board
Our analysis of the corporate governance roles of boards drawing on a broad social science 
perspective (including management, sociology and behavioural research) has suggested that 
boards can extend their involvement beyond monitoring and controlling top management 
to the provision of ongoing advice and counsel to executive directors on strategic issues.  
Resource dependence theory indicates that a board of directors may also play an important 
role in establishing relationships between the organisation and its external environment. 
From the perspective of the service, strategy and resource roles of boards, ‘good’ 
corporate governance drivers are associated with high levels of board diversity and its 
human and social capital.
Section A.3 of the Combined Code states that the board should have the balance of skills 
and experience that is appropriate for the requirements of the business. Section A.7, 
suggest that non-executive directors should be regularly re-elected, and all directors 
serving longer than two regular terms (e.g., 6 years) should be subjected to a particularly 
rigorous review.  
The Tyson Report (2003) makes a number of further steps and emphasises the importance 
of diversity in the backgrounds, skills, and experiences of non-executive directors in terms 
of enhancing board effectiveness by bringing a wider range of perspectives and 
knowledge to bear on issues of company performance, strategy and risk. In addition, this 
report suggests fostering greater board diversity in terms of age, gender, ethnicity and 
nationality of non-executive directors.
The Combined Code and Tyson Report, therefore, provide a number of guidelines that 
correspond to ‘good’ governance divers associated with the Board Diversity family identified in 
sections 2.2.4 and 4.3.2 of the Report.
6.3.1.1.3 High engagement in board processes
Our review of the board process research indicated the importance of factors associated with the 
general conduct of board affairs, as well as how and why board processes impact patterns of 
strategy and performance. This research identifies the effective and efficient board processes as 
‘good’ corporate governance drivers, including issues around information provisions and 
communication, incentives, etc.
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The Combined Code, Higgs Report, and Tyson Report suggest a number of board procedures 
that should enhance directors’ engagement and the effectiveness and efficiency of boards. The 
Combined Code indicates that independent directors should not have external commitments that 
prevent them from allocating sufficient time and efforts to their duties. Both the Code and 
Higgs Review emphasise the roles of the chairman whose main responsibility is to encourage 
active engagement by all the members of the board. S/he should make sure that non-executive 
directors receive proper induction and training that should assist with their professional 
development. The company should ensure that independent directors have access to 
independent professional advice (Section A.5.2 of the Combined Code). Section A.6 also 
suggests that the board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own 
performance and that of its committees and individual directors. Higgs Report indicates that 
board focus should be not only on financial performance but also on strategic matters rather 
than formulaic approvals of management proposals.
Finally, the Combined Code suggests that the board should be supplied in a timely manner with 
information in a form and quality appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties. This suggestion 
is re-enforced by Section 3.2.11 of the FSA’s “Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules” that 
is focused on reliability, relevance and timeliness of information provided to the board.
These regulatory documents, therefore, provide a number of guidelines that correspond to 
‘good’ governance drivers associated with board processes as identified in sections 2.2.5 and 
4.3.3 of the Report.
Our overall conclusion is that with regard to board-related drivers of ‘good’ corporate 
governance, no major content gaps exist in the UK regulatory framework.  Although some of 
the specific structures or practices of boards discussed in section 2.2 have received less 
coverage (for example, external board ties of non-executive directors, non-executive financial 
incentives, etc.), the results of our Expert Survey in section 3 indicate that these drivers did not 
receive high scores, and the experts’ opinion on their effectiveness was divided. On the other 
hand, all top scoring drivers are, to various degrees, covered in the UK Regulation.
6.3.1.2 Effectiveness gaps
By effectiveness gaps, we refer to gaps between the aim and outcome of regulatory initiatives.  
These gaps may include implementation problems associated with a particular element of the 
regulation, lack of provisions for various firm contingencies, and potential costs of regulation.
6.3.1.2.1 Implementation gap analysis
The FRC’s “Review of the 2003 Combined Code” (2006) emphasizes that its provisions are 
underlined by the principle of “comply or explain” which recognizes that one size does not fit 
all, and that there may be circumstances where it is in the interests of the company and its 
owners to adopt practices that differ from those set out in the provisions of the Code” (p. 1).  
Under section LR 9.8.6 of the FSA’s “Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules” companies 
should provide in their annual reports a statement of how they have applied the principles set 
out in Section 1 of the Combined Code. Alternatively, if the company did not comply with 
theses rules, it should explicitly indicate: (i) those provisions it has not complied with; (ii) the 
period within which it did not comply with some or all of those provisions; and (iii) the 
company’s reasons for non-compliance.  It is recognised, therefore, that companies may use 
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corporate governance practices other than those set out in the Code when they are persuaded 
that shareholders and their advisors are willing to accept explanations.
The Focus Group participants emphasised that the Combined Code puts heavy emphasis on 
monitoring and control aspects of the board. However, the test of a company’s board 
efficiency should also consider whether board members help to generate shareholder value 
through entrepreneurship and improved performance, not just whether they have increased 
transparency and improved wealth protection aspects of governance. While this is to be 
achieved through good practices set out in the Code, there is a scope for different approaches 
to board configurations and functions. For example, the Code’s detailed prescriptions with 
regard to non-executives’ tenure, independence etc, should be viewed as principles rather than 
rules, leaving to the board and investors to judge whether the director has sufficient ability 
and incentives to perform her duties efficiently.
However, a number of investment institutions, voting and rating agencies apply their own, 
private criteria that are different to those set out in the code when assessing a company’s 
corporate governance practices (FRC 2006, p. 9). According to the FRC survey, companies 
indicate that some investors and rating agencies still rely on a ‘box-ticking’ approach to the 
Code. As a result, many companies are reluctant to run the perceived risk of explaining and 
tend to default to compliance regardless of their circumstances. 
Finally, although the regulatory documents clearly define a set of principles of good corporate 
governance practice with regard to corporate boards, the enforcement mechanisms received 
much less coverage. For example, the main principle in Section A.3 of the Combined Code 
suggests that the board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors (in 
particular independent non-executive directors). Section A.3.1 provides a detailed account of 
factors that may affect the extent of non-executive director’s independence. However, a body 
of case study evidence suggests that non-executive directors very often are nominated by the 
CEOs of the company.  These independent directors may actively pursue interests similar to 
executive directors. Existing regulation does not provide enough power to shareholders to put 
forward their candidates or, indeed, have a significant impact on board diversity.
6.3.1.2.2 Contingency analysis
Our literature review suggested that the effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance 
drivers depends on a number of important firm- and industry-level contingency factors such 
as the firm’s size, age, industry regulation, growth/decline phase, etc. The UK regulatory 
framework seeks to account for these sorts of effects in various ways.  The Combined Code, 
for example, suggests that, when discussing best governance practices, one should “pay due 
regard to companies’ individual circumstances and bear in mind in particular the size and 
complexity of the company and the nature of the risks and challenges it faces” (p. 2). More 
specifically, the Tyson Report states that “factors such as company size and age, the makeup 
of its customer and employee base, the extent of its participation in global markets, its future 
strategies, and its current board membership are important determinants of NED 
requirements” (p.1). Section 2.1.2 of the FSA’s “Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules” 
states that, “the roles undertaken by non-executive directors will vary from one firm to 
another.” Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.7 stipulate that internal control and compliance systems 
which a firm needs to maintain depend on a variety of factors including (a) the nature, scale 
and complexity of its business; (b) the diversity of its operations, including geographical 
diversity; (c) the volume and size of transactions; (d) the degree of risk associated with each 
area of its operations.
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Despite this recognition of contingencies, the Code provides a limited number of guidelines 
that address this issue. A number of recommendations related to the board structure and its 
committees have specific clauses with regard to smaller companies. (Sections A 3.2; B. 2.1; 
C.3.1). Section E.2 suggests that institutional shareholders, when considering explanations for 
departure from the Code should bear in mind the size and complexity of the company, as well 
as company- specific risks. 
Smaller companies are able to bypass compliance with the Combined Code by listing on 
AIM.  In doing so, they can avoid enforced practices that are more appropriate to larger 
companies whilst still gaining the benefits of being listed. However, the Code provisions do 
not have sufficient flexibility to address issues associated with important contingencies such 
as growth phase of the company, the nature of competition in its industry (e.g., regulated vs. 
competitive), knowledge intensity, etc. Even when the Code takes into account the company’s 
size, its prescriptions are mainly focused on structural parameters, such as the proportion of 
non-executive directors, size of board committees, etc. Because of the investors’ approach to 
the assessment of corporate governance outlined above, smaller companies may be under 
pressure to adopt practices more appropriate to larger companies in circumstances that can 
cause them considerable difficulty.
These considerations suggest the importance of complementarities in enforcing corporate 
governance rules.  While the formal rules of the Code allow for a flexible approach in 
principle, comply-or-explain will only achieve such flexibility when it works in conjunction 
with investors who have sufficient capacity to actively understand and properly evaluate 
company explanations.
6.3.1.2.3 Cost analysis
Most of the corporate governance-related research is focused on potential benefits of various 
corporate governance practices. However, drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance drivers may 
also have associated costs, including the out-of-pocket compliance costs that are reflected in 
the firm’s balance sheet and other accounting documentation (e.g., the audit costs, directors’ 
insurance, etc.), less explicit opportunity costs (e.g., directors’ time spent on governance 
issues instead of business strategy, costs of strategic disclosure, etc.), and the legal and 
reputational costs which may be incurred when firms get their governance practices wrong.
The regulation put an increasing burden of new compliance requirements on listed companies, 
in particular on smaller companies, which may distract from board’s ability to provide 
entrepreneurial leadership. Too much focus on the compliance issues may reduce the amount 
of time board members spend on strategy-related matters.  Developing sophisticated board 
processes, such as induction, training and personal development of board members may have 
serious resource implications, in particular for smaller companies.
Tyson Report (2003) indicates that the growing responsibilities and liabilities facing directors 
may become a constraint on the ability of companies to find and attract individuals from non-
traditional sources who otherwise have time and willingness to accept NED positions. In 
addition, the increasing complexity and risks of board responsibilities may tempt companies 
to narrow down the skills and experiences they seek from new directors. As a result, instead 
of promoting board diversity, the UK regulation may reinforce the traditional emphasis in 
NED selection on previous board or management experience in the commercial sector.
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6.3.2 Shareholder engagement
The literature review has identified two major ‘good’ corporate governance drivers associated 
with shareholder engagement:
 Presence of large-block shareholders;
 Shareholder activism.
The governance roles and functions of large, concentrated shareholders have received a 
comprehensive coverage within the regulatory initiatives starting from Cadbury (1992) report 
which stated that “given the weight of their votes, the way in which institutional shareholders use 
their power to influence the standards of corporate governance is of fundamental importance”.
In this section, the following regulatory and related documents have been reviewed with respect 
to ‘good’ corporate governance drivers identified in previous sections:
 Company Law (the Companies Acts of 1985 and 1989, the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, the Insolvency Act 1986, the Enterprise Act 2002, and the Companies 
(Audit, Investigations, and Community Enterprise) Act 2004).
 Company Law Reform Bill (January 2006)
 Financial Services Authority (2005) “The Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules”
 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003)
 Myners Report (March 2001) “Institutional investment in the United Kingdom: a review”
 Myners Report (January 2004) “Review of the impediments to voting UK shares”. 
Report to the Shareholder Voting Working Group.
 Sandler Review (July 2003) “Medium and long-term retail savings in the UK: a review”
 ISC (Institutional Shareholders’ Committee) (2002) “The responsibilities of institutional 
shareholders and agents – Statement of principles”
 HM Treasury Report (December 2004) “Myners principles for institutional investment 
decision-making: review of progress”
 Financial Reporting Council (January 2006) “Review of the 2003 Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance”
6.3.2.1 Content gaps
This section aims at identifying various areas of shareholder-related regulation where drivers 
are not adequately covered by the regulatory framework.   We consider the gaps in the 
regulatory framework vis-à-vis the areas which academic research, including our own 
rankings above, suggest may be areas where government and business may wish to consider 
further action. We also consider gaps as identified by public and private bodies, vis-à-vis 
statements and research by the major actors as to areas which they perceive to be gaps.  
6.3.2.1.1 Presence of large-block shareholders
 The review of economics, corporate finance and “law and economics” research streams 
suggest that presence of large-block and institutional investors among the firm’s shareholders 
may perform monitoring and resource functions of ‘good’ corporate governance. However, 
management and business strategy research suggests that the governance roles of block-
holders differ depending on their investment strategies and objectives. Some large investors, 
such as pension funds, individual block-holders, etc., may be better monitors than others (e.g., 
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insurance companies and banks), and their presence per sae may be considered as a driver of 
good corporate governance. Therefore, the regulator should encourage their equity 
involvement in companies.
However, corporate governance regulation in the UK does not differentiate between various 
types of shareholders. Both Company Law and subsequent Company Law Reform Bill 
consider a general body of “company members” when referring to shareholder rights. Section 
9.3.1 of the FSA’s Listing Rules refers to “all holders of listed equity securities” when 
introducing a principle of equal treatment of shareholders. The Combined Code in Section D 
suggests that companies should establish a dialog with institutional shareholders, which are 
also referred to as “major shareholders” without making a distinction between them. 
However, the Code also includes in this category investment managers and voting services 
appointed by institutional investors to act on their behalf. The Institutional Shareholders 
Committee Principles (2002) suggest that the term “institutional shareholder” include pension 
funds, insurance companies, and investment trusts and other collective investment vehicles, 
but it does not identify any differences among them in terms of their governance effects. 
Finally, Myners Reports (2001; 2004) are focused on pension funds and related financial 
institutions.
Therefore, the UK regulatory documents do not consider the corporate governance roles of a 
number of important large investors, in particular, individual block-holders and private equity 
firms that were discussed in sections 2.3.3 and 4.4.1 of this report.  Instead, UK regulation is 
focused on corporate governance roles of public institutional investors. However, this reflects 
the general pattern of ownership and control in the UK economy, and therefore, does not 
relate to any specific regulatory failure.
6.3.2.1.2 Shareholder activism
Our review of research on actions of large-block owners suggests that their presence per se may 
be a necessary but not sufficient condition to promote efficient governance in their portfolio 
companies. Shareholder activism, or direct involvement of shareholders in “critical” decisions, 
may be another important driver of ‘good’ governance. Regulatory documents in the UK are 
particularly specific about promoting shareholder activism and providing channels, which can be 
used by shareholders to influence the direction of the company.
The major bulk of regulation is focused on “voice”-based channels of shareholder activism, such 
as participation and voting at company’s meetings. Under Section 372(1) of the Companies Act 
1985, any member of a company, the registered or “legal” owner, is entitled to attend and vote at 
a meeting of the company, and has a statutory right to appoint an agent (“proxy”) to attend and 
vote oh her behalf. The FSA’s Listing Rules, section 9.3.3 states that companies should provide 
all the necessary facilities and information to enable holders to exercise their rights (1) to attend 
shareholder meetings; (2) to cast their vote. Section 9.3.6 regulates the procedures related to 
proxy votes by shareholders. 
The proposed Company Law Reform Bill aims at improving the efficiency of shareholder 
activism by requiring public companies to hold their AGMs within 6 months of the end of the 
financial year. An amendment to clause 136 proposes that small investors whose shares are held 
by corporate nominees should be able to receive the same information and exercise the same 
voting rights that their nominees do. Companies will be required to put on their websites the 
preliminary announcements of their annual results, accounts and reports. Section 308 of the Bill 
suggests that companies may use an electronic system of voting and communication with 
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shareholders, including proxy votes. The Companies Act 1985 (Electronic Communication) 
Order 2000 has already provided companies and their shareholders with the option to 
communicate electronically. Companies will be also required to disclose on their websites the 
results of polls at general meetings (Section 315 of the Bill). In addition, shareholders will have a 
right to request an independent scrutiny of votes. Section 239 of the Bill is aimed at introducing 
derivative actions by shareholders as a matter of statute, not common law. Derivative actions are 
the route by which minority shareholders are able to enforce the company’s rights where 
directors are involved in negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust. Unlike class 
actions in the USA, the shareholder in a derivative action does not seek relief from the directors 
of the company for herself directly, rather, by statute, on behalf of the company. However, the 
court must take into account the possibility “that the member could pursue the claim in his own 
right”. The shareholder bringing the action is under the statutory duty to “promote the success of 
the company” and act “in good faith”. 
Myners Report (2004) makes a number of suggestions aimed at improving voting procedures, 
including calling a poll on all resolutions at company meetings; changes from “two way voting” 
required by the Listing Rules to including a “vote withheld” option; giving more rights to proxies 
so that they can speak and vote on a show of hands as well as a poll; and allowing multiple 
corporate representatives at the meeting. More significantly, it states on p. 22 “voting should be 
fully integrated into the investment process, as it is part of the institution’s wider ownership 
responsibilities, and, indeed, should be recognised, along with other aspects of governance, to be 
an essential service”.
Also being principals with regard to investee companies, institutional investors are, at the same 
time, agents to their clients, the beneficial owners, and this may create a “second-tier” agency 
problem that needs to be mitigated by the regulator. The UK, regulatory initiatives emphasise 
the importance of voting disclosure by institutional investors and their agents. Section E.3 of the 
Combined Code suggests that institutional investors should make available to their clients 
information on the proportion of resolutions on which votes were cast and non-discretionary 
proxies lodged. Myners Report (2004) makes a step further and suggests that institutional 
investors should report to their clients, the beneficial owners, on how they executed their voting 
responsibilities. Their clients should hold their managers to account for the manner in which the 
votes have been cast. Finally, clause 866 of the Company Law Reform Bill concerns powers 
under which ministers could compel institutional shareholders to disclose how they vote.
The Combined Code outlines a number of further guidelines for shareholder activism that go 
beyond voting at AGMs and legal actions against directors. These guidelines are based on 
principles of continuous engagement of shareholders, institutional investors in particular, with 
the company and its board members. Section D of the Code state as a principle that not only the 
CEO but also the chairman, SID and other directors should maintain sufficient contact with 
major shareholders to understand their issues and concerns. The chairman should ensure that the 
views of shareholders are communicated to the board as a whole. FRC Report (2006) “Review of 
the 2003 Combined Code on Corporate Governance” recommends that institutional investors 
should identify a lead contact for each of their investee companies. Institutional shareholders 
should evaluate companies’ governance arrangements, and they should consider carefully 
explanations given for departure from the Combined Code and make reasoned judgements in 
each case. In terms of voting, institutional investors should take all steps to ensure that their 
voting intentions are being translated into practice. 
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The ISC (2002) “Statement of Principles” provides a comprehensive set of guidelines related to 
shareholder engagement that include a clear policy on: (1) how investee companies will be 
monitored; (2) requirements with regard to investee company compliance with the Combined 
Code; (3) meetings with the company’s boards and senior management; (4) the strategy on 
intervention; (5) the policy on voting; (6) an indication of the type of circumstances when 
further action will be taken and details of the type of the action. As part of monitoring, 
institutional investors should endeavour to identify problems at an early stage to minimise any 
loss to shareholder value. When necessary, they should intervene objectively and in informed 
way, if necessary, with seeking engagement with other shareholders. The ISC identified a 
number of areas for intervention when they have concerns about (1) the company’s strategy; (2) 
the company’s operational performance; (3) independent directors failing to hold executive 
management properly to account; (4) internal controls failing.
Myners Report (2001) also suggests a number of principles of shareholder engagement 
including an explicit strategy of fund managers in terms of engagement with their investee 
companies; circumstances in which they will intervene with the company; the approach they 
will use in doing so, and how they measure the effectiveness of this strategy.
Therefore, these regulatory documents combined relate to most of ‘good’ corporate governance 
drivers related to the Shareholder Engagement family identified in sections 2.3 and 4.4.2 of the 
Report.
6.3.2.2 Effectiveness gaps
By effectiveness gaps, we refer to gaps between the aim and outcome of regulatory initiatives.  
These gaps may include implementation problems associated with a particular element of the 
regulation, lack of provisions for various firm contingencies, and potential costs of regulation.
6.3.2.2.1 Implementation gap analysis
The HM Treasury Report (2004) “Myners principles for institutional investment decision-
making: review of progress” emphasizes that the shareholder activism guidelines are underlined 
by the principle of “comply or explain” which recognizes that one size does not fit all. It 
recommends that compliance with ISC Principles should be voluntary, but that institutional 
investors, and pension funds in particular, should disclose to their members either their 
compliance or an explanation of their reasons for departure. It is expected that this would provide 
an informed commentary, in which trustees explain and justify their approach, and lead over time 
to the establishment of good practice, and their dissemination across pension funds and other 
institutional investors.
Therefore, the UK regulatory approach to the shareholder engagement issues is different to that 
of the USA, where the Labour Department Interpretative Bulletin 94-2 obliges trustees of 
pension funds and their agents to (1) vote equity shares on issues that may affect the value of the 
clients’ investment; (2) have a documented policy or guidelines in place for voting on issues; (3) 
maintain accurate voting records. The US SEC also introduced a new set of rules in relation to 
“Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies” which require investors to disclose publicly all votes cast in respect of 
voting shares held within mutual funds (Myners Report 2004). The UK Government has decided 
not to introduce a mandatory requirement for institutional investors to disclose their compliance 
with Myners and ISC Principles under the believe that monitoring such a requirement could be 
costly and time consuming, and might result in uninformative “box ticking” activity (HM 
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Treasury Report 2004, p.5). Instead, it sees merit in a voluntary, independently compiled report 
on implementation of principles that may form part of FRAG 21/94 reports on internal control of 
investments.
Because of the voluntary nature of investors’ compliance with Myners and ISC principles, 
there is evidence that “fund managers appear unnecessary reluctant to engage with the 
companies in relation to corporate underperformance (HM Treasury Report 2004, p.8). The 
lack of engagement activity also reflects in part the conflicts of interest facing fund managers 
and trustees. For example, the Focus Group participants indicated that conflicts might arise 
when trustees of the corporate pension fund are employees or stakeholders in the firm and 
thus face conflicts of interest in being too active.  The quality of engagement – as evidenced 
by the integration of engagement into investment decision-making and asset management 
process, the quality and quantity of resources committed to it, and the level of disclosure did 
not reach required levels (Ibid, p. 17). Myners Report (2004) also indicates that investment 
agents and consultants are mainly focused on economic and financial, rather than governance 
and voting, issues. Where shareholders have outsourced voting to an agency rather than 
institutional fund manager, company engagement with voting agencies is even less 
satisfactory (FRC 2006). 
The UK Regulation related to shareholder engagement does not make a full account of 
institutional features of the UK investment industry. For investment funds, the Focus Group 
participants suggested that an important prerequisite of effective involvement is the ability of 
different funds to coordinate their actions.  In regulatory terms, this issue is addressed in the 
City Code.  However, a problem regarding coordination concerns the lack of transparency 
about shareholder involvement.  Most of the co-ordination happens ‘behind the scenes’, as 
funds do not want to be perceived as being too interventionist.
In addition, when investors, whether major institutional investors or retail investors, buy 
shares in a listed company they are likely to hold their shares through an intermediary or a 
chain of intermediaries. Sandler Review (July 2003) and Myners Report (2001) identify at 
least four parties that are involved between the beneficial owner and the issuer (e.g., a 
nominee company, custodians, etc), all with distinct and important roles. Shares can also be 
lent, or used by a third party as collateral. HM Treasury Report (2004, p.7), using a number of 
previously commissioned research reports, suggests that the investment chain does not work 
efficiently from the shareholder engagement perspective. This report identifies a number of 
critical and inter-connected areas where the chain has not been functioning for a number of 
reasons, including its various principal-agent problems.
The Company Law Reform Bill partially addresses this important issue. The enhanced proxy 
rights provided in Chapter 3 of Part 13 will enable investors, acting as proxies to a registered 
member, to exercise all the meeting participation rights that would otherwise rest with the 
registered member alone. Clause 136 suggests that where companies make provision to 
extend rights to those holding shares through intermediaries, the provision is legally effective 
in relation to various statutory requirements. Myners Report (2004), however, suggests that 
further regulatory initiatives are required to make sure that votes are not “lost”, such as 
registering title in the name of a nominee company with a specific designation; mandatory 
recall of shares being lent before voting; etc.  
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6.3.2.2.2 Contingency analysis
Our literature review in relation to various drivers of good corporate governance suggest that 
effectiveness and efficiency depends on a number of important contingency factors such as 
size, age, etc. With regard to shareholder activism, the UK regulatory initiatives do not 
provide an explicit account of possible effects of these factors on good corporate governance 
drivers. The Combined Code suggests that institutional investors should apply the principle of 
shareholder activism to all firms in their portfolio. Similarly, the ISC Principles do not make 
any references to the type of investment institution or company. 
As a result, there is no sufficient flexibility built into the Code and ISC provisions that 
addresses issues associated with important contingencies such as growth phase of the investee 
company, or its size. For example, FRC Review (2006) indicates that, because they invest in a 
large number of companies, it is not always possible for investors to maintain the level of 
ongoing dialog they might wish with all investee companies, and in particular smaller listed 
companies. In addition, the resources required to follow the provisions of the Code and ISC 
guidelines are proportionately higher, and investors are less likely to keep up an ongoing 
dialog with companies that are a relatively less significant component of their investment 
portfolio. Where that is the case, the investors may be reluctant to engage with the companies 
and instead they may choose a box-ticking approach to their responsibilities.
There is also a substantial heterogeneity within the population of institutional investors in the 
UK. Different investment institutions have different decision-making horizons, and they use a 
wide range of investment strategies and management mechanisms. Some of them (e.g., 
pension funds) may be considered as longer-term investors that may obtain substantial 
benefits from engaging with companies where they have concerns about a company’s
governance policies. For other institutional investors (e.g., “index-trackers”) shareholder 
activism can be much more costly than pure reliance on indexing strategies. Sandler Review 
(2003) documents an increasing importance of “exit” strategies for the fund managers as 
opposed to shareholder activism. Their increasing reliance on indexing investment strategies 
suggests that they believe that, on average, their portfolio of firms will yield returns 
comparable to those for the market as a whole, regardless of the governance structure of their 
portfolio firms. 
Different strategies of involvement are also well documented. Although Myners Report 
(2004) argues that it is mainly driven by the size of the stake, in practice it may be a more 
complex function of (1) the absolute exposure in money terms; (2) the relevance of the stock 
within the portfolio; and (3) a sense check as to whether one can realistically influence an 
outcome. Shareholders’ involvement could also be issue-led – shareholders target particular
issues across a wider range of firms.
At present, the UK Regulatory initiatives do not take account of these important differences in 
investment strategies and mechanisms among UK investment institutions. The Focus Group 
discussants also indicated that the UK regulatory initiatives do not make a substantial 
differentiation between the governance roles of majority and minority investors. Dominant 
shareholders may promote certain interests that are different from other shareholders, and 
conflicts of interest may arise.
6.3.2.2.3 Cost analysis
The costs of implementation of the shareholder activism-related provisions and 
recommendations set out in the Combined Code, Myners Report (2001) and ISC Principles 
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are mitigated because they are voluntary best practice codes. The costs of the equivalent 
prescriptive regulation can be much higher, and some, in particular smaller institutional 
investors, may find it difficult to allocate internal resources and sufficiently qualified staff to 
shareholder activism-related systems and procedures, such as direct and regular engagement 
with companies in their portfolio. 
Too much focus on compliance with principles of shareholder activism and excessive 
disclosure may distract from fund managers’ main duty to manage risks and returns from their 
investment portfolios. In addition, for smaller pension schemes and firms, following Myners 
principles and ISC recommendations may pose a serious challenge to limited staff and 
experience of trustees. 
From the companies’ perspective, the Regulatory requirements related to an increase in 
shareholder engagement may be potentially associated with substantial costs.  Direct costs of 
corporate governance are related to the out-of-pocket expenses that are associated with 
compliance with the governance rules and regulations. More specifically, these costs include 
expenditures on reporting and communications with shareholders, introduction of electronic 
voting systems including independent assessment of voting procedures, and costs of setting up 
and running investor relations management systems. More importantly, the companies will 
incur less explicit, indirect opportunity costs and strategic costs related to shareholder activism. 
Indirect corporate governance costs are associated with the fact that focusing on engagement 
with shareholders may divert managers’ attention from strategic and operating decisions 
associated with running the firm. In addition, the litigation risks that are underpinned by the 
derivative claims provisions in the Company Law reform Bill may change management’s risk-
taking behaviour, and this, in turn, will likely slow down the growth of the firm. These costs are 
impossible to quantify on the basis of ad hoc assumptions. 
6.3.3 Information and disclosure
Two major groups of ‘good’ corporate governance drivers associated with information and 
disclosure were identified in our literature review and may be classified under the following 
broad headings:
 Breadth and depth of public information disclosure;
 Breadth and depth of private information disclosure
Disclosure of information is widely covered both in laws and other regulations, as well as codes 
and related documents.  In this section, the following are considered with respect to ‘good’ 
corporate governance drivers identified in previous sections:
 Company Law (the Companies Acts of 1985 and 1989, the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, the Insolvency Act 1986, the Enterprise Act 2002, and the Companies 
(Audit, Investigations, and Community Enterprise) Act 2004).
 Company Law Reform Bill (2006)
 Financial Services Authority (2005), The Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules.
 The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002)
 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (2003-2004)
 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003)
 Financial Reporting Council, various standards.
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 Financial Reporting Council (January 2006), Review of the 2003 Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance.
 Employment Law (the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (1992), 
the Employment Relations Act 1999, and various regulations such as those covering 
Transfer of Undertakings, European Works Councils, and Information and Consultation.
6.3.3.1 Content gaps
The academic literature suggests that information flows are a basic driver of corporate 
governance and that in turn the informational environment of the firm affects strategy and 
performance.  Informational asymmetry is pervasive in all organisations and may have 
negative effects in terms of uncertainty, high transaction costs, and the misallocation of 
resources.  Because of market failures and fears of competitive disadvantage, the state has 
intervened with laws and regulations to make firms disclose.  However, in addition, firms 
may have an interest in disclosing, above what it legally mandated.  The academic literature 
suggests that an optimal disclosure strategy is one where firms supply maximum information, 
subject to legal, cost, and proprietary constraints.
Company Law (1985; 1989) has long provided a basic floor of information, which needs to be 
publicly disclosed and also made provision for information, which need not be disclosed.  
Over time, the courts have interpreted this and brought about some broadening and some 
narrowing.  However, the legislature has progressively broadened the range of information to 
be disclosed, as seen in the disclosure provisions of the present Company Law Reform Bill.  
In addition, statutory-based regulations such as the Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules 
and the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers have information provision at their core.  
Similarly, the Combined Code places great emphasis on the flow of useful and timely 
information within the company and from the company to relevant outsiders.  Accounting 
standards provide the currency; auditing and other ‘gatekeepers’ ensure the value of 
information.
Two broad areas of information disclosure are seen as important drivers – public information 
which is provided on a mandatory basis and private information which is voluntarily 
provided.
6.3.3.1.1 Breadth and depth of public information disclosure
In terms of public information provision, our research has suggested that information in 
annual reports is a major driver.  Though obviously much of the annual report is of a standard 
nature and also often backward looking, it is nevertheless of fundamental importance.  This is 
not least because private disclosure often builds on it.  Public disclosure is well covered in 
UK Company Law.  It is underpinned by accounting standards and supported by external 
auditing.  In addition, the Listing Rules and the City Code supplement the requirements for 
public information disclosure at specific points in companies’ affairs.
In our survey of experts, the provision of information on corporate governance itself was also 
ranked high.  In the UK, a combination of the law, regulations, and listing and takeover rules 
mean that significant information is provided on the composition of boards, make-up of 
committees, and executive pay.   Here, in particular, the Combined Code and its various 
additions provide detailed prescriptions in terms of board characteristics and composition. 
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The provision of information on related party transactions and influence, which other parties 
might have on the firm, is well spelled out in Company Law, the Listing Rules, and in various 
accounting standards.  For example, the Accounting Standards Board has laid down that “It is 
necessary to establish standards that apply to all enterprises for disclosure of information 
about related party transactions and certain control relationships…. The Board believes that 
an enterprise’s financial statements may not be complete without additional explanations of 
and information about related party transactions and thus may not be reliable” (FAS, No. 57 
1982, p. 6-8).  These are outlined, and, over the years, they have been further elaborated.
Transgressions in this area may also be the subject of criminal proceedings. 
The literature review, expert survey and focus group all gave evidence suggesting the 
importance of the Operating Financial Review as a central driver of good corporate 
governance.  The Government has been consulting on the full range of options for future 
narrative reporting requirements..  Whatever the outcome, companies will face a mandatory 
requirement to produce a Business Review, as required under the European Accounts 
Modernization Directive.  However, this will probably not require as much information on 
social responsibilities as the OFR was intended to require.  It will also not necessarily have to 
be audited.
It may well be the case that most large firms will produce an OFR or something very like it in 
the Business Review.  However, potential gaps may arise.  First, not all large companies will 
provide a full OFR and many medium size firms will not do so.  Second, while audit 
committee oversight and outside auditing of publicly disclosed information ranked high in our 
research, these audit requirements are not part of the Business Review.  Third, broader 
information on areas such as employment policies, environmental policies, and social 
responsibility were also rated as important drivers in our research.  However, at the present 
time, information provision in these areas is relatively limited in both Company and 
Employment Law.  
In sum, UK regulation addresses many of the aspects of information disclosure related to 
company finance and corporate governance practices discussed in sections 2.4.2 and 4.5.1.  
However, potential gaps exist in the areas of broader information disclosure discussed in 
sections 2.4.3 of this report.  In particular, one area for consideration is narrative reporting of a 
forward-looking kind, which would contain operational and strategic information.
6.3.3.1.2 Breadth and depth of private information disclosure
In terms of private information provision, our research suggested several key aspects:  the 
extensive and timely provision of information to independent directors, the need for vertical 
information flows between the board and functional departments, and the need for good 
horizontal information flows between functional departments.  It will be noted that these are 
all topics, which relate to internal information and control.  These areas are not highly 
regulated in Company Law, in the Listing and City Codes, or by accounting standards.  
However, they are extensively covered in the Combined Code and the Higgs Report on the 
role and effectiveness of non-executive directors, the Turnbull Report on internal controls, 
and the Smith Report on audit committees.
The provision of private information to key investor groups and to analysts was covered in the 
academic literature in terms of effects of disclosure on the availability and price of capital.  
However, it was not emphasised as a driver of good corporate governance nor rated so by our 
Expert Group or Focus Group.  Here one argument is that companies have to be very careful 
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about the provision of private information to those outside the firm, for fear that this might 
advantage one group and create possibilities of unlawful share dealing.  In terms of the latter, 
Company Law, the Listing Rules and the City Code, and criminal law provide an extensive 
regulatory framework in the UK. Finally, it will be recalled that the provision of information 
to employees and the provision of information to other stakeholders were rated as being of 
importance in our expert research.  As will be discussed in the stakeholder section below, this 
is an area where both Company Law and Employment Law leave some gaps. 
The regulatory provisions, referred to above, provide a number of requirements and 
guidelines that correspond to ‘good’ corporate governance drivers associated with private 
information flows identified in sections 2.4.3, and 4.5.2 of the Report.
Our overall conclusion on information is that there are some content gaps in the UK regulatory 
framework.  One possible gap, in terms of public information, is the provision of forward-
looking information on operations and strategy.  It will be interesting to see to what extent 
companies voluntarily provide an OFR and to what extent the Business Review will substitute 
for it.  In terms of private information, the provision of information to general stakeholders and 
mechanisms for providing information for employees constitute a gap.  We return to this in the 
shareholder section below.
6.3.3.2 Effectiveness gaps
In this section we consider the gap between the stated aims and actual outcome of the 
regulatory framework.  These gaps may include implementation issues, the neglect of various 
contingencies, and the potential costs of regulation.
6.3.3.2.1 Implementation gap analysis
In terms of public information, compliance with information and disclosure rules seems to be 
relatively high.  Disclosure requirements are mainly based on the law, on both Company Law 
and on relatively hard codes, such as the Listing Rules and City Code.  The penalties for non-
compliance are heavy.  
However, it remains unclear whether the UK financial reporting regime always has the 
intended effect, as witnessed by the debates over short-termism.  For example, the high 
frequency of reporting with regard to financial information may become self-defeating by 
focusing managers on short-term time horizons and leading to undue stress on certain 
reported elements of financial performance, rather than strategic and operational goals that are 
not reported in a standardized way.  In this regard, heavy disclosure may impair managers’ 
willingness to undertake entrepreneurial risks and lead to managers concerned with ‘gaming’ 
the system to report ever-higher earnings growth.  Recent legal changes have also 
strengthened supervision as to whether Directors of a company have fulfilled their obligations 
in preparing accounts.  For example, , the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) will now 
be given statutory powers to require companies to provide information necessary to review 
the accuracy of the annual accounts, and expand the scope of FRRP supervision to interim 
reports of listed companies.  Also, information sharing between Inland Revenue and the 
FRRP will be opened to improve the effectiveness of detecting non-compliance with 
accounting rules.  
In the case of private information flows, many of the legal instruments focus largely on the 
prevention of insider dealing and restricting flows of private information in order to uphold 
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the principle of equal treatment for shareholders.  Meanwhile, the Combined Code covers the 
internal process of information sharing vertically and horizontally within the company.  The 
Combined Code gives guidance about the structure of boards or the presence of risk 
management systems.  However, it is unclear how these translate into directors’ or other 
relevant groups being adequately supplied with timely flows of information sufficient to make 
good judgements.  Here it would appear that most big firms are complying in the sense that 
few opt to explain non-compliance.  However, the extent to which this really feeds through is 
an empirical question, which requires further research.
6.3.3.2.2 Contingency analysis
The review of the literature on information suggests that the effectiveness and efficiency of 
information disclosure and sharing depends on a number of important contingency factors, 
such as size and industry, and on the context of specific events, such as crisis or takeover.
The law recognises some such contingencies in terms of company size and related 
requirements.  It also recognises event contingencies, as under the Listing Rules and Takeover 
Code.  The Combined Code is also very aware of contingencies.  For example, the 
introduction to the Combined Code spells out that, “smaller listed companies, in particular 
those new to listing, may judge that some of the provisions are disproportionate or less 
relevant to their case.”  In line with the approach of the Code, it goes on to say that deviations 
“should not be evaluated in a mechanistic way and departures from the Code should not be 
automatically treated as breaches” (p.2).  However, the degree of flexibility is not always 
clear.  The high pressure on UK companies to comply means that companies may not be able 
to consider whether it would be good in the case of the specific company.
6.3.3.2.3 Cost analysis
Despite the many benefits of information disclosure, associated costs also exist.  These 
potential costs in terms of information disclosure include the following: the fixed costs of 
producing and processing information; the more indirect opportunity costs (e.g. the time spent 
on such matters instead of business strategy); the proprietary or indirect costs when 
competitors, customers, and others use the information to the firm’s disadvantage; and the 
legal and reputational costs which may be incurred when firms get their information practices 
wrong.  
The relative balance between costs and benefits will vary between firms and overtime –
depending on size, sector, and specific events.  It is therefore an empirical question as to the 
actual trade-off between costs and benefits.  Here the history of the OFR perhaps offers some 
perspective.  The literature review suggested that firms have an interest in disclosing, above 
what is legally mandated, in anticipation of benefits, such as the reduction of uncertainty.  The 
incentive to disclose is particularly strong when other firms disclose.  Initially, there was 
substantial opposition to the OFR on the part of some companies.  However, by the time it 
was due to be introduced, many companies had become convinced of its benefits and many 
now voluntarily supply this sort of information. 
6.3.4 Audit and internal controls
The literature review has identified three major ‘good’ corporate governance drivers associated 
with audit and internal controls:
 Independent external auditors;
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 Highly qualified audit committees within the board;
 Support of audit through internal control, risk management and protection of whistle-
blowing
The corporate governance role and implications of audit and internal control processes has 
received a growing amount of attention in the last three years.  The scandal of Enron in the 
United States and regulatory response of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) has influenced debates world 
wide.  Likewise, cases such as Parmalat and Ahold sparked growing attention to the role of 
auditors in Europe as well.  In the UK, a Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting 
Issues (CGAA), was created and issued their final report in January 2003.  At the European 
level, the 8th Company Law Directive on statutory audit, which has been called the European 
“Sarbanes-Oxley” Directive, was adopted in April 2006 and came into force 29 June 2006.  
While the directive contains a number of very important provisions, these are not considered 
directly here as they have not yet been transposed in UK law.
In this section, the following regulatory and related documents have been the primary ones 
reviewed with respect to drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance identified in previous sections:
 Company Law (the Companies Acts of 1985 and 1989)
 Companies (Audit, Investigations, and Community Enterprise) Act 2004.
 Company Law Reform Bill (January 2006)
 Limited Liability Partnerships Act (2000)
 Financial Services Authority (2005) “The Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules”
 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003)
 Guidance on Audit Committees (The Smith Guidance) (2003)
 Accounting Practices Board, Ethical Standards (2004)
 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales Guide to Professional 
Ethics 
 Audit Regulations and Guidance, Institute of Chartered Accountants (2005)
 Public Interest Disclosure Act (1998)
Rules on auditing are related to the duty of directors (Section 221 of the Companies Act 1985) 
to keep accounting records sufficient to explain the company’s transactions, and for the 
annual accounts to be approved by the board of directors.  The audit process is concerned to 
establish and confirm confidence in this accounting information.  The Companies Act 1985 
(Sections 384 to 394A) outlines rules on the appointment, rights, remuneration, removal and 
resignation of auditors.   These rules have been largely upheld in the Company Law Reform 
Bill (2006), although certain provisions have been tightened regarding disclosure to 
shareholders.  A comprehensive review of legal, soft-law and self-regulatory instruments 
came in 2003 in the final report of the Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting Issues.  
Their report was significant, and led to substantial regulatory changes, particularly in the area 
of independent oversight, monitoring and investigation of the profession.  
The fundamental responsibility of auditors is to report to shareholders whether the accounts 
prepared by the directors present a true and fair view of the company’s affairs.  The auditor’s 
role, as codified by the Auditing Practices Board (APB), is not to detect or prevent fraud, but 
to qualify the audit opinion if they find evidence of substantial material misstatements.  This 
process is now subjected to greater regulatory supervision through the various boards of the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC).  For example, the Accountancy Investigation and 
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Disciple Board (AIDB) have supervisory powers, and may bar auditors from the profession if 
they detect fraud but fail to report it.  The standard of care for auditors has also been 
sharpened through case law, such that auditors should not rely entirely on honesty of other 
persons, but undertake checks on at least one or more sample items.  Thus, auditing has 
emerged in the last several years as an area of dynamic development that raises its role and 
profile as an element of corporate governance.
6.3.4.1 Content gaps
This section aims at identifying various areas regulation related to audit and internal controls 
where drivers are not adequately covered by the regulatory framework.   
6.3.4.1.1 Independent external auditors
The literature review suggested that the independence of external auditors is essential to their 
effectiveness.  An important element stressed by the Accounting Practices Board is that 
independence does not depend on whether the auditor feels their views are influenced by a 
particular situation, but whether a reasonable and informed third party would conclude that 
the auditors’ objectivity is or is likely to be impaired.  Independence in this context can entail 
several specific elements, including the restriction of ‘non-audit’ tasks involving the external 
auditors, the regular rotation of appointed external auditor, shareholder involvement in the 
appointment of the external auditor and sufficient legal liability of auditors.  Other rules 
govern the qualifications of auditors, and the eligibility of appointments under certain criteria 
of independence.
In particular, the Ethical Standards of the ABP and the Audit Regulations and Guidance of the 
ICAEW outline situations that may threaten an auditor’s independence:  undue financial 
dependence on an audit client (or group); significant overdue fees from an audit client; actual 
or threatened litigation in relation to an audit client; influences from outside the audit practice, 
including those from associated firms; personal or family relationships; beneficial or other 
interests in shares or other investments in an audit client; beneficial interests in trusts which 
have investments in an audit client; involvement as a trustee in an audit client; loans to or 
from audit clients; receipt of hospitality, goods or services from an audit client for less than 
full value; provision of other services to audit clients; a principal or senior employee joining 
an audit client; mutual business interests; participation in the business affairs of an audit 
client; voting on audit appointments; acting as auditor for a prolonged period of time; and an 
officer or employee of an audit client, who is related to an employee or principal of the firm.  
The standards are enforced through the system of professional registration as a qualified 
auditor (see below).  Auditor rotation is also an important requirement bearing upon 
independence.  For example, the Professional Ethics of the ICAEW now follow the European 
Union recommendation to require auditor rotation every five years (reduced from every seven 
years).  
Independence is also covered by shareholder involvement in the appointment of the external 
auditor, which is guaranteed under the Companies Act 1985 and requires the general meeting 
of the shareholders to appoint auditors.  If no appointment is made, the DTI must be informed 
and can make an appointment.  In practice, however, shareholders usually delegate this right 
of appointment to the board of directors.  Resignation of an auditor requires a notice 
containing a statement that no circumstances connected with the resignation should be 
brought to notice of shareholders, or a statement of such circumstances.  This statement may 
help guard the independence of auditors, even during conflicts with management.  The 
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Company Law Reform Bill (2006) is set to introduce a number of proposals to further 
improve transparency, and support shareholder involvement to improve audit independence 
and quality.  Specifically, the Bill will require publication of audit engagement letters, give 
shareholders the right to question audits, require more information disclosure within auditors’ 
resignation letters, and require the lead audit partner to individually sign the audit report.  
More broadly, the Combined Code advocates the formation of an audit committee within the 
board of directors that makes recommendations about the appointment, activities, and 
remuneration of auditors.  The audit committee should also review and monitor the auditor’s 
independence and objectivity in light of existing UK standards and regulatory requirements.  
Moreover, the audit committee should develop policies regarding non-audit services.  In 
short, the audit committee plays a central role in monitoring the independence of the audit.  
To this end, an important stipulation in Principle C.3 and related code provisions is that the 
audit committee should consist of at least three members, who should all be independent non-
executive directors.  Principle A.3 also states that only the committee chairman and members 
can attend the audit committee meeting.  
The independence of board members involved in the audit committee should add a further 
layer of independence, and act as a buffer between inside board members and the auditors by 
having some degree of autonomy from each party.    This role of the audit committee remains 
controversial.  Auditors are formally appointed by the shareholders in order to avoid conflicts 
of interest, such as having the auditor being accountable to two different constituencies. 
However, in practice the directors are required to manage the auditor on behalf of the 
shareholders, which may undermine their genuine independence, despite the mediating role of 
non-executive directors.
Auditors in the UK must hold qualifications from one of several recognized professional 
bodies, such as the Institutes of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Scotland, or 
Ireland, the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, Association of International 
Accountants or Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy.  In order to be eligible 
to act as auditors, they must also be a member of a Recognised Supervisory Body -
Association of Authorised Public Accountants, Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Ireland, Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland.  The EC Eighth 
Directive brought the profession under greater statutory control through a registration system.  
Both Company Law and the Audit Rules of the Institutes of Chartered Accountants stipulate 
that certain qualified persons may not be appointed as auditors: if they are an officer or 
employee of the company or related company, as well as any connection or association of the 
auditor with the firm that might compromise their independence.   The Institutes of Chartered 
Accountants can enforce various professional regulations by inspecting and removing the 
registration of its members.  Since September 2005, the Public Oversight Board for 
Accountancy (POBA) has a legal responsibility to oversee the regulation of auditors by the 
recognized professional bodies, as well as monitoring the quality of the auditing function in 
relation to certain significant economies entities.  
Auditors hold a variety of statutory rights and powers that help to assure their independence 
during the audit.  For example, auditors have the right to access company books and account, 
as well as receive notices related to general meetings.  Company officers face criminal 
chargers for providing knowingly misleading statements to the auditors.  These powers have 
been further expanded in the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) 
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Act 2004.  Auditors are now entitled to require information from a wider group of people, 
including company employees, and may require directors to make a statement to the effect 
that they have not withheld important information regarding the company accounts.   
The restriction of non-audit tasks is widely considered important to assure independence and 
limit conflicts of interest from arising in related to the audit.  This concern was highlighted by 
the case of Enron, and resulting demise of Arthur Andersen, where the audit firm was 
providing non-audit services.  The resulting review by the CGAA rejected a ban on the 
provision of non-audit services, and supported a “threats and safeguards” approach based 
around strict disclosure.  The Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) 
Act 2004 now requires companies to publish detailed information on the types and costs of 
services bought from their auditor or their associates.  This replaces the previous requirement 
to disclose the total amounts spent on audit and non-audit services.  The rationale behind 
these measures is that shareholders will be better able to judge whether conflicts of interest 
arise.  As mentioned above, the Combined Code also suggests that the audit committee 
develop a clear policy and transparency toward retention of auditors to perform non-audit 
tasks.  The EU 8th Company Law Directive will strengthen independence of audits through 
future requirements for auditor rotation.  
Finally, legal liability of the auditors is often considered a further type of rule in fostering 
independence of the auditors and vigilance in monitoring managers.  Liability may stem from 
statutory duties, contractual obligations or through tort in cases of negligence where the duty 
of care is shown to be in breach.  In practice, professional standards play a central role here, 
since auditors following the Auditing Standards and Guidelines, Statements of Standard 
Accounting Practice and Financial Reporting Standards are unlikely to be found in breach of 
their duty.  However, an important change is being planned in the Company Law Reform Bill 
(2006) which would allow auditors and companies to agree a limitation of the auditors’ 
liability subject to an override if the Court finds it less than fair and reasonable.  A statutory 
cap on liability was rejected as inappropriate.  The aim of this reform is to better balance the 
need for liability against the high costs associated with the current rules.  The Bill would 
lower the risks of legal claims and the costs of indemnity insurance, thereby stabilizing the 
audit market and allowing smaller firms to enter this market.  In addition, the Limited 
Liability Partnerships Act (2000) has made it easier for audit firms to limit their liability in the 
way that other companies have.
These various regulations exist, which are designed to support auditor independence as a 
driver of ‘good’ corporate governance, as discussed in sections 2.5.2 and 4.6.1 of this report.
6.3.4.1.2 Highly qualified audit committees within the board 
The literature review suggested that the qualification of audit committee members was very 
important in order to suppose the oversight of the auditing process, and assure the quality of 
external auditors.  The formation of an audit committee is advised on a comply-or-explain 
basis through the Combined Code.  Given the central role of the audit committee for auditor 
independence (see above), the membership of the committee is extremely important is
supporting this role.  Following the Smith Guidance (2003) on the role of the audit 
committee, further detail was adopted into the Combined Code.  The general notion is that the 
structure of the audit committee may depend on the particular circumstances of the firm, and 
therefore some need exists for a flexible approach.  Combined Code suggests ways in which 
the audit committee should assess the audit process—here the emphasis is not on duplicating 
or auditing the audit, but an assuring a proper system is in place.  
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In terms of the composition and qualification of its members, all should be independent non-
executive directors.  The Smith Guidance states that, “the board should satisfy itself that at 
least one member of the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience” 
(Section 2.3).  More specifically, the guidance suggests that one board member should “have 
a professional qualification from one of the professional accounting bodies” (Section 2.17).  
Other members should have “a degree of financial literacy” appropriate to the circumstances 
of the company.  However, ultimately the board may judge whether then qualifications of the 
committee are sufficient.  The guidance also suggests that companies should provide an 
“induction programme” for new members, and provide training for committee members 
regarding understanding financial statements, etc.  Despite their nominal independence, non-
executive directors may often lack the real expertise and incentives to pro-actively intervene 
in the audit process. The guidance recommends meetings three times per year.  Thus, the level 
of engagement and factual independence from the information and opinions provided by the 
external auditors may be highly variable across companies
These recommendations have been adopted into the Combined Code, which now gives 
substantial guidance with regard to issue of audit committee composition, which was 
discussed as a driver of ‘good’ corporate governance, as discussed in sections 2.5.2 and 4.6.2 
of this report.  It may be noted, however, that the provisions are of a rather broad nature and 
may leave gaps, particularly in terms of implementation.
6.3.4.1.3 Internal control, risk management and protection of whistleblowing 
The review of corporate governance literature identified several important aspects of internal 
company process that complement external supervision by auditors.  Specifically, internal 
control systems are central to monitoring risk and assuring the company meets its objectives.  
Financial controls are important here, but also a broader evaluation of the types of risks to 
which companies are exposed.  Complementary to this are procedures for whistleblowing that 
protect company staff and encourage their reporting of misconduct.
The Combined Code states that it is the responsibility of the audit committee to not only 
consider the internal financial control but also look at the broader aspect of the internal 
control and risk management systems.  Principle C.2 of the Combined Code covers internal 
control and states that, “the board should maintain a sound system of internal control to 
safeguard shareholders’ investments and the company’s assets.”  Principle C.2.1 charges 
directors with reviewing the system of internal control and reporting to shareholders that they 
have done so.  The UK Listing Rules (Paragraph 9.8.6) also require disclosure of how 
companies applied these principles.
The Turnbull Guidance (1999, 2005) outlines important responsibilities and elements of 
sound internal control systems as required by the Combined Code.  The broad approach is to 
have risk-based internal control systems where the board should consider the nature and 
extent of risks facing the company, the extent and categories of risk that they company can 
bear, the likelihood of risks materializing, the company’s ability to reduce those risks, and the 
costs and benefits of risk management.  As such, the guidance aims at providing a flexible, 
principles-based approach that allows companies to implement internal controls that are 
appropriate and proportional to the different risk environments in which they operate.  Key 
generic elements, however, constitute good systems of reporting within the company and 
monitoring of compliance.  The guidance also stresses that internal control and risk 
management should be embedded in the regular operations of the company.    
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The literature on quality of control and checks upon failures in compliance suggests the 
importance of ‘bottom-up’ monitoring by employees involved in the implementation of 
business.  To this end, the protection of employee ‘whistle-blowers’ is important to ensure 
that employees are able to disclose wrong doing, and problems can be identified and quickly 
resolved.  Employees making such disclosures must be protected to that they make qualified 
disclosures without having fear of retaliation or punishment.  
Substantial legal protection for whistleblowers was introduced by the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998, which outlines the kinds of disclosures that qualify for protection, such 
as those related to criminal offences, breaches of legal obligations, dangers to health or safety 
or the environment and so on.  Receiving legal protection requires that the disclosure be made 
in good faith and when it is reasonable to believe that the information is substantially true.  
The act provides a list of ‘prescribed persons’ to whom such disclosures can be made, which 
cover a wide gambit of regulatory agencies responsible for different areas.  The act offers a 
broad scope of protection “from being subject to a detriment by their employer.” Detriment 
goes beyond cases of unfair dismissal and includes denial of promotion, facilities or training 
which the employer would otherwise have offered.  
In addition to whistleblowing to outside regulators, many companies have related procedures 
as part of their internal control system.  The Smith Guidance (Section 4.8) and revised 
Combined Code suggests that the audit committee review arrangements “by which staff of the 
company may, in confidence, raise concerns about possible improprieties in matters of 
financial reporting or other matters.”  The audit committee should provide that proportionate 
and independence investigation and follow-up action occurs when such reports are received.    
Overall, the areas of internal controls, risk management and whistleblowing have thus 
recently become the subject to increasing levels of regulation that address, in broad terms, 
some aspects of ‘good’ corporate governance practices as discussed in sections 2.5.3, 2.5.4 
and 4.6.3 of this report.  Therefore, one conclusion may be that the coverage of important 
audit-related ‘drivers’ has improved substantially in recent years in response to the various 
scandals and resulting wave of worldwide concern about audit-related issues.  This coverage 
is more comprehensive in terms of structure and disclosure, but leaves substantial flexibility 
in terms of actual practices and organisational processes.  These latter issues will be raised in 
terms of effectiveness gaps.
6.3.4.2 Effectiveness gaps
In this section we turn to the gap between the stated aim and actual outcome of the regulatory 
framework with regard to auditors and internal control processes.  
6.3.4.2.1 Implementation gap analysis
Recent developments have substantially strengthened the oversight and enforcement of audit 
rules, particularly in the area of auditor independence.  The Companies (Audit, Investigations 
and Community Enterprise) Bill 2004 gave the FRC greater powers and resources in the area 
of audit oversight.  A Professional Oversight Board of Accounting (POBA) was also created 
in 2004 to take responsibility for the oversight of audit regulation, as well as setting up an 
Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) to monitor the quality of audits of economically significant 
entities.  In its first year of operation, POBA found that 80-87% of the registered auditors 
receiving monitoring visits by professional bodies were compliant with regulations, but some 
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non-compliance existed and this often led to having registration withdrawn.  The AIU also 
undertook monitoring of major audit firms with regard to their audit process, as well as the 
audit partners’ actual judgments.  According to the POBA 2005 Report (p.11), “the AIU 
inspections identified no systematic weakness in the overall policies, procedures and systems 
of quality control operated by the firms,” but rather focused on areas of more incremental 
improvements to the implementation of those systems.  For example, the AIU noted the lack 
of written records in some cases, where partners’ judgments had to be explained orally.  In 
2005/6, the AIU will extend its inspections beyond the ‘Big 4’ to the next tier of audit firms.  
In the area of internal controls, the FRC established the Turnbull Review Group in 2004 to 
consider the impact of the Turnbull Guidance issued in 1999.  The 2005 report concluded that 
internal control in UK companies had substantially improved.  The Evidence Paper published 
in June 2005 provided very positive reports from relevant practitioners about the 
implementation of Turnbull.  However, it seems too early to evaluate the implementation and 
long-term effects of recent regulation.  In particular, the implementation of restrictions of 
non-audit tasks relies largely on information disclosure and sanctioning by the market.  Given 
the limits and costs of shareholder engagement in the appointment and monitoring of auditors, 
the effectiveness of such measures must be evaluated and perhaps tightened as common 
practices become more established.  This observation should not detract from the 
improvements made in recent years, but point to potential effectiveness gaps in a forward-
looking manner.
6.3.4.2.2 Contingency analysis
 Various aspects of the regulation discussed in this section point out the need to adopt audit and 
internal control systems that fit the circumstances of individual firms.  This approach is 
particularly clear in the Combined Code and related guidance, and implemented through the 
comply-or-explain basis.  In particular, companies of different sizes or having different levels of 
complexity can ideally shape their auditing and control process to their own situation.  As such, 
the flexibility of the UK principles-based approach seems to have some advantages in being 
adaptable to the varying circumstances of firms.  Particularly in the area of risk management, it 
would appear extremely difficult to have clear rules about what such systems should look like 
that would be universally applicable.  The types of risks faced by firms are highly contingent on 
different national and sectoral operating environments.  
6.3.4.2.3 Complementarity and substitution analysis 
The audit process is conceived as a complementary institution that should support the quality 
of information disclosure.  Without objectivity and assurance, the value of public information 
disclosure is highly questionable.  Conversely, the quality and independence of auditors relies 
importantly on other supporting elements of corporate governance such as the independence 
of the directors who form the audit committee and supervise the audit process.  Put rather 
simply, the quality of independence in the audit depends very much on the quality of 
independence among directors, and problems in the area of director independence can 
endanger or even undermine the relationship with auditors.  
An important aspect in this regard relates to the incentives and remuneration of the parties 
involved, and more widely to the scope of non-audit activities.  Some analyses of the Enron 
case suggest the use of high-powered share-based incentives among the directors gave very 
strong incentives for the persons involved not to report the true and fair view of the company 
value.  This problem even extended to independent directors as well, who face similar types 
of incentives.  Given these dangers, the importance of external oversight and powers of the 
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auditor vis-à-vis directors and company staff would seem to be an important substitute for 
trust in the board and audit committee.  One potential solution here is the “reputational risk” 
to auditors, who are exposed as being insufficiently independent and objective.  However, it 
remains an open empirical question as to how well such reputational mechanisms work to 
protect the independence of various ‘gatekeepers’ such as auditors or other risk management 
professionals.  As mentioned above, the reliance on disclosure and sanctioning by market 
actors such as institutional investors may be too weak to reinforce regulatory provisions in the 
audit area.
A further interesting question arises for public policy – when and to what extent can there be 
a substitute for auditing itself?  Some possible alternatives may be improving the selection of 
staff, increasing the levels of training of those staff, and acculturation into particularly ethical 
or normative ways of doing things.
6.3.4.2.4 Cost analysis 
The improvement of auditing and internal controls surely has associated costs.  Still, 
increased regulation over the audit process in recent years has also improved coverage in 
terms of ‘good’ corporate governance drivers.  A number of potential effectiveness gaps 
remain, but these must be cautiously evaluated in terms of emerging practices and the costs of 
potential further regulation.  Future comparative study of the U.S. and UK policy would serve 
as an important benchmark in evaluating the costs and benefits of recent regulation.  
6.3.5 Executive pay
The literature review has identified three major ‘good’ corporate governance drivers associated 
with executive pay:
 Provision of long term incentives tied to company performance;
 Pay set by an independent remunerations committee;
 Disclosure of pay.
The role of executive pay within the corporate governance framework has been highlighted 
predominately in the Greenbury Report (1995), which has subsequently been incorporated into 
the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003).  Executive pay has also been subject to 
greater disclosure following the implementation of The Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations (2002).  In this section the following regulatory and ‘best practice’ documents have 
been reviewed with respect to ‘good’ corporate governance drivers identified in the previous 
section. 
 Company Law (the Companies Acts of 1985 and 1989)
 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003).  
 The Greenbury Report (1995)
 Financial Services Authority (2005) “The Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules”
 The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002).
 Company Law Reform Bill (January 2006)
 Financial Reporting Council (January 2006) “Review of the 2003 Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance”
 Association of British Insurers, various guidelines.
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6.3.5.1 Content gaps
This section aims at identifying areas of regulation and best practice, where the regulatory 
framework may not adequately cover drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance.  
6.3.5.1.1 Long-term performance related incentives
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) has incorporated many of the good 
practice guidelines with regards to executive pay initiated within the Greenbury Report 
(1995).  The Remuneration Section within the Combined Code can be found in section B.  
Section B1 states within the main principle that, “A significant proportion of executive 
directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance.”  The responsibility for incorporating this within any proposal (and 
implementation) of pay policies lies with the company’s remuneration committee and as such, 
this statement leaves members of the remunerations committee with two clear challenges.  
Firstly, they must address the level chosen to define ‘significant’, which would rely on 
internal interpretation, and secondly, measuring performance.  When measuring performance 
there is the question of whether you are measuring an individual, a team or the whole 
corporation’s performance. Neither the Combined Code nor Greenbury give guidance on 
either of these two specific issues.  This is in line with a principles-based approach used in the 
UK, but allows rather considerable discretion on behalf of the companies with regards to their 
rewards. 
Thus, the design of performance related remuneration schemes are clearly identified within 
Greenbury (1995) and the Combined Code (2003), and guidance is given here on a ‘comply 
or explain’ basis.  The implementation of incentive schemes is then entrusted to the
mechanisms of shareholder approval.  UK regulation takes a rather broad and principled-
based approach to the corporate governance drivers discussed in sections 2.6.3 and 4.7.1 of 
the report.    
6.3.5.1.2 Transparent and independent control of the remunerations committee
The separate report by the remunerations committee within the annual report and accounts 
provides the shareholder with vital information with regards to pay issues.  The UK Listing 
Rules (LR 9.8.8) provided requirements as to what should be in the directors’ remuneration 
report; these have now been put on formal footing with The Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations (2002). The remunerations report must provide detailed information regarding 
the actual amounts received in the financial year by way of salary and fees, bonuses, expenses 
and other non-cash benefits.  It further must state any compensation for loss of office or other 
termination payment; information on each director’s share options and interests under long 
term incentive schemes, and information on each director’s entitlements under pension 
schemes.  All these items are subject to audit verification (LR 9.8.11).  
The Combined Code attaches great significance to the role of the independent non-executive 
director.  At present the company chairman is not seen as an independent director in terms of 
serving on the Remuneration Committee.  The revised Combined Code (2003) became more 
prescriptive with regards to the composition of the Remuneration Committee, whilst the 1998 
version (Section B2.1) stresses independence of the committee; the revised section within the 
2003 version states at least three independent directors should be on this committee (for FTSE 
350 companies and 2 for smaller companies).  However the composition of this committee is 
subject to proposals for change within the FRC’s Review of the 2003 Combined Code (2006).  
The proposals from this review (if accepted) will allow the company chairman to be an 
additional member of the remuneration committee, subject to them being considered 
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independent at appointment.  This will give additional insight into the verification that 
performance incentives and other element of executive pay are correctly aligned with the 
strategic objectives of the company.  Additionally the Chairman may provide a key in role 
with good knowledge of the company and be responsive to the requirements of shareholders.
For these reasons the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) and the Combined 
Code provide significant guidelines that correspond to the ‘good’ corporate governance 
drivers identified in sections 2.6.4, 2.6.5 and 4.7.2 of the report. The underling conclusion is 
that with regards to the executive pay related drivers; there are deemed to be no content gaps 
within the UK regulatory/policy framework.  The question with regards to executive pay 
seems to be one of effectiveness rather than gaps.
6.3.5.2 Effectiveness gaps
In this section we turn to the gap between the stated aim and actual outcome of the best 
practice and regulatory framework.  These ‘efficiency’ gaps may involve implementation 
problems, a failure to take into account various contingencies, and the potential costs of 
regulation.
6.3.5.2.1 Implementation gap analysis
The issuing of share options is intended to motivate executives, relieve agency problems and 
thus ensure managers perform in line with shareholder interests.  The practice of using such 
incentive mechanisms is common.  The standard UK executive share option provides the 
executive with the right (but no the obligation) to purchase shares at a fixed, predetermined 
price (exercise or strike price) following some specified period of time.  Consideration must 
be given to the fact that share price is not just a matter of company performance; it can also be 
heavily subject to market sentiment. For example, if a company is suddenly subject to bid 
speculation and has a premium added to the share price, executives might simply gain 
rewards for circumstances beyond their control.  This is similarly true of the long-term 
incentive plans or LTIPs awards, which grant of shares (at zero cost) that vest upon the 
attainment of pre-determined performance criteria, as opposed to share options.
The Focus Group participants emphasised that executive directors are also employees and as 
such have certain levels of protection under Employment Law.  Whilst this is not particularly 
a governance issue, vast sums of money as payoffs for employment contracts can often be 
perceived as being rewarded for dismissal or failure.  In truth such payoffs are encompassed
as part of the directors’ service contracts.) Whilst both law and policy advise on service 
contract issues there is still the balancing act of getting it right for all parties.
There is also a further controversial area of executives being ‘rewarded’ for failure.  The 
existing regulation with regard to executive pay does not provide extensive safeguards which 
guarantee that incentive schemes actually reward for performance.  The design of these 
schemes is often criticised as being lax and favourable to the executives in ways that create 
unintended effects. The decisions about executive remuneration are left to a board 
remuneration committee (subject to the approval by shareholders), but some committee 
members may have vested interests in approving inefficient compensation schemes by simply 
imitating decisions of other peer companies. 
6.3.5.2.2 Contingency analysis
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One could argue that there is a greater burden placed on companies following the 2002 
Remuneration Report regulations.  Whilst the Combined Code is limited to those on the 
official list and is a ‘comply or explain’ scenario, this is not so with regulation.  The Code 
provides for company specific flexibility, and companies are able to negate responsibilities 
for areas that might provide burdens due to contingency factors such as company size, age, 
industry variants and company life cycle, providing they explain the reasons why.  With 
enforced regulation there is no room for such flexibility.  All aspects of legal regulation must 
be complied with; regardless of any additional responsibility this may place on the board of 
directors.  As such legal regulation may place a particularly heavy burden on smaller 
companies where resources and finances are often limited.   Smaller companies are able to 
bypass compliance with the Combined Code by listing on AIM, in doing so they can avoid 
enforced practices that are more appropriate to larger companies whilst still gaining the 
benefits of being listed. This may be particularly pertinent, as AIM has seen considerable 
growth over recent years. However, there is no bypass of the Regulation embedded within the 
Companies Acts and the costs associated with compliance of disclosure for smaller companies 
might negate any perceived benefits of implementing incentive schemes for directors.
6.3.5.2.3 Cost analysis
This use of long-term incentive plans and share option schemes as a way of promoting good 
corporate governance has an associated cost.  Previously the associated cost with such 
schemes was hidden to the shareholders in the footnotes of the accounts.  These are now to be 
incorporated within the accounts following the implementation of IFRS2.  Added to the 
Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulation (2002), a further burden of time is placed on the 
members of the remunerations committee in ensuring the necessary information for 
compliance is easily accessible in order to write the remuneration report for the annual report 
and accounts.  Detailed analysis must be undertaken with regards to the company’s share 
option schemes and long-term incentive plans.  This requires not just a description of the 
performance conditions themselves but also an analysis of the methods that are used to assess 
whether the performance conditions are met.  In addition, an explanation of why methods 
were chosen must also be given, thus the non executive director must be provided with this 
information or seek it out themselves.  
The greater burden from regulation here might not be immediately apparent in terms of 
financial costs; however there is an opportunity cost implication of the greater accountability.  
Directors may have to sacrifice time otherwise spent on strategic actions and in particular for 
non-executive monitoring, in order to ensure accountability for disclosure is fully discharged.
In terms of the costs related to executive pay, IFRS2 (the international accounting standard 
for share-based payments) will have a dramatic impact on companies.  For reporting periods 
following 1 January 2005, listed companies within the UK will be subject IFRS2.  The new 
accounting standard requires companies to charge share options through their profit and loss 
accounts so investors can see exactly how much company board members stand to gain.  
Unlike the past rules, the implementation of IFRS2 will highlight that share options are not 
‘free’ and do have a considerable effect on the profit and loss account.  An added dimension 
to this costing method will be the affect on smaller companies, which have relied on share 
options as an easy (cheap) way of enhancing executive pay packages in order to attract good 
talent. In doing so the options appeared not to cost anything initially, but were able to reward 
executives after the vesting period as share prices appreciated.  
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It is too early to categorically state whether this will have a dramatic effect on the structure of 
compensation packages however, this costing will do little to promote the use of share options 
which are currently considered a way to enhance corporate governance.  Companies will 
seriously have to consider how ‘charitable’ they wish to be with options when they are shown 
against the bottom line of profit.  Further to this, is the added benefit to investors who will be 
provided with an easier way to challenge any actions, which do not match up to shareholders’ 
interests.
6.3.6 Market for corporate control
The literature review has identified three major ‘good’ corporate governance drivers 
associated with the market for corporate control:
 An active market for corporate control;
 Transparency and protection for shareholders and stakeholders during mergers and 
acquisitions;
 Board power in takeover bids, subject to shareholder veto.
The corporate governance role and implications of the takeover market have received a 
detailed attention within the UK.  The rules concerning takeover bids of UK firms are set out 
in the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the City Code).  In this section, the following 
regulatory and related documents have been the primary ones reviewed with respect to ‘good’ 
governance drivers identified in previous sections:
 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the City Code)
 Substantial Acquisition Rules
 European Takeover Directive (May 2004)
 Company Law Reform Bill (January 2006)
 Financial Services and Markets Act (2000)
 Financial Services Authority (2005) “The Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules”
Established in 1968, the City Code is the main feature of takeover regulation.  It does not 
have the force of law, but is a framework based on soft-law or self-regulation accepted by 
market participants as being appropriate for UK companies.  As such, “The Code represents 
the collective opinion of those professionally involved in the field of takeovers as to business 
standards and as to how fairness to shareholders can be achieved” (Section 1A, emphasis 
added).  The City Code contains 10 General Principles and 38 Rules to provide standards of 
good standards of commercial behaviour and protect the interest of shareholders.
A European Takeover Directive came into force in May 2004 and must be implemented in 
each member state by May 20 2006. The Directive is structured around general principles 
inspired largely through the UK Takeover Code, and will replace the existing City Code 
General Principles.  The Takeover Directive lays out minimum requirements concerning the 
takeover of firms whose shares are traded on a regulated market, such as the requirement for a 
person who acquires a controlling stake in the target company to make an offer to all other 
shareholders at the equitable price (mandatory bids), the requirement that offer documents 
contain certain specified information, the length of the offer period, minority squeeze-out 
provisions, and disclosure of poison pill provisions.  Some provisions new to the UK are 
“breakthrough” clauses and disclosure of control structures, which are being implemented 
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through the Company Law reform.   On the whole, the Takeover Directive will bring 
relatively minor changes to the content of existing UK takeover rules.  Given the large 
number of contentious points, the Directive will only partially create a ‘level playing field’ for 
takeovers within Europe, since it continues to allow countries to opt-out on some provisions, 
particularly with regard to takeover defences.  The government also wishes to “opt in” to the 
frustrating action article of the Directive (Article 9), by modifying the existing provisions of 
Rule 21, which address frustrating actions.  
The Takeover Directive will bring important changes to supervision of takeovers, giving the 
Takeover Code and Takeover Panel a new statutory underpinning (DTI 2006).  Under the 
European Takeover Direction, each member state must now designate a competent authority 
to supervise takeovers.  The Panel is to get be delegated authority to act as a competent 
authority supervising bids, and receive some new statutory powers, such as rights to 
information and powers to order compensation to affected parties. As such, the legislative 
approach has focused on preserving some perceived benefits of the UK Takeover Panel, such 
as its flexibility, independence, technical expertise, and focus on principles-based regulation.     
6.3.6.1 Content gap analysis
This section aims at identifying various areas of takeover regulation where drivers are not 
adequately covered by the regulatory framework. Takeover regulation has a variety of 
functions, such as promoting efficient corporate restructuring and mitigating conflicts of 
interests between diverse company constituencies such as management, shareholders, and 
stakeholders (Goergen et al. 2005). Hence, takeover regulation has a wide impact on agency 
problems between management and shareholders, minority and majority investors, and other 
stakeholders.  Common regulatory devices available to achieve these two aims include: (i) 
mandatory bid rule, (ii) the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, (iii) ownership and 
transparency of control, (iv) squeeze-out and sell-out rules, and (v) board neutrality with 
respect to anti-takeover measures.
6.3.6.1.1 An active market for corporate control
The review of the social science literature suggested that an active market for corporate 
control make important contributions to corporate restructuring.  In particular, transfers of 
control can help firms overcome important life-cycle issues by supporting external growth, 
consolidation, or shift toward more entrepreneurial activity through focused control or 
synergistic recombination.  While hostile takeover bids also impose high costs, friendly 
takeovers and private equity deals also constitute elements of the market for corporate control.  
Hence, an active market for corporate control is important in bringing about the transfer of 
control towards more productive owners and management.  One role of takeover regulation is 
to minimize the costs and inefficiencies associated with the takeover mechanism.  In the UK, 
an active takeover market is supported by several key elements of regulation such as 
information disclosure, a squeeze-out rule, and limitations to the use of takeover defence 
measures.
Regulations over information disclosure are important for fostering greater market activity 
through the provision of adequate and timely advice and information. According to the City 
Code, information contained in an offer must be adequately and fairly presented (rule 19.1).  
The directors of the relevant companies are also responsible for ensuring the accuracy of such 
documents (rule 19.2), which carries implications for director liability.  Rule 3 of the City 
Code requires independent advice to be provided about the feasibility of the takeover and 
accuracy of the bid documents as part of the bidding procedure.  More generally, bids are 
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subject to an array of mandatory disclosure that increases the predictability of M&A 
transactions for investors.  Rules 24 and 25 of the City Code spell out detailed contents of the 
documents provided during the bid.  Rules 28 and 29 regulate the use of forecasts and 
valuations in these documents and rules 30-34 stipulate time limits governing the overall 
period of an offer and the different stages within it, which must be incorporated into the 
contractual terms of the offer document. An important aspect of these rules concerns 
competing bids.  Here the original offeror’s timetable will cease to apply in the case of a 
competitive offer, and both parties will work to the new timetable (rule 31.6).
A key provision of the City Code regards board neutrality.  In keeping with the principle of 
fair treatment for shareholders, the board of the offeree has an obligation not to take any 
action, which could frustrate the offer (rule 21).  Likewise, the general principle state that 
board of the offeree must not take any action which may deprive its shareholders of the ability 
to decide on the merits of the offer, unless its shareholders approve otherwise in general 
meeting. Examples of ‘frustrating action’ are set out in rule 21 and include: issuing new 
shares, granting options over unissued shares, creating securities carrying rights to convert 
into (or subscribe for) target shares, selling (or acquiring) assets of a material amount, and 
entering into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business.  The proposed 
Company Law Reform Bill (2006, p.90) reaffirms the principle of board neutrality, for 
example, by requiring that any payments made to directors, in relation to transfers of control, 
should be approved directly by the shareholders of the target firm.  It should be noted that the 
“duty of neutrality” imposes rules in the UK that are far stricter than the U.S. statute under 
which a board of directors is allowed to take various defence measures, particular poison pills, 
as a defensive tactic.  According to calculations from Thomson Deals database, between 1990 
and 2004, UK companies were involved in 215 hostile bids, of which 106 succeeded.  The 
comparable figure for the USA is 402 hostile bids, of which only 104 succeeded (own 
calculations).  
Overall, the UK regulatory framework covers a large number of key drivers of ‘good’ 
corporate governance needed to support an active market for corporate control, as discussed 
in sections 2.7.2, 2.7.3 and 4.8.1 of this report.        
6.3.6.1.2 Transparency and protection for shareholders and stakeholders during mergers 
and acquisitions
The Principle of Equal Treatment is outlined as General Principle 1 of the City Code, which 
stipulates similar treatment for shareholders.  This principle requires controlling shareholders, 
the management, and other constituencies to treat all shareholders within each individual class 
of shares equally.  Specifically, an acquirer must offer minority shareholders the chance to 
exit on terms that are no less favourable than those offered to shareholders who sell a 
controlling block. Rule 16 requires that no special deals be undertaken, whereas rules 6 and 
11 regulate the type of consideration.  Equal treatment is also enshrined the rules on 
mandatory offers, described below.  Hence, the principle aims at protecting minority 
shareholders.
Mandatory bid requirements are an extremely important element of protection minority 
shareholders again expropriation by major shareholders, including the bidder itself.  
Mandatory bid rules provide shareholders with an opportunity to exit and receive a fair price 
for their shares.  Under Rule 9 of the City Code, an acquirer must make a tender offer to all 
the shareholders once a threshold of 30 percent of the shares has been acquired.  This rule 
similarly applies to people acting in concert who hold not less than 30 percent but not more 
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than 50 percent of the visiting rights of a company if there is any increase at all in the
percentage level of that holding.  The rule requires that if shares are acquired by the offeror 
(or any persons acting in concert with it) which result in a holding of 30 per cent or more of 
the voting rights of a company, the offeror is required to make a cash offer for the target at the 
highest price paid by the offeror (or any person acting in concert with it) for any target shares 
in the previous 12 months.  The bidder is required to announce its offer, and provide certain 
information, which includes confirmation by a financial advisor that resources are available to 
carry out the offer under the stated terms.  While the price of the bid may be raised or parties 
to the takeover may purchase shares at a price higher than the initial bid (subject to 
disclosure), rule 6.2 provides that the bidder shall increase its offer to not less than the highest 
price paid for the securities so acquired.  An important element complementing mandatory 
bids is the mandatory disclosure of ownership stakes.  Disclosure makes it harder for bidders 
to discretely build up large toeholds of control before making a mandatory bid (or paying 
higher premiums as other shareholders begin to anticipate a bid).  However, disclosure may 
also make bidders more certain about the ownership of target firms and greater certainty about 
the prospects of white knights or other large blockholders who may become unwilling to sell, 
particularly in hostile cases.  
The effect of mandatory bid rules is to restrict partial acquisitions (acquisitions of controlling 
stakes, but without making an offer for all shares) except where explicitly allowed by the 
Panel.  In lieu of a mandatory bid, purchasers acquiring a stake greater than 15 percent, but 
less than the 30 percent are subject to Substantial Acquisition Rules (SAR) enforced by the 
Takeover Panel.  Importantly, these rules discourage two-tier takeover attempts and 
“greenmail” practices, where bidders might use control of an initial stake to gain concessions 
from other shareholders in gaining further control of the target company.  In terms of 
disclosure, the UK has one of the lowest thresholds for disclosure of ownership stakes of 3 
percent or more.  Such information about share blocks allows minority shareholders and 
regulators to monitor the impact of large blockholders on the company, and therefore supports 
minority shareholder protection.
  
Company law in the UK also provides for “squeeze-out” and “sell-out”, which are designed to 
address the problems related to residual minority shareholders following a successful takeover 
bid.  Squeeze-out rights enable a successful bidder to compulsorily purchase the shares of 
remaining minority shareholders who have not accepted the bid. Sell-out rights enable 
minority shareholders, in the wake of such a bid, to require the majority shareholder to 
purchase their shares. Since these rules involve compulsory purchase or acquisition of shares, 
high thresholds apply to the exercising of such rights and there are protective rules on the 
price that must be paid for the shares concerned.  The recent Company Law Reform Bill 
(January 2006) applies a dual threshold of the bidder acquiring both 90% of the shares to 
which the offer relates, and 90% of the voting rights carried by those shares.  Likewise, the 
requirement of cash consideration is also important protections for to allow the easy exit of 
target firm shareholders.
While protections for shareholders are well covered by regulation, stakeholder interests are 
addressed less thoroughly.  The general principles of the City Code stipulates that the 
“shareholders’ interests taken as a whole, together with those of employees and creditors, 
which should be considered when the directors are giving advice to shareholders.”  Perhaps 
more substantially, rule 24.1 provides for disclosure of important strategic and employment 
implications within the bid document.  The bidder is expected to issue statements on its 
intentions regarding the continuation of the target firm business, any major changes or 
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redeployment of fixed assets, the long-term commercial rationale for the deal, and “its 
intentions with regard to the continued employment of the employees of the offeree company 
and of its subsidiaries” (rule 24.1).  Similar disclosure requirements in the offer document and 
target response documents are required under the Takeover Directive.  Unlike in countries 
such as Germany, no provisions are provided giving rights on stakeholders, such as 
employees, to any information, consultation or co-decision rights with regard to M&A 
transactions.  Nor do the disclosure requirements stipulate any detailed specifics regarding 
employment-related information.  Therefore, while the board may consider employee interests 
under the City Code, these interests are largely outside the corporate governance system in the 
sense of mutual rights and obligations.
In sum, the UK takeover rules seem to cover very well the requirements of transparency and 
fairness for shareholders discussed as a driver of ‘good’ corporate governance in sections 
2.7.2, 2.7.3 and 4.8.2 of this report.  However, coverage of stakeholder protection and 
involvement during the takeover process is less developed.
6.3.6.1.3 Board power in takeover bids, subject to shareholder veto
The literature review found that involvement of target firm boards during takeover bids is 
important to assure that the valuation of the bid is favourable.  Target managers may possess 
informational advantages that help to understand “hidden value” in the firm, and active 
involvement in negotiations may help to assure a better price.
As discussed above, the City Code demands very high standards of board neutrality during 
takeover bids.  As such, the Board does not possess any power to directly veto or reject bids.  
Rather, the Board is responsible to give advice to shareholders regarding the bid.  Rule 25 of 
the City Code requires the disclosure of views on the offer, and disclosure any alternative 
offers.  In particular, where the board is divided in its opinion, a minority view of the board 
can also be expressed.  Where relevant, the board must also share its views regarding the 
offeror’s plans for the company and its employees.  Rules 22-27 spell out in further details the 
disclosure rules related to various potential conflicts of interest of the target’s board members.
Yet an interesting phenomenon in the UK is the high number of management buy-out 
transactions where the target firm management is involved in the bid –these account for 10 
percent of UK deals (2000-5) compared to just 3 percent in Germany or 4 percent in France 
(own calculations, Thomson Deals).  Here the City Code provides various guidance in its 
rules about disclosure and board views, which that stress the role of non-executive directors in 
these cases.  It remains an open empirical question as to how adequately these rules govern 
potential conflicts of interests or transfers of wealth in such transactions.
UK regulations address the role of the board by stressing their duty to shareholders, and in 
certain respects restricting an active role of the board, particularly in pursuing defensive 
actions.  In this regard, some gaps may exist in promoting a more active role for corporate 
boards, as discussed in sections 2.7.2, 2.7.3 and 4.8.3 of this report, that enhance the quality 
of takeover bids without utilizing wealth-destroying forms of takeover defences. 
6.3.6.2 Effectiveness gaps
In this section we turn to the gap between the stated aim and actual outcome of the regulatory 
framework.  These gaps in effectiveness involve implementation problems, a failure to take 
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into account various contingencies, lack of support from complementary institutions (or 
unintended consequences related other drivers), and the potential costs of regulation.
6.3.6.2.1 Implementation gap analysis
The City Code is issued and reviewed by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the Panel), 
which is made up of various representatives of firms within the industry.  The Panel deals 
with enforcement by giving rulings on any uncertain courses of action.  For this purpose, the 
Panel can utilize a variety of sanctions, which range from private censure to public censure to 
certain cold-shouldering options obtained through the endorsement of the Code by the 
Financial Services Authority.  The Directive also clarifies and tightens rules of international 
jurisdiction by stating that a target company will be subject to regulation in the member state 
in which it has its registered office.  The Panel plans to retain a wider view of its jurisdiction 
to cover any offer for a company that has its registered office in the UK and has securities 
admitted to trading on a UK regulated market.
In practice, the City Code applies to deals where at least one of the firms involved in the 
acquisition is a listed UK company, as well as private firms some in more limited 
circumstances.  The Takeover Directive lays down further jurisdictional rules, including 
situations where companies are registered in one EU Member States and their shares are 
traded on the regulated market of another country.  Overall, the high degree of compliance 
among listed firms is based on the fact that every company listed on the stock exchange must 
enter into a ‘listing agreement’ with the UK Listing Authority (an arm of the FSA), which 
binds the company to the rules.  The ultimate sanction for non-compliance is delisting from 
the stock market.  Moreover, since the Panel involved individuals from various key 
associations representing major financial service providers, non-compliance with the City 
Code may lead to other informal sanctions including private censure, public censure, the 
reporting of conduct to other professional bodies and cold-shouldering.  Following the 
Company Law Reform (2006), the Panel will have statutory powers to impose fines or order 
restitution if certain rules are breached, as well as require parties to act in a certain way or 
restrain them from taking a certain course of action. Compensation orders are only likely in 
respect of breaches of Rule 16 (special or favourable deals) and Rule 9 (mandatory bids).  
Some critics of the UK approach have questioned whether a non-statutory body, such as the 
Takeover Panel, should be allowed to make and enforce rules that are, in effect, very close to 
law.  The counter argument, which is widely supported, is that the relative informality and 
flexibility of the City Code has facilitated an efficient and responsive takeover regime 
represents an advantage of the UK system that has been borne out in practice.  The Focus 
Group expressed being satisfied with the existing self-regulatory approach to takeover 
regulation.  The Takeover Directive will strike a middle group, by giving the existing Panel a 
statutory basis.  In sum, the City Code is well implemented and further tightening under the 
EU Directive will further support this role.  
6.3.6.2.2 Contingency analysis
The literature review suggested that the role played by market for control is contingent upon a 
variety of firm-internal factors such as the firm’s size, age, industry, growth/decline phase, etc. 
Moreover, environmental factors such as stock market activity, ownership patterns, regulatory 
institutions, inter-firm networks and managerial conceptions of control impact M&A.  The UK 
regulatory framework facilitates M&A activity, and delegates a high level of influence to target 
shareholders in deciding the outcome, particularly of contested bids.  The potential downside of 
this approach is the failure to address certain contingencies.
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In particular, companies where firm-specific or relationship-specific investments by different 
stakeholder groups are central for competitive advantage may need greater protections for 
stakeholders or greater scope to implement takeover defences in order to avoid destroying 
effects of the market for corporate control.  Likewise, start-up and entrepreneurial firms depend 
highly on private benefits of control of company founders, but may have low market valuations 
during early stages of the company life cycle.  Here again, greater scope to implement defensive 
measures may preserve company assets.  Although hostile bids constitute a very small 
percentage of overall takeover activity, UK firms are highly exposed to the market for corporate 
control in terms in terms of both levels of hostility and the success of hostile bids.  
The UK notably has no restrictions on how companies structure their voting rights and permits 
deviations from one-share-one-vote principles.  This deviation might, in theory, allow 
companies to adopt allocations of voting rights that would effectively act as barriers to takeover 
bids, and particularly hostile bids.  In practice, 88% of UK firms within the FTSE Eurofirst 300 
index follow a one-share-one-vote principle (Deminor Rating 2005).  Non-voting preference 
shares are used at some companies (e.g. Daily Mail and General Trust), whereas multiple voting 
rates are quite rare.  Other deviations are non-voting shares without preference, ownership caps, 
and priority shares.  The UK retains so-called ‘golden shares’ in privatised companies where a 
strong public interest rationale persists.  However, state influence on privatised companies has
been progressively abandoned over recent years at companies like BAA, Cable & Wireless, BT 
Group, National Grid Transco, Scottish Power and Scottish & Southern Energy.  This approach 
would seem positive in terms of allowing companies to tailor their voting arrangements to take 
account of firm-specific contingencies, while achieving a generally high level of compliance 
with one-share-one-vote principles.
6.3.6.2.3 Complementarity and substitution analysis 
Takeover rules display a number of complementarities with other aspects of corporate 
governance drivers and related regulation.  Efficient markets for corporate control rely 
strongly on disclosure and information rules, as well as effective auditing processes.  In 
particular, however, a regulatory framework supporting an active takeover market and 
investor protection is particularly important in situations where ownership is dispersed and 
shareholders face high agency costs in monitoring management.
  
However, here takeover rules imply important tradeoffs.  Takeover rules aimed at facilitating 
the exit of minority shareholders of target firms, such as mandatory bids, are likely to 
discourage the monitoring of managers by large blockholders by limiting the private benefits 
of such monitoring.  For example, mandatory bid rules may discourage the holding of large 
blocks by requiring bids for complete control of the firm.  Consequently, the UK takeover 
rules may have a strong effect on reinforcing the highly dispersed patterns of ownership and 
unintentionally lead to lower levels of shareholder involvement by discouraging the holding 
on large blocks.  While more empirical research is needed on this point, takeovers in the UK 
result in very high percentages of shares being owned by the bidder after the transaction and 
only a small proportion of transactions involve transfer of large blocks.
Rules supporting high levels of takeover activity and low involvement of target firm boards 
may also impair the effective involvement of stakeholders within corporate governance, 
particularly employees as suggested by the ‘breach of trust’ hypothesis.  Examples from other 
countries such as Germany and Japan suggest that these costs may be offset by specific 
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legislation that regulates information and involvement of stakeholders during the process of 
M&A.
6.3.6.2.4 Cost analysis 
The costs related to compliance with UK takeover rules are moderate, and reflected in the 
detailed procedures and supporting independent advice taken by parties during a takeover.  
For example, the total fees paid to M&A consultants and brokers as a percentage of deal value 
is quite high in the UK, totalled 1.5 percent of deal value on average in the UK (2000-2005).   
High costs may restrict levels of M&A activity.  For example, mandatory bid rules may make 
transactions more expensive by requiring companies to offer bids to all shareholders, and 
thereby discourages bidders from making a bid in the first place.  This predictability may have 
a positive impact on takeover activity.  Likewise, the requirements to offer an option of cash 
payment to shareholders lead may lead to higher out of pocket costs than pure share 
exchanges.  A further point concerns the restrictions on takeover defences, which is often seen 
as a cost saving element of the UK approach relative to U.S. takeover laws.  Clear rules and 
timetables can help avoid costly battles for control during the bid, and placing shareholder 
decisions in the foreground.  Given the high level of M&A transactions in the UK compared 
to other OECD countries, it does not appear that mandatory bids or disclosure rules have 
excessively discouraged M&A transactions.  It may be noted that some regulation that raises 
the cost of transactions may have positive effects of filtering out some bids that are less likely 
to create value.  
In sum, the UK has a well established and relatively comprehensive regulatory framework 
regarding takeovers.  Nonetheless, the social science literature suggests that various trade-offs 
apply.  The UK approach stresses minority shareholder protection through mandatory bids, 
but more open takeover markets impose potential costs on other stakeholders.  Likewise, the 
UK regulatory regime stresses shareholder rights and sustaining the market through 
predictable takeover procedures, but at some expense to substantial rights for stakeholders 
and ability of managers to deflect potentially value-destroying hostile bids.
6.3.7 Stakeholders
Three major groupings of ‘good’ corporate governance drivers associated with stakeholders 
were identified in the literature review:
 Broad stakeholder involvement in corporate governance;
 Voice mechanisms for debt holders;
 Employee participation in financial outcomes and collective voice in decision making
The role of various stakeholders is covered both in the legal framework and other regulations, 
codes, and reports.  In this section, the following laws, regulations, and related documents are 
considered with respect to the ‘good’ governance drivers identified in previous sections:
 Company Law (the Companies Acts of 1985 and 1989, the Insolvency Act 1986, and the 
Enterprise Act 2002).
 Company Law Reform Bill (2006)
 Employment Law (the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (1992), 
the Employment Relations Act 1999, and various regulations such as those covering 
Transfer of Undertakings
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 Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations (1999)
 Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004
 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 on whistleblowing
 Pensions Act 2004
 Financial Services Authority (2005) “The Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules”
 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (2003-2004)
 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003)
 Financial Reporting Council, various standards.
6.3.7.1 Content gaps
As with similar sections above, the aim here is to identify areas of possible regulation where 
drivers may not be adequately covered by the present regulatory framework.  Here we 
consider specifically regulations that affect the involvement of three groups of stakeholders: 
general stakeholders, debtholders, and employees.
6.3.7.1.1 General stakeholder involvement within corporate governance
In terms of general stakeholder involvement, vis-à-vis customers, suppliers, the wider 
community, and environmental issues, the review of the academic literature has suggested 
that consideration of these wider stakeholders can act as drivers of ‘good’ corporate 
governance in certain circumstances.  Their involvement in corporate governance can also 
have a positive effect on performance.  However, the discussion of stakeholders is often 
diffuse and touches on a large number of distinct issues and areas of regulation.  Perhaps for 
this reason, the importance of stakeholders was not echoed strongly by our expert survey and 
focus group meeting.    
In Chapter 2 above, we discussed the “enlightened shareholder value” model.  This view 
states that satisfying stakeholders is both desirable from a democratic voice point of view and 
also makes good sense from a business performance point of view.  Firms, which build good 
relations with stakeholders, gain competitive advantage and are better able both to protect and 
generate wealth within the company.  This has been a position, which UK Company Law and 
judicial decisions have moved slowly towards over a long period of time.  The present 
Company Law Reform Bill explicitly states that it is the directors’ duty to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in fulfilling this duty 
the directors must have regard to both short- and long-term factors and wider interests 
including employees, trade partners, etc (Section 156).  This approach is broadly consistent 
with our review of the academic literature, which suggests that stakeholder involvement is 
likely to influence long-term company performance and maximise overall wealth protection 
and wealth creation for all stakeholders. 
The relevant sections of the Company Law Reform Bill will take some time to bed down and 
will undoubtedly be subject to interpretation by the courts.  The view that stakeholders other 
than shareholders have an interest in corporate governance is given some limited support in 
other laws, codes, and documents.  In the case of employee stakeholders, it is supported by 
certain aspects of Employment Law, which give employees the right to information and the 
right to consultation.  
While Company Law allows managers to give due consideration to stakeholder interests, the 
regulation of specific rights for stakeholders or obligations is relatively dispersed and 
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somewhat limited.  Besides the new developments in Company Law, in other areas such as 
Listing Rules, the City Code, the Combined Code, and in professional standards, one can find 
little systematic notion of broader stakeholder interests.  However, this is not to say that there 
are no other forms of regulation, which play some part here, such as regulation of particular 
sectors, such as utilities and food, which go some way to fill any gap on a sectoral needs 
basis.  
Though the paucity of regulation cannot be taken as proof of the limited need for regulation, 
our overall conclusion is that regulation on stakeholders in general, as discussed in sections 
2.8.2 and 4.9.1 of this report, does not present significant content gaps in the UK regulatory 
framework commensurate with the effect of general stakeholders on corporate governance.  
As noted above, the general issues are covered by the new broader definition of directors’ 
duties.  Given their broad and diverse nature, regulation to establish a general framework for 
stakeholders may be problematic in the UK setting beyond the current rules.  Further 
involvement did not receive unambiguous support our experts or focus group participants, 
whose opinions were also divided on this matter.  However, other more specific stakeholder 
drivers to which we refer below did receive more support.  
6.3.7.1.2 Voice mechanisms for debt holders
The review of the academic literature cited a large number of studies on debtholder 
involvement.  While much evidence exists supporting the idea of debtholder involvement as a 
driver of ‘good’ corporate governance, the results of this literature are varied and depend very 
much on the context being studied.  Our experts ranked voice for debtholders medium to high.  
Our Focus Group felt that debt holders and related ‘gatekeepers’, such as rating agencies, 
were influential, but had sufficient support in law and had sufficient leverage to exert 
appropriate pressure on company management.  It is interesting that the highest driver 
identified in our expert survey was individual voice through meetings and contacts with 
managers.  Voice through delegated monitoring systems was also rated high.  These are not 
necessarily mechanisms best promoted by an extension of the regulatory framework.
Along with these mechanisms, the use of contractual arrangements for monitoring (such as 
bank covenants, debt contracts) was ranked high.  These are widely covered by Contract Law, 
Company Law, and Insolvency Law.  Both access to private information and board presence 
were not rated.  Of course, the former of these is permitted under the law, so long as it does 
not lead to market abuse and unfair trading.  The latter is also permitted under UK law and is 
sometimes taken up by major lenders.  However, bank presence on company boards is 
obviously not a major feature of the UK system.  
Our overall conclusion is that the involvement of debtholders, as discussed in sections 2.8.3 and 
4.9.2 in this report, does not have any major content gaps in the UK regulatory framework.  On 
the whole, the aspects of debtholder involvement, which were rated highly by our experts, are 
well covered.  
6.3.7.1.3 Employee participation in financial outcomes and collective voice in decision 
making
The review of the academic literature pointed to employee involvement as a significant driver 
of ‘good’ corporate governance.  Here the evidence is less well developed, and much of the 
literature on collective forms of employee voice draws from other countries with very 
different institutions than the UK.  So, while it is more difficult to draw firm conclusions, the 
literature surveyed in Chapter 2 gives employee involvement a positive role in governance 
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and in performance.  Our Expert Group also ranked employee involvement as an important 
driver of good corporate governance.  Our Focus Group discussion was more ambivalent on 
this, but, nevertheless, did agree on the importance of some forms of financial participation 
and collective voice as drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance.  
In practice, this issue very much revolves around the question of mechanisms.  In the UK 
context, the mechanisms, which were seen as drivers were rated as follows and in this rank 
order – employee share ownership, employee voice via pension funds, collective voice via 
consultative committees, and individual voice through meeting and employee reports.  We 
comment on each of these and their regulatory context.
Employee share ownership is covered by existing law and regulations related to share issues 
and taxation thereof, although employees have no special obligations or rights as 
shareowners.  Little attention is paid to employee share ownership in the rest of the UK 
regulatory framework.   However, as we saw in Chapter 2, the coverage of employee share 
ownership is relatively small and there is a problem of how employee-owners mobilise their 
voice actually to effect corporate governance.  This is not to say that it should not be 
encouraged; but nor is it to say that there should be further regulatory intervention.
In the case of employee voice via pension funds, this only covers employees who are 
members of company-based schemes.  The area is well regulated by pension law and by 
broader fiduciary duties under the law.  It is little touched on by other aspects of the UK 
regulatory framework such as the Combined Code.  Of course, it has been affected by new 
accounting standards, which have brought the question of pension liabilities to the fore and 
made such liabilities per se a significant factor in company decision-making.   Here, in 
particular, FRS17 has had a major effect on reporting about, and the operation of, pension 
funds.
 Employee voice via pension funds, however, runs up against severe limitations – such funds 
are confined in coverage and shrinking, they are limited in action they can take within their 
own companies, and they are limited by fiduciary duties and capabilities as to their ability to 
intervene in other firms.  The mixed interests and motivations here limit the extent to which 
regulation can promote pension funds as a direct vehicle for corporate governance.
In the case of collective employee voice via consultative committees such as works councils, 
historically there has been no legally based system of collective employee voice in the UK, 
along the lines of works councils or board-level representation found in various other EU 
countries.  Trade unions are the primary vehicle for employee consultation, and thus indirect 
involvement in corporate governance.  However, 'joint consultative committees' (JCCs) are 
sometimes created on the basis of collective agreements or voluntarily, although they only 
cover some 25 percent of UK establishments and usually only relate to the immediate 
workplace, rather than high-level corporate decision-making.  
This situation changed through the implementation of the EC Directive on Informing and 
Consulting Employees, resulting in the Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations 2004.  Under these rules, under certain circumstances, employees in 
establishments with over 50 employees will have a right to be informed and consulted on a 
regular basis about issues relating to the company.  While the framework binds employers to 
this process, the form and scope of consultation are largely left to company-specific 
negotiation.  In this regard, these provisions are again rather different than most European 
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works councils.  However, where no agreement is reached, some standard provisions apply as 
a fallback requiring the employer to inform employee representatives about the company’s 
activities and economic situation, and consult them on employment issues and major changes 
in work organisation or employees’ contractual relations.  Disputes emerging in the 
consultation process are referred to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC).  The CAC will 
decide the matter, and if necessary, order the employer to take steps to rectify the situation. If 
the CAC upholds a complaint against an employer, the complainant can then apply to the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal for a financial penalty to be imposed on the employer.
Other regulations require information disclosure to trade unions, where they are recognised.  
For example, the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 provide a 
general duty to disclose to recognised unions information for collective bargaining purposes.  
The Social Security Pensions Act 1975 requires employers to consult with recognised trade 
unions over contracting-out of the state earnings-related pensions scheme.  However, these 
developments are taking place in the context of shrinking voice via trade unions and the 
absence of board level representation of employees in the UK.  
Other regulations do exist that provide for consultation of employees over certain issues.  For 
example, the relevant EU Directives led to consultation rights applied with respect of 
collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings.  Section 188(2) of the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act states that redundancy consultation should be genuine 
and meaningful and include ways of avoiding, reducing and mitigating the consequences of 
dismissals. Employers are required to disclose information on the reasons, numbers affected, 
methods of selection and compensation. A recent amendment in 1999 also required employers 
to consult through a trade union where there was union recognition, or in the absence of a 
recognised trade union through an existing consultative committee or specially elected 
employee representatives. Similar issue-specific forms of consultation apply to safety issues 
under the Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977 and the Health and 
Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996.  Likewise, the Working Time 
Regulations 1998 provide for the conclusion of 'workforce agreements' with elected employee 
representatives.
Finally, in order to implement the EU European Works Councils Directive (94/45/EC), the 
UK introduced the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations in 
1999.  These regulations offer a range of statutory information and consultation rights 
concerning transnational issues in multinational companies, and provided for the first time in 
the UK for the creation of a standing works council-type body.  The requirements are for 
informing and consulting employees at the European level, in undertakings or groups with at 
least 1000 employees across the member states and at least 150 employees in each of two or 
more of those member states.  The rules set out detailed provisions about how employees in 
different EU states are to be represented within the European body and also enumerate topics 
on which the European Works Council has the right to be informed and consulted (e.g. the 
economic and financial situation of the business, its likely development, probable 
employment trends; the introduction of new working methods; and substantial organisational 
changes).
As to individual voice through meetings, employee reports, etc., this was identified in the 
literature as important and also seen as important by our Expert Group and Focus Group.  
Here UK law is limited.  There is implied and underlying support for this in the Company 
Law Reform Bill, but there is no further support in company law or in the various rules and 
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codes.  There is some small support for this in Employment Law, where companies have long 
had to state in their company accounts what they do by way of employee involvement.  
However, this is an obligation to report and not to actually operate specific employee 
involvement processes. 
In sum, the regulatory framework contains a number of provisions that correspond to drivers of 
‘good’ corporate drivers associated with the stakeholder family identified in sections 2.8, 4.9.1, 
4.9.2, and 4.9.3 of the Report.  Some areas are well covered by law and regulations of various 
kinds, including employee share ownership and pension funds.  However, though extensively 
regulated, there must be some question mark as to whether they are regulated in such a way as 
to promote these mechanisms as significant drivers.  The area of collective employee voice is 
extensively regulated, with some new developments in terms of information and consultation.  
It will be necessary to see how these arrangements develop, especially in certain specific 
circumstances.  Further, most of the regulation to which we have referred relates to collective 
employee voice. One area where there seems to be insufficient regulatory coverage would seem 
to be in the area of individual voice and reporting to individual employees within the firm.
Our overall conclusion on stakeholding is that there are a few significant content gaps in the UK 
regulatory framework, affecting general stakeholders, debt holders, and employees.  Some 
identified drivers have received less coverage, such as individual employee voice mechanisms, 
and some drivers, though well covered e.g. pension funds, are not covered in such a way as to 
promote these arrangements as drivers of good corporate governance.  There may be some 
issue-specific situations where employee voice might be greater, as in the case of takeovers and 
mergers.  Moreover, the UK is weak compared to other countries in terms of the very different 
ways of involving employees as stakeholders in corporate governance, such as via board level 
representation (e.g. which exists in Germany and Scandinavia) or via strong trade unions.  
6.3.7.2 Effectiveness gaps
In this section we turn to the gap between the stated aim and actual outcome of the regulatory 
framework.  These ‘effectiveness’ gaps may involve implementation problems, a failure to 
take into account various contingencies, and the potential costs of regulation.
6.3.7.2.1 Implementation gap analysis
The regulatory framework in this area is diverse and covered less by mechanisms such as 
Listing Rules, City Codes, and Combined Codes.  It is more an area of Company and 
Employment Law.  In the case of general stakeholders, it remains to be seen as to how new 
regulations on directors’ duties will be applied in practice and whether these regulations give 
more latitude to stakeholder or enlightened shareholder value thinking.  In the case of debt 
holders, significant players who can influence corporate governance enforce insolvency and 
contract laws.  
In the case of employee involvement, the implementation of existing rules is potentially 
uneven.  The law and regulation on pension fund operations are extensive and enforced by 
their Regulator.  However, the regulatory contexts of both pension fund and employee share 
ownership have various objectives and are not geared towards the promotion of good 
corporate governance per se.  In the important area of collective and individual employee 
rights to information and consultation, these provisions may not always feed through in 
practice.  Here the law is largely permissive and, for it to be triggered, other bodies, such as 
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trade unions or works councils, may be needed to activate it.  Importantly, recent law on 
consultation remains very broad and leaves much to be negotiated between companies and 
employees.  Thus, practice is likely to be highly variable and employee voice may often be 
limited to the establishment level, rather than fostering participation at higher levels of the 
organisation in the case of large firms.  It remains to be seen whether these broad frameworks 
will be sufficient to support effective employee involvement that can act as a driver of ‘good’ 
corporate governance.  Moreover, effectiveness gaps may exist especially in certain 
situations, such as mergers and takeovers, and that this event-specific intervention could be 
covered more adequately in other forms such as the City Code and Combined Code (see 
previous discussion).
6.3.7.2.2 Contingency gap analysis
The literature review of drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance suggests that their 
effectiveness and efficiency may depend on factors such as the firm’s size, age, industry 
characteristics etc.   Thus, in the case of debtholder influence, this will vary with the size of 
the debt and may be greater in smaller firms.  In the case of employee influence, this may also 
vary with size or with the extent to which a company is unionised or not.  Overall, although 
these areas are regulated more by law than by codes, the regulatory framework does make 
some provision for the possible effect of these contingencies.  In some cases, triggers for 
numbers of pension fund trustees or for works council representation depend on the size of 
the company.  Moreover, the framework for negotiation over information and consultation 
rights leaves large latitude for firm-specific solutions that can take account of individual 
circumstances and contingencies.  As noted above, such flexibility may come at some trade-
off to the level of enforcement of legal rights and lead to lower provision.
6.3.7.2.3 Cost analysis
Corporate governance research has tended to focus on the potential benefits of various 
governance practices.  However, drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance may also have 
associated costs.  These potential costs include the following: out-of-pocket compliance costs; 
more indirect opportunity costs (e.g. the time spent on governance issues instead of business 
strategy and operations).  In addition, there are legal and reputational costs, which may be 
incurred when firms get their governance practices wrong.  
Stakeholder participation in corporate governance may have costs associated with it.  Thus, 
disclosure of information to employees or others increases the amount of information to be 
collected and processed and raises issues of confidentiality.  Likewise, stakeholder voice may 
also have an impact on decision-making processes within the firm, for example, it may slow 
down decision times and stakeholder may extract rents from the firm.  However, stakeholder 
involvement may have offsetting benefits of speeding up implementation once decisions have 
been made, since stakeholders will have higher levels of information and greater consensus 
around those decisions.  As such, the net cost impact of stakeholding remains unclear, but our 
review of the literature suggests either real benefits or zero net costs.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed various elements of the UK regulatory framework, and explored to 
what extent they address and support the drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance identified by 
our review of a broad social science literature.  We presented this analysis in terms of ‘gaps’ 
in the content of regulation, and the effectiveness of regulation, including issues of 
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implementation, dealing with firm-specific contingencies, and complementarities with other 
governance mechanisms and costs of regulation.
This review has shown that the UK has a very broad and ambitious regulatory framework.  
Regulation exists that relates to all of our identified drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance, 
albeit with different depth and scope of content and greater or lesser effectiveness of 
implementation.  In recent years, much work has been done to close regulatory gaps and 
develop a more comprehensive set of rules and guidelines for best practice.  In part, these 
developments have been driven by EU Directives (such as in the areas of employee 
involvement).  Other developments have been driven by scandals of large international 
companies, such as the case of Enron, Shell or Parmalat, which have had repercussions for 
debates in the UK.  As such, it is clear that corporate governance is increasingly an 
international policy field.  These interdependencies have led the UK to not only rest on its 
traditional strengths in some aspects of corporate governance, but also gradually develop a 
broader and more comprehensive view of corporate governance as it is reflected in various 
regulations.
  
In order to guide further developments, our analysis suggests several areas of continued gaps 
in the UK regulatory framework.  First, larger gaps were identified in areas such as executive 
pay and employee involvement.  Gaps in these areas relate to the broad nature of regulation, 
and large scope for private negotiation often fail to give clear guidelines and thereby support 
best practices in light of ‘good’ corporate governance.  Second, smaller gaps were identified 
with regard to information disclosure, boards, shareholder activism, auditors, internal control, 
and the market for corporate control.  These areas are often well covered by regulation, but 
may have problems of effectiveness.  Such problems may relate to implementation and 
enforcement, particularly where these are left to market-based mechanisms supported by 
disclosure and comply-or-explain rules.  
While this distinctive UK approach intends to leave greater scope for flexibility that should 
help take account of important contingencies in individual firms, the effect may often lead to 
either conformity and box ticking, or lack of enforcement.  Where these market-based notions 
of enforcement are weak, this is often due to the lack of complementary supporting 
institutions in other areas of corporate governance.  In particular, shareholder involvement is 
often necessary as a complementary support to various important corporate governance 
processes, such as auditing and board independence.  However, the expectations placed on 
shareholder involvement often do not seem to be upheld in practice.  And the effectiveness of 
shareholder involvement is often quite variable across different types of firms.  
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7 Implications for Public Policy and Future Research 
7.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out considerations for future strategies for public policy in relation to 
corporate governance, and considers how future social science research may better contribute 
to this process.  The review of ‘good’ corporate governance drivers and analysis of regulatory 
gaps from the previous chapters suggest a number of general points that may usefully inform 
discussion of UK public policy:
 Potential Regulatory Gaps.  The UK regulatory framework has become increasingly 
comprehensive in recent years, and now constitutes a very broad and complex set of 
regulations.  Nonetheless, several potential gaps in coverage exist that are related to 
executive pay, employees, and stakeholders in general.  Our analysis has also 
identified a number of potential gaps in effectiveness that affect key drivers such as 
boards, shareholder involvement, information disclosure, auditing, and the market for 
corporate control.    
 Regulatory trade-offs.  The UK regulatory framework embodies an innovative 
combination of mandatory regulation (uniform requirements), enabling or facilitative 
regulation (removing restrictions, allowing choice of structures), and flexible forms of 
soft-law such as codes based on comply-or-explain principles and self-regulatory 
norms of professional groups.  These different regulatory approaches have important 
trade-offs.  On the one hand, mandatory regulation can help to overcome market 
failures and weak diffusion of governance practices, but it may be inflexible in 
addressing the governance needs of different types of firms and different contexts.  It 
may also impose significant costs.  On the other hand, soft-law approaches provide 
more flexibility and may elicit more commitment from companies and the City, but 
may be less effective in terms of coverage and enforcement. 
 Balancing different corporate governance demands. Corporate governance is shaped 
by a number of contingencies, complementarities, and costs.  These factors bear 
strongly upon the effectiveness of key drivers in actually promoting ‘good’ corporate 
governance.  Consequently, improving the effectiveness of the UK regulation requires 
a more holistic approach as to how various corporate governance drivers interact, and 
are affected by contingencies and costs. These issues may fall in between different 
specific bodies of regulation, or regulation may build upon presumed support of 
market mechanisms in areas where these are, in fact, weak and lead to poor 
implementation.  Central issues in this regard concern firm’s lifecycles (e.g. start-up 
stage, mature firms, and restructuring or wind-up), and the active involvement of 
shareholders and key stakeholders in supporting other aspects of corporate 
governance.
 Future social science research.   Public policy in the area of corporate governance 
needs to be well grounded on a solid basis of social scientific evidence.  Much past 
research has failed to address corporate governance from a holistic perspective that 
examines the contingencies, complementarities and costs in a broader sense.  An 
important element of this approach involves better understanding of how corporate 
governance relates to different elements of company performance, going beyond 
financial performance to issues of productivity, innovation and social inequality.
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The remainder of the chapter turns to a detailed analysis of these regulatory implications with 
regard to the individual drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance identified in the Report.  
Finally, we outline considerations for further research, which would widen the evidence base 
for future public policy development.
7.2 Potential Regulatory Gaps 
Table 1 summarizes how the various families of drivers of ‘good’ corporate identified in 
Chapter 4 relate to different elements of UK regulation outlined in Chapter 6.  Regulation 
ranges from ‘harder’ legal forms of regulation and move toward ‘softer’ forms of voluntary 
self-regulatory mechanisms.  The cells summarize the degree to which the laws, regulations, 
and codes cover or effectively support each driver using a three-point scale of high, medium, 
and low.  Our assessment considers gaps in the content of the regulation (e.g. quantity and 
coverage) and effectiveness (e.g. implementation) in promoting each driver.  This form of 
tabular summary necessarily entails simplification and should be read alongside the specific 
analysis of the preceding chapter.  It must be stressed that the table is not intended to be merely 
descriptive rather than normative—a low score does not imply that more regulation is required; 
nor does a high score imply that there is over-regulation in a particular area.  Fuller conclusions 
can only be drawn in the context of the empirical evidence regarding a particular driver (e.g. 
market failures), on one hand, and the potential for different types of regulation to affect those 
drivers given issues of contingencies, complementarities, and costs surrounding ‘good’ 
corporate governance, on the other.  
Analysis of Table 1 suggests that gaps in the UK regulatory content are relatively small in 
many areas, including boards, shareholder activism, information and disclosure, auditors and 
internal control, and the market for corporate control.  Most are covered by detailed rules 
within at least one body of regulation.  In some areas this coverage has been longstanding, 
such as takeover rules, whereas elsewhere regulations have only been recently implemented.  
The UK regulatory framework has become increasingly comprehensive in the last several 
years as a result.  Nonetheless, important observations can be made regarding potential 
regulatory gaps.  
In terms of content gaps, the main areas where content is less covered are stakeholders 
(generally), employees, executive remuneration, and information disclosure.  Stakeholders are 
mentioned in the Company Law Bill (2006) in relation to directors’ duties, but questions 
remain with regard to establishing a framework for stakeholder participation.  Employees are 
likewise covered by new legislation related to joint consultation committees, but these rules 
are not comprehensive in coverage.  Executive pay is also addressed in the Combined Code 
and through remuneration committees, but these cover the procedure for setting pay rather 
than the substantive content of remuneration.  Information disclosure is also covered 
extensively in relation to financial disclosure, but some more forward-looking and strategic 
elements of reporting remain unregulated, although rules on the Business Review may or may 
not close this gap.  Overall, these areas have received less detailed coverage, and often outline 
only general principles and frameworks.  Much more latitude to private contracting and 
potential for market failures is higher.  Here regulation generally lacks supporting standards 
that would help to differentiate between good and bad practices, or set sufficiently clear 
standards for implementation.  
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In terms of effectiveness gaps, the main areas where “good” governance principles are less 
well implemented concerns shareholder engagement and board independence.  The 
importance of shareholder engagement is stressed throughout the UK regulatory framework. 
However, since their involvement remains voluntary, some  groups of shareholders may fail 
to be actively engaged in corporate governance.  Board independence is also a central driver, 
but the implementation of current rules may still fail to prevent the ‘capture’ of non-executive 
directors by the CEO and assure outside directors are themselves accountable and have proper 
incentives to be critically engaged within the board.  Overall, even where regulatory content 
may be strong, gaps in effectiveness may affect almost all drivers of good corporate 
governance to different degrees. Issues of effectiveness often stem from the fact that higher 
coverage regulatory content is often associated with ‘softer’ forms of regulation, such as 
codes rather than law.  This consideration raises further issues related effectiveness, such as 
how to balance different corporate governance demands, as well as cope with regulatory 
trade-offs between greater flexibility and standardised enforcement.
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Table 1   Summary of Potential Regulatory Gaps: 


























Boards Medium Not covered Medium Medium High Medium
Shareholder 
activism
Medium Not covered Medium Medium High High
Executive pay Low Not covered Not covered Low Medium Not covered
Information 
disclosure
Medium Low High High Medium High
Auditors and 
advisers
Medium Not covered Low Medium High High
Internal 
control






Low Low Not covered High Not covered Low
Debtholders Medium Not covered Not covered Low Low Low
Employees Low Medium Not covered Low Low Not covered
Stakeholders 
in general
Low Low Not covered Low Low Not covered
Notes:   Company Law includes the Companies Acts of 1985 and 1989, the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000, the Insolvency Act 1986, the Enterprise Act 2002, and the Companies (Audit, Investigations, and Community 
Enterprise) Act 2004.  It also includes EU Directives, which have been transposed into UK law.  It includes various 
Regulations such as the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002.  It does not include the European 
Company Statute.   Employment Law includes the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (1992), 
the Employment Relations Act 1999, and various regulations such as European Works Councils and Information & 
Consultation, which have been transposed from EU Directives into UK law.  It also includes law on pensions such 
as the Pensions Act 2004 and on whistleblowing rights for employees under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1998.   The Listing Rules are The Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure Rules (2005) and the City Code is The City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers (2003-2004).  The Combined Codes (2003) includes the following: Cadbury, 
Hampel, Turnbull, Higgs, Smith, and Tyson Reports.  The column professional standards and self-regulation refers 




Gaps relate to a number of important trade-offs exist regarding the mechanisms, coverage, and 
implementation of the governance-related regulation in the UK.  While some drivers are 
covered extensively by regulation, this coverage is often mainly by ‘softer’ mechanisms, as in 
the case of shareholder activism or boards.  One trade-off that arises is between greater 
enforcement of legal regulation and greater flexibility of Codes.  Likewise, law may be effective 
at ensuring minimum standards for all, whereas codes may support richer sets of ‘best practices’ 
in particular contexts.
In terms of balancing enforcement and flexibility, much of the ‘soft’ regulation reviewed in this 
Report is built around a principle of ‘comply or explain.’ This approach allows for a high 
degree of flexibility in implementation according the different situations of firms and their 
constituent stakeholders.  However, the very nature of this approach reduces the scope for 
effective enforcement of corporate governance principles, since enforcement is a prerogative of 
the market participants themselves. In some areas, such as shareholder activism, behavioural 
changes in response to good corporate governance principles have been rather slow.  For 
example, information disclosure may not lead to changes in corporate governance unless 
investors or other interested parties effectively use that information to actively engage with 
companies.  In such areas, improving the enforcement of Codes and principles-based regulation 
depends on greater support of complementary market incentives for participation, as well as 
support of legally-based mechanisms that support participation and effective representation of 
investor and stakeholder interests within corporate governance.  Conversely, legal approaches 
may be made more flexible by providing company ‘choice’ among alternative sets of legally 
based structures, such as corporate boards in France or Japan.  A limited number of parallel 
legal regimes may likewise combine benefits of flexibility and greater enforcement.
In addition, this regulatory trade-off creates different sets of unintended consequences related to 
various forms of ‘gaming’.  For example, softer enforcement may allow market participants to 
engage in box ticking exercises without facing much sanction from the market.  Alternatively, 
harder regulation may lead market participants to take advantage of ‘over-regulation’ by 
developing various consultancy and advisory services focused solely on costly compliance 
issues.  Likewise, companies may respond to legal regulation by defensive compliance that aims 
solely at limiting the legal liabilities of individuals or the company, but may not be in the spirit 
of good corporate governance principles.
In terms trade-offs between minimum standards and best practices, ‘harder’ legal regulation 
may have advantages in terms of wide coverage and specific enforceable standards.  For 
example, legal intervention can require that all companies of a certain size must follow certain 
governance practices.  But breadth of coverage may make it difficult, even through secondary 
regulations, to specify detailed structures or give guidance about best practices in any great 
detail.  By contrast, the ‘softer’ approach may not have the same breadth coverage and 
enforcement, but can give richer support regarding specific arrangements, and turning guiding 
principles into interpretable norms.  The UK approach does, in fact, combine these two 
approaches to often favour a floor of statutory obligations and rights, backed up by codes and 
voluntary standards.  Courts may also play an important role to interpret legal rules and further 
develop good practice.  Further intervention by the legislature may then fill gaps or consolidate 
good practice, as and when necessary.
161
From a more holistic perspective on ‘good’ corporate governance, these considerations on 
regulatory trade-offs suggest that not all gaps can be effectively filled by greater legal 
regulation.  Rather, corporate governance must be addressed by a balance between self-
regulation and state regulation.  Each has advantages and disadvantages, but they may also 
interact in ways that complement and support one another (see Kirkbride and Letza 2004, 
Deakin and Cook 2000).  For example, market mechanisms require support from information 
disclosure and comply-or-explain rules.  Self-regulation may be a first step, often “in the 
shadow” of further government intervention.   However, continued market failure (as might 
have been the case with some issues surrounding accounting information and the role of 
auditors) creates a continued role for statutory interventions.  On the whole, these processes are 
not antithetical.  Rather, state and self-regulation should work together to make each one work 
more effectively, thereby promoting both well-run organisations and the maintenance and 
generation of wealth by encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation.
7.4 Balancing Different Corporate Governance Demands
Strategies for public policy must not only be aware of the regulatory trade-offs mentioned 
above, but also how these related to contextual factors that surround various corporate 
governance drivers—specifically, the complementarities among drivers, contingencies related 
to firm-specific and industry-specific factors, and the non-trivial costs associated with different 
corporate governance arrangements.    
Complementarities. Various drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance may complement or 
substitute for one another in various ways.  Many of the UK regulatory initiatives have been 
focused on separate elements ‘good’ corporate governance.  Still, important inter-dependencies 
exist among these drivers that need more systematic consideration.  This holistic approach 
suggests viewing corporate governance as a system of interrelated elements with strategic or 
institutional complementarities. Corporate governance mechanisms operate interdependently, 
with the overall effectiveness depending on the simultaneous operation of several mechanisms 
in limiting managerial opportunism. For individual firms, corporate governance involves 
different sets of practices that need to operate as a whole in order to be effective.   Likewise, 
regulatory frameworks have interrelated elements that need to perform complementary 
functions. 
In the UK, our analysis pointed to a number of areas where the enforcement of ‘good’ corporate 
governance principles depends upon market-mechanisms.  Here, a number of improvements can 
be made to strengthen the support from complementary practices where they are currently 
lacking.  For example, the independence of board members from the executive directors may be 
undermined by the use of high-powered incentives schemes or the lack of serious shareholder 
engagement in matters of nomination. Shareholder involvement also remains a crucial area 
where the existing corporate governance framework supports many prerequisites for 
shareholder involvement, such as information disclosure, but lack sufficient complementary 
mechanisms in the governance of institutional investors to assure that they are engage and take 
responsibility in corporate governance matters.  Likewise, overriding concern for shareholder 
interests may undermine may undermine the desired consideration for stakeholder interests and 
greater participation.  Thus, future regulatory strategy should consider how regulatory gaps 
result from the particular combinations of practices, which may be important good corporate 
governance ‘drivers’ on their own but not cohere together in terms of a complementary system 
of elements.  
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Contingencies. Our report cited the need to consider various contingencies related to a 
company’s size, age or industry.  Existing regulations do often take into account some firm-
specific contingencies, such as size, market of listing, etc.  However, less consideration has 
been made of factors such as the firm’s strategic dynamics, growth phase, and innovation 
characteristics.  An emerging body of research on the life cycle of corporate governance 
suggests the notion of a number of dynamic stages where different bundles of corporate 
governance characteristics are needed.  For example, a firm’s evolution is accompanied by 
changes in ownership structure, board composition, the degree of founder involvement, etc. The 
balance between greater external accountability and fostering of entrepreneurship and risk 
taking may change over this life cycle from establishment, growth, maturity and decline.  
Specifically, the corporate governance roles of boards, shareholders or executive pay schemes 
may change substantially.  
A potential strength of the UK regulatory framework is the flexibility of implementing 
corporate governance rules through a comply-or-explain approach that should, in principle, be 
well suited to accommodate different contingencies by letting firms adopt the practices that best 
suit their situation.  Most discussion of UK corporate governance is centred on a single set of 
standards that is not necessarily well tailored to the needs of smaller firms and new ventures.  
For example, the concept of shareholder rights and engagement may be very different given the 
different ownership patterns of new start-up ventures.  Likewise, the role of the board may be 
more strategic and entrepreneurial rather than monitoring for the sake of the financial interests 
of distant institutional investors.  While being flexible in terms of compliance, it may be 
difficult for firms to ‘explain’ their use of alternative corporate governance templates and may 
thus find it easier to comply in a box ticking-like fashion.  
The UK guidance, particularly in terms of the Combined Code, does not yet fully consider these 
‘dynamic’ issues of corporate governance.  One consequence may be to unintentionally 
promote ‘inertia’ of corporate governance practices that fail to suppose dynamic transitions in 
the company lifecycle.  For example, UK regulation on boards outlines a number of key 
elements such as independence or diversity, but does not consider that the relative importance 
of these may change over time.  In younger, venture-type business, boards may play a more 
strategic and involved role, and where ownership by founders and inventors is a key element of 
providing entrepreneurial incentives for innovation.  Future regulatory initiatives may take into 
account these contingency factors by developing a number of guidelines for ‘families’ of firms 
with similar strategic characteristics, in addition to their size and listing parameters. The UK 
regulation may provide a greater set of clearly structured alternatives corporate governance 
templates for firms to choose among.  
Costs of corporate governance.  Most regulatory efforts are  underpinned by potential benefits 
of ‘good’ corporate governance. However, drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance may also 
have associated costs of several types.  Direct costs related to compliance with rules that result 
in out-of-pocket expenditures that are reflected in the firm’s balance sheet and other accounting 
documentation (e.g., the audit costs, investment in internal risk management and control 
systems, etc.).  Less explicit costs include opportunity costs, such as directors’ time spent on 
governance issues instead of business strategy or when strategic information is disclosed.  Legal 
and reputational costs may also be incurred when firms get their governance practices wrong. In 
particular, the risk of litigation may change management’s risk-taking behaviour, which is likely 
to affect the growth or strategy of the firm. These costs are impossible to quantify on the basis 
of ad hoc assumptions.  But future cost-benefit analyses of regulatory initiatives should also 
consider these broader notions of costs in additional to benefits of correcting market failure.  
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The Combined Code and other recent regulatory initiatives have introduced some concern 
about the framework of prudent and effective controls. Any rebalancing from a sole focus on 
governance compliance towards the broad focus on the performance and strategic 
development of the business should make sure that governance does not become an 
alternative agenda to a company’s successful growth and development.  ‘Good’ corporate 
governance should be considered as a means towards various ends and not as a stand-alone 
system of checks and controls, which is discussed and enforced outside the context of 
company’s wealth-protection and wealth-creation strategies. 
7.5 Implications for Specific Areas of Public Policy 
This section briefly sets out some more specific considerations in developing strategies for 
public policy.  Public policy can usefully be guided by the analysis of regulatory gaps in 
relation to key drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance.  The gaps identified in previous 
sections suggest areas where future regulatory initiatives may be considered.  However, as 
already explained, simply because a gap is identified does not imply that further legal 
regulation is necessary or effective.  Nor does law necessarily achieve the desired result.  This 
Report has suggested that better regulation will result from stronger linkages between hard 
state- and self-regulation with an eye toward how different drivers of corporate governance 
interrelate in complementary ways or how those drivers are affected by contingencies and 
costs.  
The remainder of this section briefly considers selected public policy issues related to the 
various families of corporate governance drivers.  Our intention here is not to recommend or 
advocate specific policies, but outline some potential issues for consideration in light of the 
gap analysis.
7.5.1 Corporate boards
Company Law and the Combined Code provide a comprehensive set of principles that are 
closely related to major ‘drivers’ of good corporate governance.   Further regulation in this 
area may be in danger of becoming over-prescriptive and supportive of formal ‘box-ticking’. 
However, important issues remain in relation to enforcement and support from 
complementary governance mechanisms.  For example, the link between the board and 
shareholder engagement needs to be examined more closely.  One area concerns helping 
companies establish dialogue with institutional investors and various ‘gatekeepers’ (e.g. 
voting and rating agencies) concerning corporate governance arrangements that deviate from 
the Code’s prescriptions.  Various regulatory investment institutions, rating agencies and 
corporate governance activists also apply their own, private criteria that differ from those in 
the Code. The use of divergent standards and potentially uneven reporting with regard to 
different issues may interfere with or complicate compliance.  Similarly, board independence 
and diversity is outlined as a main principle of good corporate governance in the Code, but 
the selection of independent and diverse boards may only be weakly linked to participation of 
minority shareholders, institutional investors or other stakeholders to influence directly 
directors’ nomination and selection. 
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7.5.2 Shareholder engagement
The area of shareholder engagement and activism has received considerable attention from 
both the regulatory authorities and the investment industry. The Combined Code, Company 
Law and various government-commissioned reports provide shareholders with various legal 
rights and mechanisms that can be used for an effective monitoring and control of managerial 
decisions. However, the hope that institutional investors might voluntarily comply with the 
Myners and ISC recommendations have not been followed by a significant increase in 
shareholder activism or changes in institutional investor behaviour.  The possible benefits of 
introducing mandatory requirements might be explored with regard to investors’ 
responsibilities (1) to vote equity shares on issues that may affect the value of the clients’ 
investment; (2) to have a documented policy or guidelines in place for voting on issues; (3) to 
maintain accurate voting records and disclose them to the general public. 
The Government and investment industry need to ensure that the ISC Principles have been 
integrated into investment decision-making and asset management processes, and that the 
quantity and quality of resources and people committed to engagement, and the level of 
reporting provided by fund managers, are appropriate from the good corporate governance 
perspective. However, ‘hard’ regulation, such as mandatory requirements for voting 
disclosure, may have unintended consequences such as ‘outsourcing’ of voting decisions and 
execution to outside agencies, politicisation of voting process by various pressure groups, etc. 
A robust impact assessment should accompany regulatory initiatives in this area.
7.5.3 Information and disclosure
Information and disclosure are traditionally seen as crucial areas in driving ‘good’ corporate 
governance and they have been the subject of continuing regulatory initiatives over many 
years.  These have led to an increase in information flows within the firm and to those outside 
the firm.  All in all, UK regulation has been effective and has served as something of a model 
for other countries.  However, there would seem to be much to commend by the inclusion of a 
narrative report which relates to a companies present operations and future strategy.  The 
Business Review may well meet this requirement, but the breadth of topics covered and 
demands for forward-looking information are lower that in originally suggested with regard to 
OFRs.  Of course, this discussion must weight the costs of preparation and other costs such as 
proprietary costs. 
Some concerns are expressed with regard to the absence of US-style ‘safe harbour’ provisions 
to exempts reporting companies, their auditors, etc. in certain areas where companies may be 
open to legal actions over forward-looking reporting. As a result, some companies may not try 
to reduce the costs of capital through better disclosure, but will take advice from lawyers in 
order to reduce the liability risk. However, any regulation to deal with this potential ‘market 
failure’ has to take into account possible implications in other areas of law affecting directors, 
auditors, and shareholders.
Another gap identified in the Report suggests that more information should be provided to 
other stakeholders, especially to employees at a collective and individual level.  In addition, 
more information might be provided about company policy and outcomes with regard to 
investment in human capital and more broadly to notions of ‘corporate social responsibility.’  
Here a more comprehensive, objective and comparable set of standards would help market 
participants more accurately take account of long-term or intangible factors in making 
investment decisions.  Likewise, the area of pension provision and the impact of pensions 
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arrangements are also of considerable importance, where new standards and new disclosures 
have been introduced.  
7.5.4 Audit and internal controls
Audit and internal control has been the subject of many very recent regulatory initiatives.  
Given that these reforms have led to a substantial tightening of rules, audit and internal 
controls would not seem to be a major policy priority in terms of closing regulatory ‘gaps’.  
Substantial debates remain about the levels of stringency on various issues, such as 
restrictions on non-audit work, definitions of independence and qualification of audit 
committee members, or the actual powers of auditors.  Here it remains to be seen whether 
market mechanisms based around increased disclosure will be sufficient to assure best 
practice.  The impact of recent regulation must be monitored closely in order to generate 
further incremental improvement in these areas.  
More broadly, concerns are often expressed about the creeping scope of auditing and the 
long-term impact it may have on corporate cultures and decision-making.  One direct concern 
is this area is cost.  Likewise, particularly in smaller and younger entrepreneurial firms, the 
demand for transparency and auditing may not be as high as in firms that have more remote 
institutional investors.  Perhaps more serious in the long term is that, as external pressures for 
more auditing and greater compliance rise, other unintended consequences arise.  For 
example, in order to comply with auditing rules, the design of organisational processes may 
become overly bureaucratic and cumbersome for the sake of making them ‘auditable’.  The 
sociology of organizations clearly suggests that not every decision or process within an 
organisation can be audited, as it would require each process to be documented in ways that 
would consume the organisation in box ticking exercises and bureaucratic routines.  The 
broader issue is whether an increasing scope of auditing or internal controls that make 
processes auditable is to be equated with good corporate governance, or whether too much 
auditing may itself undermine levels of trust and lead to excessive gaming of targets, rather 
than entrepreneurial wealth creation.
7.5.5 Executive pay
Executive pay is an area where a voluntary approach was tried, but later followed by 
government intervention in the form of the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 
(2002). This provides a consistent format for disclosure, and ensures investors can gain
knowledge of pay issues within companies.  More detailed disclosure with regard to executive 
compensation should investors understand the actuarial value of pension rights, fair or market 
valuation of stock options granted, bonuses and payments-in-kind, and so on.  Meanwhile, 
actual levels of pay are set by remunerations committees within the board.  Given the 
importance of executive’s skills and individual human capital for firms, little precedent exists 
of legal intervention is the setting of pay in the labour market for executive talent.  In 
important respects, regulatory initiatives cannot effectively substitute market-based setting of 
executive compensation.  
However, likewise, the reliance of private enforcement even based on greater levels of 
information disclosure may have rather limited results.  Most regulation in the area either 
covers the procedures for setting pay, or gives guidance through soft-law regarding best 
practices in terms of incentive schemes.  Kt remains an open question as to how much impact 
greater disclosure may have on these market processes and whether the quality of executive 
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pay schemes will increase as a result.  A missing link may relate to giving stakeholders 
greater input into actual decision making, or assuring the genuine independence of outside 
board members who will be active in shaping pay schemes.  
7.5.6 Market for corporate control
The City Code and other regulatory initiatives have been widely accepted and serve as a 
standard of best practice for many other countries around the world.  The regulatory 
framework is very focused on a particular set of goals related to minority shareholder 
protection, and implements these goals quite effectively.   However, takeover rules may lack a 
particular balance with regard to the protection of stakeholder wealth or the capacity for 
wealth-creation in entrepreneurial ventures.  Regulatory gaps exist in relation to the rights of 
stakeholders, such as employees.  Likewise, a further issue is whether the limited scope of 
defensive measures allowed under the UK rules is genuinely desirable.  Particularly given 
firm-specific contingency factors, it may be worth considering greater flexibility or innovative 
and creative measures regarding these issues.  One interesting avenue for discussion is the 
rights or involvement of bidding firm shareholders in the takeover process and whether, for 
large or hostile transactions, some form of involvement or consent might be considered.
7.5.7 Stakeholders
The Company Law Reform Bill has stated that it is the directors’ duty to promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole and, in fulfilling this duty, that 
directors must have regard to both short- and long-term factors and wider interests including 
various stakeholders.  Future development of this regulation would require the relevant parties 
to think about how stakeholders are to be engaged in corporate governance and incorporate 
those understandings with soft or hard regulatory frameworks.  In other words, while 
consensus around this principle is emerging and is certainly well established in many other 
European countries, the UK regulatory framework must more specifically develop relevant 
mechanisms. 
These considerations are particularly relevant in the case of employees, both collectively and 
individually.  In the case of employees, recent regulatory measures have led to an extension of 
rights to information and consultation.  Some of these measures are general, and establish on-
going mechanisms for limited participation.  Other regulations are issue specific, and require 
particular events as triggers, as in the case of redundancies and transfer of undertakings.  
There is a question as to in what other specific events, such as mergers and takeovers and 
pension, should employees have rights to further information and consultation.
7.5.8 Summary
In sum, UK regulation has increased in its scope and depth in recent years.  Likewise, UK 
policy initiatives have been innovative in terms of the use of both legal regulation and 
particularly extensive use of soft-law mechanisms, such as Codes.  Still, some potential gaps 
in the regulatory framework exist.  This section has outlined how those gaps often result from 
lack of complementary relationships between corporate governance drivers, or the need to 
balance hard and soft-law approaches.  One important implication is that regulatory gaps 
cannot simply be solved by more legal regulation.  Further legal regulation of corporate 
governance may be crucial in some areas, but public policy should be guided by looking more 
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holistically in terms of understanding the interactions among different aspects of corporate 
governance, as well as the potential complementarities between hard and soft forms of 
regulation.
7.6 Future Social Science Research 
This report has identified a number of important drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance, and 
used these as benchmarks to evaluate potential gaps in the UK regulatory framework that 
might inform future strategies for public policy.  However, the social science evidence base 
for evaluating policy or developing new policy initiatives remains limited.  This section 
explores the gaps in policy-oriented academic research and identifies some specific areas 
where further research may be particularly important for public policy.
7.6.1 Implications for research on corporate governance
The comprehensive review of academic literature undertaken for this Report suggests several 
somewhat broad considerations for information future research strategies in the field of 
corporate governance:  the need for greater dialogue of research and public policy, the 
importance of moving toward a more holistic view of corporate governance, and better 
understanding of the behavioural impact of regulation.  Each of these is discussed in turn.
Greater dialogue of research and public policy.  The literature review in section 2 shows 
the need for a stronger dialogue between empirical research by academics and issues of 
implementation of public policy.  Many of the studies on corporate governance reviewed for 
this report utilize US data, and a stronger body of empirical research is needed with regard to 
UK companies, which is also informed by factors and practices specific to the UK.  
Moreover, the UK regulatory framework has developed rapidly in the past five years and 
many new initiatives have only recently been put into place.  Some key examples here are 
provisions about auditors and audit committees, proposals for forward looking operational 
and strategic information disclosure, and new employee rights for information and 
consultation.  It is important to investigate whether these regulatory initiatives were followed 
by behavioural changes among various governance participants.
Holistic View of Corporate Governance..  Most academic studies and policy initiatives have 
tended to focus on particular aspects of corporate governance in isolation.  This report has 
argued that it is necessary to look at corporate governance holistically as a system of 
interdependent elements.  At the level of companies, a better understanding is need as to how 
drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance are supported (or potentially undermined) by other 
complementary practices (or lack thereof) (Aoki 2001; Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Milgrom 
and Roberts 1995).  Here new innovations in social science, such fuzzy-set methods, may 
help to understand and evaluate how corporate governance factors act in configurations to 
produce different outcomes (Fiss 2005; Jackson 2005a 2005b).  At the level of regulation, the 
interdependencies and complementary nature of hard and soft forms of regulation must also 
be more systematically understood (Kirkbride and Letza 2004).  
A holistic approach also implies reconsidering the link between corporate performance and 
research methodology.  Much of the literature on corporate governance uses published data 
from company accounts, or relies on surveys of companies or investors.  Much of this 
research attempts to link the presence of particular corporate governance practices (e.g. board 
committees) with the economic performance of companies (e.g. share price performance or 
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profitability).  While such research has produced important results, the link between ‘good’ 
corporate governance and performance is not always straightforward. There is a dearth of 
research on governance processes that may be intermediating, transmission mechanisms 
between corporate governance drivers and organisational outcomes, including business 
strategy and performance.  Moreover, performance itself has many dimensions and may be 
difficult to summarize in a single measure (Dechow and Schrand 2004; Stout 2005), such as 
shareholder returns, growth, employment, sustainability and quality of earnings, risk 
parameters, etc.  The appropriateness of different measures may differ across firms (e.g. 
according to sector or life-cycle factors) and corporate governance drivers (e.g. internal 
controls may reduce risks, but also reduce profits).  Corporate governance often affects other 
important parameters that are proximate but independent from performance outcomes, such as 
the strategies, resource capabilities and innovation.  Here a more holistic view of corporate 
governance is important to better understand the trade-offs involved in corporate governance 
drivers as they impact different elements of strategy, resources and, ultimately, different 
aspects of corporate performance.  
On a somewhat different level, a holistic understanding of corporate governance may be 
furthered by more comparative research on UK companies in the European context.  The 
diversity of corporate governance in Europe and salience of EU-related developments for 
public policy mean that future development of UK corporate governance will increasingly 
involve interaction with European practices.  While the UK is often considered a leader its 
approach to corporate governance, European countries have recently adopted a wide range of 
changes to their corporate governance systems.  Moreover, countries such as Germany are 
developing alternative ‘hybrid’ approaches to enlightened shareholder value that may 
incorporate a more balanced view of stakeholder involvement and shareholder rights (Aoki 
2006; Höpner 2001).  These developments should not be complacently overlooked, and 
benchmarking the practices of top UK companies with their European counterparts will 
become of increasing important in coming years.  In particular, while UK corporate 
governance seems well tailored to the needs of investors, a broader evaluation is needed as to 
how corporate governance may help foster productivity and innovation in a European context.
Behavioural impact of regulation.  Finally, more research is needed on how regulations and 
corporate governance structures impact the processes of corporate governance itself, as well 
as behaviour of various participants in the governance mechanism.  Put another way, much 
corporate governance research looks at the relationship between easily observable 
organizational structures and measurable performance outcomes, but often give little direct 
evidence or explanation about how the two are linked by behaviour.  By looking at 
behavioural processes, research may incorporate a more qualitative understanding of how 
corporate governance elements interact and influence investors, managers, creditors, 
employees, and other ‘gatekeepers’ involved in mediating market processes.  An important 
correlate is the necessity to collect and triangulate data from a variety of sources – such as 
combining statistical studies based on surveys and published information with follow-up of 
semi-structured interviewing about processes and case studies that look at how these 
processes interact.  This more behavioural approach would help understand issues of 
compliance or regulatory effectiveness, by conceiving of these not just in terms of adopting 
particular structures of corporate governance but how stakeholders use them to achieve 
different ends.  A large number of issues raised in this report hinge on better understanding in 
these areas, such as ‘gaming’, defensive compliance, participation, independence and 
incentives.  For example, corporate governance may suffer from problems of ‘gatekeeper 
failure’ in situations when reliance on ‘reputational intermediaries’, such as auditors, 
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securities analysts, attorneys, and other professionals.  These groups pledge their reputational 
capital to vouch for information that investors cannot easily verify, but trust in them may not 
always be justified (Coffee 2002).
In the next sections, we turn to considerations about specific issues around each family of 
corporate governance drivers, and identify areas for further research, which seem important in 
relation to policy gaps in the UK context.
7.6.2 Boards
In terms of board structures, compliance with the Combined Code is generally considered as 
being relatively high.  However, little evidence exists as to whether explanations of non-
compliance with the Combined Code are being accepted by shareholders and what impact 
non-compliance has on those companies.  Investors and other ‘gatekeepers’, such as rating 
agencies, often apply their own private criteria that are different to those set out in the code
when assessing a company’s corporate governance practices.  The use of different criteria 
may create a problem with company’s compliance with the Code. Some investment 
institutions have thus discontinued their separate corporate governance guidelines and would 
henceforth assess companies against the provisions of the Combined Code.  This issue seems 
of fundamental important to understanding how comply-or-explain works in practice, and 
whether the intended flexibility is being achieved in practice.
In terms of board process, future research is needed to better understand how boards operate 
and the issue of how independent directors are fulfilling their roles.  The role of independent 
non-executive directors is at the core of UK corporate governance, and the quality of many 
other key drivers relate to the presumed independence and quality of NEDs—for example, the 
role of audit committees, the quality of executive compensation schemes, and so on.  
However, the evidence base needs to be furthered as to whether NEDs have the necessary 
information, time, training, and independence to perform these roles.  Future research should 
address the roles of contingency factors (e.g., size, age, complexity, etc.) in defining the 
optimal board configurations, both in terms its value-protecting and value-creating roles. It 
should also evaluate potential costs of implementation for different group of companies, in 
particular, for smaller firms.
7.6.3 Shareholder engagement
Shareholder engagement is also a crucial element of corporate governance, and many 
processes surrounding comply-or-explain rules rely, ultimately, on the evaluations and 
engagement of shareholders.  While much research has looked at how ownership structure 
(e.g. concentration or dispersion) affects corporate governance, more research is needed on 
the processes underlying shareholder engagement.  That is, in what ways do shareholders get 
involved in corporate governance, and what determines the level of shareholder involvement?  
For example, currently no research has assessed the impact of the ISC Principles on the 
behaviour of institutional investors.  It is unclear to what extent engagement has been 
integrated into investment decision-making and asset management process, as well as the 
resources and people committed to it and the level of reporting provided by fund managers to 
their ultimate clients. Bearing in mind that shareholder activism has substantial cost 
implications, future research should identify the extent of direct and indirect costs associated 
with shareholder engagement mechanisms.
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When investors, whether major institutional investors or retail investors, buy shares in a listed 
company they are likely to hold their shares through an intermediary or a chain of 
intermediaries. The Sandler Review (July 2003) and Myners Report (2001) identify at least 
four parties that are involved between the beneficial owner and the issuer (e.g., a nominee 
company, custodians, etc), all with distinct and important roles. Shares can also be lent, or 
used by a third party as collateral. An HM Treasury Report (2004, p.7) reviewed a number of 
previously commissioned research reports, and suggested that the investment chain does not 
work efficiently from the shareholder engagement perspective. Likewise, this report identifies 
a number of critical and inter-connected areas where the chain has not been functioning. 
Further research is needed to explore multiple principal-agent problems within the investment 
chain in the UK, and their possible impacts on the effectiveness of shareholder activism. More 
generally, these issues surround the question of ‘who monitors the monitors’ and the 
effectiveness of various ‘gatekeepers’, which act as intermediaries between ultimate 
beneficial owners and companies.  Here much theoretical literature has stressed the 
importance of reputational mechanisms in promoting best practices, but this area needs 
further substantiation and empirical investigation.  
7.6.4 Information and disclosure
In the area of public information disclosure, future research will be needed on the extent to 
which UK companies have introduced something like the OFR and the extent to which this 
will continue in the future.   Conversely, it will be important to see how investors evaluate the 
quality of such information, and how they use this information in making their investment 
decisions and in setting their agendas for corporate governance.  Future research is also 
needed on the provision of information relevant to stakeholders in general and to employees 
in particular.  A growing debate over stakeholders, corporate social responsibility and socially 
responsible investment raises issues as to how market participants might better evaluate the 
social and environmental performance of companies, in order that investors or stakeholders 
can better judge the sustainability of company strategies and long-term costs of company 
operations.
In the area of private information flow within companies, the extent, costs and benefits of 
compliance with the Combined Code requires further research.  Very little is known about the 
quality of internal information flows within companies, and the extent of oversight and 
involvement of the board in various other processes of the organisation.  It is interesting that 
information flows to boards and in particular to independent directors are seen as a major 
driver of ‘good’ corporate governance by our expert survey.  The validity of this would also 
seem to be an interesting area for further research.
Future research should address the roles of contingency factors (e.g., size, age, industry, etc.) 
in defining the optimal breadth and depth of information disclosure, both in terms its value-
protecting and value-creating roles.  It should also evaluate potential costs of implementation 
for different group of companies, in particular, for smaller firms.  This issue relates closely to 
the costs and benefits of information provision by firms and the extent to which greater 
information provision, of which kinds and to whom, leads to greater wealth protection and 
generation.
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7.6.5 Audit and internal controls
The numerous new policy measures introduced in the very recent past raise obvious questions 
about how market players will utilize and respond to new rules and regulatory oversight.  For 
example, a key empirical question will be whether disclosure and transparency will have any 
effect on the level and scope of non-audit services provided.  It also remains to be seen 
whether shareholders will actually become more active toward the audit process, and make 
use of the right to question auditors.  In this sense, future evaluation of the toughness and 
costs vs. benefits of the various new rules will be needed.  
In particular, this consideration suggests more detailed research on how auditors relate to 
other elements of the corporate governance system, such as shareholder involvement, board 
independence, and stakeholder involvement.  The empirical literature remains very sceptical 
about the overall impact of structural measures, such as the presence of audit committees or 
auditor independence, on the quality of audit.  Stronger evidence was found related to process 
factors, including qualification and involvement, which are both harder to measure and harder 
to regulate.  Better understanding of how boards, audit committees, shareholders, 
stakeholders, regulators, and auditors interact is needed to target further improvements to 
policy.  In particular, it remains unclear whether having independent structures is sufficient to 
provide auditors with real incentives to act as effective checks on management behaviour.  
However, the improvement of external oversight of auditors has seemingly given them greater 
leverage to require compliance from companies.  
A more specific issue concerns how auditing relates to disclosure of information relevant 
from the perspective of stakeholders and concerns around corporate social responsibility 
(CSR).  While companies have sought to improve their reputation by voluntarily disclosing 
information under the rubric of CSR, it is nearly impossible for various stakeholder groups to 
verify this information or objectively compare the CSR strategy of different companies within 
a common framework.  
7.6.6 Executive pay
Within existing literature, considerable debate remains about the effectiveness of incentive 
schemes designed to give pay rewards based on performance.  Here new research has been 
limited by the exclusive focus on using financial rewards to improve motivation that has not 
been sufficiently balanced by considerations from other areas of social science.  In particular, 
resource-based approaches to corporate governance (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) provide an 
alternative to managers being motivated singularly by financial rewards.  In short, financial 
incentives must be understood within a broader exploration of the formal and informal factors 
that affect the motivation of executives, such as power, careers, and stakeholder relationships.  
A related issue is whether certain types of incentives, such as share options, bias decision 
making in favour of certain financial targets and unintentionally lead to too much focus on the 
short-term.  Further research in these areas could usefully draw from behavioural economics, 
sociology and social psychology.
Perhaps more narrowly, no empirical evidence can be cited that measures true incentive 
effects of LTIP.  For example, just because a share option or LTIP has been granted, it will 
not automatically vest.  Future research should address the notion of ‘potential’ rewards 
versus the ‘actual’ ones received, as well as the upside versus downside risks involved in pay 
for performance schemes.  This would further give valuable insight into the motivational 
issues surrounding the grants of share options, and provide additional insight into the true 
172
costs, which could then be measured against an increase in shareholder value.  Related to this, 
the definitions and criteria for performance criteria attached to share option schemes would 
provide an area for fruitful further research.  The Combine Code only provides details that 
schemes should be subject to “challenging performance criteria reflecting the company’s 
objectives” (Combined Code 2003 p21.)  These performance criteria could be plotted against 
actual performance in order to provide an insight as to how demanding such targets are.  
Some comparative research suggests that the performance criteria set by UK companies are 
less stringent than, for example, similar schemes used by German companies (Buck et al. 
2003; Buck and Sharhrim 2005).
7.6.7 Market for corporate control
Research of mergers and acquisitions is an area where the empirical results remain 
particularly ambiguous.  While takeovers are obviously important for corporate restructuring, 
the positive and negative effects on performance are often unclear.  Future research should 
address the roles of contingency factors (e.g., size, age, complexity, etc.) in the role of 
takeover markets, both in terms its value-protecting and value-creating roles.  The mix of 
positive or negative results regarding the market for corporate control reflects the fact that 
both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ deals exist.  While UK regulation stresses the rights of target firm 
shareholders, the empirical literature suggests that disappointing or negative effects of ‘bad’ 
deals are born out by bidding firm shareholders, who often have little say in the takeover 
process.  Future research might focus on how investors of bidding firms approach the 
takeover process, and to what extent those investors are protected (Stout 2006).  
The governance functions of a market for corporate control is likewise based on a 
fundamental assumption of the capital market efficiency. However, the institutional 
underpinnings of financial market efficiency have been recently challenged by behavioural 
approaches, which suggest that the level of market efficiency depends on the importance of 
several market distinct mechanisms - universally informed trading, professionally informed 
trading, derivatively informed trading, and uninformed trading operates to reflect that fact in 
market price. A new framework for evaluating the efficiency of the stock market, called 
"behavioural finance," and a growing number of empirical studies pose a serious challenge to 
the efficient markets hypothesis (Gilson and Kraakman 2004), and further research that brings 
together corporate governance and behaviour finance may help to shed light on the efficiency 
of market for corporate control.
Future research should also take note of the growing international dimension to the market for 
corporate control.  There is currently no data available on the extent of non-compliance with 
the City Code, and particularly regarding the behaviour of UK companies acting in foreign 
markets.  Around 40 percent of UK mergers and acquisitions are cross-border, and it should 
be investigated as to whether the lower barriers to hostile deals in the UK relative to other 
countries puts UK firms at any competitive disadvantages.  Given the diversity of takeover 
rules in Europe, the United States and Japan, an interesting question remains as to what rules 
are best in terms of their wealth-creating and wealth-protecting effects (e.g. in light of breach 
of trust issues or bidding firm shareholders).  Here comparative research with regard to 
multiple dimensions of firm performance would seem highly desirable. 
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7.6.8 Stakeholders
Existing research on stakeholders has been relatively underdeveloped in the UK.  In part, this 
reflects the lack of practical development, since stakeholders have played a rather marginal 
role in UK corporate governance.  More recently, a literature has emerged on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and socially responsible investment (SRI) from a general stakeholder 
perspective.  Much of this literature has remained rather normative (e.g. arguments for and 
against) and the empirical work in the UK has often been rather exploratory and descriptive 
(e.g. describing what individual companies are doing voluntarily).  This is despite the fact that 
some research, albeit mainly US, suggests that broader stakeholder involvement can have an 
effect on governance and on performance.  Future research is also needed that sees CSR and 
SRI from a governance perspective, which explores the processes whereby stakeholders such 
as SRI funds, NGOs, communities, etc. use information provided by companies to actually 
affect corporate governance.  
In terms of debt holders, further research is needed to complement work on shareholder 
engagement.  The goal would be a more comprehensive picture of the investment chain, and a 
mapping of the key ‘gatekeepers’ involved in various aspects of the investment process.  Here 
the role of investment analysis and ratings agencies is particularly important, since previous 
research identifies a number of potential conflicts of interests the ‘gatekeepers’ may have 
when dealing with individual companies and their investors (Chan et al. 2003).
In terms of employees, three areas of future research are important on understanding the 
mechanisms of employee involvement.  One is on the role of pension funds and how and 
whether they can give employees a voice in governance.  A second is on collective forms of 
involvement – what makes works councils and information sharing with employees effective 
and what positive outcomes it has. A third area would be to investigate the mechanisms and 
effectiveness of more individual forms of employee voice via employee reports, briefing 
meetings etc.  Here recent policy developments in the area of information and consultation 
rules will need monitoring in terms of how these are implemented in the UK, and whether 
they sufficiently support a positive role of employment involvement in corporate governance.  
Future research should address the roles of contingency factors (e.g., size, age, complexity, 
sector) in operationalising the role of stakeholder involvement, both in terms its value-
protection and value-creation.  It should also evaluate potential costs of implementation for 
different group of companies, in particular, for smaller firms.
7.7   Conclusions
In sum, this section has identified a number of both content gaps and effectiveness gaps in the 
UK regulatory framework in relation to ‘good’ corporate governance drivers identified in 
academic research. Content gaps are biggest in relation to executive pay, employees, and 
stakeholders in general.  These gaps are smaller in areas such as information disclosure, 
boards, shareholder activism, auditors, internal control, and the market for corporate control.  
Gaps in effectiveness influences almost all drivers of good corporate governance, but to 
different degrees. Even if regulatory content is strong, the implementation may be potentially 
weak, especially when enforcement of codes is relying on self-regulatory guidelines. For 
example, ISC Principles encourage shareholder engagement, but supporting frameworks may 
not lead to sufficient implementation. In this regard, regulation may also involve unintended 
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outcomes, which include behavioural aspects (e.g., box-ticking; “gaming”, etc); and defensive 
compliance to limit legal liabilities.
However, our analysis suggests that more regulation is not always the answer.  There are 
various trade-offs associated with the implementation of corporate governance principles that 
may influence the effectiveness of individual drivers.  For example, greater enforcement of 
legal regulation should be considered in comparison with greater flexibility of Codes based on 
comply-or-explain principles. However, Codes and principles may be well enforced if 
supported by market incentives, and this still remains an empirical question. Similarly, law 
ensures “minimum standards” for all, whereas codes support “best practices” in certain 
contexts. Some countries, however, offer “choice” of different legally based structures. An 
explicit recognition of these interdependencies and trade-offs may inform future regulatory 
initiatives.  Likewise, regulation should strive to balance the different governance demands by 
taking into account governance-related factors such as complementarities between various 
governance drivers, firm-level contingencies that may affect the effectiveness of particular 
governance drivers, and potential costs associated with compliance with good corporate 
governance principles. For example, key aspects in the UK are shareholder engagement and 
board independence, which need to support other drivers. 
Finally, the social science evidence base for evaluating past policies or developing new policy 
initiatives remains limited.  More evidence-based, policy-oriented academic research in a 
number of specific areas may help to further inform public policy.  First, a more holistic 
approach to the effectiveness of corporate governance drivers requires further research on 
such aspects as stakeholder involvement, contingencies, complementarities and cost aspects 
that may affect the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. One aspect of this is to 
analyse wealth creation and performance trade-offs. More specifically, it is important to look 
not only at shareholder returns, but also whether different corporate governance 
configurations promote long-term, value-creating economic production in a fashion that 
benefits not only shareholders but also other groups that make specific investments in 
corporations (Blair and Stout 2006).  Second, it is important to verify whether recent 
regulatory initiatives are followed by the desired behavioural changes, including unintended 
consequences such as the development of ‘gaming’ practices. This suggests a change of 
emphasis from corporate governance structures to understanding the processes actual process 




Corporate governance has become a major topic of debate and policy development in the 
worlds of business, politics, and academia, in the UK and throughout the world.   These debates 
and policy outcomes have important implications not only for business, but the wider economy 
and society.
This Report results from a DTI sponsored project on “Identifying the Key Drivers of ‘Good’ 
Corporate Governance and the Appropriateness of Policy Responses.”  The research was 
carried out in a number of stages.  Initially, we reviewed the existing research literature to 
identify what have been seen as the main ‘drivers’ of corporate governance and in particular 
‘good’ corporate governance. ‘Good’ corporate governance is defined here with regard to the 
rights and responsibilities of company stakeholders, and the wealth-creating and wealth-
protecting functions of corporate governance within this context.  Based on this definition, a 
detailed review of the theoretical and empirical social science literature on corporate 
governance was undertaken, drawing on the fields of economics, finance, management, 
sociology, law, and political science.  The review covered seven broad areas:  board of 
directors, shareholder activism, information disclosure, auditing and internal controls, executive 
pay, the market for corporate control, and stakeholders.  The result was the identification of 18 
key ‘drivers’ or governance mechanisms, which promote ‘good’ corporate governance.  An 
internet-based survey of international corporate governance experts was conducted in order to 
verify and further specify how these drivers operate in relation to the UK context.
The second stage of the project reviewed the existing regulatory framework of corporate 
governance in the UK, covering a spectrum from ‘hard’ law and regulations to ‘soft’ codes and 
standards.  Policy initiatives were analysed with regard to both their content and effectiveness in 
promoting each of the identified drivers.  A Focus Group discussion was also held at the DTI 
with practitioners from a wide range of backgrounds.  On the basis of our analysis and the 
feedback from the Focus Group, a number of potential gaps were identified, both in terms of 
content and implementation of the present UK system.  These gaps also suggested a number of 
areas in which further research is desirable in order to improve the evidence-based relevant for 
UK public policy.
A number of important conclusions of this Report may be summarised as follows.
First, various perspectives exist with regard to what constitutes corporate governance and 
especially ‘good’ corporate governance.  Our approach focussed on a set of institutions and 
processes, inside and outside the company, and on a wide range of wealth-protecting and 
wealth-creating functions, which are often overlooked in traditional corporate governance 
literatures.  In addition, ‘good’ corporate governance involves fairness and transparency with 
regard to both rights and responsibilities of shareholders and other key stakeholders.  
Second, the Report identifies key drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance practices.    Our 
review focused on seven areas:  boards of directors, shareholder activism, information 
disclosure, auditing and internal controls, executive pay, the market for corporate control, and 
the role of stakeholders.  Based on the review of the social science literature within these 
broad ‘families,’ 18 specific drivers or mechanisms were identified which promote ‘good’ 
corporate governance. Existing empirical research and our survey of international experts 
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both show important areas of consensus with regard to some drivers.  However, some areas 
exist where more diverse opinions persist as to the relative salience of different drivers.  In 
particular, strong areas of agreement centred on the structure and composition of boards, as 
well as information disclosure and the audit process.  More contentious issues were related to 
executive pay and the market for corporate control.  Stakeholder involvement was generally 
viewed as important, although in the UK context stakeholders are often seen as a 
complementary corporate governance device within a broader ‘enlightened’ shareholder-
oriented framework.
Third, our analysis of policy initiatives with reference to drivers of ‘good’ corporate 
governance suggests a number of potential gaps in the UK regulation.  Overall, the UK 
regulatory framework was deemed to be both extensive and effective, when viewed in 
international perspective. Nonetheless, several potential gaps in coverage were identified in 
the areas of executive pay, employees, and stakeholders more generally.  A number of 
potential gaps in effectiveness were also identified with regard to other key drivers such as 
boards, shareholder involvement, information disclosure, auditing, and the market for 
corporate control.   In particular, many of these key drivers are covered extensively, but by 
relatively ‘soft’ self-regulatory mechanisms, which rely ultimately on market-driven 
processes to sanction and enforce ‘good’ corporate governance practices.  For example, 
deficits in shareholder engagement may translate into weaknesses in the effectiveness of other 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as the board or market for corporate control, since 
these latter drivers may be missing complementary support from other institutions.  
Fourth, the Report stresses the importance of contexts, complementarities, and costs 
associated with development and implementation of good corporate governance.  The context 
in which the firm operates, its size, industry, age, shapes aspects of governance and needs to 
be taken into account in terms of regulatory initiatives. In addition, complementarity and 
substitution effects need to be taken into account, since some corporate governance drivers or 
regulation may substitute for others and or work to support others.  A key issue in this regard 
concerns supporting greater shareholder and stakeholder engagement with regard to key 
corporate governance processes.  The costs of regulation must also be considered not only in 
terms of the out-of-pocket compliance costs that are reflected in the firm’s balance sheet and 
other accounting documentation (e.g., the audit costs, directors’ insurance, etc.), but also the 
less explicit opportunity costs (e.g., directors’ time spent on governance issues instead of 
business strategy, costs of strategic disclosure, etc.), and the legal and reputational costs 
which may be incurred when firms get their governance practices wrong.  Future regulatory 
initiatives should also include a thorough discussion of regulatory trade-offs between 
mandatory regulation (uniform requirements), and more flexible forms of soft-law such as 
codes based on comply-or-explain principles and self-regulatory norms of professional 
groups.
The Report identifies a number of areas where further research may help improve the fact 
base for new policy initiatives related to corporate governance. A more holistic approach to 
the effectiveness of corporate governance drivers requires further research on such aspects as 
stakeholder involvement, contingencies, complementarities and cost aspects that may affect 
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. One aspect of this is to analyse wealth 
creation and performance trade-offs in terms of wider aspects of performance such as 
productivity, innovation and social inequality. Moreover, it is important to verify whether 
recent regulatory initiatives are followed by the desired behavioural changes, including 
unintended consequences such as the development of ‘gaming’ practices. This suggests a 
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change of emphasis from corporate governance structures to understanding the processes 
actual process that underlie corporate governance and the creation of wealth.
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Appendix I: Experts’ Survey Questionnaire
“Identifying the Key Drivers of ‘Good’ Corporate Governance and the 




I. Board of Directors
Question 1
How important are the following aspects of board structure in terms of promoting “good 
corporate governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high 
importance):
board size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a high proportion of independent 
board members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a high proportion of executive 
directors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
separation of the roles of CEO 
and board Chairman 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
independent nomination, 
remuneration and audit committees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
presence of a senior (lead) 
independent director 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other aspects of board structure that you consider important for 
“good corporate governance.” 
Question 2
How important are the following board characteristics in promoting “good corporate 
governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high importance):
number of network ties to other 
firms and external constituencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
human capital of independent 
board members  (experience, 
expertise, reputation) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
179
board directors’ heterogeneity 
in terms of human capital 
(education, expertise, etc) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
board directors’ heterogeneity 
in terms of gender and age 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other board characteristics that you consider important for “good 
corporate governance”. 
Question 3
How important are the following board processes in terms of promoting “good corporate 
governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high importance):
regular evaluation of
board members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
frequency and lengths of 
board meetings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
regular meetings of independent 
directors (separately from 
board meetings) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
regular communications with major
shareholders/investors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
board focus on financial controls
(accounting performance, 
TSR, EPS etc) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
board focus on strategic controls
(growth of market share, 
competitiveness) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
directors’ financial incentives, 
including equity-based incentives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
imposing age and term limits for
independent directors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
imposing age and term limits for
executive directors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
extensive and timely provision of 
information to independent directors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
bottom-up information flow from 
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functional departments to 
independent directors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
using specialist recruitment companies  
when recruiting new board members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
independent directors’ social ties with
CEO/executive directors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other factors related to board processes that you consider important 
for “good corporate governance”. 
Question 4
In your opinion, which of the “good corporate governance” drivers listed in Questions 1 
to 3 may have firm-level costs of execution (including financial, opportunity costs, etc.) 
that outweigh the benefits of execution?
II. Shareholder Activism
Question 1.
How effective are the following types of shareholders in terms of promoting “good 
corporate governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high 
importance):
pension funds, mutual funds, 
foundations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
corporate pension funds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
banks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
insurance companies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
private equity investors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
individual (non-family) blockholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
family blockholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
dispersed individual shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Please indicate any other types of shareholders that you consider important in promoting 
“good corporate governance.” 
Question 2.
How important are the following aspects of shareholder activism in terms of promoting 
“good corporate governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high 
importance):
publicly criticizing board members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
influencing board and management 
turnover 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
influencing revisions of executive 
compensation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
regular discussions with board members 
of strategy issues (M&A, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
maintaining stable shareholding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
voting at the AGM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
use of electronic voting systems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
disclosure of voting at 
shareholder meetings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
use of lawsuits against managers 
and  auditors for negligence 
or breaches of duty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other aspects of shareholder activism that you consider important in 
terms of promoting “good corporate governance.” 
Question 3
Of the “good corporate governance” drivers listed in Question 2 which, in your opinion, 
may have firm-level costs of execution (including financial, opportunity costs, etc.) that 
outweigh the benefits of execution?
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III.  Executive Pay
Question 1
How important are the following executive pay related items in terms of promoting “good 
corporate governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high 
importance):
performance-related bonus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
share option incentive scheme 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
long term incentive plan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
non-remuneration based incentives
(e.g. firm’s pension contribution) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other executive pay related items that you consider important in 
promoting “good corporate governance.” 
Question 2
How important are the following executive pay processes in terms of promoting “good 
corporate governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high 
importance):
caps on the size of 
executive pay 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
shareholders to vote on 
remuneration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
incentives tied to performance 
targets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
issuing ‘out of the money’ options 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
high levels of pay disclosure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
remuneration committee’s access to 
external profession advice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
the costs of issuing share options
clearly shown in the annual
report and accounts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Please indicate any other pay processes that you consider important in promoting “good 
corporate governance.” 
Question 3
Of the “good corporate governance” drivers listed in Questions 1 to 2 which, in your 
opinion, may have firm-level costs of execution (including financial, opportunity costs, 
etc.) that outweigh the benefits of execution?
IV. Information and Disclosure
Question 1
How important are the following forms of public disclosure of information in terms of 
promoting “good corporate governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 
7 = high importance):
annual report and related 
documents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
quarterly or monthly reports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
operating and financial reviews 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
information specifically on corporate 
governance (eg director’s pay) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
information on related party 
transactions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
information on corporate social
responsibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
information on employment policies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
information on environmental 
policies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
audit committee’s oversight 
of publicly disclosed information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other aspects of public information disclosure that you consider 
important in promoting “good corporate governance.” 
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Question 2
How important are the following forms of private information provision in terms of 
promoting “good corporate governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 
7 = high importance):
private information to key investors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
private information to analysts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
vertical information flows 
between  the board and 
function departments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
horizontal information flows 
between functional departments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
provision of information to 
employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
provision of information to 
other stakeholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other aspects of private information disclosure that you consider 
important in promoting “good corporate governance.” 
Question 3
Of the “good corporate governance” drivers listed in Questions 1 and 2, which, in your 
opinion, may have firm-level costs (including financial, opportunity costs, etc.) which 
outweigh the benefits?
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V.  Audit and Internal Controls
Question 1
How important are the following audit related items in terms of promoting “good 
corporate governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high 
importance):
board approval of external auditor
appointment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
shareholders’ vote on appointment 
of the external auditor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
regular rotation of appointed
external auditor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
professionally qualified members
on the audit committee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
reporting from the audit
committee to shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
restriction on the quantity of ‘non-audit’
tasks involving external auditors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
unconstrained legal liability of 
auditors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other audit related items that you consider important in promoting 
“good corporate governance”.
Question 2
How important are the following mechanisms of internal control in terms of promoting 
“good corporate governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high 
importance):
risk management systems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
financial control and budgeting
systems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
support and protection of
‘whistleblowers’ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other aspects of internal controls that you consider important in 
promoting “good corporate governance”.
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Question 3
Of the “good corporate governance” drivers listed in Questions 1 and 2, which, in your 
opinion, may have firm-level costs (including financial, opportunity costs, etc.) which 
outweigh the benefits?
VI.  Market for Corporate Control
Question 1
Leaving aside potential issues of anti-trust and competition policy, how important are the 
following aspects of the market for corporate control in promoting “good corporate 
governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high importance):
an active M&A market 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
hostile takeovers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
leveraged buy-outs (LBO) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
management buy-outs (MBO) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
public-to-private transactions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other aspects of the market for corporate control that you important 
in promoting “good corporate governance.” 
Question 2
How important are the following in promoting an effective market for corporate control 
(score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high importance):
mandatory bid rule 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
principle of equal treatment 
of shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
transparency of ownership and
control (inc. defensive measures) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
squeeze out and sell-out rules 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
one-share / one-vote principle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
break-through rules 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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payment through cash 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
payment through share swaps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
payment through debt (e.g. LBO) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
protection of firm-specific assets
during M&A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
protection of employee interests
during M&A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
establishment of an international 
‘level playing field’ that reduces 
takeover barriers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ability to ‘ring fence’ target firms from
acquirers in countries with higher 
takeover barriers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please suggest other aspects that you consider important in promoting an effective market 
for corporate control 
Question 3
How appropriate do you consider the following aspects of takeover defenses in the context 
of  “good corporate governance” (score each factor as follows: 1 = not appropriate, 7 = 
highly appropriate):
the board should be strictly neutral 
during takeover bids 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
the board should have substantial 
decision power regarding takeover 
bids, subject to shareholder veto 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pre-bid defensive actions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
post-bid defensive actions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
anti-takeover devices (e.g. poison 
pill, golden parachutes, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
white knights or defense through
building a constituency of stable 
long-term shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate any other aspects of takeover defenses that you consider important for 




How important is the involvement in company decision-making process of the following 
stakeholders in terms of promoting “good corporate governance” (score each factor as 
follows: 1 = not important, 7 = high importance):
debtholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
customers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
suppliers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
local communities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NGOs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
the State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please suggest other stakeholders who are important for promoting “good corporate 
governance.” 
Question 2.
In the case of employees, which of the following mechanisms do you think is important in 
terms of promoting “good corporate governance”( score each factor as follows: 1 = not 
important, 7 = high importance):
individual voice
through meetings, 
employee reports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
employee share ownership 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
consultative committees
such as works councils 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
board-level representation 
of employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
employee voice via pension fund 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
trade unions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
189
Please suggest other important mechanisms of employee voice that you consider 
important in promoting “good corporate governance.”  
Question 3.
In the case of debt holders, which of the following mechanisms do you think is important 
in terms of promoting “good corporate governance”( score each as driver as: 1 = not 
important, 7 = high importance):
individual voice through
meetings and contacts with 
managers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
use of delegated 
monitoring systems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
access to private information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
board presence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
use of contractual mechanisms of
monitoring (bank covenants, etc) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
inclusion of governance factors in
risk evaluation mechanisms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please suggest other important aspects of debt holder involvement that you consider 
important in promoting “good corporate governance.”  
VIII.  Evaluation of UK Corporate Governance Regulation
Question 1
How do regard current UK regulation regarding corporate governance in the following 
areas (score each factor as follows: 1 = highly unsatisfactory, 7 = highly satisfactory.  If 
unsatisfactory, please provide a brief comment):
protection of minority shareholder 
interests
1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Don’t know
facilitating shareholder activism
1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Don’t know
increasing information disclosure
1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Don’t know
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raising effectiveness of the 
Board of Directors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Don’t know
promoting appropriate incentives
in executive pay
1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Don’t know
raising effectiveness of auditors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Don’t know
improving internal control systems
1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Don’t know
regulating the market for corporate control
1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Don’t know
promoting corporate social  responsibility
1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Don’t know
Please, provide comments here if you want to clarify your views.
Thank you for your time and help with this research!
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 Appendix II: Participants in the Focus Group
Group 1: Boards, auditing and internal controls, executive pay.
Charlotte Barbour Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland
William Claxton Smith Insight Investment 
Tim Copnell KPMG
Hans Hirt Hermes
Chris Hodge Financial Reporting Council 
Martyn Jones Deloitte
Judy Lowe Bovis Lend Lease, Europe; Wrekin Construction plc.
Giles Peel Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators 
Gerald Russell Ernst & Young 
David Jackson BP
Chris Yates Quoted Companies Alliance
Group 2: Shareholder activism and the market for corporate control
Robert Blanks Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators
Anthony Carey Robson Rhodes
Frank Curtis RailPen Investments
Alison Kennedy Standard Life Investments





Group 3: Information disclosure, stakeholders
Patricia Constant Central Lobby
George Dallas S&P
Jonathan Hunt ICAEW
Finn Jackson Tomorrow’s Company
Toby Kent Corporate Citizenship
Lord Newby All Party Parliamentary Group on Corporate Responsibility
Sir Geoffrey Owen LSE
Tom Powdrill TUC
Andrew Shrager Renaissance Capital
Alan Thompson Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland
192
Bibliography
Abhyankar, A., Ho, Keng-Yu and Zhao, Huainan. 2005. Long-run Post Merger Stock 
Performance of UK Acquiring Firms: A Stochastic Dominance Perspective. 
Working Paper Series.
Abraham, S. and Tonks, I. 2004. Voluntary corporate disclosure by UK companies’: 
mimeo Exeter.
Addison, J. T., Schnabel, K., and Wagner, J. 2004. The course of research into the 
economic consequences of German works councils. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 42(2): 255-281.
Admati, A., Pfleiderer, P., and Zechner, J. 1994. Large shareholder activism, risk 
sharing, and financial market equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy, 102: 
1097-1130.
Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C. 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control 
agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 31: 377-395.
Agrawal, A. and. J., Jeffrey F. 2002. Do Takeover Targets Under-perform? Evidence 
from Operating and Stock Returns. Working Paper Series.
Agrawal, A. and Jaffe, J. F. 2003. The Disciplinary Motive for Takeovers: A Review of 
the Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31: 
213-234.
Aguilera, R. V. and Jackson, G. 2003. The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate 
Governance: Dimensions and Determinants. Academy of Management Review, 
XII(3, July): 1-19.
Aguilera, R. 2005. Corporate governance and director accountability: an institutional 
comparative perspective. British Journal of Management, 16(S39-S53. ).
Akerlof, G. 1980. The market for “lemons”: qualitative uncertainty and the market 
mechanism. Quaterly Journal of Economics, 84(3): 488-500.
Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic 
organization. American Economic Review, 62: 777-795.
Alexander, J. A., Fennell, M. L., and Halpern, M. T. 1993. Leadership instability in 
hospitals: The influence of board-CEO relations and organizational growth and 
decline. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38: 74-99.
Al-Hawamdeh, A. and Snaith, I. 2005. Is "private briefing" illegal in the United 
Kingdom? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(4): 489-504.
Anderson, R., Mansi, S., and Reeb, D. 2003. Founding family ownership and the 
agency costs of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68: 263-285.
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., and Stafford, E. 2001. New Evidence and Perspectives on 
Mergers? Journal of Economic Perspectives: 103-120.
Ang, J., Cole, R., and Lin, J. 2000. Agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of 
Finance, 55: 81-106.
Angelini, P., Di Salvo, R., and Ferri, G. 1998. Availability and cost of credit for small 
businesses. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22: 925-954.
Aoki, M. 1988. Information, incentives, and bargaining in the Japanese economy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Aoki, M. 1994. The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes. In M. Aoki & R. Dore 
(Eds.), The Japanese Firm: Sources of Competitive Strength: 11-40. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
193
Aoki, M. 2006. Whither Japan’s Corporate Governance?  Toward External Monitoring 
of Internal Linkage. In M. Aoki & G. Jackson & H. Miyajima (Eds.), Corporate 
Governance in Japan: Organizational Diversity and Institutional Change. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aoki, M. and Patrick, H. (Eds.). 1994. The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance 
for Developing and Transforming Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aoki, M. 2001. Information, Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aoki, M. 2001. Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Archambeault, D. and DeZoort, T. 2001. Auditor Opinion Shopping and the Audit 
Committee:  An Analysis of Suspicious Auditor Switches. International Journal 
of Auditing, 5: 33–52.
Arthur, N. 2001. Board Composition as the Outcome of an Internal Bargaining Process: 
Empirical Evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7: 307-340.
Ascioglu, A., Hegde, S. P., and McDermott, J. B. 2005. Auditor compensation, 
disclosure quality, and market liquidity: Evidence from the stock market. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24(4): 325-354.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., LaFond, R., and Mayhew, B. W. 2003. Do Non-Audit Services 
Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence. University of 
Wisconsin Working paper.
Association of British Insurers. 1994. Long-term remuneration for senior executives. 
London: ABI.
Association of British Insurers. 1996. Long term incentive schemes - Notes of 
emerging good practice. London: ABI.
Association of British Insurers. 1999. Share incentives: A statement of principles. 
London: ABI.
Association of British Insurers. 2002. Executive compensation and share based 
remuneration: Guidelines for share incentive schemes. London: ABI.
Association of British Insurers. 2004. Principles and Guidelines on Remuneration. 
London: ABI.
Asthana, S., Balsam, S., and Kim, S. 2004. The Effect of Enron, Andersen, and 
Sarbanes-Oxley on the Market for Audit Services. Mimeo
Baker, R. C. and Owsen, D. M. 2002. Increasing the role of auditing in corporate 
governance. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 13(5-6): 783-795.
Barnes, P. 1999. Predicting UK Takeover Targets: Some Methodological Issues and an 
Empirical Study. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 12(3): 283.
Barnhart, S. W. and Rosenstein, S. 1998. Board composition, managerial ownership, 
and firm performance: An empirical analysis. The Financial Review, 33: 1-16.
Barton, H. 1992. Does top management add value to investment decisions. Long Range 
Planning, 25(5): 43-58.
Bathala, C. T. and Rao, R. P. 1995. The determinants of board composition: An agency 
theory perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics, 16: 59-69.
Baums, T. 1993. Takeovers versus institutions in corporate governance in Germany. In 
D. D. Prentice & P. R. J. Holland (Eds.), Contemporary Issues in Corporate 
Governance: 151-183. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Baums, T. and Frick, B. 1998. Codetermination in Germany: the impact of court 
decisions on the market value of the firm. Economic Analysis, 1,2: 143-161.
Baysinger, B. D. and Butler, H. 1985. Corporate governance and the board of directors: 
Performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, 
194
Economics, & Organization, 1: 101-134.
Baysinger, B. D. and Hoskisson, R. E. 1990. The Composition of Boards of Directors 
and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy. Academy of Management 
Review, 15: 72-87.
Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, D. R., and Turk, T. A. 1991. Effects of board and ownership 
structure on corporate R&D strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 
205-214.
Bazerman, M. and Schoorman, F. 1983. A limited rationality model of interlocking 
directorates. Academy of Management Review, 8: 206-217.
Beasley, M. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, 71: 443-
465.
Beattie, V. A., Goodacre, A., and Fearnley, S. 2003. And Then There Were Four: A 
Study of UK Audit Market Concentration - Causes, Consequences and the 
Scope for Market Adjustment. University of Stirling Discussion Paper, No. 
03/03.
Beatty, R. P. and Zajac, E. J. 1994. Managerial incentives, monitoring and risk bearing: 
a study of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial 
public offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(2): 313-335.
Beatty, R. and Welch, I. 1996. Issuer expenses and legal liability in initial public 
offerings. Journal of Law and Economics, 39: 545-602.
Bebchuk, L. 1994. Efficient and inefficient sales of corporate control. . Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 109: 957-994.
Bebchuk, L. 1999. A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control: 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7203, Cambridge (MA).
Bebchuk, L., Kraakman, R., and Triantis, G. 1999. Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, 
and dual class equity: The creation and agency costs of separating control from 
cash flow rights. : National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 6951, 
Cambridge (MA).
Bebchuk, L. A. and Roe, M. J. 1999. A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Governance and Ownership. Columbia Law School, Center for Law and 
Economic Studies, Working Papers, No. 131.
Beekes, W. and Brown, P. 2005. Do better governed Australian firms make more 
information disclosures? Mimeo, Lancaster.
Beekun, R. I., Stedham, Y., and Young, G. J. 1998. Board characteristics, managerial 
controls and corporate strategy: A study of U.S. hospitals. Journal of 
Management, 24: 3-19.
Bennedsen, M. and Wolfenzon, D. 2000. The balance of power in closely held 
corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 113-139.
Berglöf, E. 1990. Capital structure as a mechanism of control: A comparison of 
financial systems. In B. Gustafsson & O. Williamson (Eds.), The Firm as a 
Nexus of Treaties: 237-262. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Berglöf, E. 1991. Corporate control and capital structure : essays on property rights and 
financial contracts. Stockholm School of Economics : Distributed by IIB 
Institute of International Business, Stockholm.
Berglöf, E. and Perotti, E. 1994. The governance structure of Japanese keiretsu. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 35: 45-57.
Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
New York: Macmillan.
Berman, S., Wicks, A., Kotha, S., and Jones, T. M. 1999. ‘Does stakeholder orientation 
195
matter? The relationship between stakeholder management models and firm 
financial performance’. Academy of Management Journal, 42(5): 488-505.
Bethel, J. E. and Liebeskind, J. 1993. The Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate 
Restructuring. Strategic Management Journal, 14 (special issue): 5-31.
Beyer, J. and Hassel, A. 2002. The Effects of Convergence: Internationalisation and the 
Changing Distribution of Net Value Added in Large German Firms. Economy 
and Society, 31(3): 309-332.
Bhagat, S., Shleifer, A., and Vishney, R. W. 1990. Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The 
Return to Corporate Specialization. In M. N. Baily & C. Winston (Eds.), 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics: 1-84. Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution.
Bhagat, S. and Black, B. 1999. The uncertain relationship between board composition 
and firm performance. Business Lawyer, 54: 921-963.
Bhattacharya, S. and Chiesa, G. 1995. Proprietary information, financial 
intermediation, and research incentives. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 4: 
328-357.
Bittlingmayer, G. 1998. The Market for Corporate Control (Including Takeovers). In B. 
Bouckaert & G. D. Geest (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: Edward 
Elgar.
Black, B. S. 1992. Agents watching agents: the promise of institutional investor voice. 
UCLA Law Review, 39: 811-839.
Black, B. and Coffee, J. 1994. Hail Britannia: institutional investor behaviour under 
limited regulation Michigan Law Review, 92: 1997-2087.
Black, B. S. and Gilson, R. J. 1998. Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital 
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 47: 
243-277.
Blackburn, S. 1999. Managing risk and achieving Turnbull compliance. Accountants' 
Digest, 417: 1-51.
Blair, M. M. 1993. The Deal decade : what takeovers and leveraged buyouts mean for 
corporate governance. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Blair, M. 1995. Ownership and control: rethinking corporate governance for the 
twenty-first century. Washington.D.C: Brookings Institute.
Blair, M. and Stout, L. A. 1999. A team production theory of corporate law. Virginia 
Law Review, 85: 247-328.
Blair, M. M. and Stout, L. A. 2001. Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
149(June): 1735–1810.
Blair, M. M. and Stout, L. A. 2006. Specific Investment and Corporate Law. European 
Business Organization Law Review.
Blair, M. M. 2002. Post-Enron Reflections on Comparative Corporate Governance. 
Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper, No. 316663.
Boeker, W. 1992. Power and managerial dismissal: Scapegoating at the top. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 37: 400-421.
Boeker, W. and Goodstain, J. 1993. Performance and successor choice: the moderating 
effects of governance and ownership. Academy of Management Journal, 36: 
172-186.
Bond, S., Meghir, C., and Windmeijer, F. 1998. Productivity, Investment and the 
Threat of Takeover. Mimeo, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
Boot, A. and Thakor, A. 1997a. Financial system architecture. Review of Financial 
Studies, 10: 693-733.
196
Boot, A. and Thakor, A. 1997b. Banking scope and financial innovation. Review of 
Financial Studies, 10: 1099-1131.
Borrie, G. and Dehn, G. 2001. Whistleblowing the new perspective [online] 
www.pcaw.co.uk/policy%5Fpub/newperspective.html [accessed 05/12/05.]
Botosan, C. A. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital The Accounting 
Review, 72(3): 3243-3349.
Botosan, C. A. and Frost, C. 1998. Regulation, disclosure, and market liquidity. 
Mimeo, Washington University and Dartmouth College.
Botosan, C. A. and Plumlee, L. A. 2002. A re-examination of disclosure level and the 
expected cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 41(1): 21-40.
Bowie, N. and Duska, R. 1990. Business Ethics. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Boyd, B. K. 1994. Board control and CEO compensation. Strategic Management 
Journal, 15: 335-344. .
Brady, G. F. and Helmich, D. L. 1984. Executive succession. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall.
Bratton, W. W. 2002. Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value. Tulane Law 
Review, May: Forthcoming.
Brav, A. and Gompers, P. A. 1997. Myth or reality? The long-run underperformance of 
initial public offerings: Evidence from venture and nonventure capital-backed 
companies. Journal of Finance, 52(5): 1791-1821.
Brennan, N. 1999. Voluntary disclosure of profit forecasts by target companies in 
takeover bids. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 26: 883-918.
Brett, M. 2003. Company owners need more say in pay. Estates gazette(322): 40.
Brickley, J., Lease, R., and Smith, C. 1988. Ownership structure and voting on anti 
takeover amendments’, Journal of Financial Economics. Journal of Financial 
Economics 20: 267-291.
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., and Terry, R. L. 1994. Outside directors and the adoption 
of poison pills. Journal of Financial Economics, 35: 371-390.
Brinker Dozier, J. and Miceli, M. P. 1985. Potential predictors of whistle-blowing: A 
prosocial behavior perspective. Academy of Management Review, 10(4): 823-
836.
Bruce, A. and Buck, T. 1997. Executive reward and corporate governance. In K. 
Keasey & S. Thompson & M. Wright (Eds.), Corporate governance: Economic, 
management and financial issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bruner, R. 2002. Does M&A Pay?  A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker. 
Journal of Applied Finance, 57: 1731-1761.
Bruton, G., Ahlstrom, D., and Wan, J. 2003. Turnaround in East Asian firms: evidence 
from ethnic overseas Chinese communities. Strategic Management Journal, 24: 
519-540.
Buchholtz, A. K. and Ribbens, B. A. 1994. Role of chief executive officers in takeover 
resistance: Effects of CEO incentives and individual characteristics. Academy 
of Management Journal, 37: 554-579.
Buck, T., Bruce, A., Main, B. G. M., and Udueni, H. 2003. Long term incentive plans, 
executive pay and UK company performance. Journal of Management Studies, 
40(7): 1703-1721.
Buck, T. and Sharhrim, A. 2005. The Translation of Corporate Governance Changes 
Across National Cultures: The Case of Germany. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 36: 42-61.
Bushee, B. J. and Noe, C. F. 2000. Disclosure quality, institutional investors, and stock 
return volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, 38 (Supplement): 171-202.
197
Bushee, B. J. and Leuz, C. 2004. Economic consequences of SEC regulation: evidence 
from the OTC bulletin board. Mimeo, Wharton School.
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J., and Smith, A. 2001. What determines corporate 
transparency? Mimeo, University of Chicago.
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J., and Smith A. 2004. What determines corporate 
transparency? Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2): 207-252.
Cadbury, A. 1992. Report of the committee on financial aspects of corporate 
governance (Cadbury Committee Report). London: Gee Publishing.
Callaway Dee, C., Lulseged, A. A., and Nowlin, T. S. 2002. Earnings Quality and 
Auditor Independence: An Examination Using Non-audit Fee Data. Mimeo.
Callen, J. L. a. M., Mindy. 2002. The Enron-Andersen Debacle: Do Equity Markets 
React to Auditor Reputation? EFMA 2003 Helsinki Meetings.
Câmara, A. 2001. The pricing of relative performance based incentives for executive 
compensation. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 28(9/10): 1115.
Campbell, A. 1997. Stakeholders: the case in favour. Long Range Planning, 30: 446-
449.
Cannella Jr, A. A., Frasier, D. R., and Lee, S. 1995. Firm failure and managerial labor 
markets: Evidence from Texas banking. Journal of Financial Economics, 38(2): 
185-210.
Canoy, M., Riyanto, Y. E., and Van Cayseele, P. 2001. Corporate takeovers, bargaining 
and managers' incentives to invest. Managerial and Decision Economics, 21(1): 
pg. 1.
Carcello, J. V. and Neal, T. L. 2003. Audit committee independence and disclosure: 
choice for financially distressed firms. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 11(4): 289-299.
Carlin, W. and Mayer, C. 2000. Finance, investment, and growth. Mimeo, Oxford.
Carney, M. and Gedajlovic, E. 2002. The coupling of ownership control and the 
allocation of financial resources: evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of 
Management Studies, 39(1): 123-146.
Carpenter, M. A. and Westphal , J. D. 2001. The Strategic Context of External Network 
Ties: Examining the Impact of Director Appointments on Board Involvement in 
Strategic Decision-making. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 639-660.
Carpenter, M. A. 2002. The Implications of Strategy and Social Context for the 
Relationship Between Top Management Team Heterogeneity and Firm 
Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 23: 275-284.
Carpenter, M. A., Pollock, T. G., and Leary , M. M. 2003. Testing a Model of 
Reasoned Risk-taking: Governance, the Experience of Principals and Agents, 
and Global Strategy in High-technology IPO Firms. Strategic Management 
Journal, 24: 803-820.
Cartwright, S. C., Cary L. 1993. The Psychological Impact of Merger and Acquisition 
on the Individual: A Study of Building Society Managers. Human Relations, 
46(3): 327-347.
Certo, T., Daily, C., and Dalton, D. 2001. Wealth and the Effects of Founder 
Management Among IPO-Stage New Ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 
22: 641-658. .
Certo, T. S. 2003. Influencing initial public offering investors with prestige: signaling 
with board structures. Academy of Management Journal, 28(3): 432-446.
Chaganti, R., Mahajan, S., and Sharma, S. 1985. Corporate Board Size, Composition 
and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry. Journal of Management, 22: 400-
417.
198
Chahine, S. and Filatotchev, I. 2005. Signalling the firm’s value: information 
disclosure, corporate governance, and performance of IPOs. Mimeo, King’s 
College London.
Chambers, A. 1995. Whistleblowing and the Internal Auditor. Business Ethics: A 
European Review, 4(4): 192-198.
Chan, LKC, Kareceski, J and Lakonishok, J. (2003) Analysis' conflict of interest and 
biases in earnings forecasts. NBER Working paper 9544. 
Chang, S. and Hong, J. 2000. Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in 
Korea: Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transactions. Academy 
of Management Journal, 43: 429-448.
Chang, S. 2003. Ownership structure, expropriation, and performance of group-
affiliated companies in Korea. Academy of Management Journal, 46: 238-254. .
Charkham, J. 1994. Keeping good company: a study of corporate governance in five 
countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chatterjee, S. 1986. Types of Synergy and Economic Value: The Impact of 
Acquisitions on Merging and Rival Firms. Strategic Management Journal, 7: 
119-139.
Cheng, E. and Courtenay, S. 2004. Board composition, regulatory regime, and 
voluntary disclosure. Mimeo, Nanyang Business School, Singapore.
Cho, M.-H. 1998. Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: an 
empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 47: 103-121.
Chrisman, J. J. and Leslie , J. 1989. Strategic, administrative, and operative problems: 
The impact of outsiders on small firm performance. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 4(2): 37-51.
Citron, D., B. . 2003. The UK's framework approach to auditor independence and the 
commercialization of the accounting profession. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 16(2): 244-274.
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.  2003-2004.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., and Lang, L. 2000. The separation of ownership and control 
in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 81-112.
Clarke, R. N., Conyon, M. J., and Peck, S. I. 1998. Corporate Governance and 
Directors' Remuneration: Views from the Top. Business Strategy Review, 9(4): 
21-30.
Cochran, P. L., Wood, R. A., and Jones, T. B. 1985. The composition of boards of 
directors and the incidence of golden parachutes. Academy of Management 
Journal, 28: 664-671.
Coffee, J. 1991. Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor as corporate 
monitor. Columbia Law Review, 91: 1277-1368.
Coffee Jr., J. C. 2003. "What Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and Economic History 
of the 1990's. Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 214.
Coffee Jr., J. C. 2002. Understanding Enron: It's About the  Gatekeepers, Stupid. 
Columbia Law & Economics Working Paper No.207.
Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., and Wright, A. M. 2002. Corporate Governance and the 
Audit Process. Contemporary Accounting Research 19(4): 573–594.
Coles, J. W. and Hesterly, W. S. 2000. Independence of the chairman and board 
composition: Firm choices and share-holder value. Journal of Management, 26: 
195-214.
Collett, P. and Hrasky, S. 2005. Voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices 
by listed Australian companies. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 13(2): 188-196.
199
Collier, P. and Gregory, A. 1999. Audit committee activity and agency costs. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 18(4-5): 311-332.
Committee on Standards in Public Life. 2005. Getting the balance right.  Implementing 
standards of conduct in public life.
Companies Act (The). 1985.
Companies Act (The). 1989.
Companies (Audit, Investigations, and Community Enterprise) Act (The).  2004.
Company Law Reform Bill.  2006.
Company Law Reform. 2005. London: TSO.
Company Law Steering Group. 2001. Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: Final Reports, Vols I and II. London: DTI.
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act (The).  1985.
Conyon, M. and Leech, D. 1994. Top pay, company performance, and corporate 
governance. Oxford bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 56(3): 229-247.
Conyon, M. J. and Gregg, P. 1994. Pay at the top: A study of the sensitivity of top 
director remuneration to company specific shocks. National Institute Economic 
Review(149): 83.
Conyon, M., Gregg, P., and Machin, S. 1995. Taking care of business: executive 
compensation in the United Kingdom. The Economic Journal, 105(430): 704-
714.
Conyon, M. J. 1997. Corporate governance and executive compensation. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 15(4): 493-509.
Conyon, M. J. 1997. Institutional arrangements for setting directors' compensation in 
UK companies. In K. Keasey & S. Thompson & M. Wright (Eds.), Corporate 
Governance: Economic, Management and Financial Issues: 103-121. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Conyon, M. J. and Nicolitsas, D. 1998. Does the market for top executives work? CEO 
pay and turnover in small U.K. companies. Small Business Economics, 11(2): 
145.
Conyon, M. J. and Peck, S. I. 1998. Board control, remuneration committees and top 
management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41: 146-157.
Conyon, M. J. 2000. Directors pay in UK Plc's.  A guide to executive pay 
determination. London: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.
Conyon, M. J. and Murphy, K. J. 2000. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the US 
and the UK. Economic Journal, 110: 640-671.
Conyon, M. J., Peck, S. I., Read, L., and Sadler, G. V. 2000. The structure of executive 
compensation contracts: UK evidence. Long Range Planning, 33(4): 478-503.
Conyon, M. J., Peck, S. I., and Sadler, G. 2000. Econometric modelling of UK 
executive compensation. Managerial Finance, 26(9): 3-20.
Conyon, M. J. and Schwalbach, J. 2000. Executive Compensation: Evidence from the 
UK and Germany. Long Range Planning, 33(4): 504-526.
Conyon, M., Peck, S., and Read, L. 2001. Performance pay and corporate structure in 
UK firms. European Management Journal 19(1): 73-82.
Conyon, M. J. 2001. The Disclosure of UK Boardroom Pay: the March 2001 DTI 
proposals. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9(4): 276-285.
Conyon, M. J., Girma, S., Thompson, S., and Wright, P. 2001. Do hostile mergers 
destroy jobs? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 45(4): pg. 427.
Conyon, M. J., Peck, S. I., and Sadler, G. V. 2001. Corporate tournaments and 
executive compensation: Evidence from the U.K. Strategic Management 
Journal, 22(8): 805.
200
Conyon, M. J. and Sadler, G. V. 2001. CEO compensation, option incentives, and 
information disclosure. Review of Financial Economics, 10(3): 251-277.
Conyon, M. J. and Sadler, G. V. 2001. Executive pay, tournaments and corporate 
performance in UK firms. International Journal of Management Reviews, 3(2): 
141.
Conyon, M., J. , Mallin, C., and Sadler, G. 2002. The disclosure of directors' share 
option information in UK companies. Applied Financial Economics, 12(2): 95-
103.
Conyon, M. J., Girma, S., Thompson, S., and Wright, P. 2002. The Impact of Mergers 
and Acquisitions on Company Employment in the United Kingdom. European 
Economic Review, 46: 31-49.
Conyon, M. and Lerong, H. 2004. Compensation committees and CEO compensation 
incentives in US entrepreneurial firms. Mimeo.
Cooke, R. 1991. Danger signs of unethical behavior: How to determine if your firm is 
at ethical risk. Journal of Business Ethics, 41(4): 249.
Copeland, T. and Galai, D. 1983. Information effects on a bid-ask spread. Journal of 
Finance, 38(5): 1457-1469.
Corbett, J. 1994. An overview of the Japanese financial system. In J. Dimsdale & M. 
Prevezer (Eds.).
Core, J. E. 2001. A review of the empirical disclosure literature: discussion. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 31 (1-3): 441-456.
Cornu, P. I., Dusan. 2000. The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover 
Contests: Theory and Evidence from the UK. European Financial Management, 
6(4).
Cosh, A., Hughes, A., and Singh, A. 1984. The Causes and Effects of Takeovers in the 
UK: An Empirical Investigation for the late 1960s at the Macroeconomic Level. 
University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics, Economic 
Reprint(87).
Cosh, A. 1990. Takeovers and short-termism in the UK. London: Institute for Public 
Policy Research.
Cox, P., Brammer, S., and Millington, A. 2004. An empirical examination of 
institutional investor preferences for corporate social performance. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 52(1): 27-43.
Cranston, R. M. 2005. Whistleblowing [online] www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200405/cmhansrd/cm050405/halltext/50405h05.htm#50405h
05_head0 [accessed 02/12/05].
Criminal Justice Act (The).  1993.
Cully, M., Woodland, S., O’Reilly, A., and Dix, G. 1999. Britain at Work. London.: 
Routledge.
D’Aveni, R. 1990. Top Managerial Prestige and Organizational Bankruptcy. 
Organization Science, 1: 121-142.
D’Aveni, R. A. and Kesner, I. F. 1993. Top Managerial Prestige, Power and Tender 
Offer Response: A Study of Elite Social Networks and Target Firm Cooperation 
During Takeovers. Organization Science, 4: 123-151.
Dahya, J. and Powell, R. 1998. Ownership structure, managerial turnover and 
takeovers: Further U.K. evidence on the market for corporate control. 
Multinational Finance Journal, 2(1): pg. 63, 23 pgs.
Dahya, J. and Powell, R. 1999. Top Management Changes Following Hostile and 
Friendly Take-overs. ACCA Research Report No. 61, London.
Daily, C. M. and Dalton , D. R. 1992. The relationship between governance structure 
201
and corporate performance in entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 7(5): 375-386.
Daily , C. M. and Dalton, D. R. 1994. Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance: The 
Impact of Board Composition and Structure. Academy of Management Journal, 
37: 1603-1617.
Daily, C. M. 1995. The relationship between board composition and leadership 
structure and bankruptcy reorganization outcomes. Journal of Management, 21: 
1041-1056.
Daily, C. M. and Schwenk , C. 1996. Chief executive officers, top management teams, 
and board of directors: Congruent or countervailing forces? Journal of 
Management, 22: 185-208.
Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., Ellstrand, A. E., and Dalton, D. R. 1998. Compensation 
committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation. Academy of 
Management Journal, 41(2): 209-220.
Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., and Dalton, D. R. 1999. On the Measurements of Board 
Composition: Poor Consistency and a Serious Mismatch of Theory and 
Operationalization. Decision Sciences, 30: 83-106.
Daily, C., McDougall, P., Covin, J., and Dalton, D. 2002. Governance and strategic 
leadership in entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Management, 28(3): 387-412.
Daily, C., Dalton, D., and Rajagopalan, N. 2003. Governance through ownership: 
centuries of practice, decades of research. Academy of Management Journal, 
46: 115-158.
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., and Canella, A. A. 2003. Corporate Governance: Decades 
of Dialog and data. . Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 371-398.
Dallas, L. 2003. A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and 
Their Directors and Officers for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's 
Demise. Rutgers Law Journal, 35.
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., and Johnson, J. L. 1998. Meta-analytic 
review of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. 
Strategic Management Journal 19: 269-290.
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J., and Ellstrand, A. 1999. Number of Directors 
and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Academy of Management 
Journal, 42: 674-686.
Dalton, D., Daily, C., Certo, S., and Roengpitya, R. 2003. Meta-analysis of financial 
performance and equity: fusion or confusion? Academy of Management 
Journal, 46: 13-26.
Danbolt, J. 2000. Cross-Border Acquisitions into the UK - An Analysis of Target 
Company returns. University of Glasgow, Working Paper.
Datta, D., Pinches, G., and Narayanan, V. 1992. Factors Influencing Wealth Creation 
from Mergers and Acquisitions: A Meta-Analysis. Strategic Management 
Journal, 13(1): 67-84.
David, P., Kochhar R., and Levitas, E. 1998. The effects of institutional investors on 
level and mix of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41: 
200-208.
Davis, G. F. and Stout, S. K. 1992. Organization Theory and the Market for Corporate 
Control: a Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large Takeover Targets 
1980-1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37: 605-633.
Davis, G. F., Diekmann, K. A., and Tinsley, C. H. 1994. The Decline and Fall of the 
Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The De-institutionalization of an 
Organizational Form. American Sociological Review, 59: 547-570.
202
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., and Donaldson, L. 1997. Towards a stewardship theory 
of management. Academy of Management Review, 22: 20-47.
De Bakker, F., Groenewegen, P., and Den Hond, F. 2005. A bibliometric analysis of 30 
years of research and theory on corporate social responsibility and corporate 
social performance. Business and Society, 44(3): 283-317.
De Jong, H. W. 1992. Der Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle.  Eine historische, 
theoretische und empirische Betrachtung. In H. Gröner (Ed.), Der Markt für 
Unternehmenskontrollen: 141-159. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
De Jong, H. W. 1996. European Capitalism Between Freedom and Social Justice. In W. 
Bratton & J. McCahery & S. Picciotto & C. Scott (Eds.), International 
Regulatory Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on Economic 
Regulation in Europe and the United States: 185-206. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Deakin, S. and Cook. J. 2000.  Economic Effects of Criminal and Civil Sactions in the 
Context of Company Law.  (www.dti.gov.uk/cld/review.htm)
Deakin, S., Hobbs, R., Nash, D., and Slinger, G. 2002. Implicit contracts, takeovers and 
corporate governance: in the shadow of the city code. ESRC Centre for 
Business Research - Working Papers., wp254.
Dechow, P., Hutton, A., and Sloan, R. 2000. The Relation Between Analysts’ Forecasts 
of Long-Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity 
Offerings. Contemporary Accounting Research, 17(Spring): 1-32.
Dechow, P. M., and Schrand, C. M. 2004.  Earnings Quality, CFA Publications. 
http://www.cfapubs.org/rf/issues/v2004n3/toc.html
DeFond, M. L., Raghunandan, K., and Subramanyam, K. R. 2002. Do Non-audit 
Service Fees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going-concern 
Audit Opinions. USC Leventhal School of Accounting.
Degryse, H. and Van Cayseele, P. 1998. Relationship lending with a bank-based 
system’, mimeo, Tilburg.
Deloitte. 2005. Options take a hit but what will take their place?  The 2005 Deloitte 
stock compensation survey: Deloitte Development LLC.
Deloitte & Touche. 2004. Report on the impact of the Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations.  A report for the Department of Trade and Industry. London: 
Deloitte & Touche LLP.
Demb, A. and Neubauer , F. 1992. The Corporate Board. Confronting the Paradoxes. . 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Deminor Ratings. 2005. Application of the one share - one vote principle 
in Europe. Brussels. [online] 
http://www.abi.org.uk/BookShop/ResearchReports/DEMINOR_REPORT.pdf
Demirag, I. 1998. Board of Directors’ Short-term Perceptions and Evidence of 
Managerial Short-termism in the UK. The European Journal of Finance, 4(3): 
195-211.
Demsetz, H. 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 26: 375-390.
Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and 
consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93: 1155-1177.
Denis, D. and Sarin, A. 1999. Ownership and board structures in publicly traded 
corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 52: 187-223.
Deutsch, Y. 2005. The impact of board composition on firm's critical decisions: a meta-
analytic review. Journal of Management, 31(3): 424-444.
Dewatripont, M. and Tirole, J. 1994. A theory of debt and equity. Diversity of 
securities and management-shareholders congruence. Quarterly Journal of 
203
Economics, 109: 1027-1054.
Dewing, P. and Russell, P. O. 2004. Regulation of UK corporate governance: lessons 
from accounting, audit and financial services. Corporate Governance, 12(1): 
107-115.
DeZoort, F. T. 1998. An Analysis of Experience Effects on Audit Committee 
Members’ Oversight Judgments. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 23(1): 
1-21.
Diacon, S. R. and O’Sullivan, N. 1995. Does corporate governance influence 
performance? Some evidence from U.K. insurance companies. International 
Review of Law and Economics, 15: 405-424.
Diamond, D. and Verrechia, R. 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of equity 
capital. Journal of Finance, 46(4): 1325-1360.
Dickerson, A. P. G., Heather D.; Tsakalotos, Euclid. 1998. Takeover Risk and 
Dividend Strategy: A Study of UK Firms. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 
XLVI(3).
Dickerson, A. P., Gibson, Heather D,  Tsakalotos, Euclid. 2002. Takeover risk and the 
market for corporate control: The experience of British firms in the 1970s and 
1980s. International Journal of Industrial Organization 20(8): pg. 1167.
Dittmann, I. and Maug, E. 2003. Lower salaries and no options?  On the optimal 
structure of executive pay: ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 032/2003.
Dodd, P. and Ruback, R. 1977. Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical 
Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 5: 351-374.
Donaldson, T. 1989. The Ethics of International Business. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Donaldson, T. and Preston, L. 1995. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: 
concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy of Management Review 20: 65-
91.
Dong, M., Hirshleifer, D. A., Richardson, S. A., and Teoh, S. H. 2003. Does Investor 
Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market? EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper, 
No. 652.
Donnelly, S., Gamble, A., Jackson, G., and Parkinson, J. 2000. The Public Interest and 
the Company in Germany and Britain. London: Anglo-German Foundation.
Dore, R. 2005. Deviant or Different?  Corporate Governance in Japan and Germany. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(3): 437-446.
Draper, P. and Paudyal, K. 1999. Corporate takeovers: Mode of payment, returns and 
trading activity. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 26(5/6): 521-538.
DTI. 1998. Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy. London: DTI.
DTI. 2002. Modernising Company Law. London: DTI.
DTI.  2004. Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations. London: DTI.
DTI.  2006.  Implementation of the EU Directive of Takeover Bids. Guidance on 
changes to the rules on company takeovers.  London: DTI.
Dunne, P. G., Falk, H., Forker, J., and Powell, R. 2005. Information Quality, Auditor 
Reputation and Capitalization Effects: The Legacy of Enron.
Dyck, I. 2000. Ownership structure, legal protection and corporate governance: Mimeo, 
Harvard Business School.
Dyson Report.  2003.  Recruitment and Development of Non-executive Directors.
Edelsten, M. 2005. Manage reward or reward new management. Executive 
Compensation Review, 297(November 2005): 21-23.
Edwards, J. and Fischer, K. 1996. Banks, Finance, and Investment in Germany. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
204
Egginton, D., Forker, J., and Grout, P. 1993. Executive and employee share options: 
Taxation, dilution and disclosure. Accounting & Business Research, 23(91A): 
363-372.
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1): 57-74.
El-Gazzar, S. M. 1998. Predisclosure information and institutional ownership: A cross-
sectional examination of market revaluations during earnings announcement 
periods. The Accounting Review, 73: 119-129.
Elsas, R. and Krahnen, J. P. 1998. Is relationship lending special?  Evidence from 
credit file data in Germany. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22: 1283-1316.
Emmanuel, C. and Garrod, N. 2004. Rules- versus judgement-based accounting in the 
UK’. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(6): 441-455.
Employment Relations Act (The).  1999.
Ensley, M. D., Pearson, A. W., and Amason, A. C. 2002. Understanding the Dynamics 
of New Venture Top Management Teams: Cohesion, Conflict, and New 
Venture Performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 17(4): 365-386.
Enterprise Act (The).  2002.
ESRC. 2003. The UK's Productivity Gap: What Research Tells Us and What We Need 
to Find Out. London: London School of Economics.
European Foundation. 2004. European works councils in practice. Dublin: European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
European Takeover Directive.  2004. 25/EC  
Ezzamel, M. and Watson, R. 1998. Market comparison earnings and the bidding up of 
executive cash compensations: evidence from the United Kingdom. The 
Academy of Management Journal, 41(2): 221-231.
Faccio, M. and Lasfer, M. 2000. Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in 
which they hold large stakes? Journal of Corporate Finance, 6: 71-110.
Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy, 88(8): 288-307.
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 26: 301-325.
Fama, E. F. 1985. What’s different about banks? Journal of Monetary Economics, 15: 
5-29.
Fearnley, S., Hines, T., McBride, K., and Brandt, R. 2002. The impact of the financial 
reporting review panel on aspects of the independence of auditors and their 
attitudes to compliance in the UK. The British Accounting Review, 34(2): 109-
139.
Felo, A. J., Krishnamurthy, S., and Solieri, S. A. 2003. Audit Committee 
Characteristics and the Perceived Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empirical 
Analysis. Mimeo.
Filatotchev, I. and Bishop , K. 2002. Board Composition, Share Ownership and 
Underpricing’ of UK IPO Firms. Strategic Management Journal, 23: 941-955.
Filatotchev, I. and Toms , S. 2003. Corporate Governance, Strategy and Survival in a 
Declining Industry: A study of UK Cotton Textile Companies. Journal of 
Management Studies, 40(4): 895-920.
Filatotchev, I. and Wright, M. (Eds.). 2005. Corporate Governance Life-Cycle. 
London: Edward Elgar.
Financial Accounting Standards Board.  1982.  Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 57. (Related Party Disclosures).  Connecticut: Financial 
Accounting Standards Board.
205
Financial Director. 2006. The Annual Audit Fees Survey [online] 
http://images.vnunet.com/v7_images/pdf/aa/fd-audit-fees-2005.pdf
Financial Reporting Council. 2005. Internal control: Revised guidance for directors on 
the combined code (Turnbull Guidance). London: The Financial Reporting 
Council.
Financial Reporting Council. 2006. Review of the 2003 combined Code on corporate 
Governance. London: The Financial Reporting Council.
Financial Services and Markets Act (The).   2000.
Financial Services Authority. 2003. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance. 
London: Financial Services Authority.
Financial Services Authority. 2005. Listing, Prospectus and Disclosure Rules. London: 
FSA.
Finkelstein, S. and Hambrick, D. C. 1996. Strategic Leaderships: Top Executives and 
their Organizations. Minneapolis.: West Educational Publishing.
Finkelstein, S. and Boyd, B. 1998. How much does the CEO matter? The role of 
managerial discretion in the setting of CEO compensation. Academy of 
Management Journal, 41: 179-199.
Fiss, P. C. 2005. A Set-Theoretic Approach to Organizational Configurations. 
Academy of Management Review.
Fitzroy, F. R. and Kraft, K. 2005. Codetermination, efficiency, and productivity. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 43(2): 233-247.
Fizel, J. L. and Louie, K. K. T. 1990. CEO retention, firm performance, and corporate 
governance. Managerial and Decision Economics, 11: 167-176.
Fligstein, N. 1990. The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Forker, J. 1992. Corporate governance and disclosure quality. Accounting and Business 
Research, 22(86): 111-124.
Forsyth, M. and Raj, M. 2002. Hostile bidders, long-term performance, and 
restructuring methods: Evidence from the UK. American Business Review
20(1): pg. 71, 11 pgs.
Forsyth, M. and Raj, M. 2003. Hubris amongst UK Bidders and Losses to 
Shareholders. International Journal of Business, 8(1): 1-16.
Forth, J. and Millward, N. 2002. The Growth of Direct Communication. London.: 
CIPD.
Foster, M. and Meinhard, A. 2002. Corporate social responsibility in the Canadian 
context: the new role of the corporation in community involvement and social 
issues. Mimeo, Ryerson University.
Francis, J. R. 2004. What do we know about audit quality? The British Accounting 
Review, 36(4): 345-368.
Frankel, R. M., Johnson, M. F., and Nelson, K. K. 2002. The relation between auditors’ 
fees for non-audit services and earnings quality. MIT Sloan School of 
Management, Working Paper, No. 4330-02.
Frankel, R. M. and Li, X. 2004. Characteristics of a firm’s information environment 
and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 37(2): 229-259.
Franks, J. R. and Harris, R. 1989. Wealth effects of take-overs in the UK. Journal of 
Financial Economics: p.225-241.
Franks, J. and Mayer, C. 1996. Hostile Takeovers in the UK and the Correction of 
Managerial Failure. Journal of Financial Economics, 40: 163-181.
Franks, J. and Mayer, C. 1997. Corporate ownership and control in the UK, Germany, 
206
and France. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9: 30-45.
Fredrickson, J. W., Hambrick, D. C., and Baumrin, S. 1988. A model of CEO 
dismissal. Academy of Management Journal, 13: 255-271.
Freeman, R. and Medoff, J. 1984. What do unions do? New York: Basic Books.
Freeman, R. E. 1984. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston.: 
Pitman.
Frege, C. 2002. Theoretical and Empirical Research on German Works Councils: A 
Critical Assessment. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40(2): 221-248.
Frick, B., Speckbacher, G., and Wentges, P. 1999. Arbeitnehmerbestimmung und 
moderne Theorie der Unternehmung. Zeitschrift fur Betriebswirtschaft, 69(7): 
745-763.
Frick, B. and Lehmann, E. 2004. Corporate governance in Germany: ownership, 
codetermination, and firm performance in a stakeholder economy. In H. Gospel 
& A. Pendleton (Eds.), Corporate Governance and Labour Management. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Friedman, M. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Frooman, J. 1997. Socially irresponsible and illegal behavior and shareholder wealth: a 
meta analysis of event studies. Business and Society, 36: 221-249.
Gamble, A. and Kelly, G. 2001. Shareholder value and the stakeholder debate in the 
UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9(2): 110-117.
Gaved, M. 1997. Closing the Gap: Disclosure and Institutional Shareholders. London: 
ICAEW.
Gaved, M. 1998. Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance. London: 
Foundation for Business Responsibility.
Geletkanysz, M. and Hambrick, D. 1997. The External Ties of Top Executives: 
Implications for Strategic Choice and Performance. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 42: 654-681.
Gerke, W., Garz, H., and Oerke, M. 1995. Die Bewertung von 
Unternehmensübernamen auf dem deutschen Aktienmarkt. Zeitschrift für 
betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, 47: 805-820.
Gibbs, P. 1993. Determinants of Corporate Restructuring: The Relative Importance of 
Corporate Governance, Takeover Threat, and Free Cash Flow. Strategic 
Management Journal, 14: 51-68.
Gietzmann, M. and Ireland, J. 2004. Cost of capital, strategic disclosures, and 
Accounting Choice. Mimeo, London School of Economics.
Gillan, S. L. and Martin, J. D. 2002. Financial Engineering, Corporate Governance, and 
the Collapse of Enron. U of Delaware Coll. of Bus. and Econ. Ctr. for Corp. 
Governance, Working Paper No. 2002-001.
Gilson, S. C. 1989. Management turnover and financial distress. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 25: 241-262. .
Gilson, S. C. 1990. Bankruptcy, boards, banks and blockholders. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 27: 355-387.
Gilson, R. and Roe, M. 1993. Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between 
corporate governance and industrial organization. Yale Law Journal, 102: 871-
906.
Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, Reinier H.,2004 "MOME in Hindsight" . Regulation, 
Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 64-72
Glassman, C. A. and Rhoades, S. A. 1980. Owner vs manager control effects on bank 
performance. Review of Economics and Statistics, 62: 263-270.
Glosten, L. and Milgrom, P. 1985. Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a specialist 
207
market with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 
14(1): 71-100.
Goddard, A. R. and Masters, C. 2000. Audit committees, Cadbury Code and audit fees: 
an empirical analysis of UK companies. Managerial Auditing Journal, 15(7): 
358-371.
Goergen, M. and Renneboog, L. 2004. Shareholder wealth effects of European 
domestic and crossborder takeover bids. European Financial Management, 10: 
9-45.
Goergen, M., Renneboog, L., and Martynova, M.  2005.  Corporate 
Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeover Regulation Reforms in 
Europe.  Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21 (2), 243-268.
Golden, B. R. and Zajac, E. J. 2001. When Will Boards Influence Strategy? Inclination 
x Power = Strategic Change. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 1087-1111.
Gomes-Mejia, L., Nunez-Nickel, M., and Guttierrez, I. 2001. The role of family ties in 
agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 81-95.
Gomes-Mejia, L., Larraza-Kintana, M., and Makri, M. 2003. The determinants of 
executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations. Academy of 
Management Journal, 46: 226-237.
Goodstain J and W., B. 1991. Turbulence at the Top: A New Perspective on 
Governance Structure Changes and Strategic Change. Academy of Management 
Journal, 34: 306-330.
Gordon, J. N. 2002. What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the 
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections. University of Chicago 
Law Review, Summer.
Gorton, G. and Scmid, F. 2000. Class struggle inside the firm: a study of German 
codetermination, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Working Paper 2000-25.
Gospel, H., Lockwood, G., and Willman, P. 2003. A British Dilemma: Disclosure of 
Information for Collective Bargaining and Joint Consultation. Comparative
Labor Law and Policy Journal, 22(2): 101-123.
Gospel, H. and Willman, P. 2003. Dilemmas in Worker Representation – Information, 
Consultation, and Negotiation. In H. Gospel & S. Wood (Eds.), Representing 
Workers: Trade Union Recognition and Membership in Britain: 144-165. 
London: Routledge.
Gospel, H. and Pendleton, A. (Eds.). 2004. Corporate Governance and Labour 
Management. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grabosky, P. N. 1995. Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory 
Compliance. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and 
Administration, 8(4): 527-550.
Graves, S. and Waddock, S. 1994. Institutional owners and corporate social 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 37(4): 1035-1046.
Greenbury, S. R. 1995. Director's remuneration report of a study group chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury (Greenbury Report). London: Gee Publishing Ltd.
Greenley, G. and Foxall, G. R. 1997. Multiple stakeholder orientation in UK companies 
and the implications for company performance. Journal of Management Studies, 
34(2): 259-284.
Gregg, P., Machin, S., and Symanski, S. 1993. The disappearing relationship between 
directors pay and corporate performance. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
31(1): 1-9.
Gregory, A. and McCorriston, S. 2002. Foreign acquisitions by UK limited companies: 
long-run performance in the US, Continental Europe and the rest of the world. 
208
Working Paper, Financial Markets Research Centre, University of Exeter.
Griffin, J. J. and Mahon, J. F. 1997. The corporate social performance and corporate 
financial performance debate: 25 years of incomparable research. Business and 
Society, 36(1): 5-31.
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. 1980. Disclosure laws and takeover bids. Journal of Finance, 
35: 323-334.
Grossman, S. 1981. The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about 
product quality Journal of Law and Economics, 24: 461-483.
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. 1988. One share-one vote and the market for corporate 
control. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 175-202.
Groves, J. 1999. Identifying, developing and effectively implementing a risk 
management methodology which suits your company's operating strategy and 
corporate culture. Paper presented at the Proactively Managing Business Risk 
and Ensuring Effective Internal Control in the Light of the Combined Code and 
the New Turnbull Committee Report, London.
Gulati, R. and Westphal, J. 1999. Cooperative or Controlling? The Effects of CEO-
Board Relations and the Content of Interlocks on the Formation of Joint 
Ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44: 473-506.
Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, P. A. and Gingerich, D. W. 2003. Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional
Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis. Max-Planck-
Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Discussion Paper.
Hallock, K. and Murphy, K. 1999. The Economics of Executive Compensation: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Hambrick, D. and Mason, P. 1984. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection 
of its Top Managers. Academy of Management Journal, 9: 193-206.
Hambrick, D. C. and D’Aveni , R. A. 1992. Top team deterioration as part of the 
downward spiral of large corporate bankruptcies. Management Science, 38: 
1445-1466.
Hambrick, D. and Jackson, E. 2000. Outside Directors with Stake: The Linchpin in 
Improving Governance. California Management Review, 42: 108-127.
Hampel, R. 1998. Committee on corporate governance: final report (Hampel 
Committee Report). London: Gee Publishing.
Hampel, R. 1998. Committee on corporate governance: the combined code. London: 
Gee Publishing.
Hannah, L. 1986. Inventing Retirement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hansmann, H. 1996. The ownership of enterprise. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.
Harhoff, D. and Körting, T. 1998. Lending relationships in Germany. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 22: 1317-1353.
Harris, M. and Raviv, A. 1988. Corporate governance. Voting rights and majority rules. 
Journal of Financial Economics 20: 203-235.
Harris, M. and Raviv, A. 1990. Capital structure and the information role of debt. 
Journal of Finance, 45: 321-350.
Harrison, J. S. and Freeman, R. E. 1999. Stakeholders, social responsibility, and 
performance: empirical evidence and theoretical perspectives. Academy of 
Management Journal, 42: 479-487.
Hart, O. 1995. Corporate governance some theory and implications. Economic Journal, 
105(430): 678-689.
209
Hart, O. 1995. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Hart, O. 2001. Financial contracting. Journal of Economic Literature, 39: 1079-1100.
Haspeslagh, P. and Jemison, D. 1991. Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value Through 
Corporate Renewal. New York: Free Press.
Hayek, F. 1969. The corporation in a democratic society: in whose interests ought it 
and will it be run. In H. Ansoff (Ed.), Business Strategy. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin.
Hayward, M. and Hambrick, D. 1997. Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large 
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubbris. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 
103-127.
Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations.  1996.
Healy, P., Hutton, A., and Palepu, K. G. 1999. Stock performance and intermediation 
changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Fall 1999: 485-520.
Healy, P. and Palepu, K. G. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and 
the capital market: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 31(1-3): 405-440.
Helbok, G. and Walker, M. 2003. On the willingness of UK companies to issue profit 
warnings. Mimeo, Manchester.
Hempel, P. and Fay, C. 1994. Outside director compensation and firm performance. 
Human Resource Management, 33: 111-133.
Hendry, C., Woodward, S., Harvey-Cook, J., and Gaved, M. 1999. Investors' views of 
people management. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 7(4): 
324.
Hendry, J. 2002. The Principal’s Other Problems: Honest Incompetence and the 
Specification of Objectives. Academy of Management Review, 27: 98-113.
Hermalin, B. E. and Weisbach, M. S. 1991. The effects of board composition and direct 
incentives on firm performance. Financial Management 20: 101-112.
Hermalin, B. and Weisbach, M. 1998. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and 
Their Monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review 88: 96-118.
Hermalin, B. and Weisbach, M. 2003. Boards of directors as an Endogenously 
determined institution: a survey of the economics literature. Economic Policy 
Review, 9: 7-26.
Higgins, M. and Gulati, R. 1999. Getting off to a Start: The Effects of Upper Echelon 
Affiliations on Prestige of Investment Bank and IPO Success: Working Paper, 
Harvard Business School.
Higgs, D. 2003. Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. 
London: HMSO.
Higson, C. and Elliot, J. 1998. Post-takeover Returns: The UK Evidence. Journal of 
Empirical Finance, 5: 27-46.
Hill, C. W. L. and Snell, S. A. 1988. External control, corporate strategy, and firm 
performance in research-intensive industries. Strategic Management Journal, 9: 
577-590.
Hill, S. 1995. The social organization of boards of directors. The British Journal of 
Sociology, 46: 245-278.
Hillman, A., Cannella Jr, A. A., and Paetzold, R. L. 2000. The resource dependence 
role of corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in 
response to environmental change. Journal of Management Studies, 37: 235-
255.
210
Hillman, A. J. and Dalziel, T. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: 
Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of 
Management Review, 28(3): 383-396.
Himmelberg, C., Hubbard, R., and Palia, D. 1999. Understanding the determinants of 
managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 53: 353-384.
Hirschleifer, J. 1973. Where are we in the theory of information? American Economic 
Review, 63(2): 31-39.
Hirschman, A. O. 1972. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.  Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hirshey, M., Slovin, M. B., and Zaima, J. K. 1990. Bank debt, insider trading, and the 
return to corporate sell-offs. Journal of Banking & Finance, 14: 85-98.
Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., Johnson, D., and Moesel, D. 1996. The Market for 
Corporate Control and Firm Innovation. Academy of management Journal, 
39(5): 1084-1119.
HM Revenue and Customs. 2005. Annual Statistics.
HM Treasury.  2004.  Myners principles for institutional investment decision-making: 
review progress.  London: HMSO  
Holderness, C. and Sheehan, D. 1988. The role of majority shareholders in publicly 
held corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 317-346.
Holl, P. K., Dimitris. 1997. Wealth Creation and Bid Resistance in U.K. Takeover 
Bids. Strategic Management Journal, 18(6): 483-498.
Holland, J. 1994. Bank lending relationships and the complex nature of bank-corporate 
relations. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 21: 367-393.
Holland, J. 1997. Corporate communications to institutional shareholders. Edinburgh: 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland.
Holland, J. 2005. A grounded theory of corporate disclosure: mimeo, Glasgow 
University.
Holmstrom, B. and Kaplan, S. 2001. Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the 
US: Making Sense of the 80's and 90's. Journal of Economic Perspectives: 121-
144.
Höpner, M. 2001. Corporate Governance in Transition:  Ten Empirical Findings on 
Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in Germany. MPIfG Discussion 
Paper 01 / 5, Köln: Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung.
Höpner, M. and Jackson, G. 2001. An Emerging Market for Corporate Control?  The 
Case of Mannesmann and German Corporate Governance. MPIfG Discussion 
Paper 01 / 4, Köln: Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung.
Hoskisson, R. E., Johnson, R. A., and Moesel, D. D. 1994. Corporate divestiture 
intensity in restructuring firms: Effects of governance, strategy and 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 37: 1207-1251.
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Johnson, R. A., and Grossman, W. 2002. Conflicting 
voices: The effects of institutional ownership heterogeneity and internal 
governance on corporate innovation strategies. Academy of Management 
Journal, 45: 697-716.
Hoskisson, R., Cannella, A., Tihanyi, L., and Faraci, R. 2004. Asset restructuring and 
business group affiliation in French civil law countries. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25: 525-539.
Humphrey, C. and Moizer, P. 1990. From Techniques to Ideologies: An Alternative 
Perspective on the Audit Function. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 1(3): 
217-238.
211
Humphrey, C., Moizer, P., and Turley, S. 1992. The Audit Expectations Gap in the 
United Kingdom. London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales.
Hunter, J. and Schmidt, F. 1990. Methods of Meta-Analysis: Correcting Error and Bias 
in Research Findings. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Hussainey, K., Schleicher, T., and Walker, M. 2003. Undertaking large-scale disclosure 
studies when AIMR-FAF ratings are not available: the case of prices leading 
earnings. Accounting and Business Research, 33(4): 275-294.
Hussainey, K., Schleicher, T., and Walker, M. 2004. The information content of the 
annual report narratives of loss making firms: preliminary evidence: mimeo, 
Manchester University.
Hutton, W. 1997. Stakeholding and its critics. London: London.
Hutton, A. 2002. The Role of Sell-Side Analysts in the Enron Debacle. Working Paper, 
Harvard Business School.
IDS. 2005. Incentive schemes boost FTSE 100 directors' earnings. Executive 
Compensation Review, 297 (November 2005): 4-7.
IFRS2. 2005. The International Accounting Standard for Share-based Payments.
Informa Group. 2003. The Review: Corporate Governance Handbook. London: 
Informa Group.
Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations.  2004.
Insolvency Act (The).  1986.
IRS Employment Review. 2000. Growing use of variable pay packages for UK 
executives. IRS Employment Review (696): 8.
ISC. 2002.  The responsibilities of institutional shareholders and agents – Statement of 
principles.  London: Institutional Shareholders’ Committee.
Jackson, G. and Vitols, S. 2001. Between Financial Commitment, Market Liquidity and 
Corporate Governance: Occupational Pensions in Britain, Germany, Japan and 
the USA. In B. Ebbinghaus & P. Manow (Eds.), Comparing Welfare 
Capitalism. Social Policy and Political Economy in Europe, Japan and the USA: 
171-189. London: Routledge.
Jackson, G. 2003. Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Liberalization 
Pressures and Responses. In K. Yamamura & W. Streeck (Eds.), The End of 
Diversity?  Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism: 261-305. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press.
Jackson, G. 2005a. Employee Representation in the Board Compared: A Fuzzy Sets 
Analysis of Corporate Governance, Unionism, and Political Institutions 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 12(3): 1-28.
Jackson, G. 2005b. Stakeholders under Pressure: Corporate Governance and Labour 
Management in Germany and Japan. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 13(3): 419-428.
Jackson, G. 2006. Modeling Complementarity: Multiple Functions and Different 
Levels. Socio-Economic Review, forthcoming.
James, C. 1987. Some evidence of the uniqueness of bank loans. Journal of Financial 
Economics 19: 217-235.
James, C. and Weir, P. 1990. Borrowing relationships, intermediation, and the cost of 
issuing public securities. Journal of Financial Economics, 28: 149-171.
James, H. 1999. Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 6(1): 41-55.
Jarrell, G., Brickley, J., and Netter, J. 1988. The Market for Corporate Control: The 
Empirical Evidence since 1980. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(1): 49-68.
212
Jenkinson, T. and Mayer, C. 1994. Hostile Takeovers. London: McGraw-Hill.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-
360.
Jensen, M. C. and Ruback, R. 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11: 5-50.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
American Economic Review, 76: 323-329.
Jensen, M. C. and Warner, J. B. 1988. The distribution of power among corporate 
managers, shareholders, and directors. . Journal of Financial Economics 20: 3-
24.
Jensen, M. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal 
control systems. Journal of Finance, 48: 831-880.
Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R. E., and Hitt, M. A. 1993. Board of director involvement 
in restructuring: The effects of board versus managerial controls and 
characteristics. Strategic Management Journal, 14: 33-50.
Johnson, J. L., Daily, C. M., and Ellstrand, E. 1996. Board of directors: A review and 
research agenda. Journal of Management, 22: 409-438.
Johnson, R. B. 1997. The board of directors over time: Composition and the 
organizational life cycle. International Journal of Management, 14: 339-344.
Johnson, R. and Greening, D. 1999. The effects of corporate governance and 
institutional ownership types on corporate social responsibility. Academy of 
Management Journal, 42(5): 564-576.
Jones, T. M. 1995. Instrumental stakeholder theory: a synthesis of ethics and 
economics. Academy of Management Review 20: 305-360.
Jovanovic, B. and Rousseau, P. L. 2002. The Q-theory of mergers. American Economic 
Review, 92: 198-204.
Jubb, P. 1999. Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 21(1): 77-94.
Judge, W. Q. and Dobbins, G. H. 1995. Antecedents and effects of outside directors’ 
awareness of CEO decision style. Journal of Management, 21: 43-64.
Judge Jr, W. Q. and Zeithaml , C. P. 1992. Institutional and strategic choice 
perspectives on board involvement in the strategic decision process. Academy 
of Management Journal, 35: 766-794.
Kakabadse, N. and Kakabadse, A. 2004. Pension fund governance: an overview of the 
role of trustees. International Journal of Business, Governance and Ethics, 1(1): 
3-26.
Kalbers, L. P. and Fogarty, T. J. 1998. Organizational and Economic Explanations of 
Audit Committee Oversight. Journal of Managerial Issues, 10(2): 129-151.
Kaplan, S. and Reishus, D. 1990. Outside directors and corporate performance. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 27: 389-410.
Kay, J. The Foundations of Corporate Success. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kay, J. and Silberston, A. 1995. Corporate governance. National Institute for Economic 
and Social Research, 84: 84-97.
Kay, J. 1997. The stakeholder corporation. In G. Kelly, et al. (Ed.), Stakeholder 
capitalism, Macmillan, London. London: Macmillan.
Keasey, K. and Wright, M. 1993. Issues in Corporate Accountability and Governance: 
An Editorial. Accounting and Business Research, 23: 291-303.
Keasey, K., Thompson, S., and Wright, M. 1997. Introduction: the corporate 
governance problem – competing diagnoses and solutions. In K. Keasey & S. 
213
Thompson & M. Wright (Eds.), Corporate governance: economic, management, 
and financial issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelly, G. and Parkinson, J. 1998. The conceptual foundations of the corporation: a 
pluralist approach. Corporation, Financial, and Insolvency Law Review, 2: 174-
197.
Kennedy, R. J. and Limmack, V. A.. 1996. Take-over Activity, CEO Turnover and the 
Market for Corporate Control. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 23: 
267-285.
Kerr, J. and Bettis, R. A. 1987. Boards of directors, top management compensation, and 
shareholders returns. Academy of Management Journal, 30: 645-664.
Kesner, I. 1987. Directors’ Characteristics and Committee Membership: An 
Investigation of Type, Occupation, Tenure and Gender. Academy of 
Management Journal, 31: 66-84.
Kesner, J. L. and Johnson, R. B. 1990. An investigation of the relationship between 
board composition and stockholder suits. Strategic Management Journal, 11: 
327-226.
Kester, W. C. 1990. Japanese takeovers : the global contest for corporate control. 
Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press.
Kester, W. C. 1996. American and Japanese Corporate Governance: Convergence to 
Best Practice? In S. Berger & R. Dore (Eds.), National Diversity and Global 
Capitalism: 107. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
King, D. R., Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., and Covin, J. G. 2004. Meta-Analysis of Post-
Acquisitions Performance: Indications of Unidentified Moderators. Strategic 
Management Journal, 25: 187-200.
Kini, O., Kracaw, W., and Mian, S. 1995. Corporate Takeovers, Firm Performance and 
Board Composition. Journal of Finance, 1: 383-412.
Kirkbride, J. and Letza, S. 2004.  Regulation, Governance and Regulatory Collibration: 
achieving an “holistic” approach.  Corporate Governance, Vol. 12, No.1, p.85-
92.
Klein, A. 2000. Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings 
Management.
Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of directors’ characteristics, and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3): 375-400.
Kochar, R. and David, P. 1996. Institutional investors and firm innovation: a test of 
conflicting hypotheses. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 73-84.
Konstantinos, S., Espenlaub, S., and Walker, M. 2004. U.K. Executive Compensation 
Practices: New Economy versus Old Economy. Journal of Management 
Accounting Research, 16: 57-92.
Kosnik, D. R. 1987. Greenmail: A study in board performance in corporate governance. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 32: 163-185.
Kraakman, R. 1988. Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of Discounted
Shares Prices as an Acquisition Motive. Columbia Law Review, 88: 891-941.
Kraft, K. and Stank, J. 2004. Die Auswirkungen der gesetzlichen Mitbestimmung auf 
die Innovationsaktivitaten deutscher Unternehmen. Schmollers Jahrbuch, 124: 
421-449.
Kyle, A. 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trade. Econometrica, 53(6): 1315-1335.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1998. Law and finance. 
Journal of Political Economy, 106: 1113-1155.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. 1999. Corporate ownership around 
the world. Journal of Finance, 54: 471-517.
214
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 2000. Investor 
protection and corporate valuation. Mimeo, Harvard University.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 2000. Investor 
protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 3-27.
Laing, D. and Weir, C., M. . 1999. Governance structures, size and corporate 
performance in UK firms. Management Decision, 37(5): 457-464.
Lambert, R. A. 2001. Contracting theory and accounting. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 32(1): 3-87.
Lane, C. and Bachmann, R. 1998. Trust Within and Between Organizations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Lang, L. H. P., R. Stulz, and Walkling, R. A. 1989. Managerial performance, Tobin’s q, 
and the gains from successful tender offers. Journal of Financial Economics, 24: 
137–154.
Lang, M. and Lundholm, R. 1993. Cross sectional determinants of analysts rating of 
corporate disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 31 246-271.
Lang, M. and Lundholm, R. 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. 
Accounting Review, 71: 467-492.
Lang, M. and Lundholm, R. 2000. Voluntary disclosure during equity offerings: 
reducing information asymmetry or hyping the stock? Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 17(4): 623-663.
Langevoort, D. C. 2001. The human nature of corporate boards: laws, norms, and the 
unintended consequences of independence and accountability. Georgetown Law 
Journal, , 89: 797-832.
LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1998. Corporate 
ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54: 471-518.
LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. 2004. What works in securities 
laws? Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Larcker, D. F. and Richardson, S. A. 2003. Corporate Governance, Fees for Non-audit 
Services and Accrual Choices.
Larcker, D. S., Richardson, S., and Tuna, A. 2005. How important is corporate 
governance? , http://ssrn.com/abstract=595821.
Laverty, K. J. 1996. Economic “short-termism”: The debate, the unresolved issues, and 
the implications for management practice and research. Academy of 
Management Review, 21: 825-860.
Leech, D. and Leahy, J. 1991. Ownership structure, control type classifications and the 
performance of large British companies. Economic Journal, 101: 1418-1437.
Leone, A., Rock, S., and Willenborg, M. 2003. Disclosure of intended use of proceeds 
and underpricing in initial public offerings: Working Paper, University of 
Connecticut.
Lepsius, M. R. 1990. Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen. Opladen: Westdeutsche 
Verlag.
Lerner, J. 1995. Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms. Journal of 
Finance, 50: 301-318.
Letza, S., Sun, X., and Kirkbride, J. 2004. Shareholding versus stakeholding: a critical 
review of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 12(3): 242-262.
Leuz, C. and Verrechia, R. E. 2000. The economic consequences of increased 
disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 38: 91-124.
Levine, P. and Aaronovitch, S. 1981. The Financial Characteristics of Firms and 
Theories of Merger Activity. Journal of Industrial Economics, XXX: 149-172.
215
Levine, R., Loayza, N., and Beck, T. 2000. Financial intermediation and growth: 
causality and causes. Journal of Monetary Economics, 46: 31-77.
Lewis, D. 2001. Whistleblowing at Work. London: Continuum.
Limited Liability Partnerships Act (The).  2004.
Lin, H. and McNichols, M. 1998. Underwriting Relationships and Analysts’ Forecasts 
and Investment Recommendations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 25: 
101-127.
Lombardo, D. and Pagano, M. 2000. Legal determinants of the return on equity: CEPR 
Discussion Paper, London.
Lorsch, J. W. and MacIver, E. 1989. Pawns or Potentates. The Reality of America ’s 
Corporate Boards. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School.
Lowenstein, L. 1985. Management Buyouts. Columbia Law Review, 85: 730-784.
Lummer, S. L. and McConnell, J. 1989. Further evidence on the bank lending process 
and the capital market response to bank loan agreements. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 25: 99-122.
Luoma, P. and Goodstein, J. 1998. Stakeholders and corporate boards: institutional 
influences on board composition and structure. Academy of Management 
Journal, 42(5): 553-563.
Lynall, M. D., Goden, B. R., and Hillman, A. J. 2003. Board composition from 
adolescence to maturity: a multitheoretic view. Academy of Management 
Review, 28(3): 416-431.
Mace, M. 1971. Directors: Myth and reality. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Macey, J. and Miller, G. 1997. Universal banks are not the answer to America's 
corporate governance “problem”: a look at Germany, Japan and the US. Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, 9: 57-73.
Main, B. G. M. and Johnston, J. 1993. Remuneration committees and corporate 
governance. Accounting & Business Research, 23(91A): 351-362.
Main, B. G. M., Bruce, A., and Buck, T. 1996. Total board remuneration and company 
performance. The Economic Journal, 106(439): 1627-1644.
Mak, Y. and Li, Y. 2001. Determinants of Corporate Ownership and Board Structure: 
Evidence from Singapore. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7: 235-256.
Mallette, P. and Fowler, K. L. 1992. Effects of board composition and stock ownership 
on the adoption of poison pills. Academy of Management Journal, 35: 1010-
1035.
Mangel, R. and Singh, H. 1993. Ownership structure, board relationship and CEO 
compensation in large U.S. corporations. Accounting & Business Research, 23: 
339-350.
Mangena, M. and Pike, R. 2004. Shareholding of audit committee members, audit 
committee size and expertise, and the quality of interim financial reporting. 
Mimeo, Bradford.
Manigart, S., DeWaele, K., Wright, M., Robbie, K., Desbrières, P., Sapienza, H., and 
Beekman , A. 2002. Determinants of Required Return in Venture Capital 
Investments: A Five-country Study. Journal of Business Venturing, 17: 291-
312.
Manne, H. 1965. Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control. Journal of Political 
Economy, 73(2): 110-120.
Marris, R. 1964. The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism. New York: The Free 
Press.
Marston, C. 1999. Investor relations meetings: views of companies, institutional 
investors, and analysts. Edinburgh: Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
216
Scotland.
Martin, K. J. and McConnell, J. J. 1991. Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, 
and Management Turnover. Journal of Finance, 46: 671-688.
Martin, B. 2000. The Whistleblower's Handbook: How to Be an Effective Resister 
Oxford: Jon Carpenter Publishing.
Maug, E. 1998. Large shareholders as monitors: Is there a trade-off between liquidity 
and control? Journal of Finance, 53: 65-92.
McConaughy, D., Matthews, C., and Fialko, A. 2001. Founding family controlled 
firms: Performance, risk and value. Journal of Small Business Management, 39: 
31-49.
McConnell, J. and Servaes, H. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and 
corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27: 595-612.
McGuire, J. B., Sundgren, A., and Schneeweis, T. 1988. Corporate social responsibility 
and firm financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 31(4): 854-
872.
McMillan, I. C., Kulow, D. M., and Khoylian, R. 1988. Venture capitalists’ 
involvement in their investments: Extent and performance. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 4: 27-47.
McMullen, D. A. 1996. Audit committee performance: an investigation of the 
consequences associated with audit committees. Auditing, 15(1): 87-103.
McNulty, T. and Pettigrew, A. 1999. Strategists on the board. Organization Science 20: 
47-74.
Meeks, G. K., Roberts, C. B., and Gray, S. J. 1995. Factors influencing voluntary 
annual report disclosures by US, UK, and continental European multinational 
corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 26: 555-573. .
Megginson, W. L. and Weiss, K. A. 1991. Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial 
Public Offerings. Journal of Finance, 96: 879-903.
Melis, A. 2004. Financial reporting, corporate communication, and governance. 
Corporate Ownership and Control, 1(2): 31-31.
Menon, K. and Williams, J. D. 1994. The Use of Audit Committees for Monitoring. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 13: 121–139.
Metcalf, D. 2005. Trade unions: resurgence or perdition? In S. Fernie & D. Metcalf 
(Eds.), Trade unions: resurgence or demise. London.: Routledge.
Meyrick-Jones, J. 1999. Effective strategies to ensure you overcome the barrier of 
corporate culture when adopting a proactive risk management approach. Paper 
presented at the Proactively Managing Business Risk and Ensuring Effective 
Internal Control in the Light of the Combined Code and the New Turnbull 
Committee Report, London.
Michaely, R. and Womack, K. L. 1999. Conflicts of Interest and the Credibility of 
Underwriter Analyst Recommendations. Review of Accounting Studies, 12(4): 
653-686.
Mickiewicz, T. and Filatotchev, I. 2005. Private Benefits of Control and Debt 
Financing. Mimeo, King’s College London.
Mikkelson, W. H. and Rubak, R. S. 1985. An empirical analysis of the interfirm equity 
investment process. Journal of Financial Economics, 14: 523-553.
Miles, D. undated. Testing for short-termism in the UK stock market. Bank of England, 
Working papers, 4.
Milgrom, P. 1981. Good news and bad news. Econometrica, 12(2): 380-391.
Milgrom, P. R. and Roberts, J. 1990. Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in 
Games with Strategic Complementarities. Econometrica, 59(1255-1277).
217
Milgrom, P. R. and Roberts, J. 1994. Complementarities and systems: Understanding 
Japanese economic organization. Estudios Economicos, 9(1): 3-42.
Milgrom, P. R. and Roberts, J. 1995. Complementarities, industrial strategy, structure, 
and change in manufacturing. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19: 179-
208.
Mizruchi, M. 1983. Who controls whom? An examination of the relationship between 
management and boards of directors in large American corporations. Academy 
of Management Review, 8: 426-435.
Mizruchi, M. S. and Stearns, L. B. 1994. A longitudinal study of borrowing by large 
American corporations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(1): 11-19.
Mizruchi, M. 1996. What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of 
research on interlocking directorates. Annual Review of Sociology, 22: 271-
298.
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. 1958. The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the 
theory of investment. American Economic Review, 48(4): 261-297.
Modigliani, F. and Perotti, E. 1997. Protection of minority interest and the development 
of security markets. Managerial and Decision Economics, 18: 519-528.
Molz, R. 1988. Managerial domination of boards of directors and financial 
performance. Journal of Business Research, 16: 235-249.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1988. Management ownership and market 
valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-316.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. 1988. Characteristics of Targets of Hostile 
and Friendly Takeovers. In A. J. Auerbach (Ed.), Corporate Takeovers: Causes 
and Consequences: 101-129. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Morck, R., Strangeland, D., and Yeung, B. 1998. Inherited wealth, corporate control 
and economic growth: The Canadian disease?: National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 6814, Cambridge (MA).
Morris, R. 1995. Cracking the Cadbury code. Management Today, April 1995: 48-51.
Mulherin, J. H. and Boone, A. L. 2000. Comparing acquisitions and divestitures. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 6: 117-139.
Murphy, K. 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical 
study. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3): 11-42.
Murphy, K. 1999. Executive compensation. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), 
Handbook of Labour Economics Vol 3A. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Murphy, K. J. 2003. Stock-based pay in new economy firms. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 34(1-3): 129-147.
Myers, S. C. Capital structure. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2): 81-102.
Myers, C. A. 1983. Top management featherbedding? . Sloan Management Review, 
24(4): 55-58. .
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions 
when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial 
Economics 20: 187-221.
Myners, P. 2001. Institutional investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (Myners 
Review).
Myners Report.  2004. Review of the impediments to voting UK shares”. Report to the 
Shareholder Voting Working Group.
National Statistics. 2005. Private Pension Scheme Membership. London: Office of 
National Statistics.
Nobes, C. W. and Parker, R. 2002. Comparative International Accounting. London: 
Pearson Education.
218
North, D. 2001. The Role of Managerial Incentives in Corporate Acquisitions: the 
1990s Evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7: 125-149.
Nowak, M. J. and McCabe, M. 2003. Information costs and the role of the independent 
corporate director. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(4): 300-
307.
Nunnenkampf, P. 1996. The German model of corporate governance, basic features, 
critical issues and applicability to transition economies: Working Paper 713.  
Kiel Institute of World Economics.
Nuttall, R. 1999a. Takeover Likelihood Models for UK Quoted Companies. Nuffield 
College, University of Oxford, Working Paper(No. 6).
Nuttall, R. 1999b. An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of the Threat of Takeover on 
UK Company Performance. Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Working 
Paper (5).
O’Connor, S. M. 2002. The inevitability of Enron and the impossibility of “auditor 
independence” under the current audit system. University of Pittsburgh School 
of Law, Unpublished paper.
O’Connor, S. M. 2004. Be Careful What You wish For: How Accountants and 
Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence. British Columbia Law 
Review.
O’Sullivan, M. 2000. Contests for Corporate Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Sullivan, N. 2000a. Managers as Monitors: An Analysis of the Non-Executive Role 
of Senior Executives in UK Companies. British Journal of Management, 10: 17-
29.
O'Sullivan, N. 2000b. The impact of board composition and ownership on audit 
quality: evidence from large UK companies. The British Accounting Review, 
32(4): 397-414.
Ocasio, W. 1994. Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in 
U.S. industrial corporations 1960-1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39: 
285-312.
Ongena, S. and Smith, D. C. 1998. The duration of bank relationships: mimeo, 
University of Florida.
Ongena, S. and Smith, D. 2000. Bank relationships: a review. In P. Harker & S. A. 
Zenios (Eds.), The performance of financial institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Orlitzky, M. 2000. Corporate social performance: developing effective strategies: 
mimeo, Australian Graduate School of Management, Sydney.
Oswald, S. and Jahera, J. 1991. The influence of ownership on performance: An 
empirical study. Strategic Management Journal, 12: 321-326.
Pagano, M. and Röell, A. 1998. The choice of stock ownership structure: Agency costs, 
monitoring, and the decision to go public. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113: 
187-225.
Page, J.P.  2005.  Corporate Governance and Value Creation.  Charlottesville, VA: 
Research Foundation of the CFA Institute.
Palepu, K. and Healy, P. M. 2003. The Fall of Enron. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 17(2): 3-26.
Parkinson, J. 1993. Corporate Power and Responsibility.  Issues in the Theory of 
Company Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parkinson, J. 1995. The role of exit and voice in Corporate Governance. In S. Sheikh & 
W. Rees (Eds.), Corporate governance and corporate control. London.: 
Cavendish.
219
Parkinson, J. and Kelly, G. 2001. The Conceptual Foundations of the Firm. In J. 
Parkinson & A. Gamble & G. Kelly (Eds.), The Political Economy of the 
Company: 113-140. Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing.
Parkinson, J. 2003. Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 41(September): 481-509.
Pass, C. L., Robinson, A., and Ward, D. 2000. Performance criteria of corporate option 
and long term incentive plans: a survey of 150 companies 1994-1998. 
Management Decision, 38(2): 130-137.
Pass, C. L. 2003. Long-term incentive schemes, executive remuneration and corporate 
performance: An empirical study. Corporate Governance, 3(4): 18-27.
Pearce, J. and Zahra, S. 1991. The Relative Power of CEOs and Boards of Directors: 
Associations with Corporate Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 12: 
135-153.
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P., and Young, S. 2000. Accrual Management to Meet Earnings 
Targets:  UK Evidence Pre- and Post Cadbury. British Accounting Review, 
32(December). 415–445.
Peccei, R., Bewley, H., Gospel, H., and Willman, P. 2005a. ‘Is it Good to Talk?  
Information Disclosure and Organizational Performance in the UK. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 43(1): 11-37.
Peccei, R., Bewley, H., Gospel, H., and Willman, P. 2005b. Look who’s talking: 
sources of variation in information disclosure in the UK: mimeo, King’s 
College London.
Pensions Act. 2004.
Pendleton, A. 1997. Employees as shareholders. In A. Gamble et al. (Ed.), Stakeholder 
Capitalism. London: Macmillan.
Pendleton, A. 2001. Employee Ownership, Participation and Governance. London.: 
Routledge.
Perotti, E. and Van Thadden, E. 2004. The political economy of bank and market 
dominance: mimeo, Tinbergen.
Petersen, M. A. and Rajan, R. G. 1994. The benefits of lending relationships: evidence 
from small business data. Journal of Finance, 49: 3-37.
Petersen, M. A. and Rajan, R. G. 1995. The effects of credit market competition on 
lending relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110: 406-443.
Pettigrew, A. M. 1992. On Studying Managerial Elites. Strategic Management Journal, 
13: 163-182.
Pettigrew, A. and McNulty , T. 1995. Power and Influence in and Around the 
Boardroom. Human Relations, 48: 845- 873.
Pettigrew, A. M. and McNulty , T. 1998. Sources and uses of power in the boardroom. 
European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 7(2): 197-214.
Pettigrew, A. M. and McNulty , T. 1998. Control and creativity in the boardroom. In D. 
C. Hambrick & Nadler, D. A & M. L. Tushman (Eds.), Navigating Change: 
How CEOs, Top Teams and Boards Steer Transformation: 226-255. Boston, 
MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Pfeffer, J. 1972. Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The 
Organization and Its Environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17: 218-
222.
Pfeffer, J. 1972. Mergers as a Response to Organizational Interdependence. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(3): 382-394.
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.
220
Pieterse, J. N. 1994. Globalization as Hybridization. International Sociology, 9(2): 161-
184.
Pistor, K. 1999. Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance 
Externalities. In M. M. Blair & M. J. Roe (Eds.), Employees and Corporate 
Governance: 163-193. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Plender, J. 1997. A stake in the future: the stakeholder solution. London: Nicholas 
Brealey.
Podolny, J. M. 2001. Networks As the Pipes and Prisms of the Market. American 
Journal of Sociology, 107(1): 33-60.
Pound, J. 1988. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of 
Financial Economics 20: 237-265.
Powell, R. 1997. Modelling take-over likelihood. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 24: 1009-1030.
Powell, R. and Stark, A. W. 2004. Does Operating Performance Increase Post-takeover 
for UK Takeovers? A Comparison of Performance Measures and Benchmarks. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming.
Power, M. 1997. The Audit Society.  Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Prentice, R. A. 2000. The case of the irrational auditor: A behavioral insight into 
securities fraud litigation. Nw. U. L. Rev, 95: 1333.
Preston, A. M., Cooper, D. J., and Scarborough, P. 1995. Transformations in the Code 
of Ethics of the US Accounting Profession 1917 and 1988: Changing Narratives 
of Legitimation. Accounting, Organizations and Society 20(6): 507-546.
Provan, K. 1980. Board Power and Organizational Efficiency Among Human Service 
Agencies. Academy of Management Journal, 23: 221-236.
Public Concern at Work. 2003. Workplace whistleblowing doubles [online] 
www.whistleblowing.org.uk/news/press_28.html, [accessed 02/12/05].
Pye, A. 2001. A Study in Studying Corporate Boards Over Time: Looking Backwards 
to Move Forwards. British Journal of Management, 12: 33-45.
Pye, A. 2002. Corporate directing: Governing, strategising and leading in action. 
Corporate Governance, 10: 153-162.
Pye, A. and Pettigrew, A. 2005. Studying board context, process and dynamics: Some 
challenges for the future. British Journal of Management, 16: S27-S38.
Rajanj, R. and Zingales, L. 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American 
Economic Review, 88(3): 559-586.
Rau, R. and Vermaelen, T. 1998. Glamour, Value, and the Post-Acquisition 
Performance of Acquiring Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 49: 223-254.
Rediker, K. J. and Seth , A. 1995. Boards of Directors and Substitution Effects of 
Alternative Governance Mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal, 16: 85-
99.
Reinstein, A. and Weirich, T., R. . 1996. Testing for bias in the audit committee. 
Managerial Auditing Journal, 11(2): 28-35.
Renneboog, L., Simons, T., and Wright, M. 2005. Leveraged Public to Private 
Transactions in the UK. ECGI - Finance Working Paper, No. 78.
Reynolds, K. and Francis, J. 2001. Does size matter? The influence of large clients on 
office-level auditor reporting decisions. . Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
30: 375-400.
Rhoades, D. L., Rechner, P. L., and Sundaramurthy, C. 2000. Board composition and 
financial performance: A meta-analysis of the influence of outside directors. 
Journal of Managerial Issues, 12: 76-91.
221
Richardson, A. J. and Welker, M. 2001. Social disclosure, financial disclosure, and the 
cost of equity capital. Accounting, Organisations, and Society, 26: 597-616.
Roberts, J. and Styles, P. 1999. The Relationship Between Chairmen and Chief 
Executives: Competitive of Complementary Roles? Long Range Planning, 32: 
36-48.
Roberts, J., McNulty, T., and Styles, P. 2005. Beyond agency conceptions of the work 
of the non-executive directors: creating accountability in the boardroom. British 
Journal of Management, 16: 5-26.
Robinson, A. and Zhang, H. 2005. Employee share ownership: safeguarding 
investments in human capital. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 43(3): 
469-488.
Roe, M. J. 1990. Political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public 
companies. Journal of Financial Economics, 27: 7-42.
Roe, M. J. 1999. Codetermination and German Securities Markets. In M. M. Blair & 
M. J. Roe (Eds.), Employees and Corporate Governance: 194-205. Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution.
Roll, R. 1986. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Journal of Business, 59: 
197-216.
Romano, R. 2004. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance. Yale ICF Working Paper, No. 04-37.
Rosen, S. 1990. Contracts and the markets for executives. In e. b. L. W. a. H. 
Wijkander (Ed.). Oxford: NBER Working Paper, No. W3542.
Rosenstein, J. 1988. The board and strategy: Venture capital and high technology. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 3: 159-170.
Rosenstein, S. and Wyatt, J. 1990. Outside directors, board independence, and 
shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 26: 175-184.
Rosenstein, J., Bruno, A., Bygrave, W. D., and Taylor, N. T. 1993. The CEO, venture 
capitalists, and the board. Journal of British Venturing, 8: 99-113.
Roulstone, D. 2002. Analyst following and market liquidity: mimeo, University of 
Chicago.
Royal Society of Arts. 1995. Tomorrow’s Company. London.: RSA.
RSM International. 2003. Building World-Class Boards - A Director's Guide. London: 
RSM International.
RSM Robson Rhodes. 2003. Board Effectiveness Survey. London: RSM International.
Ruland, W., Tung, S., and George, N. 1990. Factors associated with the disclosure of 
managers’ forecasts. The Accounting Review, 65(3): 710-721.
Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations.  1997.
Samra-Fredricks, D. 2000. Doing ‘Boards-in Action’ Research – An Ethnographic 
Approach for the Capture and Analysis of Directors’ and Senior Managers’ 
Interactive Routines. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 8: 244-
257.
Sanders, G. W. and Carpenter , M. A. 2003. Strategic Satisficing? A Behavioral –
Agency Theory Perspective on Stock Repurchase Program Announcements. 
Academy of Management Journal, 46: 160-178.
Sanders, G. W. and Boivie, S. 2004. Sorting Things Out: Valuation of New Firms in 
Uncertain Markets. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 167-186.
Sandler Review.  2003.  Medium and long-term retail savings in the UK: a review.
Sarbanes-Oxley. 2002.
Schleicher, T. and Walker, M. 1999. Share price anticipation of earnings and 
management’s discussion of operations and financing. Accounting and Business 
222
Research, 29(4): 321-335.
Schmid, F. A. and Seger, F. 1998. Arbeitnehmerbestimmung, Allokation von 
Entscheidungsrechten, und Shareholder Value. Zeitschrift fur 
Betriebswirtschaft, 69(5): 453-473.
Schnitzer, M. 1995. "Breach of Trust" in Takeovers and the Optimal Corporate Charter. 
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 43(3): 29-259.
Schrand, C. and Verecchia, R. E. 2002. Disclosure choice and the cost of capital: 
evidence from underpricing of initial public offerings: mimeo, Wharton School.
Schulze, W., Lubatkin, M., and Dino, R. 2003. Exploring the agency consequences of 
ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms. Academy of 
Management Journal, 46: 217-229.
Scott, W. R. and Meyer, J. W. (Eds.). 1994. Institutional Environments and 
Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage.
Sengupta, P. 1998. Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. The Accounting 
Review, 73(4): 459-474.
Servaes, H. 1991. Tobin’s Q and the gains from takeovers. Journal of Finance, 46: 409–
419.
Sesil, J., Kroumova, M., Blasi, J., and Kruse, D. 2002. Broad-based employee stock 
options in US new economy firms. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
40(2): 273-294.
Shen, W. 2005. Improve board effectiveness: the need for incentives. . British Journal 
of Management, 16(1): S81-S89.
Shivdasani, A. 1993. Board Composition, Ownership Structure, and Hostile Takeovers. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16: 167-198.
Shivdasani, A. and Yermack, D. 1999. CEO Involvement in the Selection of New 
Board Members: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance, 54: 1829-1853.
Shleifer, A. and Summers, L. H. 1988. Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers. In A. J. 
Auerbach (Ed.), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences: 33-68. 
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. 1988. Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(1): 7-20.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 1989. Management entrenchment: The case of manager-
specific investment. Journal of Financial Economics, 25(1): 123-140.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. 1996. A survey of corporate governance, NBER 
working paper series; Working Paper No. 5554. Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of 
Finance, 52(5): 737-783.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. 2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of 
Financial Economics.
Short, H. 1994. Ownership, control, financial structure and the performance of firms. 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 8: 203-249.
Sias, R. W. 1996. Volatility and the institutional investor. Financial Analysts Journal, 
52(2): 13-20.
Singh, A. 1975. Takeovers, Economic Natural Selection and the Theory of the Firm: 
Evidence from the Post-War UK Experience. Economic Journal, 85: 497-515.
Singh, M. and Davidson III, W. 2002. Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate 
governance mechanisms. Journal of Banking & Finance.
Sinha, R. 2004. The role of hostile takeovers in corporate governance. Applied 
223
Financial Economics, 14(18): pg. 1291.
Skinner, D. 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 32: 38-60.
Slinger, G. 1999. Spanning the gap – the theoretical principles that connect stakeholder 
policies to business performance. Corporate Governance, 7(2): 136-150.
Slovin, M. B., Sushka, M. E., and Hudson, C. D. 1988. Corporate commercial paper, 
note issuance facilities, and shareholder wealth. Journal of International Money 
and Finance, 7: 289-302.
Slovin, M. B. and Young, J. E. 1990. Bank lending and initial public offerings. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 14: 729-740.
Smith, R. and Szymanski, S. 1995. Executive pay and performance: The empirical 
importance of the participation constraint. International Journal of the 
Economics of Business, 2(3): 485.
Smith, B. and Amoako-Adu, B. 1999. Management succession and financial 
performance of family controlled firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5: 341-
368.
Smith, R. 2003. Audit Committees Combined Code Guidance (Smith Report). London: 
Financial Reporting Council.
Solomon, J. F., Solomon, A., Norton, S. D., and Joseph, N. L. 2000. A conceptual 
framework for corporate risk disclosure emerging from the agenda for corporate 
governance reform. The British Accounting Review, 32(4): 447-478.
Song, M. H. and Walkling, R. A. 1993. The Impact of Managerial Ownership on 
Acquisition Attempts and the Market for Corporate Control. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28: 439-457.
Spira, L., F. . 1999a. Ceremonies of Governance: Perspectives on the Role of the Audit 
Committee. Journal of Management and Governance, 3(3): 231-260.
Spira, L. 1999b. Independence in Corporate Governance: the Audit Committee Role. 
Business Ethics: A European Review, 8(4): 262-273.
Stark, D. 2001. Ambiguous Assets for Uncertain Environments: Heterarchy in 
Postsocialist Firms. In P. DiMaggio (Ed.), The Twenty-First-Century Firm.  
Changing Economic Organization in International Perspective: 69-104. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Stearns, L. and Allan, K. 1996. Economic Behavior in an Institutional Setting: The 
Merger Wave of the 1980s. American Sociological Review, 61(4): 699-714.
Steiner, P. 1975. Mergers:  Motives, Effects, Policies. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press.
Sternberg, E. 1996. A Vindication of Whistleblowing in Business.  In: Four Windows 
on Whistleblowing: 24-39. London: Public Concern at Work.
Sternberg, E. 1997. The defects of stakeholder theory. Corporate Governance, 5(1): 3-
10.
Stigler, G. 1961. The economics of information. Journal of Political Economy, 69: 213-
225.
Stigler, G. J. 1982. The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly. American 
Economic Review: 1-11.
Stiglitz, J. E. 1985. Credit markets and the control of capital. Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 17: 133-152.
Stiles, P. and Taylor, B. 2001. Boards at Work. How Directors View their Roles and 
Responsibilities. Oxford.: Oxford University Press.
224
Stout, L. A. 2005. Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law. UCLA 
School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-7. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=660622
Stout, L. A. 2006. Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex 
Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem. Stanford Law Review, Forthcoming 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=338601
Streeck, W. 1992. Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of Industrial 
Relations in Advanced Capitalist economies. London ; Newbury Park, Calif.: 
SAGE Publications.
Streeck, W. 1996. Lean Production in the German Automobile Industry: A Test Case 
for Convergence Theory. In S. Berger & R. Dore (Eds.), National Diversity and 
Global Capitalism: 138-170. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Sudarsanam, S., Holl, P., and Salami, A. 1996. Shareholder Wealth Gains in Mergers: 
Effect of Synergy and Ownership Structure. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 23(5): 673-698.
Sundaramurthy, C. 1996. Corporate governance within the context of antitakeover 
provisions. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 377-394.
Sundaramurthy, C. and Lewis, M. 2003. Control and collaboration: paradoxes of 
governance. Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 397-415.
Sunders, A. 2005. Who's top of the pay pile. Management Today, Sept 2005: 42-47.
Taniura, T. 1993. The Lucky Goldstar group in the Republic of Korea. Developing 
Economies, 31: 465-484.
The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations. 2002, SI 2002/1986: 1-27. London: 
HMSO.
The Institute of Charted Accounts in England & Wales. 2004. Auditing Implications of 
IFRS Transition. London: ICAEW.
The Institute of Charted Accounts in England & Wales. 2003. Guidance for Audit 
Committees: Whistleblowing Arrangements. London: ICAEW.
The Institute of Chartered Accountants for England and Wales. 1997. Financial 
reporting of risk.  Proposals for a statement of business risk. UK: ICAEW.
The Public Interest Disclosure Act. 1998.
Thomas, L. G. and Waring, G. 1999. Competing capitalisms: capital investments in 
American, German and Japanese firms. Strategic Management Journal 20: 729-
748.
Thompson, S. 1997. Takeover Activity Among Financial Mutuals: An Analysis of 
Target Characteristics. Journal of Banking & Finance, 21: 37-53.
Thomsen, S. and Pedersen, T. 2000. Ownership structure and economic performance in 
the largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 689-705.
Thornton, P. H. 1999. The Sociology of Entrepreneurship. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 25: 19-46.
Thornton, P. H. 2001. Personal Versus Market Logics of Control: A Historically 
Contingent Theory of the Risk of Acquisition. Organizational Science, 12(3): 
294-311.
Tihanyi, L., Johnson, R., Hoskisson, R., and Hitt, M. 2003. Institutional ownership 
differences and international diversification: the effects of boards of directors 
and technological opportunity. 46: 195-211.
Tirole, J. 2001. Corporate governance. Econometrica, 69(1): 1-35.
Tosi, H., Katz, J., and Gomez-Mejia, L. 1997. Disaggregating the Agency Contract: 
The Effects of Monitoring, Incentive Alignment, and Term in Office on Agent 
Decision Making. Academy of Management Journal, 40: 584-602.
225
Tosi, H. L., Werner, S., Katz, J. P., and Gomez-Mejia, L. R. 2000. How much does 
performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies. Journal of 
Management, 26(2): 301-339.
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (The).  1992.
Transnational Information and Consultation of Employee Regulations.  1999.
Travlos, N. 1987. Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms' 
Stock Returns. Journal of Finance, 42: 943-963.
Tricker, B. 1997. What information do directors really need? Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 5(3): 109-111.
Turley, S. and Zaman, M. 2004. The Corporate Governance Effects of Audit 
Committees. Journal of Management and Governance, 8(3): 305-332.
Turnbull, N. 1999. Internal control: Guidance for directors on the combined code (The 
Turnbull Guidance). London: The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales.
Turnbull, N. 2005. Internal control: Revised guidance for directors on the combined 
code (Turnbull Guidance). London: The Financial Reporting Council.
Turnbull, S. 2005. How US and UK Auditing Practices Became Muddled to Muddle 
Corporate Governance Principles.
Ullmann, A. 1985. Data in search of a theory: a critical examination of the relationship 
among social performance, social disclosure, and economic performance of US 
firms. Academy of Management Review, 10(3): 540-557.
Useem, M. 1984. The Inner Circle. Large Corporations and the Rise of Business 
Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K. New York.: Oxford University Press.
Useem, M. 1993. Executive Defence. Shareholder Power and Corporate 
Reorganization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Van Damme, E. 194. Banking: a survey of recent microeconomic theory. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 10: 14-33.
Verecchia, R. E. 2001. Essays on disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
32(1-3): 97-180.
Verrecchia, R. 1983. Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
12: 179-194.
Vinten, G. 2001. Shareholder versus stakeholder – is there a governance dilemma? 
Corporate Governance, 91: 36-47.
Vitols, S. 2004. Negotiated Shareholder Value: The German Version of an Anglo-
American Practice". Competition and Change, 8(4): 1-18.
Vitols, S. 2005. Prospects for trade unions in the evolving European system of 
corporate governance. Brussels: ETUI-REHS.
Waddock, S. and Graves, S. 1997. The corporate social performance – financial 
performance link. Strategic Management Journal, 18(4): 303-319.
Wagner, W., Pfeffer, J., and O’Reilly, C. 1984. Organizational demography and 
turnover in top management groups. Administrative Science Quarterly, 29: 74-
92.
Wagner, J., Stimpert, J., and Fubara, E. I. 1998. Board Composition and Organizational 
Performance: Two Studies of Insider/Outsider Effects. Journal of Management 
Studies, 35: 655-677.
Wahal, S. 1996. Pension fund activism and firm performance. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 31: 1-23.
Walker, M. and Tsalta, A. 2001. Corporate financial disclosure and analyst forecasting 
activity. London: ACCA.
Wallace, N. D., Worrell, D. L., and Cheng, L. 1990. Key executive succession and 
226
stockholder wealth: The influence of successor’s origin. Journal of 
Management, 16: 647-664.
Walsh, J. P. and Seward, J. K. 1990. On the efficiency of internal and external 
corporate control mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 15: 421-458.
Weir, C. 1997. Corporate governance, performance and take-overs: An empirical 
analysis of UK mergers. Applied Economics, 29(11): pg. 1465.
Weir, C. and Laing, D. 2003. Ownership structure, board composition and non-hostile 
take-overs in the UK: an empirical analysis. Aberdeen Business School, mimeo.
Weir, C., Laing, D., and Wright, M. 2003. Public to Private Takeovers and the Market 
for Corporate Control. Mimeo.
Weisbach, M. S. 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial 
Economics 20: 431-460.
Westphal, J. D. and Zajac , E. J. 1995. Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, 
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 40: 60-83.
Westphal, J. D. 1998. Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board 
Independence From Management. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43: 511-
537.
Westphal, J. D. 1999. Collaboration in the Boardroom: Behavioral and Performance 
Consequences of CEO-Board Social Ties. Academy of Management Journal, 
42: 7-24.
Westphal, J. D. and Fredrickson , J. W. 2001. Who Directs Strategic Change? Director 
Experience, the Selection of New CEOs, and Change in Corporate Strategy. 
Strategic Management Journal, 22: 1113-1137.
Williamson, O. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Wim, V. and Commers, M. S. R. 2004. Whistle Blowing and Rational Loyalty. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 53(1-2): 225.
Windram, B. and Song, J. 2000. The Effectiveness of Audit Committees: Evidence 
from UK Companies in the Post-Cadbury Period. Paper presented at the British 
Accounting Association Annual Conference, University of Exeter.
Woidtke, T. 2002. Agents watching agents?: evidence from pension fund ownership 
and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 63: 99-131.
Wood, D. J. and Jones, R. E. 1995. Stakeholder mismatching: a theoretical problem in 
empirical research on corporate social performance. International Journal of 
Organization Analysis, 3: 229-267.
Working Time Regulations.  1998.
Wright, M., Buck, T., and Filatotchev, I. 2003. Is stakeholder corporate governance 
appropriate in Russia? Journal of Management and Governance, 7: 263-290. .
Wruck, K. H. 1989. Equity ownership concentration and firm value. Evidence from 
private equity financing. Journal of Financial Economics, 23: 3-28.
Xie, B., Davidson, W., N. , and DaDalt, P., J. . 2003. Earnings management and 
corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 9(3): 295-316.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Smaller Board of 
Directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40: 185-211.
Yosha, O. 1995. Information disclosure costs and the choice of financial source. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 4: 3-20.
Young, G. J., Stedham, Y., and Beekun, R. I. 2000. Boards of directors and the 
adoption of a CEO performance evaluation process: Agency and institutional 
theory perspectives. Journal of Management Studies, 37: 277-295.
227
Zahra, S. A. and Pearce, J. A. 1989. Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, 15: 
291-334.
Zahra, S. A. 1996. Governance, ownership, and corporate entrepreneurship: The 
moderating impact of industry technological opportunities. Academy of 
Management Journal, 39: 1713-1735.
Zajac, E. and Westphal, J. 1994. The costs and benefits of incentives and monitoring in 
the largest US corporations: when is more not better? Strategic Management 
Journal, 15(Winter Special Issue): 121-142.
Zajac, E. J. and Westphal, J. D. 1996. Director Reputation, CEO-Board Power, and the 
Dynamics of Board Interlocks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41: 507-529.
Zeckhauser, R. J. and Pound, J. 1990. Are large shareholders effective monitors? An 
investigation of share ownership and corporate performance. In R. G. Hubbard 
(Ed.), Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance and Investment: 149-180. 
Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.
Zhang, I. 2005. Economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Working 
Paper, University of Rochester.
228
First published January 2007. Department of Trade and Industry. www.dti.gov.uk
 Crown Copyright. .1k/01/07/NP. URN 07/581
